Chapter 1

1808 – Success, Controversy and Disaster

The first campaign in the Iberian Peninsula saw the piecemeal arrival of British troops from all over Europe. Various fleets converged on Mondego Bay in July and August 1808 from England, Ireland, Sweden and the Mediterranean. The first engineers to arrive from Cork with Sir Arthur Wellesley were Captain Howard Elphinstone with Second Captain Patton and Lieutenants Williams, Boteler, Wells and English. Captain George Landmann with Lieutenants Mulcaster and Mercer arrived from Gibraltar with Sir Brent Spencer. Captain Richard Fletcher with Captains Squire and Burgoyne, Lieutenants Smith, Forster and Stanway arrived with Sir Harry Burrard and Sir John Moore.

Elphinstone had recently returned from the ill-fated South American expedition to the Rio de la Plata and was assigned to Sir Arthur Wellesley’s new South American task force. Following requests for support from the Spanish provinces that had risen against Napoleon, the task force was rapidly diverted to the new Iberian adventure. In the early euphoria following the French surrender at Bailén on 19 July 1808, the Spanish were keen to get assistance in the form of arms and money but were reluctant to allow British troops on their soil. Wellesley’s original plan was to land his troops at Corunna but the Spanish suggested he would be better employed supporting the Portuguese. Wellesley accordingly moved south to Oporto and then on to Lisbon for talks with the Portuguese authorities.

Elphinstone wrote frequently to his wife and provides entertaining although not always accurate commentary on what was going on. As the senior engineer present he became, by default, the Commanding Royal Engineer with the army. Writing home to his wife on 27 July 1808, he expressed his initial impressions and hopes for the campaign.

We anchored in this bay [Mondego Bay] yesterday morning and are to land in the course of a day or two. The inhabitants are friendly to us and there is no danger in landing … Junot has but a small force in Lisbon such as I think will surrender upon our appearance … I am only afraid that the opposition will be so trifling that I shall not get a Majority [i.e. promotion] from the French rogue.¹

He also noted that he dined with Sir Arthur Wellesley on his first night ashore and said ‘from what I can perceive at present everything will go on alright with him’.² His first intention was to get transport for himself, but, as the whole army was discovering, horses were in very short supply and his demands on the commissariat fell on deaf ears. As Elphinstone was riding a mule at the first battle, his high hopes of securing a thoroughbred were obviously dashed. Having said that, you should not confuse an Iberian mule with a British seaside donkey, these were big, powerful brutes! He noted he paid 94 dollars for his ‘neddy’.

In the days following Elphinstone’s landing, other engineers started arriving including Captain George Landmann, whose father was Professor of Fortifications at the Royal Military Academy. Landmann had powerful delusions of grandeur and soon would get his brief moment of glory. But first, like Elphinstone, he needed personal transport and bought a pony without a personal inspection. You can hear Landmann making fun of himself as he described the first ride on his new pony on 10 August 1808:

… at the sounding of the bugle next morning, I jumped up and ordered my famous pony to be accoutred with my handsome new Mameluke saddle, holsters and ornamented bridle etc; then swinging over my left shoulder, my spy glass … and my haversack … over my right shoulder, I mounted [and found that whatever encouragement was applied] my pony advanced no faster than a walk.³

Landmann’s movements in these early days of the war are fairly well known through his self-publicising two-volume memoirs.⁴ But he does also tell us what Wellesley and Elphinstone were doing.

Beginning a trend that continued throughout the war, engineers were assigned to each infantry brigade and would report directly to the unit commander. Landmann was appointed to General Fane’s brigade. Elphinstone as CRE would have remained with Wellesley at his headquarters.

On the morning of 11 August the troops were raised around 3 a.m. and stood to arms until after daybreak when it was confirmed there was no sign of a French attack. The army remained around Leiria until the morning of the 14th when after a cold, foggy start the warm weather quickly turned into a hot, dry day with copious amounts of dust covering everyone. Staying close to the coast, the army advanced to Alcobaça where the first contact with the French under Delaborde occurred. The Allied army then moved on to Caldas da Rainha on the 15th. The next day, at Óbidos, Landmann describes his Engineers’ training kicking in.

My first object was to reconnoitre the whole of the surrounding country [around Óbidos]. Having quickly inspected the ground to the west, I crossed the valley to the eastward of the town … where there is a good road … which I suspected might join … the more direct road to Lisbon which is by Roliça. Having questioned several of the country people … they confirmed my conjecture.⁵

He then rode back to Óbidos to brief General Fane, reporting that the French could be clearly seen on the heights of Columbeira. Although Landmann recounts as his own idea the decision to reconnoitre in front of the advancing army, it is more likely that such activity was being ordered by Wellesley and co-ordinated through Elphinstone.

