France, September–October 1961

A Soviet Trade Fair in Paris in September 1961 created the next opportunity for Penkovsky to meet the same CIA/MI6 debriefing team. He arrived in Paris on 20 September and, at the first meeting, resumed his discourse about Khrushchev’s belligerency.

Penkovsky: This old man is striving to accomplish some fantastic coup during his lifetime. Khrushchev is stirring up all of the trouble that there is. He is the instigator of everything. He is the formulator and executor of all this dirty business and adventurism. If he died or was killed it would relieve and change the situation considerably to our (the West’s) advantage. It seems that he knows he has not many years to live and he wants to do something like a maniac, which stems from his senility.

By this time, Penkovsky was able to report on Soviet plans for future actions. One of the most important of these concerned Soviet military manoeuvres scheduled to coincide with the 22nd Party Congress, due to start in Moscow on 17 October.

President Kennedy first met Khrushchev three months earlier, at the Vienna Summit on 4 and 5 June 1961. The agenda was wide-ranging but the most important outcome was their disagreement over Berlin.

Militarily, West Berlin was extremely vulnerable to any Soviet or East German move to compromise its status. Western forces within West Berlin were limited and certainly no match for Soviet forces in East Germany and neighbouring satellite countries. The Allied access corridor – a 100-mile-long autobahn running across East Germany – could not be defended. The Soviets and East Germans could now make it much more difficult to sustain an airlift similar to that of the blockade of 1948–9.

Khrushchev’s threat at the Vienna Summit to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany if the West did not enter into negotiations to settle the Berlin problem would give East Germany responsibility for the corridor. This contravened the post-war agreement for Allied control of Berlin and it could result in Allied forces and other officials having to deal directly with the East German authorities. This would constitute a major problem because the West did not recognise East Germany as a sovereign state.

On his return to the United States from the Vienna Summit, Kennedy was horrified to discover that American military plans to defend West Berlin in the event of Soviet aggression were to send tanks across East Germany. Should they meet with unassailable opposition, the battle would escalate rapidly into nuclear warfare.

A few weeks later Kennedy announced plans for a massive increase in the strength of American conventional forces to ensure continued Allied access to Berlin. This move was used by the Soviet and East German authorities as an excuse for finally closing the border between East and West Berlin on 13 August with the erection of the Berlin Wall.

More than ever, Berlin was now a strategic chess piece in the delicate and complex battle of wills between Khrushchev and Kennedy.

Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union would sign the threatened peace treaty with East Germany at the end of the 22nd Party Congress in October. Penkovsky put it to the debriefing team like this:

Penkovsky: Since I left you in England I have had the opportunity of speaking with Varentsov, Zasorin, Buzinov and many others. This is what I must relate to you at once.

In the beginning of October this year there will begin extensive general strategic manoeuvres. There were never such manoeuvres in the history of the Soviet Army. This is because all headquarters of all military districts will participate and also all headquarters of groups of forces. Even all rear services in the military districts will participate in these manoeuvres. In other words, every Army formation will execute its assigned mission in these manoeuvres just as they would be called upon to do in case there was a war. In addition, all headquarters of all countries of People’s Democracies will also take part in the manoeuvres. These strategic manoeuvres will begin in early October and will take place throughout the entire USSR and throughout all of the countries of People’s Democracies, all based on combating a hypothetical enemy in the direction of Germany …

I will now try to explain to you in detail why these manoeuvres will take place and what their objective is … These manoeuvres will continue for a period of up to a month. The objective is to examine everything as a whole and to determine what units have specific capabilities. They will examine who can best fulfil offensive missions, shock action, defensive operations and to examine the state of training and combat readiness of all units, as well as their joint action. Through these manoeuvres deficiencies in training can be corrected and experience in joint operations gained.

But this is only one purpose: the second purpose is to have these huge forces in a state of combat readiness exactly at the time that the Peace Treaty with East Germany will be signed, so that if any difficulties occur immediately after the signing of this Treaty, which will be signed right after the Congress, they would be in a position to strike a heavy blow. In other words, what Khrushchev wants to do is to backdrop his signing of the Peace Treaty with East Germany with actual large-scale military preparations camouflaged as manoeuvres.

Khrushchev considers that if NATO swallows this second pill (he considers that the first pill – the closing of the borders of East and West Berlin last month, on 13 August – has already been swallowed) … and say ‘very well, since you have signed a Treaty with East Germany we will deal with East Germany’, then the strain will be relieved and the manoeuvres will terminate and the result of these will still serve as a valuable training exercise for joint operations. If not, the powder is still dry and military action can be employed. This is the dual purpose for which these manoeuvres are planned for the early days of October.

