Whilst there is no doubt that this bridging work was essential, Mackenzie had unwittingly set off an internal disagreement about seniority. As Fletcher had noted in his letter of 23 September, Landmann was not part of his command and had been ordered back to his official role as part of the Gibraltar garrison. The commander-in-chief at that time, Sir Hew Dalrymple, had ‘expressed himself in strong terms of approbation as to the zeal, activity and intelligence with which he had acted during the period he had served with this army’.³ A few days later Fletcher reported that Landmann had been ordered to carry out a survey of Peniche before he returned to Gibraltar. Four weeks later, on 21 October, Fletcher wrote again to Landmann, asking for copies of his report to be sent to England and also left with Captain Patton at Lisbon. On 26 November Fletcher again asked for the report on Peniche and said that the Inspector-General of Fortifications had ordered that Landmann proceed ‘to Gibraltar at the first opportunity’.⁴ On receiving Mackenzie’s order to work on the bridges over the Tagus, Landmann wrote to Captain Peter Patton, the senior engineer at Lisbon, assuming command of the engineering activities at Lisbon and ordering Patton, who was working on the defences at Setuval, to return to Lisbon.⁵ This left Patton in a difficult position and when Landmann did not communicate any further, he was left with no choice but to raise the matter with the commander-in-chief at Lisbon and subsequently with the Board of Ordnance. On 21 January 1809, Patton wrote that Landmann had confirmed to Sir John Craddock that he had been ordered to return to Gibraltar and he was to be considered ‘unattached to the army’.⁶ Landmann appeared to have an ability to slip through the command net and, writing to his commander at Gibraltar on 21 February apologising ‘after so long a silence’, he explained he was now at Cadiz with General Mackenzie.

Landmann now became involved in the unrest at Cadiz where the population, fearful of a French attack, were objecting to the authorities’ refusal to allow British troops to land. The Spanish were still suspicious of British intentions and were reluctant to allow their troops into the city. Unfortunately they did not want to make this public due to the popular unrest. To prove they did not need British aid, they had marched in Spanish troops, but when the population discovered that the regiment was full of French deserters, they rioted. The compromise agreed between the British and Spanish authorities was to appoint two British officers to speak to the population and appease their fears. General Mackenzie described the situation:

… [A] deputation of Spanish arrives at the British consul’s residence and said the population were ‘extremely tumultuous’ because they thought the city had been betrayed and the only way to appease them would be a declaration from the British that they would assist in the defence of the town and appoint two officers (one of them artillery) to assist the Spanish defenders. I in consequence sent Captain Landmann of the Royal Engineers and Lieutenant Wills of the Royal Artillery to the Governor about 9 o’clock in the evening.⁷

The actions of these two officers appeared to have the required effect and in gratitude Landmann was given a lieutenant colonel’s commission in the Spanish army. Writing to Mackenzie, Frere, the British Ambassador, reported:

I have according to your desire procured the rank of Lieutenant Colonel for Captain Landmann, and intend to apply for additional rank for Lieutenant Wills. I should hope that you might be able to dispense with the services of these two officers, who may be so usefully employed in the situation to which they have been invited.⁸

A few days later, Landmann turned up at Seville, with Captain Henry Evatt RE, who was stationed there, noting that he did not know why Landmann had arrived. Writing in April, Evatt reported that Landmann had still not returned to Gibraltar. Landmann is one of those interesting characters who plays a role in many events but does not appear to be under the direct control of anyone. He was at Cadiz for most of the period up to mid-1810, when he returned to England for the recovery of his health. He did return to the Peninsula and spent several months in some vague Military Agent role, until he was ordered home by Lord Liverpool personally. In true Landmann style, he wrote from Corunna that he would do so, as soon as he had returned some papers in his possession to Cadiz!⁹

Evatt, along with Lieutenant Hustler RE, had been sent from the Gibraltar garrison to Seville at the request of John Hookham Frere ‘to aid in forming the defences’.¹⁰ His initial report on the activities of the Spanish was pessimistic:

On my arrival here, they were supplying a working party of about four hundred men constructing a breastwork around the town under the direction of a Brigadier-General and colonel of engineers, but in my opinion the work was inadequate to any kind of defence as the parapet was not more than four feet thick … [I recommended] not less than 5,000 men [are required] so as to carry on the whole with vigour, but from the unaccountable stupor of the supreme junta it was not till last night I could get any satisfactory compliance.¹¹