On the morning of 17 August, Landmann was back in the Moorish tower at Óbidos watching the French ‘with my famous three-feet telescope, by Watson’⁶ when Sir Arthur Wellesley arrived. Landmann’s account has him passing his telescope to Wellesley and then briefing him on the terrain based on his reconnaissance the day before. Five engineer officers were present at the first battle of the war at Roliça on 17 August 1808. They were Elphinstone in command, Captain Landmann and Lieutenants English, Mulcaster and Wells. Landmann was with the flanking force under General Fane and Elphinstone remained with Wellesley. Late in the day, Elphinstone was wounded, a musket ball shattering his lower jaw. Landmann related that Elphinstone was watching the assault of the 29th Regiment at Columbeira through his telescope when he was hit, the shock knocking him from his mule. ‘He was raised by Lieutenant Mulcaster’⁷ and Elphinstone described, as he retired, ‘a second ball did me the favour to graze my thigh – a third saluted me on the rump’.⁸ Landmann lost no time in personally visiting Wellesley at headquarters and writing to the Board of Ordnance reporting he was now the Commanding Royal Engineer, but could not find the time to visit the injured Elphinstone until the following day. He reported the action as follows:

I have to report that yesterday the army under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, proceeded from Óbidos, and engaged the French troops under the command of General La Port [sic], who had taken a very strong post in the mountains we now occupy, which we carried after a very severe action of about four hours – It is with the deepest regret that I have to say that Captain Elphinstone was severely wounded by a musquet ball in the face, the surgeons report is very favourable, and I hope he will be again able to take the command, although I fear it may be some time. I was unfortunately not able to see him myself, as we had advanced too far before I heard of the accident. Lieutenant Mulcaster was with Captain Elphinstone at the time, and has seen him last night who says he was in good spirits, and well taken care of in a small village about three miles in the rear of our present situation. I am happy to add that all the other officers of the corps have escaped unhurt.⁹

The Allied army now moved south to Vimeiro to cover the landing of Acland and Anstruther’s brigades. Junot, realising that any chance of success would diminish once these troops were ashore, attacked on the morning of 21 August. Although Sir Harry Burrard had arrived in Maceira Bay to take over command, he had not yet landed and Wellesley was able to retain command during the battle. During the battle, Landmann described the situation around Wellington who was ignoring the French skirmishers shooting at him, causing much anxiety to the young engineer Lieutenant Edmund Mulcaster. After the second time that Mulcaster brought the situation to Wellington’s attention, he was ordered to chase them away, which he promptly carried out with the assistance of some orderly dragoons.

Landmann’s report on Vimeiro was short and to the point:

I have the honour to report to you that a little after eight o’clock this morning we were attacked by a large force of the enemy said to be about sixteen thousand under the command of General Junot. We obtained a complete victory by 12 o’clock, the enemy having left in the field about 15 pieces of ordnance and a great quantity of ammunition. It is with great regret that I have to report that Lieutenant Wells is missing. I have no doubt of his being a prisoner, for had he been killed or wounded we should have found him, as the field of battle remained in our hands. The last accounts I had of the state of Captain Elphinstone’s wounds were very favourable, and I expect him to be able to return to duty in about a month.¹⁰

There may have been a practical reason why his report was so short. He recorded in his book that it was written in the rain, under an umbrella picked up on the battlefield. Lieutenant Wells had been assigned to General Acland’s brigade and was asked to ride to a unit of Portuguese cavalry to give them orders. Being short-sighted, he got lost and mistook a group of French staff for his intended target, whereupon he was made prisoner. Wells was then taken to Junot and spent the remainder of the battle with the French commander. He remained a prisoner until he was released as part of the terms of the Convention of Cintra.¹¹

Captain Richard Fletcher RE had arrived with Sir Harry Burrard on the eve of Vimeiro but neither got ashore until after the battle. Burrard replaced Wellesley as commander of the army and Fletcher took command of the Royal Engineers. Fletcher, because he was not present at the battle, allowed Landmann the honour of reporting to the Board of Ordnance the victories of Roliça and Vimeiro to the Board of Ordnance.

Elphinstone had held the position of CRE for sixteen days and Landmann for a mere four days. Elphinstone showed his character very early with his annoyance when he discovered a French émigré engineer, Captain Preval, was on board HMS Crocodile with Wellesley and who quite rightly, being his senior, would not accept Elphinstone’s authority. Preval, who was under the command of the Royal Engineers, had been sent out to Lisbon in advance of the main force to evaluate the situation there. Wellington sought his advice when he briefly visited the city and took him on board before returning to Mondego Bay. Elphinstone lost no time writing home reporting the situation and also complained to his wife that it was very ‘shabby’ that Fletcher had been sent out above him. Elphinstone’s reason for requesting leave to go home was more about his injured pride rather than his injured chin.

Issues around seniority were a constant theme for engineer officers in the Peninsula. The senior officer of engineers at any location or an officer acting on his own was entitled to claim the title of Commanding Royal Engineer. This could lead to a greater chance of recognition in dispatches and the potential for brevet promotion in the army lists. Apart from the kudos of commanding, positions of authority also came with increased pay and allowances. This additional pay was significant. Fletcher noted the award of 5s [shillings] per diem command pay in 1808.¹² A captain’s daily pay was 11s, in this case doubled to 22s as engineers received double pay when on active service to help cover their additional costs.¹³ Before Fletcher left England in July 1808, he wrote to his superiors at the Board of Ordnance asking for clarification on his role. He pointed out that Colonel Harding was likely to be appointed to command the Royal Artillery and would be a senior Ordnance officer. He asked for clarification that he would command the engineers with the Army and that this would also be independent of the engineering command at Gibraltar.¹⁴ Fletcher received the confirmation of his appointment as CRE in Spain and Portugal in early September 1808.¹⁵