One cannot overestimate the value of this graphic statement of the Soviet Union’s plans for a build-up of military strength in East Germany. Khrushchev’s announced intention of signing a peace treaty with East Germany was an immediate threat to West Berlin. Now, with the intelligence provided by Penkovsky, the West could mobilise their forces to match the Soviet military build-up, and thus continue to threaten military action should either the Soviet or East German authorities try to block Allied access to West Berlin. There was the implied threat that nuclear devices could be used.

In the event, the Soviet Union did not sign a peace treaty with East Germany, the Allied corridor to West Berlin was not closed, and the threat of war was averted: a war that could have become nuclear, destroying much of Europe and killing millions of people.

This example of Penkovsky’s value to the West is often overshadowed by the emphasis placed on his contribution to the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Penkovsky could also have warned the West about the plans to close the East/West Berlin border, except that the procedure for him to contact his handlers in an emergency was confined to only one day a week.

He reported details of Varentsov’s sixtieth birthday party.

Penkovsky: Varentsov’s birthday party was celebrated not on 15 September but on Saturday 16th in order to permit more time. On the 15th at 0900 hours I met Varentsov at Leningrad Railway Station where he had just arrived from Leningrad. I had given him his electric battery razor as soon as I got back after the last time I saw you, but on the 15th at the railway station I brought him a package containing the cognac, about which I shall tell you in a moment, and it is not without interest for you, as well as the rocket-shaped lighter and the cigarette box with the inscriptions thereon. He kissed me as he greeted me at the station. He was also met there by Lieutenant General Voznesensky and Lieutenant General Nikolayev.

We all got together at 1600 hours on 16 September at Varentsov’s dacha. When I arrived with my family Ryabchikov, the Professor of Chemistry, was already there. Then Lieutenant General Semenov came, then General Fomin, then the Minister [of Defence] Malinovsky came with his wife. There were others.

The presents we brought were the best and most sensible of the lot. Malinovsky brought a magnum of Champagne and also a big cake shaped like the Horn of Plenty. Churayev brought a large wooden eagle on a stand. Varentsov said that ‘my boy’ (me) had really tried to do everything from his heart. I wanted to tell him that there were five boys doing this.

The only one in uniform was the Minister and when I was presented to him he asked if I didn’t have a relative in the Far East, to which I replied that I had a distant relative of sorts. Varentsov said to Malinovsky that I was one of Serov’s boys.

When we sat down Varentsov told me to do the honours so I opened our Cognac. It turned out to be out of this world (sixty years old). The Minister wanted to drink only that Cognac. I made it go round for everyone three times; however I gave full glasses only to the Minister, Varentsov, Churayev and myself. They began to feel tipsy after the first round because the Minister made a toast to Varentsov and everyone drank bottoms-up. The Cognac was so good and everyone was so delighted with it that they talked about it for half-an-hour out of the six hours that the party lasted.

After that there were toasts by Varentsov and Semenov and finally it came to me. I remembered that no one mentioned the fact that Varentsov had just been presented with the Order of Lenin, so I said that I proposed to drink a toast of congratulations to Sergei Sergeievich for his having been the recipient of the highest governmental award, the Order of Lenin. As they began to applaud I thought I would pull a fast one on the Minister, so I continued by saying that this award represents the high esteem for Sergei Sergeievich by the Party, the government and personally by the Minister of Defence. After that he beamed and I could talk to him as a Comrade. He continued to drink Cognac and vodka and frankly the other cognac was junk. Churayev, about whom I shall give you details later, drank a lot and was getting tipsy. After this the men went into the next room to smoke and I kept my eyes and ears open as you would expect an intelligence officer to do.
Kisevalter: Was Khrushchev criticised by anyone at the party? Penkovsky: No; they drank a toast to him. They are all people placed in their positions by Khrushchev.

Much of the information Penkovsky had reported about the military manoeuvres and nuclear warhead testing was from tongues loosened by the ‘sixty’-year-old Cognac at that party.

Janet Chisholm appeared for a while at the meeting held in Paris on 27 September, when they discussed the schedule for Penkovsky’s future meetings with her in Moscow:

The final meeting in Paris, on 14 October – the forty-second meeting of the series that had started in London on 20 April – ended emotionally. After recording all of the business that had been transacted during the course of the meeting, the report concludes:

At the London, Birmingham, Leeds and Paris debriefing meetings with Penkovsky, when the full extent of his ability to provide high-grade intelligence became increasingly apparent, there was a growing awareness of the need for increased security in passing the information. Towards the end of 1961 and into 1962, the team regularly suggested to Penkovsky that he should reduce his espionage activities in the interests of his own security, or even stop them altogether for a few months.

