When Oswald’s one-year Soviet residence permit expired on 4 January 1961, the OVIR office in Minsk called him in to ask if he still wished to apply for Soviet citizenship. He said he had changed his mind about becoming a Soviet citizen, but he would like to have his residence permit extended for another twelve months.
Having received no response from the American Embassy in Moscow to the letter he had written in December (the KGB had intercepted it, as noted above), Oswald wrote to them again on 5 February, castigating them for not responding to his first letter and asking for his passport to be returned to him. He also asked if any legal proceedings against him would be dropped. (He must have assumed he might be charged with espionage.)
The embassy responded to the effect that he would have to visit them in Moscow to be interviewed about the possibility of returning his passport. Exchanges of correspondence continued through April. Oswald wanted to know why they could not just send him a questionnaire, protesting that it would be difficult for him to get to Moscow. The embassy insisted he attend in person, and they could not confirm or promise anything relating to possible criminal charges.
In February the Red Cross stopped paying him the handsome supplement he had received throughout his stay in Minsk.
Back in June 1960 Oswald had fallen in love with an attractive co-worker called Ella German. They danced together; he visited her at her parents’ home – including over Christmas 1960 – and she was a frequent guest in his apartment. However, Ella always parried his sexual advances and eventually rejected his proposal of marriage.
In early March 1961, very much on the rebound from Ella, he began to date Marina Prusakova, a pharmacist he met at a dance. It was a whirlwind romance: they became engaged on 15 April and married on 30 April. Oswald wrote in his diary that this expedited union was at first a spiteful act of revenge against Ella, but that he soon grew to love Marina deeply.
When they had first met, Marina thought Oswald was from one of the Baltic States, but she did not mind that he was American, and nor did her family. He told her it was his intention to stay in the Soviet Union, so there was no question of her marrying him just to acquire US residency and eventual citizenship. He reported his marriage to the embassy in Moscow, saying that Marina would return with him to America, and again asked them to confirm that he would not be prosecuted.
The beginning of the flurry of correspondence with the embassy in December 1960 coincided with determined action by Oswald’s mother, Marguerite, to find him. Marguerite at first corresponded with the State Department and when this appeared not to stir them into action she went to Washington to confront them in person. At this point, the CIA and FBI started to take a renewed interest in Oswald. Where, exactly, was he in the Soviet Union? What was he doing there? Why had he not kept in touch with his mother and brother? Had he been secretly corresponding with someone else in America? Could the CIA somehow make use of his presence there? Had someone in the deepest depths of the CIA sent him there on a top-secret mission?
As the correspondence progressed into 1961 and his whereabouts and circumstances became known, the questions changed. Was he being trained by the KGB? Would he return to the United States to spy for the Soviet Union? The files thickened but provided no definite answers.
Suddenly, on Saturday 8 July, Oswald turned up at the United States Embassy in Moscow. The consular section was closed so he made an appointment to meet Consul Richard Snyder on the following Monday. (It is remarkable how often Oswald turned up at embassies and consulates – in Moscow and in Mexico City – on a Saturday, when they were closed.)
Unlike his quarrelsome interview with Snyder on 31 October 1959, Oswald was now submissive and anxious to comply with all necessary requirements to secure the return of his passport and obtain a United States visa for his wife, Marina.
It took ten months for the ham-fisted American and Soviet bureaucracies to finalise the processes required to issue all of the requisite passports and visas for Lee, Marina and their baby daughter June Lee, who was born on 15 February. They left Moscow by train on 2 June 1962 bound for Amsterdam, and thence by sea to New York.
‡
After Penkovsky’s failure to get Merriman, the British metallurgist, to take his package of secret documents to the American Embassy, he approached the Canadians. As part of his job, he had to meet Dr J. M. Harrison, the director of the Canadian Geological Survey, at the airport and liaise with him throughout his visit. At one stage, on 9 January 1961, he asked Harrison to arrange for him to meet William Van Vliet, the commercial counsellor at the Canadian Embassy. When they met, Penkovsky gave Van Vliet a package of secret papers and asked him to deliver it to the American Embassy. They met again the next day, but to Penkovsky’s disappointment Van Vliet said he would not deliver the package and returned it to him.
Van Vliet reported this incident in detail to the Canadian Ambassador, who in turn informed his superiors in Ottawa.
‡
Unbeknown to Penkovsky, COMPASS was in Moscow, failing miserably to contact him either through the dead drop or the 10 a.m. Sunday phone call. This failure was in part occasioned by Ambassador Thompson’s stubborn refusal to help, but mostly reflected COMPASS’s ineptitude.
Eventually, on Sunday 5 February 1961, COMPASS attempted to make the phone call, which turned out to be a disaster. He phoned at 11 a.m. instead of 10 a.m., and spoke in English as well as Russian. Penkovsky could not understand what he was trying to say in either language and eventually hung up, not knowing who had called and assuming it was a wrong number.
Washington
In spite of the continuing mistrust of MI6 by the CIA, Dick Helms, the CIA’s Deputy Director of Plans, decided they would have to bring in the British to help them to make contact with Penkovsky.