Why was Richard Fletcher selected for this very important role? This was the biggest expedition organised by the British Army for many years. At first glance the decision seemed odd. Fletcher’s seniority in the Corps was a lowly 24th out of 143. However, when you go through his superiors and strike off those holding senior posts at Ordnance headquarters, those commanding major stations in the UK, those commanding stations abroad, the choice came down to two officers, Robert D’Arcy and Richard Fletcher, with three less likely possibilities (Alexander Bryce, Augustus De Butts and John Rowley). It looks likely that Fletcher was selected as he had the most recent field experience. D’Arcy went on the ill-fated Walcheren campaign in 1809 where he narrowly avoided a court-martial for insubordination but was still offered a baronetcy, something Fletcher did not get until the end of 1812! It should also be noted that some of Fletcher’s superiors were VERY old, with several being over 60. Fletcher was a sprightly 40 years young. It also says something about his views on his duty that despite having lost his wife a few weeks earlier, he left his six children in the care of relatives to go on this expedition.¹⁶

The day after the Battle of Vimeiro, the French asked for a ceasefire to discuss terms for their evacuation of Portugal. These negotiations led to the unpopular Convention of Cintra where the French and their ‘personal possessions’ (in many cases including items stolen from Portugal) were transported home in British ships with no restrictions on the troops serving again. Following widespread outrage at home and in Portugal, the Allied commanders Dalrymple and Burrard, along with Wellesley, were recalled for an inquiry with Sir John Moore taking over command of the Allied army. Under the terms of the Convention, the French troops started to embark at the beginning of September 1808 and Fletcher was assigning his officers to various tasks. These included:

• Trying to obtain maps and plans from the Portuguese archives before the French removed them.

• Ordering plans to be made of the defences at Lisbon and St Julian to the south of Lisbon, St Julian being a possible point of embarkation.

• John Burgoyne ordered to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo to report on the defences.

• John Squire assigned to General Hope’s division that was marching to Elvas to take control of it from the French.

• George Landmann ordered to survey Peniche as a place of defence and possibly for embarkation.

• Peter Patton being ordered to review the defences at Setuval, south of Lisbon, that was also being considered as a point of embarkation for the army.

• Edmund Mulcaster being ordered to survey the Tagus at Villa Velha and Abrantes for possible crossing-points.

In addition Moore had ordered Lieutenant Boothby RE to the Portuguese frontier fortress of Elvas with the party sent to demand the surrender of the French garrison under the terms of the Convention of Cintra. Leading this group was John Colborne who was required to make three journeys between Lisbon and Elvas. At first, the terms were challenged by the French garrison and then the Spanish refused to let the French garrison leave. Boothby took the opportunity to review the defences and look for plans whilst at the fortress.

In early October 1808, the first reports on the roads and rivers were being returned, with details of the routes from Lisbon to Almeida and Abrantes being some of the first received. This was the start of a mapping exercise that would be carried out by Staff Corps, Engineer and QMG’s staff continually to the end of the war. The targets of these surveys quickly spread with reconnaissance in the Alentejo and south of the Tagus towards Setubal.

Advance of Moore’s Force

Sir John Moore was officially confirmed as commander of the Allied forces on 7 October 1808 and immediately started considering how best to support the Spanish armies, an operation that was expected by both the British and Spanish governments. On the 8th, Fletcher reported home that orders had been issued for the advance of Sir John Moore’s army into Spain and most of the engineers would accompany it. Much to their disappointment, Captain Patton and Lieutenants Williams, Stanway and Forster were ordered to remain in Lisbon.¹⁷ Captain Landmann also remained in Lisbon as technically he was part of the Gibraltar garrison and not attached to the army in Portugal. Landmann appeared entirely happy with this arrangement. He always seemed to find a way of not coming under the direct control of any of his seniors, a situation that he used to his advantage throughout the war.

Fletcher’s attention turned to how to move the engineer stores with the army, a task that proved nearly impossible due to the shortage of transport. He expected the Ordnance store ships would move to Corunna or Grijon and, writing home on 22 October, he reported that he could only obtain transport for entrenching tools for 1,000 men.¹⁸ The Army was in a very similar position, with transport only for the most basic supplies.

Moore’s army started its advance from Lisbon on 18 October although the General did not leave Lisbon until the 27th. Fletcher left Lisbon on the 26th, although other engineers were already moving ahead of the army surveying the various routes, e.g. on 1 November, Lieutenant Wells wrote a report on the road from Almaraz to Salamanca.¹⁹ On the same day Fletcher reported that the army was moving to Abrantes and the route from there would depend on the reports that were coming in. However, one important decision had been made, based on inaccurate information on the state of the roads. Burrard had come to the conclusion that the artillery could not follow the route of the army to Ciudad Rodrigo through Coimbra and Almeida and planned to send the artillery via Elvas. Moore came to the same conclusion and made the dangerous decision to split his forces. He sent his artillery protected by Hope’s division, by the main road through Elvas to Almaraz and then north.²⁰ This led to several days’ delay at Salamanca whilst Moore waited for his forces to concentrate. If time had not been so critical and Moore could have justified delaying his advance for a couple of weeks, he would have been in possession of accurate reports on the roads and he would have had more confidence that the artillery could have moved with the army via Coimbra and Ciudad Rodrigo. Having said that, the early surveys by engineer officers warned of the difficulties of moving artillery over the route. John Burgoyne described the roads in the first part of the journey from Lisbon to Coimbra as ‘good’ and ‘frequently extremely fine’. He then reported that they deteriorated:

from Coimbra [towards Almeida] the road is very bad, steep and narrow, and in its present state not practicable for artillery, the country carts do pass it, but with much difficulty that they can scarcely get from Coimbra over the mountains 10 miles in a whole day; from the foot of the mountains the road is bad but passable for carriages.²¹

