Fourteen

Evasion

 

The entire Confederate army was on the move. Jeb Stuart’s cavalrymen, who were guarding both of Lee’s flanks, had no better time of it in the downpour and barely passable roads than did the Union cavalry. Stuart decided to detour around Kilpatrick, and with that in mind departed Emmitsburg at midmorning. When Stuart approached the outskirts of Smithstown, however, he was surprised to discover that Kilpatrick was lying in wait with skirmishers deployed on each side of the road and artillery positioned on three hills.

Colonel Huey and Colonel Nathaniel P. Richmond—now commanding Farnsworth’s brigade—had been assigned the front; Custer’s Wolverines remained in the rear. Federal guns pounded Stuart’s advance units, and he was incapable of immediately counterattacking—his own artillery was far behind and inaccessible for the time being. Stuart quickly dismounted his troops to return fire, dispatched a courier to bring up the artillery, and summoned Colonel M. J. Ferguson, whose Jenkins Brigade was engaged with Richmond, to reinforce Chambliss.1

The Union cavalry held a major advantage, and threatened to trap Chambliss in the pass even with assistance from Ferguson. Stuart, however, was afforded a lucky break when Kilpatrick, who was informed of Ferguson’s movement, committed a tactical blunder. Instead of pressing his advantage, Kilpatrick inexplicably disengaged his troops and ordered them to ride for Boonsboro, twenty miles to the south.

The Third Division commander later wrote in his report that he had broken off contact in order “to save my prisoners, animals, and wagons.” Perhaps Kilpatrick had suffered a momentary bout of faintheartedness at the prospect of fighting Stuart’s Invincibles. To be fair, however, Kilpatrick may have been uninformed about Stuart’s true strength, and, although uncharacteristic for a man with a reputation for sending his men headlong into the face of danger, on this occasion chose to err on the side of prudence. Kilpatrick’s troops reached Boonsboro at 10:00 P.M., and bivouacked for a well-deserved rest.2

Meanwhile, Stuart dutifully reported the movements of the Union cavalry to General Lee, and then led his column toward Leitersburg to rendezvous with Beverly Robertson. Stuart, who had been informed that Kilpatrick was in Boonsboro, had his four brigades in the saddle by daylight heading southward toward Hagerstown and the Potomac.3

Kilpatrick had caught wind of Stuart’s movement, and was preparing to mount a pursuit when General John Buford arrived in Boonsboro. Buford had been on the trail of Imboden’s wagon train, and was armed with the information that his quarry was presently stalled at Williamsport—thirteen miles to the northwest. The capture of this supply train could conceivably cripple the Army of Northern Virginia beyond recovery.

It was decided that Buford, supported by Custer’s Michigan Wolverines—and personally accompanied by Kilpatrick—would attempt to surround the train at Williamsport. The other column would ride for Hagerstown and engage Stuart to try to prevent his cavalry from assisting Imboden.4

Colonel Richmond led the Union advance into Hagerstown, and encountered Chambliss and Robertson approaching from the northeast. The Confederates initially gained the upper hand and, fighting street to street, pushed Richmond’s disorganized troops backward. Reinforcements were sent in to bolster the attack, and eventually succeeded in driving Chambliss’ undersized unit out of town.

Stuart was aware that Kilpatrick’s ultimate objective would be Imboden’s wagon train at Williamsport, and he must at all costs hold Hagerstown. Chambliss was ordered to charge directly down the road while Ferguson and two of Robertson’s regiments would attempt to strike the Union flank.5

While the blue and the gray horsemen dueled on the streets of Hagerstown, Buford and Kilpatrick approached Williamsport at about 1:30 P.M. to discover a well-fortified enemy. General Imboden had deployed his two brigades of cavalry, two regiments of infantry, twenty-four pieces of light artillery, and even the teamsters armed with the weapons of the wounded, into a tight perimeter at the base of a hill below town to protect his immobile caravan. Ambulances had been unloaded and the wounded moved into nearby houses, and makeshift rafts had begun ferrying supplies across the swollen river. Imboden had prepared to hold the position until the remainder of Stuart’s cavalry and Lee’s infantry could arrive to reinforce the position and drive off any enemy.