Kisevalter: We’re concerned that the frequency of your meetings with Janet is too high. Weekly meetings make it a huge risk that you’ll get caught. We’d much rather have less intelligence than see you getting caught. Your safety is paramount to us, as it should be to you.
Penkovsky: I’m an experienced intelligence officer. I’ll take precautions.
Shergold: Well let’s use other means then; start to use dead letter drops more often. There are other ways.
Penkovsky: No. I don’t like dead letter drops; they’re too dangerous and should be used only in emergencies. Besides, I like personal contact. Wynne is coming to Moscow in January or February, and he’s also going to Belgrade and maybe Bucharest. There’s talk of me organising and accompanying the Soviet delegation to the Seattle World Fair in May. I can use those opportunities, safely, to pass films and other intelligence to you, and that would reduce the number of times I meet Janet.
Kisevalter: Yes, but there are still big gaps. You have to be careful; this is not a game, you know.
Penkovsky: You’ll have to arrange for me to be invited in my official capacity to Embassy parties. First of all I have to meet Janet at such a party so that I know her officially and I then have a legend for talking to her if I happen to see her in the Arbat area or in the park. I have already met Hilary King [commercial minister at the British Embassy] and Doctor David Senior [scientific attaché at the British Embassy] at trade exhibitions in the course of my duties. I should be invited to their parties and I could pass my material to someone there and not just Janet. That could be done with excellent safety.
Kisevalter: Right. We’ll see what we can do.

Kisevalter, for all his excellence at leading the debriefings, appeared to have difficulty in accepting that it was Britain and not America that had landed Penkovsky. He seems to have been uncomfortable with MI6’s overall responsibility for hosting, organising and controlling the activities surrounding the debriefings.

Commenting afterwards on problems the Americans had in Birmingham (England) with the recording equipment they brought over from America, he said:

This was a strange criticism, calling the centre of the modern industrialised city of Birmingham ‘the tail end of the world’ and mocking the accents of Scottish engineers. Above all, Kisevalter appears to have got the wrong end of the stick: Birmingham was on alternating current – not direct current, as he claimed – and the problem is more likely to have been that the American’s standard AC recorders were set for 110 volts and 60 cycles (Hertz), while in Britain and most of the rest of the world the electricity current is 220 volts and 50 cycles. They should have known this and brought the correct specification of equipment, or transformers.

Then there were the snide little remarks:

It hurt Kisevalter that Penkovsky’s contact in Moscow was with the wife of a British diplomat rather than someone from the American Embassy:

Kisevalter had more to say about the British after the debriefing meetings in Paris in September 1961:

Conversely, Kisevalter was well aware that Americans were not universally liked. Talking about Soviets who might consider defecting to the United States, he rounded off his comments with this philosophical thought (bearing in mind that Kisevalter was born in Russia):

After the final debriefing meeting, in Paris in October 1961, Kisevalter was withdrawn from the CIA team and replaced by a more junior case officer.

The British team had nothing but praise for the brilliance of Kisevalter’s work in handling Penkovsky. It was not just his familiarity with the language that impressed them, but the way in which he managed to get into Penkovsky’s psyche; to see him through rough patches, to give this headstrong man his head and yet deftly rein him in when that was necessary. No one could have done it better.

While Kisevalter bemoaned the fact that MI6 were largely responsible for managing the Penkovsky case, other senior CIA officers refused to acknowledge it. Astonishingly, CIA Director John McCone even went so far as to claim that the CIA recruited and controlled Penkovsky and kindly allowed MI6 to participate because Penkovsky had to be managed outside the United States. The minutes of a 1963 meeting of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board record that:

He continued, at the same meeting, to claim that the British were responsible for Penkovsky getting caught: ‘We think that the case was blown because of a penetration of the British government who saw Wynne and Penkovsky together.’†

† The CIA have never claimed publicly that they think the British were responsible for Penkovsky being caught. They state on their website that: ‘To this day, it is unclear who or what implicated Penkovsky. Some believe that George Blake informed the KGB about Penkovsky’s work for the United States and Great Britain. At that point, the KGB began to keep a close watch on Penkovsky. KGB officers were stationed in apartments above and across the river from Penkovsky’s home.’