Fletcher also noted that the few light guns travelling with General Hill ‘will find many difficulties as the roads are said to be almost impassable for carriages of any description’.²² Whilst it may have been possible to move the artillery by the more northerly route, with winter approaching and an inexperienced army and commissariat the decision to send the artillery by the best road may have been the correct one.

Moore arrived in Salamanca on 13 November with Fletcher arriving on the 15th. Moore now waited for his forces to concentrate, most of his infantry arriving by the 23rd, but his artillery did not arrive until early December. He was also waiting for a further 16,000 troops under Sir David Baird which had arrived at Corunna on 13 October but could not get permission to land until the local Junta had received approval from Madrid. Baird finally concentrated his troops at Astorga by 22 November, but by then Moore had decided to retreat and Baird was instructed to head for Vigo to re-embark.

Fletcher, whilst stationed at Salamanca, continued to receive reports from engineer officers on the state of the various roads. This extract from one of Fletcher’s reports indicates the type of activity underway:

I have now sent Captain Burgoyne and Lieutenant Meineke, to reconnoitre the province of Avila, its roads, rivers, bridges etc and Lieutenant Boteler is gone from hence to Zamora, and … will proceed up the Douro as far as he can with safety, to examine that river and the roads leading to and from it. Lieut. Wells arrived this morning, from Elvas, by way of Badajoz, Merida, Truxillo, Almaraz and Plasencia, and he is going on towards Madrid, to meet the head of Lieut.-Gen Hope’s column, and report on the country he has passed through.²³

When he arrived at Avila, Burgoyne heard that General Hope with the cavalry and artillery were at Madrid and, taking the initiative, rode overnight, arriving on 21 November. Burgoyne then worked with Hope’s Quarter Master-General, De Lancey, to plan the route for the artillery over the Guadarrama mountains and on towards Salamanca.²⁴ Lieutenant Meineke, who travelled with Burgoyne, wrote two detailed reports on the route for Fletcher. Whilst Fletcher makes no reference to receiving direct orders from Moore, he was building a detailed picture of the operational environment whether it was ordered or not. Officers had realised very quickly that most of the maps had serious errors. The engineer John Squire remarked:

All the maps of Portugal, particularly in this part of the country, are extremely incorrect, Faden’s last map … is as bad as any of them. The Carta Militar published at Lisbon can never be depended upon. To form a good judgement, it is necessary to actually visit every part of the frontier.²⁵

The activities of the engineer officers over the last three months now meant that the British had detailed descriptions of the area around Lisbon and the three main routes from Lisbon to Elvas, Castello Branco and Coimbra and the routes into Spain via Badajoz to Madrid and Ciudad Rodrigo to Salamanca. There were also reports of the condition of the four border fortresses. We will leave Moore at this time and look at what had been happening in the north of Spain.

Military Liaison in the North of Spain between the British and Spanish

Whilst the main engineering activity was concentrated around the British army in Portugal, a completely separate activity was underway further north. Following the Spanish risings against the French occupation in mid-1808, a number of emissaries had been sent to London to request support from the British government. In the absence of a central Spanish government, which was not formed until late September 1808, in June the British government ordered out a number of military agents ‘acquainted with the Spanish Language’²⁶ to liaise with the Spanish provinces and report on the situation.²⁷ These officers initially arrived in the northern provinces of Asturias and Galicia and then, with more enthusiasm than good sense, encouraged the Spanish into uncoordinated actions against the French with vague promises of British help. They also wrote a stream of misleading reports to the British government, which rapidly regretted these appointments. On 29 August, Canning (Foreign Secretary) wrote to Castlereagh (Secretary of State for War and the Colonies) expressing horror at what Colonel Doyle was promising the Spanish authorities:

Nothing can be more unlucky than the orders which Colonel Doyle has given [to prepare accommodation at Corunna in expectation of the arrival of a British force] … as it appears to excite expectations which will be disappointed, and the disappointment of which may lead to disasters of great extent.²⁸

Realising that the situation in northern Spain needed better control, Generals Leith and Broderick were dispatched in August to Santander and Corunna respectively. Four officers from the Royal Engineers were also appointed under the command of General Leith. These were Captains Charles Lefebure, John Francis Birch, Charles William Pasley and John Thomas Jones. General Leith set out on 17 August, arriving in Santander on the 23rd. Castlereagh’s detailed instructions to Leith were delivered by Lefebure when he and John Jones joined him at Oviedo: ‘This letter will be delivered to you by Captain Lefebure whose talents as an engineer will be of much use in accelerating the survey of the military line of the Asturias and the principality of Santander.’²⁹

The engineers’ orders were to carry out surveys of the northern provinces and report on the state of the Spanish forces. This seems like the same brief that was originally given to the first group of military agents who were now running almost out of control. The main difference was that the engineer officers were clearly under military control.