Captain Patton appears again in Board of Ordnance correspondence in February 1809, when the other tricky issue of inter-service co-operation was raised. Patton had jointly signed a report on the defences around Lisbon with Major Worthy of the Royal Staff Corps. This generated a query from the Master-General:

The report was signed first by Major Worthy, and under his signature that of Captain Patton appeared. The Master-General could not avoid considering this measure rather out of rule, as he is not aware of any other instance when the Corps of Royal Engineers and Staff Corps were blended in a professional report; His Lordship can readily understand that the Commander of the forces in Portugal might require the opinions of Captain Patton and Major Worthy on questions of position; but it occurs to the Master-General that their sentiments should have been submitted in distinct reports, unless Lieutenant General Sir J Craddock should have ordered the report to be signed by both these officers, in which case or even under any view, it was the duty of Captain Patton to have stated all the circumstances that accompanied this transaction.¹²

This response showed the sensitivity at home about the potentially conflicting roles of the Royal Engineers and the Royal Staff Corps. In the field, there appeared to be a more pragmatic approach, where they remained on amicable terms and in the subsequent campaigns often worked together. Having finished his work around Lisbon and Setuval, Patton was then sent to Abrantes in April 1809 to assist the Portuguese in the defence of the bridge and the castle.¹³

At the end of the last chapter it was mentioned that Captain Stephen Chapman was ordered to Lisbon and had set sail on 14 January 1809. Whilst he had been ready at Portsmouth since 28 December 1808, bad weather delayed his arrival in Lisbon until 5 March. With him travelled Captain Henry Goldfinch and Lieutenants Anthony Emmett, Edward Fyers, Rice Jones and Alexander Thomson. Already at Lisbon were the engineers Captain Patton, Lieutenants Emmett and Williams and also Lieutenant Wedekind of the King’s German Legion. The fleet that brought Chapman to Lisbon also contained a force under General Sherbrooke that was expected to move swiftly on to Cadiz. Sir John Craddock, commanding at Lisbon, asked Chapman to assign engineer officers to join Sherbrooke’s force ‘at a moment’s notice’ and Goldfinch, Wedekind and Thomson were assigned.¹⁴ Two weeks later the situation had changed, with news of Soult crossing the northern Portuguese border and advancing on Oporto. Chapman reported that:

In consequence of the commands of Lieutenant General Sir John Craddock, I have directed Captain Goldfinch and Lieutenant Thomson to proceed to Oporto with all possible dispatch. Captain Goldfinch will take upon himself the command of the Engineer department and has been directed to put the city in such a state of defence as circumstances will permit.¹⁵

There were few trained troops in the north and the militia and civilian defenders were swept aside with terrible casualties. On 29 March, Soult took Oporto and Goldfinch and Thomson were taken.

In the same letter above, written on 22 March 1809, Chapman explained the other tasks that were ordered:

Lieutenant Jones and Stanway are gone into the interior for the purpose of ascertaining whether gunboats can act with effect up the Tagus upon the flanks of an army as far as Santarem, and whether carronades in ships’ launches will be beneficial as far up as Abrantes. I have also directed Lieutenant Jones to examine the Zezere where it joins the Tagus, and to proceed from there by Thomar as far as Leyria and to report to me in writing on his return, the result of his observations upon these positions. Lisbon is to be placed immediately in a state of defence and a project has been presented to General Beresford by the Portuguese Chief Engineer for that purpose … [the plan has] been submitted for my opinion; I have therefore been employed upon the examination of the several points upon the ground and I hope to make a beginning to the works immediately.¹⁶

The work described above appears to fit some of the components of what would become the Lines of Torres Vedras. Gunboats on the Tagus below Santarem were certainly a feature of the scheme. Lieutenant Rice Jones was a twenty-year-old Welshman. He was offered the Adjutancy of the Corps in Lisbon, which whilst it meant extra work, also meant extra pay which was very useful when buying the necessaries for campaign. He commented that Chapman had paid fifty guineas for a horse and he paid only slightly less. This was three months’ pay for a captain, and five months’ pay for a lieutenant! Jones wrote home saying that his survey of the Tagus required riding 270 miles and as had been discovered by other engineer officers, wearing his blue uniform was risky as he was often taken for a Frenchman. Jones also noted that ‘I am extremely glad I went as in the event of our being obliged to evacuate this country, I may not have another opportunity of seeing it’. His view on the likely outcome of the campaign against the French was shared by many others. Although Jones initially expected Chapman to accompany him, ‘he [Chapman] was detained in Lisbon commencing batteries on both sides of the Tagus’.¹⁷ Jones noted with regret that both himself and Chapman lost their additional pay when Fletcher arrived on 23 April to take command of the Royal Engineers and appointed Edmund Mulcaster to the post of Adjutant.