Imboden greeted Buford with a barrage of small arms fire and artillery designed to impress upon the Yanks that they would pay dearly should they advance. Skirmishers were sent forward in various spots along the line to bluff an attack and keep Buford confused with respect to the size and position of his troops. Buford retaliated with a series of assaults, which were for the most part easily repulsed.6

At one point, Kilpatrick dispatched Custer and the Fifth Michigan to advance through town on a saber charge, but had second thoughts and rescinded the order. Colonel Alger’s riflemen were then dismounted and sent forward, but were met with heavy resistance and, as one cavalryman described, “with shells bursting over our heads,” and they could not get close enough to be effective.7

Back at Hagerstown, Stuart was supported by the head of Lee’s infantry column and an artillery brigade from Ewell’s corps, which supplied enough firepower to push the Union cavalrymen into a fighting retreat. The final blow was administered when the head of Longstreet’s corps arrived to reinforce Stuart.

Colonel Richmond halted once to counterattack, but was quickly routed by the Fifth North Carolina and Eleventh Virginia, and this strategic position was in sole possession of the Army of Northern Virginia. By evicting the Union army from Hagerstown, Stuart was now free to concentrate on the threat by Buford and Kilpatrick to Williamsport.8

With darkness descending and Jeb Stuart and Fitz Lee approaching, General Buford made the decision to withdraw. Custer and his Wolverines accompanied Buford’s First Division into camp at Jones’s Crossroads, while Kilpatrick and Huey retired to Boonsboro. General Imboden summed up the sentiments on the Confederate side of the line at the sight of the retreating Yankees when he wrote, “The news was sent along our whole line, and was received with a wild and exultant yell. We knew then that the field was won.”9

The actions by Jeb Stuart and his horsemen had saved the day for the Confederates. The loss of the supply wagons—gathering supplies, after all, had been the initial purpose of the campaign—would have been disastrous.

The reports written by both Buford and Kilpatrick grudgingly acknowledge their failure to seize this opportunity to possibly crush the Confederacy. Buford wrote, “The expedition had for its objective the destruction of the enemy’s trains, supposed to be at Williamsport. This, I regret to say, was not accomplished. The enemy was too strong for me, but he was severely punished for his obstinacy. His casualties were more than quadruple to mine.” Buford might have overestimated the losses suffered by his obstinate enemy. Union casualties in the engagement amounted to about four hundred; the Southerners reported 254.10

News traveled rather slowly throughout the country in time of war, and it was not until July 6 or thereabouts that Libbie Bacon heard about the promotion of Armstrong Custer to brigadier general. And she was informed of the news by none other than her rival, Fanny Fifield. Libbie tried to act apathetic to this startling revelation, but must have been overjoyed and proud. Her elation was tempered at the time, however, by Fanny suggesting that Libbie and Nettie Humphrey could serve as bridesmaids for the nuptials between Fanny and her beau. Libbie wondered if Armstrong was simply flirting with Fanny, or if he was serious about her in case his romance with Libbie would come to an end.11

Soon after, however, she became upset when she learned that Custer had shown her ambrotype to Fanny. She wrote, “He had no business to write the passionate messages he has about me & to me when he has been writing so constantly & lovelike to Fan. He is nothing to me. He never will be.”12

Libbie was somewhat embarrassed when David Reed, Armstrong’s brother-in-law, visited the Bacon household bearing a drawing that Al Waud of Harper’s Weekly had rendered about Custer’s dangerous ride into the Rebel lines on a runaway horse. Reed, who handed a letter to Libbie as well—that summarized the episode—explained that Armstrong had wanted him to show the picture to all of Fanny’s friends. Reed also mentioned that he expected Armstrong to return in the fall and marry Fanny Fifield.

David Reed then oddly asked Libbie if that was what she thought would happen. Libbie was noncommittal, but later wrote, “By his manner his words & all, he knew C—loved me.” Libbie begged her stepmother not to mention Reed’s visit to her disapproving father.13

In the moonlight that night, Libbie wrote in her journal, “I love him still. I know it is love from fancy with no foundations, but I love him still and theory vanishes when practice comes into play. There is no similarity of tastes between us and I will never think of it, but I love him.”14

Brigadier General George Armstrong Custer and his men remained in a rain-drenched camp to rest throughout the day on July 7, while Stuart deployed his troopers in strategic locations to enable General Lee to freely inspect approaches to the river that would afford a safe crossing for his army back into Virginia. Lee, whose army was now concentrated around Williamsport and Hagerstown, was in no hurry to test the flooded river. Before he would make a final decision, he would spend his time consulting with his subordinates and discussing the merits of various potential crossing areas designated on maps drawn by his engineers.15

The opposing cavalries engaged in a heated skirmish on July 8 when the wily Stuart, who intended to aggressively cover the presence of his army, executed a ploy designed to make his enemy think that he was heading for the South Mountain passes beyond Boonsboro.

General Pleasonton had issued orders for his cavalry to protect these mountain gaps in order to enable passage by Meade’s infantry, which was on the far side of the mountain moving south. And Stuart intended to keep the cavalry confused with respect to specific movements and locations.