Leith-Hay, in his Narrative of the Peninsular War,³⁰ responded to what he felt was unjustified criticism by Napier describing the engineer officers as follows: ‘That, in point of zeal, intelligence, military knowledge, or sound judgement, four more distinguished persons could not have been selected from any army … these officers were active and zealous, constantly moving from one point to another.’ Leith-Hay, who was present as ADC to General Leith, went on to remark that finding suitably-qualified persons in the British Army at this time would have been difficult due to the state of practical knowledge (or more precisely, the lack of practical knowledge).³¹ Leith-Hay’s defence of the engineer officers was unnecessary, as Napier’s criticism was almost certainly directed at the originally appointed military agents Doyle, Dyer, Roche, Whittingham and Patrick.

Pasley, who was waiting to sail with Sir David Baird’s force, received orders directly from Castlereagh on 30 August to proceed to Gijon ‘on a particular service’ and set off immediately for Portsmouth, reporting two days later that the fleet was ready to sail as soon as the ‘dollars’ arrived.³² The dollars were of course the funds that the British government were sending out to support the Spanish revolt. Pasley joined General Leith at Oviedo on 11 September.³³

Through the early part of September the engineer officers, Lefebure, Jones and Pasley, stayed close to General Leith as he moved between Oviedo, Gijon and Santander.³⁴ On 20 September, the Spanish under Blake pushed the French out of Bilbao and Lefebure and Jones moved into the town to liaise with the local authorities. At the same time, Pasley was ordered to carry out a survey of the Asturian mountains and Birch was ordered to join the Spanish Army of the Centre under Castaños to report on his intentions and the condition of his army. The French, stung into activity by the advance of the Spanish, regrouped and started closing in on Bilbao. On 26 September, Lefebure and Jones carried out a forward reconnaissance³⁵ and found the French under Marshal Ney advancing on the town, necessitating a rapid withdrawal by the Spanish and the loss of Jones’ baggage.

General Leith, who was present when the French marched back into Bilbao, then went inland to Frias, accompanied by Jones, where he expected to find General Blake. He eventually found him at Lastras de la Torre and having discussed the situation with him, Leith, returned to Santander. Leith-Hay, who was with General Leith, expressed surprise at the lack of knowledge Blake had of the location and movements of the French.³⁶ Meanwhile Pasley had returned from his survey of the Asturian mountains on 30 September, writing a detailed report for General Leith and also later copying it to General Sir David Baird.³⁷

There was now a lull in Spanish activity as their generals and juntas discussed the next steps. Agreements had been made to form three armies: the Army of the Left under Blake around Bilbao and Valmaseda; the Army of the Centre under Pignatelli around Logrono; and the Army of the Right under Castaños between Logrono and Tudela. Another force, mainly levies under Palafox, were around Zaragossa.³⁸ Lefebure wrote an update for the Board of Ordnance on 7 September:

I lay before you a letter from Captain Pasley, in the hope that you will be pleased to find that the officers of your corps are gaining the good wishes of the generals on the spot. General Leith’s statements to Lord Castlereagh are all very flattering to each and every engineer with this mission.³⁹

On 8 October, the Spanish army received some welcome news when HMS Defence arrived at Bilbao with a convoy carrying 9,000 Spanish troops that had been serving in northern Europe with the French.⁴⁰ They had been secretly embarked from Nyborg in Denmark. Unfortunately for them, their commander, General Romana, had travelled separately via London and Corunna. Pasley, commenting on the event, wrote:

I have been here since I wrote you last with Major-General Leith, and have been witness to the happy return of the Spanish army of the north to their country, who are very fine looking and well-disciplined troops. The greatest part is still here either waiting orders from Madrid or the arrival of their general, the Marquis de la Romana. At present they are commanded by the Conde de San Roman, who is a fine soldier-like man. On his arrival he gave out a very impressive order to his troops which was read at the head of each regiment on King Ferdinand’s birthday; A Major of one of the regiments who was reading it was so much affected that he could not proceed. They all seem full of ardour and patriotism and their presence will inspire confidence whatever army they may join.⁴¹

Blake, taking full advantage of his unexpected reinforcements, advanced on Bilbao, pushing the French out again on 11 October.⁴² He then settled into a period of inactivity that allowed the French to regroup and to absorb the large reinforcements that were pouring over the Pyrenees. Jones noted with great satisfaction that the personal possessions that he had lost when the French retook Bilbao on 29 September had been hidden by the Spanish and were returned to him when he went back to his billet.

