Havana

Fidel Castro was pleased with the Soviet Union–Cuba agreement for the deployment of abundant quantities of weapons and equipment in Cuba, together with the tens of thousands of Soviet troops and advisers to manage them. There was the obvious advantage of discouraging a United States-backed invasion and it would bring Cuba the national and international status Castro wanted. He had no problem with Soviet army personnel commanding the missiles at first but hoped that Cubans could be trained to use at least the SS-2 surface-to-air missiles in time.

Castro’s sense of enhanced prestige and security did not last long. The more Soviet matériel that arrived, the more the Soviets shrouded it in secrecy, refusing to allow Cuban troops to see it, let alone help to unpack and transport it. Some Soviet officers perceived their men as superior to their Cuban counterparts, and did not trust Castro’s troops and officers to keep secrets.

Washington

October 1962 was a good month for John McCone in his capacity as director of the CIA. He emerged from the substantial shadow of his predecessor, Allen Dulles, to be his own man. He gained immense respect for the way in which he handled the Cuban crisis, in spite of having to deal with a family tragedy just as that crisis approached its climax.

As evidence of the build-up of Soviet personnel, military equipment and weapons in Cuba poured in, McCone used Penkovsky’s Ironbark and Chickadee material to inform his interpretation of events.* As early as 10 August, at a high-level meeting in Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s office, McCone warned that the build-up would lead to the introduction of offensive strike weapons including medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) in Cuba. No one believed him, and they continued to dismiss his claims right through to early October. Indeed, on 30 September, Rusk said on US television that the configuration of Cuban military forces in Cuba was ‘defensive’.

There was a short-tempered meeting of the Special Group Augmented on 4 October to discuss progress on Operation Mongoose. Attorney-General Robert Kennedy was in the Chair:†

Robert Kennedy: I’ve been discussing the Cuban situation with the President. We’re both unhappy about lack of action with regard to sabotage. Nothing is moving forward: the situation in Cuba is developing fast, but nothing is moving forward under Operation Mongoose.

General Lansdale, trying to avoid confrontation, reviewed the operations that were in process and concluded:

All of these operations are proceeding in accordance with the plan, both in time and scale, as agreed by this Group.

McCone, possibly fearing the wrath of Bill Harvey as much as that of Robert Kennedy, dared to say:

Robert Kennedy:

The heated exchanges continued for a while, but the group left the argument unresolved and simply ‘reaffirmed their determination to move forward’.

They agreed that the phase-two plan they had approved on 6 September was now out of date because the level of action that could be attributed solely to local Cubans, maintaining plausible deniability, would no longer be effective. Lansdale was instructed to consider new and more dynamic approaches. His orders were to bring forward some of the previously considered acts of sabotage and develop new ones such as mining harbours and capturing Cuban soldiers for interrogation.

McCone took advantage of this new mood for effective action, asking the group to reconsider their past caution about overflights and to authorise complete sweeps of Cuba by U-2 spy planes. This would provide incontrovertible evidence of the existence of SS-4 medium-range ground-to-ground missiles which were reportedly being installed on new sites. It was agreed that Colonel Ralph Steakley (US Air Force) would present recommendations for overflights to a special meeting of the group to be held on 9 October.

At Robert Kennedy’s request, McCone and McGeorge Bundy (President’s special assistant for national security affairs) met on 5 October to try to resolve some of the issues that had caused the bickering at the meeting on the 4th. Bundy was the strongest critic of McCone’s view about the likelihood of offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba. Far from resolving the issues, the two men were at loggerheads. The discussion went like this:‡

McCone: Look, Mac; I believe it’s not just possible but probable that Soviet-Cuban operations will end up with an offensive capability in Cuba including MRBMs and IRBMs such as the SS-4 and the SS-5. I’ve been warning of this for the past two months, even in cables from France when I was on honeymoon.§
Bundy: But you’re wrong, John; the Soviets wouldn’t go that far. I’m satisfied that no offensive capability would be installed in Cuba because of its world-wide effects. It’s not only me: the President is satisfied about this and so are the Attorney General, your own CIA Board of National Estimates and most of the rest of the American intelligence community. You’re out on a limb with your assertions. The reason you can’t produce hard information on this is simply because there isn’t any.
McCone: We haven’t hard evidence because our hands are tied behind our backs. The Attorney General was totally wrong when he said the SGA hadn’t put unacceptable restrictions on the kind of action that could be taken under Mongoose; and you know it. You’re the main protagonist for weak non-attributable action, but let me tell you this, Mac: the United States cannot afford to take a risk on there not being MRBMs.
Bundy: Look at it this way, John. Our policy on Cuba isn’t clear. We don’t have any objectives so our efforts aren’t productive. On this basis I’m not criticising the Mongoose operations, nor am I criticising Edward Lansdale’s operations. I’m not in favour of a more active role because I don’t think any of the operations Bill Harvey’s team are likely to come up with would bring Castro down; and equally, they would be detrimental to America’s position of world leadership.
McCone: I’m not sure where you’re going with this, Mac. Maybe you’re admitting you don’t support the more dynamic action we agreed at the SGA meeting; but look, the President and the Attorney General both agree that the whole government policy with reference to Cuba must be resolved promptly. That’s a necessity before we can take further action.
Bundy: That may well be, but I see it like this: we should either make a judgment that we would have to go in with the military, which to me is intolerable, or we would have to learn to live with Castro and his Cuba and adjust our policies accordingly.