Stuart led four brigades—Lee, Jones, Chambliss, and Baker—down the Hagerstown Pike from Funkstown and met Union forces at about 5:00 A.M. near Jones’s Crossroads and Boonsboro. The battle commenced when Stuart ordered McGregor’s artillery battery to open up on Buford’s right flank. This was followed by an attack by Grumble Jones’s dismounted brigade—on foot due to the soft, saturated earth, which made it difficult for mounted troops to maneuver. Colonel Ferguson’s brigade arrived from the northwest and was dispatched by Stuart to strike the Union left flank. The combination of smoking cannons and bold skirmishers was successful—Buford’s men were compelled to withdraw up the mountain into Turner’s Pass.16

Kilpatrick responded by stabilizing the center of Buford’s line with Custer’s brigade and the left flank with Richmond. The batteries commanded by Elder and Pennington, which were positioned on the hills behind Boonsboro, began having an effect on holding back the aggressive Confederate skirmishers. The horsemen of Custer and Richmond, supported by Colonel William Gamble’s infantry, shored up defenses and in time gained the upper hand. Custer and his Wolverines forced the enemy back to Beaver Creek, three miles away.

The intense fighting continued throughout the afternoon, with casualties mounting on both sides—including Colonel Russell Alger of the Fifth Michigan, who was severely wounded when struck with a minié ball in the left thigh. The capable Alger would not return to action until September.

As five o’clock approached, Jeb Stuart was aware that he had accomplished his mission. Upon learning that his men were running low on ammunition, he ordered a gradual pull back in a northerly direction on the old National Road toward Funkstown. The Federal troops pursued, but Stuart deployed a strong line of defense four miles away below Funkstown, which effectively brought an end to hostilities.

Buford and Kilpatrick reasoned that their original role had been to guard the mountain passes, and that endeavor had been achieved by chasing away Stuart. They were now content to return south with their jubilant, albeit battle-weary troops, who to a man were certain that another victory had been won that day. One ecstatic Wolverine wrote, “This is the eighth fight we have had with the Rebs and have whipped them everry [sic] time.”17

General George Meade had moved his army to within eight miles west of South Mountain, and issued orders for Pleasonton’s cavalry to harass the enemy all they wanted but to avoid a major engagement. That reluctance to crush the Army of Northern Virginia, which was virtually trapped with its back to the river, did not particularly sit well with President Lincoln, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, or Chief of Staff Major General Henry Halleck. But, taking into consideration the consolidated Confederate position, which extended in an almost uninterrupted line for eight miles and contained a six-foot-wide parapet dotted with frequent gun emplacements, Meade’s decision in hindsight was appropriate.18

Meade’s cautiousness afforded Custer and his Wolverines a couple of lazy days spent resting and refitting. The Union cavalrymen and horses had endured an extensive stretch of continuous battle in elements that would test even the hardiest person. The morale of the troops, however, was soaring, as evidenced by George R. Barse, who wrote, “Although much worn down by fatigue and need of rest, the cry is, ‘No rest until the rebels are driven from the State.’ We can whip them, and must do so, cost what it will.” This welcome respite provided ample time to clean and repair mud-covered clothing and equipment, care for the horses, reflect on the victory at Gettysburg, and perhaps speculate about the victories that surely lay ahead.19

General Lee had selected a crossing point for his army at the village of Falling Waters, four miles below Williamsport, and his engineers toiled to construct pontoon bridges at that location. Jeb Stuart and his horsemen were kept busy in the saddle protecting the stranded army from the enemy, which would prove to be a constant chore.

At about 8:00 A.M. on July 10, Buford’s foot soldiers waded Beaver Creek and advanced down the road from Boonsboro toward a line of Stuart’s dismounted cavalry. The Federal attack pushed the Rebels north to Funkstown toward a Confederate infantry position above Antietam Creek. The engagement continued until about 3:00 P.M., when Buford’s men ran out of ammunition and chose to withdraw and bivouac about four miles away. While directing the vicious fighting, Stuart had a horse shot out from under him but otherwise emerged unscathed.20

Early on July 12, with Meade’s infantry arriving to darken the hills around them, General Custer and his Wolverines were roused from their inactivity. Custer’s brigade, in advance of the Third Division, charged “screaming and yelling” into Hagerstown unopposed to grab fifty prisoners and occupy the town. Detachments of the First, Fifth, and Seventh Michigan advanced toward Williamsport, but ran into Rebel entrenchments and wisely decided to wait for reinforcements from Meade’s infantrymen. The foot soldiers, who had not fought in ten days since Gettysburg, compared to Custer’s men, who had seen battle every couple of days, soon appeared and enabled the cavalrymen to fall back.21