On 13 October, around 16,000 reinforcements under Sir David Baird arrived at Corunna. Travelling with Baird was Captain James Carmichael-Smyth RE. The junta at Corunna would not let Baird land without permission from the Central Junta at Madrid. Riders were sent for their approval, which was received on the 22nd. Much to his displeasure, Baird was instructed to move his troops in small numbers to limit the impact on the local population. The landings began on 26 October but it was not complete until 13 November, on which day Baird set off for Astorga.⁴³ Like his fellow generals, Baird had sent his engineers forward to reconnoitre the route to Astorga and to review the terrain around Villa Franca ‘with a view to its defence’.⁴⁴

On 21 October, Pasley wrote an update report for the Board of Ordnance in England. Jones, Lefebure and himself were at Santander with General Leith and Birch was attached to Blake’s army to report on its activities. He said that Lefebure had been ordered to go to Bilbao to assist in arming the inhabitants. Pasley went on to express concern on the state of the Spanish armies: ‘That great portion of the Spanish troops, being newly raised, imperfectly disciplined, and officered by peasants, so that you cannot reckon a Spanish army of 30,000 equal to more than a veteran army of 20,000 or less.’⁴⁵ Similar sentiments were expressed by Jones: ‘The new regiments (I mean the armed and organised peasantry) have not sufficient confidence in themselves to contend with the French veterans, and it is to be doubted whether the men are under sufficient command to be kept together should the French follow up.’⁴⁶

Although working completely independently, it is interesting to note that the engineers serving under Leith in the north of Spain were corresponding with Fletcher who was with Moore’s army and we can assume that this information was passed on to Moore.⁴⁷ Moore was expressing concern about the limited information he was receiving from Leith on the activities of the various Spanish forces.

Birch, who had been with Blake for some weeks, was ordered to join the Spanish Army of the Centre under Castaños and find out his intentions. Jones and Pasley were sent to replace him at Blake’s Headquarters. Birch, writing from Burgos in early November, described the formation of a Spanish grand strategy to outflank the French forces. He arrived at Castaños’ headquarters on 27 October and then travelled with him to Saragossa where they met Palafox:

The result of which I understand from General Doyle was that the army of the centre should unite itself to the army of the right on the Aragon near Sanguesa … and that at the same time the army of the left should move along the mountains in the rear of the enemy and form a junction with the two others. General Blake had sent an officer to arrange his movements with General Castaños. He [Doyle] was present when the above measures were decided upon, and told me … that he had little doubt of their success, and hoped to … accompany General Castaños to carry to General Blake the notice of the time when the movements were to commence.⁴⁸

The British military agent Colonel Doyle, who was now using his new honorary Spanish rank of Major-General, claimed the idea for this strategy was his. Birch noted that Doyle was ‘on the most intimate footing’ with Palafox. Birch found the Spanish plans ‘very extraordinary’ and felt ‘the army of the left … would be exposed to entire destruction’, and said he planned to go to Blake ‘to take the liberty of explaining my sentiments’. Before Birch had an opportunity to do this and before the Spanish grand plan had commenced, their moment had passed.

In late October the French reacted to Blake’s further advance. Although Napoleon had ordered that no action should be taken until he arrived, General Lefebvre decided to attack, pushing Blake out of Zornosa on 29 October. Jones, who was present at the battle, reported the action as follows:

It was my fortune to be present in the action, and I have great pleasure in being able to state that the Spanish troops behaved with the greatest gallantry and the success of the French is to be attributed to their superiority in numbers and in artillery, and not at all to their superior courage – the ground having been disputed inch by inch – and when General Blake saw it was useless contending any longer, he took up a new position about two leagues in the rear of his former position, which was occupied with so much skill as to deter the enemy from renewing their attack that afternoon, in the night General Blake drew off all his forces and retreated towards Valmaseda – the retreat was conducted with so much order that no loss was sustained, and scarcely a musquet left behind.⁴⁹

Jones stayed with Blake for a few days after the action reporting on the situation and then returned to Santander. This repulse meant that Bilbao again became indefensible. Captain Lefebure, who had been sent to organise distribution of arms to the Spanish was ordered to send the supply ships back to Santander and then return there himself.⁵⁰

Meanwhile Blake, realising that some of his troops had been cut off by his retreat, pushed forward again on 5 November, allowing the stranded troops to rejoin him. For the next six days the French applied constant pressure on Blake, steadily pushing him back. Birch, who had rejoined Blake’s army, was wounded in a skirmish on the 7th and was shipped out to Corunna.

Despite the best efforts of General Leith, the situation with the Spanish armies remained unclear. Conflicting reports continued to be circulated. Pasley, writing on 7 November, described as ‘absurd’ the report dated 3 November from the British Military Agent, Captain Caroll, saying that Blake had been cut off after the battle at Zornosa on 29 October.⁵¹ Four days later Pasley wrote:

You will recollect my mentioning that we had very desponding accounts from Captain Carroll, who by letter to Gen Leith dated the 3rd instant from Headquarters expressed his fears that the army would be cut off – What grounds he went upon he did not state but the next thing we heard from him was the account of a splendid victory … This morning a dispatch arrived from General Blake who notwithstanding all these favourable accounts it appears has retreated from Valmaseda.⁵²

Moore, who was in the vicinity of Salamanca, needed clear information on the state and intentions of the Spanish armies if he was to have any chance of making a successful strike against the French. This he was not getting. On 16 November, Moore wrote to John Hookham Frere, British Ambassador to the newly-formed Spanish Central Junta, as follows:

Officers employed to correspond, … might have been useful before you or I were sent to Spain … but I … disapprove of any person being authorized to correspond officially with Government but you and me … my wish is to overset the whole system; to send them with their Spanish rank to England, and to send, as they may occasionally be wanted … officers … who will look to no rank or emolument but from their own country, in whose duty they should consider themselves employed.⁵³

Moore clearly had a problem with the British agents being awarded Spanish commissions and the potential conflict of interest that it created. Doyle had been given the honorary Spanish rank of major-general and Caroll was made a lieutenant-colonel.