This exchange illustrated the polarity of thought in Washington’s top-level political, intelligence and defence circles in early October. A particularly telling point was Bundy’s assertion that: ‘Our policy on Cuba isn’t clear. We don’t have any objectives so our efforts aren’t productive.’

This may have been on President Kennedy’s mind when, with the US congressional election campaign in full swing and dominated by fears over the military threat from Cuba, he appealed in a television interview that Cuba should be left off the campaign agenda. He suggested that Castro was an irrelevance: ‘We are all concerned about Cuba, and as you know, we are taking a lot of steps to try to isolate Castro, who we believe eventually is going to fall,’ he said.

The President attended the SGA meeting on 9 October and approved the recommendation for a U-2 flight. However, poor visibility over Cuba caused the flight to be postponed until Sunday the 14th. The mission was successful and encountered no resistance.

On 15 October, McCone received news of the death of his stepson and immediately flew to the West Coast to be with his family. The deputy director of the CIA, Lieutenant-General Marshall Carter, was left in charge at the CIA’s Langley Headquarters.

That evening, Carter was informed that the photographs from the previous day’s U-2 flight indicated the deployment of MRBMs. He immediately authorised the dissemination of this information on a strict need-to-know basis to US Intelligence Board members and their immediate commanders.

He gave the news to McGeorge Bundy at 8.30 p.m. but Bundy – the man who refused to believe the Soviets would place strategic offensive weapons in Cuba and was convinced that even if they did it would not justify attacking Cuba – decided not to notify the President until the next morning.

On hearing the news, the President called a meeting of the National Security Council at the White House. Carter, assisted by two experts on offensive missile weapons and photographic interpretation, made a preliminary briefing to the group. In essence, the photographs showed three mobile medium-range ballistic missile sites.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk opened the discussion by saying how disturbed he was about this development but pointed out that CIA Director John McCone had predicted such a possibility back in mid-August.

Discussions, which lasted for several hours, centred on considering the following courses of action:

In the context of keeping their allies informed, Rusk warned that America’s allies in Europe might not give their wholehearted support to aggressive action against Cuba. They could, justifiably, point out that they had been targeted by Soviet missiles for many years without firing so much as a warning salvo, so why was military action necessary, especially at such great risk, when America faced the same danger?

Many were anxious that any US attack on Cuba might have serious consequences for West Berlin which, notwithstanding the recent massive increase in NATO conventional forces in Europe, was still precariously vulnerable to sudden military attack and occupation, and to isolation by closure of the Allied rail and road corridors.

The only significant action taken at the meeting was the President’s authorisation of unlimited U-2 flights over Cuba. Kennedy also selected a team of twenty-four advisers – including McCone – that would make meetings about the Cuban situation more manageable than gatherings of the entire National Security Council. It subsequently became known as ‘ExComm’, short for Executive Committee of the National Security Council.

One of the State Department representatives on ExComm was Llewellyn Thompson who, as Ambassador in Moscow, had obstructed local CIA management of Penkovsky. He was now ‘Ambassador at Large’ and had the ear of the President, who valued his knowledge of both the Soviet Union and of Khrushchev as a person. Both men shared the inclination to blame the CIA when things went wrong.

Havana

Oblivious of America’s discovery of the offensive missile sites, tension began to build between Cuban and Soviet forces as an American attack or invasion became an increasing likelihood. Resentment and disillusionment among Cuban soldiers and civilians over their treatment by the Soviet visitors bubbled to the surface and word of it reached Fidel Castro through his brother Raúl.

Fidel was enormously upset. His vision of Communist brothers facing the common enemy with unity, equality and brotherhood was starting to tarnish in the face of Soviet arrogance. He was particularly perplexed because he had originally taken the view that they should be open about the deployment of Soviet military weapons and manpower in Cuba. It would be better for the Americans to know what was going on so that they could take measured, rational decisions to deal with it, and learn to accept the situation. Sudden discovery – which was bound to happen sooner or later – could precipitate a disastrous knee-jerk reaction. Castro was beginning to feel that Khrushchev was using Cuba to promote his own military agenda rather than cooperating with and assisting Castro.