On that same Sunday that Custer’s Wolverines had charged into Hagerstown, the names of the first draftees in New York City were published in accordance with the National Conscription Act, which declared that all able-bodied men between the ages of twenty and forty-five were liable for military service. The response to this unpopular act was four days of rioting on the streets as a mob of fifty thousand people roamed about the city lynching blacks, assaulting abolitionists, looting, and destroying property. Soldiers returning from the Gettysburg battle were called upon to reinforce the police to quell this violence, and were forced to fire upon the crowd. Order was maintained in this instance, but this would not be the last time or place that rallies were held to protest the draft. In reality, however, the draft ended up providing only about 46,000 men from the 775,000 names that were drawn—about 6 percent of the Union army.

On July 12, General Meade convened a council of war to relate his intention to thrust his massive army against Confederate fortifications at Williamsport in order to follow up on his success at Gettysburg. The majority of his infantry generals at the meeting, however, argued in opposition to an immediate attack. Meade, in another controversial decision, deferred to their wishes. The assault would be postponed. Instead, reconnaissance patrols would be dispatched in the morning to gather additional intelligence regarding the specific positions of his enemy.22

By that time, the water had receded to a level low enough to chance a crossing, and the Rebel engineers and sappers had completed their work placing the pontoons across the river. General Lee had hoped that his enemy would test the strength of his entrenched army. But, upon learning that the Federals had commenced digging fortifications, which indicated that an attack was not imminent, Lee decided that he could wait no longer to cross. He remarked, “They have but little courage.”23

At 4:15 P.M., Jeb Stuart was summoned, and issued his orders by Lee. Stuart’s cavalrymen would assume the positions of fifty thousand foot soldiers in an attempt to deceive the enemy into thinking that the trenches along the nearly eight-mile line remained occupied. After the entire army had crossed, Stuart and his men would ride to safety.24

On that dark, rainy night, with thunder rolling and lightning cracking, the Confederate army made its move. Longstreet’s and Hill’s corps began crossing at Falling Waters while Ewell’s corps forded at Williamsport. By first light, in spite of losing a small number of men and wagons that had been swept away, Lee’s army was well on its way of completing its mission with near flawlessness.25

At about 3:00 A.M., the first word of an enemy movement reached Kilpatrick’s ears. Scouts informed him that Confederate pickets had retired from the works below Hagerstown. General Buford’s reconnaissance reported at the same time that Confederate positions farther to the east were empty, and the enemy had been observed crossing the river. Both divisions advanced slowly forward. Buford indicated that he would attempt to maneuver between the river and Lee’s rear guard, apparently expecting Kilpatrick to follow suit with his cavalry and assist by distracting the enemy.

Kilpatrick did not coordinate his efforts with Buford, and instead headed south, with Custer and the Fifth Michigan in the lead. At about 6:00 A.M., the Wolverines galloped up the hills overlooking Williamsport. Custer’s troopers discovered only a few stragglers from Ewell’s corps at that location, and chased those panicked men into the river with the support of Pennington’s guns. Perhaps as many as fifty Rebels drowned and twenty-five wagons with their mule teams were swept away in the raging torrent. Other fleeing members of the Rebel rear guard were found along the road and gathered up as prisoners.

Local residents informed Kilpatrick that a large force of Confederate troops was presently crossing the river four miles downstream at Falling Waters. The Fifth Michigan remained at Williamsport to mop up while Custer and his three other Michigan regiments hastened toward Falling Waters.26

By now, most of the Confederate army, as well as Stuart’s cavalry, had reached Virginia. Locals told Kilpatrick that two divisions of Henry Heth’s and William Pender’s infantry remained behind on the north bank at Falling Waters. Custer deployed the Fifth at Williamsport, and led the other three regiments in a dash to cut off the Southerners. Two miles from their objective, Custer and an advance detachment of the Sixth Michigan encountered the Rebel rear guard and drove them steadily south.27

At about 7:30 A.M., Custer and his Wolverines halted in a woodlot a mile and a half from the river, and from that point could view the enemy crossing point. Imposing breastworks and trenches had been constructed on a crescent-shaped knoll, and were manned by artillery and veteran troops of the Thirteenth Alabama and the First, Seventh, and Fourteenth Tennessee, veterans from Henry Heth’s division. These men had been lazing around, waiting for Union soldiers to arrive. Their commander was Brigadier General J. Johnson Pettigrew, who had led these same men on the ill-fated Pickett’s charge at Gettysburg. They were not about to be intimidated by the force of cavalry that approached.