With Moore arriving in Salamanca and being able to communicate directly with the Central Junta and with the Spanish commanders, the need for a separate military authority in northern Spain came to an end. This seemed to be recognised by both Moore and Leith. Writing on 17 November, Jones, who was still with Leith, reported that Lefebure had been sent to Moore to deliver dispatches and to provide any further information requested. He also reported that Pasley had been sent to join Sir David Baird’s force. Jones then returned to Santander to remove any remaining British money and provisions.⁵⁴ His final task (according to himself) before winding up his military adventures was to return to Corunna and take charge of a delivery of 100,000 dollars for General Romana. Jones recounts leading his forty-mule convoy against the flow of troops heading for Corunna before being dispersed in the disorder at Astorga. He wrote that half was handed over to the British commissary ‘without receipt or acknowledgement’. The other half was thought to be lost but was handed back by the Spaniard in charge of it after the Battle of Vitoria in 1813. The whole story seems implausible if it were not mentioned in a letter to the Board of Ordnance by Pasley.⁵⁵

On 19 November, Moore wrote to John Hookham Frere complaining that he had received no correspondence from Leith ‘who is employed with that army to correspond’. He went on to say that as he had a shortage of general officers, he had ordered Leith to join Baird at Astorga.⁵⁶ Moore’s complaint about the lack of communication from Leith was resolved soon after when Lefebure arrived at Moore’s headquarters to brief him.⁵⁷ Leith had clearly realised his role in northern Spain had come to an end. At the same time that he ordered Lefebure to Moore’s headquarters, he added Jones to his staff as an extra ADC and dispatched Pasley to Astorga. There, Pasley briefed General Craufurd and passed over a dispatch to be sent to Moore at Salamanca (probably a duplicate of the information that Lefebure was delivering in person). Baird then kept Pasley on his staff on account of his knowledge of Spanish. Pasley later transferred on to Moore’s staff for the same reason.

The role of these four engineer officers during the period from September to November 1808 showed their flexibility. Whilst their initial brief was to carry out surveys of the northern Spanish regions, this turned out to be a minimal part of their work. Their primary task was liaison with Spanish military and civilian bodies and accurate evaluation and reporting of the rapidly changing situation. They also became heavily involved in the distribution of arms, supplies and money to the Spanish.

Moore’s Retreat and Corunna

Moore, having arrived at Salamanca on 13 November 1808, now started receiving reports of the reverses suffered by the Spanish armies and also the advance of the French as far as Valladolid, which would threaten his plans to join with Baird. When Moore heard on 29 November of Castaños’ defeat at Tudela, he felt he had no choice but to order a retreat to Lisbon. He urgently needed good intelligence of the position of the advancing French. Amongst others, engineer officers were employed to probe for the French forces. Lieutenant Charles Boothby noted in his diary that he set off on 30 November to reconnoitre north-east towards Valladolid. That morning they met a Spaniard carrying a French requisition for rations and a proclamation from the French announcing the defeat of Castaños. He continued out in advance for some days before joining General Paget at Villapando on 17 December 1808.⁵⁸

In the first days of December Moore had communications from Castaños informing him that he was reforming his army, and from Stuart and Hookham Frere, who were both strongly against Moore’s retreat. Also Moore finally met up with his artillery on 4 December at Alba de Tormes. The claims that the Spanish intended to defend Madrid swayed Moore to make one last effort on their behalf. He recalled Baird to Astorga and then planned a move north to Zamora and Toro. Even whilst cautiously moving forward, Moore made plans and arranged depots in case a retreat was needed. Corunna and Vigo were being considered as likely points of retreat. On 14 December, he learned from a captured French dispatch, that Soult was unsupported and moved his forces against him. Lieutenant Charles Boothby RE, who was attached to the reserve under Paget, excitedly reported on 19 December ‘Sir John [Moore] dines with General Paget, Battle is the word!’.⁵⁹ Two days later, Paget’s cavalry surprised and dispersed the French cavalry at Sahagun. Three days later, when about to launch his offensive against Soult, Moore received information that Napoleon was advancing north to cut off his retreat.

Realising the danger, Moore immediately ordered the retreat, with Allied and French forces racing each other in terrible weather to the river Esla around Benavente. The first of the Allied troops crossed the river on 26 December. The following day, most of the infantry were across the river and work started on destroying the bridge, which was blown on the morning of the 29th. The bridge was prepared for destruction by the Royal Engineers, Burgoyne’s biography reporting that the destruction was left to the last moment to allow stragglers to cross with ‘the French cavalry reaching the farther end of it before Burgoyne exploded the charge’.⁶⁰ Boothby noted that he rode with a message for Moore ‘through devilish rain and numbing wind’. He spent the night of 28 December sawing through the woodwork with ‘cursed saws that refused to do their duties’ and setting fire to the buildings on the enemy side of the bridge.⁶¹

On the morning of the 29th, General Lefebvre-Desnoettes’ cavalry of the Guard managed to find a ford over the river but were repulsed by the British cavalry, Lefebvre-Desnoettes himself being captured. While the French failed to cross the river Esla at Benavente, they succeeded further north at Mansilla. The weather remained very bad with snow and rain hampering every step of the journey. Moore ordered a further retreat to Villa Franca on 30 December, with discipline in the Allied army disintegrating. Fortunately, the rearguard under Paget kept the French at bay all the way to Corunna where the Allies turned to face their pursuers, the French having refused a similar challenge at Lugo.