Castro and Soviet Ambassador Aleksandr Alekseev had struck up a close friendship soon after Alekseev had arrived in Havana in October 1959. His appointment at that time had been as the KGB Rezident in Cuba, with cover as press attaché. He was ‘promoted’ and appointed ambassador in August 1962. Now their friendship was being tested.

Castro called Alekseev in on 17 October and poured out his feelings. Cubans were a proud people, he told Alekseev, rightly happy and excited about the Soviet presence in their homeland. It enhanced their international status and served as a powerful defence against American-backed aggression. But they were now wondering if they would be able to live comfortably together – Cubans and the multitude of Soviet visitors – because some Soviet army personnel were riding roughshod over Cubans as if they were all ignorant peasants or possible American agents.

Alekseev took a side-swipe at the GRU, blaming them for much of the problem.|| He promised, nevertheless, to inform Khrushchev of Castro’s complaint and felt sure that things would become more harmonious.

Moscow

Khrushchev had more than enough on his plate when, on 18 October, he received Alekseev’s telegram about Castro’s complaints. Alekseev would have emphasised that the problem was mainly caused by GRU officers, and it may have been this that later propelled the propaganda machine into condemning Serov and the GRU for ‘the most corrupt and unproductive period in its history’.

Had Khrushchev found the time in the midst of this critical state of affairs to reprimand Serov, the latter would have protested the charges and defended his organisation’s honour. The GRU had not been informed of the Soviet Union’s true political and military intentions in Cuba. They did not know that strategic nuclear weapons had been installed on the island. They had not been consulted about the viability of hiding the launch sites from prying American eyes. The GRU had expertise in these matters and, had they been consulted, they would have either advised against attempts to conceal the weapons, or made a better job of it.

Washington

There were sixteen U-2 spy flights over Cuba from 15 to 22 October, most of them bringing in evidence of new missile sites or continuing preparations for the operational readiness of known sites. The final count was forty-eight MRBMs with a range of 1,100 miles (1,800 km), which would just about reach Washington; thirty-two IRBMs with a range of 2,500 miles (4,000 km), which would take in most of the US, and twenty-three sites with operationally ready SA-4 surface-to-air missiles. There were also twenty-five MIG-21 advanced interceptor fighters and twenty Illusion-28 medium bombers.

At a meeting of members of ExComm on Wednesday 17 October, Ambassador Thompson strongly advocated a blockade of shipping to prevent any increase in Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. He urged that there should be no military action unless Castro and Khrushchev refused to reverse their activities and remove the missiles already in place. It was important, he said, to communicate with Khrushchev. He also said that any action, whether a blockade or direct military intervention, should be preceded by a declaration of war.

On 18 October, Kennedy held talks in the White House with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, ostensibly about a summit with Khrushchev proposed for later in the year and the continuing disputes over West Berlin, although it later emerged that Cuba had also been high on the agenda. Kennedy then left Washington for a campaign tour.

Each day’s fresh intelligence generated more meetings, particularly of ExComm and the US Intelligence Board, but also of small groups of up to half a dozen people.

Most parties, including Kennedy and McCone, initially favoured direct and immediate military action to eliminate all missile sites. Some said this should be attempted only after a warning to the Soviets but others proposed a surprise attack. When political opinion gradually moved towards a blockade of shipping there were still those on the military side – particularly Robert McNamara (Secretary of Defence) and General Maxwell Taylor (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) – who advocated an immediate attack, for which preparations had already been made.

The 18th Airborne Corps, including many of America’s frontline forces, were put on standby on 16 October and a squadron of fighter aircraft flew to the Key West base just ninety miles from Cuba, in what the Pentagon described as a ‘precautionary measure’. Some forty ships, including aircraft carriers, and 20,000 troops were holding an exercise in the area between the Florida Keys and Puerto Rico, although the Pentagon insisted it was a pre-planned exercise with no extraordinary significance.

Moscow

Oleg Penkovsky had warned the Americans about Khrushchev’s warmongering inclinations, including the possibility of Soviet weaponry in Cuba, and he provided technical intelligence about the missiles themselves. One detail that was of immense importance as the situation rapidly moved towards crisis point was the protracted time required to fuel, arm and launch Soviet offensive missile rockets compared to their American equivalents.

The Soviets were still unaware that the Americans had discovered the missile sites, and they did not know of the frenetic meetings that were taking place in Washington.

It was therefore by a bizarre and cruel coincidence that the KGB decided to raid Penkovsky’s apartment in Moscow on 20 October, discovering one of his Minox cameras. Penkovsky had not been in regular contact with MI6/CIA during this period, which caused some unease, but they had no inkling of the KGB raid.