At present, Custer had only two companies at his disposal—the others had been delayed with rounding up prisoners—and thought it prudent to probe the position with dismounted skirmishers while waiting for the main force to arrive. Companies B and F under Major Peter Weber were ordered forward on foot for that purpose. During this movement, Weber confided to Captain James Kidd that he desired one more chance to make a saber charge.

Judson Kilpatrick arrived on the scene, and afforded Weber that opportunity. The Third Division commander decided to countermand Custer’s order. Without knowing what was in front of him, Kilpatrick directed Weber to mount about fifty-eight men and charge into what would amount to thousands of enemy occupying the hill.28

Major Weber must have been aware that this situation was strikingly similar to Elon Farnsworth’s earlier ill-fated charge on the last day at Gettysburg. Regardless, he offered no objection, and obediently mounted his men and lit out at a trot across the open field and up the hill at a gallop.29

The advance of the Union horsemen was observed by Heth and his staff as soon as it had emerged from the woods. But the consensus opinion was that it must be the rear guard of Stuart’s cavalry. No detachment of Federals this small would dare attack a Confederate infantry division. And it was believed that the cavalry—which, incidentally, had earlier crossed by mistake—was bringing up the rear.

The identity of Weber’s cavalry unit remained a mystery to the Rebels until it was in their midst, unfurling a “Stars and Stripes” guidon and unleashing a murderous saber attack and yelling, “Surrender!”

The relaxed Confederates had stacked their weapons, and now resorted to using fence rails, axes, and rifles as clubs to fend off the surprise assault. Weber and his men hacked with their sabers and fired their pistols, exacting a toll that included General Pettigrew, who was mortally wounded.30

James Kidd, who was wounded in the foot by a bullet while in the rear of the charge, wrote about what happened next, “Weber, cutting right and left with his saber, and cheering on his men, pierced the first line, but there could be but one result. Recovering from their surprise, the Confederate infantry rallied, and seizing their arms, made short work of their daring assailants.” The brave Wolverines never had a chance against the overwhelming force.31

The Confederate infantry blasted Weber’s men with a point-blank volley. Weber and his executive officer, Lieutenant Charles E. Bolza, were cut from their saddles—along with at least thirty other Wolverines, more than half of the unit, who were killed, wounded, or captured. Captain David G. Royce of the Sixth Michigan was also killed when his dismounted squadron supported the initial charge. Lieutenant George Crawford would be struck by a bullet that shattered his leg, which would later require amputation. Kill-Cavalry had once again ordered a suicide charge that had resulted in mass slaughter.

The remnants of Weber’s companies struggled to find refuge in the trees, while General Armstrong Custer dismounted what remained of the Sixth and, along with the First and Seventh, led a series of charges that kept the Confederates at bay until the rest of the brigade could reach the field.

Private Victor E. Comte of the Fifth Michigan, who had been chosen as personal escort to Custer and was at his side throughout the engagement, later wrote home, “I saw him [Custer] plunge his saber into the belly of a rebel who was trying to kill him. You can guess how bravely soldiers fight for such a general.”32

After a couple of hours of fierce fighting, Custer’s men overwhelmed their enemy, and either killed them or drove them across the pontoon bridge over the Potomac. The Wolverines captured about fifteen hundred prisoners, three battle flags, and a ten-pound Parrott gun. The Confederates had lost one hundred twenty-five killed and fifty wounded, compared to twenty-nine killed, thirty-six wounded, and forty missing for the Union.

General George Meade could not fathom that cavalry could have such success against an entrenched enemy, and had Kilpatrick’s report read to him twice before he would approve it. Equally amazed was New York Times correspondent E. A. Paul, who witnessed the action, and wrote, “This is cavalry fighting the superior of which the world never saw.”33

And it was Custer’s Wolverines who had achieved this near impossible feat. Although marred by Kilpatrick’s suicidal order for Major Weber and his men, the Michigan Brigade had risen to the occasion and brought glory upon themselves—and their commander.

Confederate General Henry Heth, who had fired the opening shots at Gettysburg, now cut the ropes behind him on the pontoon bridges at Falling Waters to effectively end the campaign.34

That night, the Third Cavalry Division bivouacked near Boonsboro. In the morning, Judson Kilpatrick complained of a pain in his side that may have been an inflammation of the kidneys. He requested and was granted a temporary medical leave of absence.

In place of Kilpatrick, Alfred Pleasonton chose twenty-three-year-old Brigadier General George Armstrong Custer to command the division.35

Now that the dust—or rather the mud—of Gettysburg had settled, the Boy General was on the verge of becoming a national hero for his exploits during this significant campaign.