On 30 December, Moore had ordered a number of engineer officers ahead of the army to survey routes and more importantly provide information on where Moore’s force should retire to. The original plan was to retire to Vigo and that was where the Allied transports had been sent. However, Corunna was also being considered. Fletcher rode with Edmund Mulcaster to Corunna and Captain John Burgoyne RE headed for Vigo, both producing reports for Moore. Fortescue wrote that Moore reviewed the engineer reports on 4 January 1809 and determined on falling back on Corunna although the reports from Fletcher and Burgoyne are dated later.⁶² Interestingly, Captain John Birch RE, who was at Corunna recovering from his wounds, commented:

From what I have seen of this place, I may venture to say that it is an exceedingly bad and improper one for the re-embarkation of the Corps of the Army pursued by the enemy; the fortifications of the town are indefensible, and defenceless, and were the town in the hands of the enemy, the citadel would be presently untenable, and it would be difficult if not impossible to embark from it. The bay is commanded from all the shore around it, which might expose the shipping to the enemy’s fire from thence, and the vessels might be detained in the harbour under it by a contrary wind.⁶³

Also on 30 December, Lieutenant Charles Boothby RE and Lieutenant William Forster RE were ordered to

obtain the correct information of any movements of the enemy from Benavente towards Orense and to transmit the same by the most expedition and secure route to Sir John Moore. Also to endeavour to induce the Spanish troops now at or near Sanabria to defend the passes as long as possible, and also to defend the fortress of Puebla and that of Monterey, and throw every impediment in the way of the advance of the enemy.⁶⁴

The orders from George Murray, the Quarter Master General, also included instructions to order a party from the 76th Regiment to retire from Monterey and any supplies there to be removed or destroyed. Boothby carried out his orders and then rejoined the army in time to be present at the Battle of Corunna.

Fletcher remained in the vicinity of Corunna and began work on the defences, starting at the village of Betanzos. Orders were given to destroy one of the bridges at Betanzos, mine the other and also mine a third bridge at El Burgo. Mulcaster, who carried out the work at the latter on 10 January, noted ‘the pavement [was] so hard and well laid as to turn all the picks’. Mulcaster noted with satisfaction that the 3cwt (150kg) of gunpowder ‘answered perfectly’. The general view of the engineers involved in this task was that their limited operational experience and training in destroying bridges led to numerous failures. Charles Pasley, who went on to form and command the School of Military Engineering from 1812, wrote ‘all attempts to blow up stone bridges … made by officers of the Corps, myself amongst others, failed … with the exception of only one, which Lieutenant Davy … succeeded in completely destroying, but at the expense of his own life, which he lost from not understanding the very simple precautions necessary’. Mulcaster noted that Davy ‘was killed by the explosion of it going off immediately on his lighting the portfire’. The blowing of the other bridge at Betanzos failed when one of the two charges was displaced when the first went off. The French cavalry had to be removed from the bridge before the mine could be re-laid and blown again at 8 p.m. on 11 January.⁶⁵ A few days earlier Captain Evelegh RA noted ‘we retired over a bridge which Pasley attempted to blow up, but did not succeed. Chester and Barlow remained with two guns to defend the blowing up of the bridge.’⁶⁶

Over the next few days the engineer officers were involved in strengthening the defences at Corunna and destroying stores. Mulcaster wrote in his diary on 13 January 1809, ‘The transports came in sight and some of them anchored in the evening. Hard at work making cask traverses; laying platforms’. Boothby noted on the day of the battle that he was ‘charged with the erection of a battery in the town’. When the firing started, having not taken part in a battle before, he managed to obtain a horse and joined General Hope’s party, Moore and Baird having already been wounded. Boothby’s description of the role of an engineer in battle is worth repeating as it will happen again many times throughout the war: ‘An engineer has no appropriate place or defined duty in an open battle, but he is always acceptable in the field if mounted, because he is generally a good sensible smart fellow that looks about him, and is trustworthy in the communication and explanation of orders.’⁶⁷ He goes on to describe how he ‘was very glad to find myself so little disturbed by the whizzing of the balls’. Mulcaster was not so fortunate, complaining ‘Being nailed in the citadel and now dismounted I could not go into the action, a circumstance I shall regret to the last hour of my life’. The day after the battle, Boothby claimed that he and General Hope were the last two to embark after all other troops had been loaded on to the transports.

The end of January 1809 saw the British army returning to England in a sorry state. Many saw Moore’s campaign as a humiliating defeat, but it had in fact achieved its objective, which was to disrupt the French aims in the Iberian Peninsula. Without the British intervention, it was likely that Portugal and Spain would be fully under French control. The British army still had a foothold in Lisbon and were much better prepared for the following years’ campaign through accurate information on the geography of Portugal and western Spain. The Portuguese and Spanish governments were also turning their thoughts to resisting the French. As the Battle of Corunna was being fought, other engineer officers were setting off for the Peninsula. Captain Stephen Chapman wrote that a fleet of forty transports, with six engineer officers on board, had set off from Spithead on 14 January destined for Lisbon.⁶⁸