Washington

On the weekend of 20 and 21 October, President Kennedy and Vice-President Lyndon Johnson pulled out of their campaign schedules to fly back to Washington, both saying they had ‘a slight cold’. Secretary of State Dean Rusk stayed in Washington ‘to cope with a backlog of work that had accumulated because of his long talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on Thursday’. They, together with McNamara and a number of other officials, discussed the growing crisis and briefed key Congressional leaders.

An ExComm meeting on the 20th was devoted largely to detailed discussions of the two main options for action: a naval blockade or an air strike. Opinions, including the President’s, were gradually swaying towards the former, though the military remained sworn advocates of the latter. There was agreement that the President should address the nation, but not about what he should say.

Records of ExComm meetings throughout this intense period show that the President was constantly concerned about the likely reaction of America’s allies in Europe and Latin America to whatever action America finally took to resolve the Cuba problem. He wanted to show strong action without precipitating some kind of a disaster. He was also conscious of the diplomatic need to consult his allies.

He spoke to British Ambassador David Ormsby-Gore – a close and dear friend of many years standing – on 21 October, immediately before another ExComm meeting. Having now made up his mind about which option to pursue, he suggested to the Ambassador that a blockade was the better option and left the Ambassador with little opportunity to argue otherwise. This was not consultation in the true sense. Ormsby-Gore reported the discussion to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan.

The President then attended the ExComm meeting. Discussion was now focused on the wording of the President’s speech. A blockade was now the consensual preference, though there was some debate about whether it should be called a blockade, which conjured up thoughts of the Berlin blockade, or a quarantine. This was a purely semantic choice with no legal bearing. The President opted for ‘quarantine’.

They discussed plans for a military strike in the event that the quarantine failed to bring the stand-off to an end. Defence Secretary McNamara said that planning was based on an initial air strike followed seven days later with landings. Twenty-five thousand men would be put ashore the first day, and by the eighteenth day, 90,000 would be ashore. There was an alternative plan for the landing of 90,000 men in a 23-day period. The President asked that everything be done to reduce the length of time between a decision to invade and the landing of the first troops.

The President went on to say he believed that, as soon as he had finished his television speech, the Soviets would (a) speed up the development of their missile capability in Cuba, (b) announce that if the US attacked Cuba, the Soviet would launch offensive rockets, and (c) possibly act to eject Western forces from West Berlin.

The ExComm members agreed to emphasise international action through the Organisation of American States (OAS), rather than the United Nations. Failure to give prominence to the OAS could jeopardise that regional alliance, seen as crucial to limiting the spread of Communism in South and Central America.

After this meeting, Kennedy sent a telegram to Macmillan informing him of his intention to impose a blockade.

There was another ExComm meeting on the 22nd, which opened with the reading of Macmillan’s response to the President’s telegram of the night before. It registered reservations about imposing a blockade, which could be construed as an act of war. Macmillan reminded the President that Western Europe had been a target for Soviet nuclear weapons for some years with little difficulty, so he need not expect too much support from other European countries. More importantly, he warned Kennedy that a blockade would give the Soviets an excuse to impose a retaliatory blockade on West Berlin, opening up a serious rift between Western Europe and America.

Rusk thought Macmillan’s reaction to the news of the proposed blockade ‘was not bad’. Kennedy commented that the Prime Minister’s message ‘contained the best argument for taking no action’.

In the course of this meeting the President admitted he had finally come down in favour of a blockade rather than an air strike only the previous morning, just prior to his conversation with Ambassador Ormsby-Gore.

The meeting clarified some of the points to be included in the President’s TV speech that evening and covered a wide range of ‘what if?’ scenarios. The President said there was risk in whatever action they decided to take. ‘That risk should be carefully measured,’ he said, ‘and the chance taken; because it would be a mistake to do nothing.’

After the meeting had ended and before he addressed the nation, the President had a telephone conversation with Macmillan in the course of which he said: ‘Some action is necessary. It could result in WWIII; we could lose Berlin.’

* Ironbark was the CIA’s code name for documentary intelligence from Oleg Penkovsky. Chickadee was their code name for the material from his debriefing sessions.

† Author’s interpretation based on McCone’s ‘Memorandum of MONGOOSE Meeting Held on Thursday, October 4, 1962’, from CIA documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis.

‡ Author’s interpretation based on McCone’s ‘Memorandum of Discussion with Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Friday. October 5. 1962, 5:15p.m’ from CIA documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis.

§ McCone had been on honeymoon in France from 23 August to 23 September.

Carter was still deputising for McCone, who returned from the West Coast later in the day.

|| During his early years in Cuba, Alekseev had resisted the appointment of any GRU personnel to Cuba: he wanted the ear of Castro solely for the KGB. However, in October 1961 the Chief of Staff of the Cuban Army, General Sergio del Valle, specifically requested the presence of GRU officers and Alekseev was forced to accept this.