Harold Shergold, one of MI6’s top agent handlers, paid a routine visit to CIA headquarters in January 1961. He brought up the subject of Penkovsky with Joe Bulik on 27 January. Up to this point MI6 had not been captivated by the prospects of approaching Penkovsky, whom they thought was probably an agent provocateur. However, when Bulik – reluctantly – informed him of Penkovsky’s first letter and the material in the package that Cox had handed in to the American Embassy, Shergold changed his mind.†
Shergold was converted. He returned to London and persuaded Dick White not only to work with the Americans on Penkovsky, but to make much of the running because of the major problems the CIA faced when trying to operate in Moscow.
Moscow
Penkovsky encountered difficulties with organising the Soviet trade mission visit to the United Kingdom and the original date of March 1961 could not be met. Instead, the date was set for arrival in London on 20 April.
Wynne went to Moscow early in April to discuss the causes of the delay and to agree as much of the programme as possible, including which Soviet delegates would visit which British companies. The two men worked well together and soon developed a friendship, at least to the extent that they could talk frankly to each other, which was not common between Soviets and Westerners in those days.
Wynne was concerned about the kind of people proposed as members of the Soviet delegation: they were all academics or technical experts rather than managers who would know how to discuss a commercial agreement. He reaffirmed to Penkovsky that the purpose of the mission was to look for import and export opportunities, not to spy on the latest British technology and manufacturing processes.
Penkovsky agreed, but asked Wynne to understand that he – Penkovsky – had no power to change the delegates. He had already put Wynne’s point to the relevant people in the ministries, but they were unmoved by his protestations. He begged Wynne to accept the list and allow the mission to proceed. He then suggested to him that they take a breath of fresh air and discuss the matter further.
Wynne sensed that Penkovsky was becoming agitated and judged, correctly, that the room could well be bugged. Penkovsky clearly wanted to say something without being overheard.
Penkovsky continued from where he had left off as soon as they were safely outside. He told Wynne it was essential for him to get to England and the mission would have to go ahead no matter what the composition of the team. A lot of things to which he objected were happening in the Soviet Union. He expressed his dislike for the way the Soviet Union was being governed; his concern for the country’s economy and – most importantly – about his fears for the ultimate outcome of the military policies being pursued by Khrushchev. Khrushchev was making grossly exaggerated claims about the strength of the military and its nuclear capability and this was bound to result in disaster unless the West knew the truth. He had to get to England to tell them the truth.
He pleaded for Wynne’s trust and help.
Following Shergold’s visit to the CIA, Wynne had been briefed to take Penkovsky seriously and to cooperate with him to the extent he thought reasonably safe. He should do nothing to compromise his own position as a legitimate businessman trying to attract Soviet business for the companies he represented. Above all, he should not allow himself to listen to, or look at, any secret intelligence from Penkovsky.
Wynne was an excellent judge of character. More than most, he was aware of the possibility of meeting an agent provocateur in his dealings with Eastern Bloc countries, but Penkovsky was different. The words he had just heard took him by surprise but he felt they were sincere. Now he had to be careful not to let Penkovsky know of his involvement with the security services.
He agreed to accept Penkovsky’s list of delegates. He insisted, however, that he was an import–export businessman earning an honest crust by representing a few British companies and could not, therefore, become involved in Penkovsky’s cloak-and-dagger schemes.
During the evening of 6 April, in Wynne’s hotel room, Penkovsky moved to the bathroom, signalling that Wynne should follow him. With the water taps turned on to prevent any hidden microphone from picking up what they said, Penkovsky handed Wynne a heavily taped thick package and asked him to deliver it to the English Embassy.‡ Wynne did so that same evening.
Several days later, on 10 April, Penkovsky was relieved to hear that Wynne had delivered the package safely to the embassy, but he now asked him to take another thick envelope back with him to London and deliver it to the Foreign Office or the American Embassy. This time Wynne refused. It was one thing to deliver a package across Moscow to the British Embassy. To carry papers on his person, travelling through Soviet passport, customs and KGB checks would have constituted a far greater risk.
Penkovsky accompanied Wynne to the airport the next morning. Shortly before he was due to board the aircraft, he again tried to thrust the package on Wynne, who again refused to take it, saying he was bound to be questioned about the contents of such a thick package. Penkovsky, with some difficulty, then opened the package and extracted a single letter he had written on Christmas Day 1960. ‘Well, this is not too thick,’ he said. Wynne agreed to carry it.
It was a letter addressed to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, lamenting the lack of response to the package handed in by Cox, again offering his services, and suggesting means of arranging a clandestine meeting.
† Bulik was under instruction from Dick Helms to tell Shergold about Penkovsky’s two envelopes and to try to persuade the British to cooperate with them in contacting Penkovsky. He later said that the big lesson on the Penkovsky case was never to enter into a joint operation with another service.
‡ Penkovsky always referred to Britain or the United Kingdom as ‘England’ and used the adjective ‘English’. No one, it seems, ever tried to correct him. In fairness, virtually all Russians use the word ‘Angliski’ (English) when they really mean ‘Britanski’ (British).