On 22 February a number of officers in England received preparatory orders from the Board of Ordnance for foreign service ‘at the shortest notice’. This included Fletcher, Burgoyne, Squire, Pasley, Boothby and Mulcaster.¹⁸ Fletcher immediately set to work trying to equip his engineer force for the return to the Peninsula.

As I am ordered to prepare for foreign service, I beg to submit for your consideration the expediency of being supplied with the following maps – the map of the Pyrenees about to be published by Arrowsmith which will include the provinces of Aragon, Catalonia, Navarre and Biscay. The map of Portugal by Lopez – the Mentelle map of Spain. The best plan extant of Cartagena and Barcelona and also that of Cadiz by Faden. I would further request that the following instruments etc. may be sent with the engineers department should it meet your approbation. One barometer, three small theodolites, three small sextants, six pocket compasses with sights, a proportion of stationary, ten quires of oiled tracing paper.¹⁹

William Fadden, the famous map-maker, wrote personally to the Board of Ordnance, saying that he could not provide the Lopez maps of Portugal and offered the Jefferey map as an alternative.²⁰ Other maps and plans were provided from the personal collection of Lieutenant Colonel Frederick W. Mulcaster RE, who had been in Lisbon in 1797 and ‘took them by stealth’. Fletcher also asked for a small detachment of twenty Royal Military Artificers to be attached to the expedition. This was clearly approved as Fletcher noted that a detachment was present on his arrival in Lisbon on 2 April. With Fletcher were Captain Burgoyne and Lieutenants Boothby, Hamilton and Mulcaster. Sir Arthur Wellesley would not arrive for another three weeks. What is interesting to note is that two experienced engineer officers who were included in the preparatory orders, Charles Pasley and John Squire, did not sail. Both of these officers subsequently went on the Walcheren campaign later in the year. What is not clear is whether their orders were changed or whether they tried to avoid going to the Peninsula as it was seen as a lost cause.

On arrival in Lisbon, Fletcher had to quickly get up to speed on the activities of the Portuguese government, the British commander and the engineer officers who had preceded him. He found that two of his engineers who had been sent to assist in strengthening the defences of Oporto had been captured when it was overrun by the French. Other engineer officers were working on Portuguese proposals to fortify Lisbon. He reported ‘The outer line is I fear very extensive but I have not been over the ground’.²¹ Writing a few days later, Fletcher’s opinion had not changed:

I do not think there is any good point of retreat for an army near Lisbon, as there is no work or position in which a moderate rear guard could effectually cover the embarkation of the main body, if closely pursued. Positions are to be taken in front of the town but I feel they are too extensive to be defended by the present British force, and on the discipline and firmness of the Portuguese but little reliance can be placed – they are now deserting by whole regiments – The tract of country to be enclosed within the positions will, I should imagine, be quite insufficient to subsist the inhabitants of this populous city, and therefore once completely invested they must soon be compelled to surrender as I do not conceive they could bring any considerable supplies by water when an enemy possesses the left bank of the Tagus.²²

His initial pessimistic view was based on two points that eventually proved erroneous. The first point was that the Portuguese army and militia would be incapable of playing their part in the defence of Portugal. Fletcher’s view on the quality of the Portuguese troops was common amongst the British officers, Jones commenting ‘I am of opinion we shall embark and leave the French in quiet possession of Lisbon, for I fear we can place but little reliance on the Portuguese fighting’. The second point was that the French would take possession of the south bank of the Tagus, meaning that supplies could not be brought in by sea. This concern was also shared by Wellesley who wrote on 9 April 1809, just before he left for Portugal, ‘I have long determined to fortify the heights of Almada, so as to be able to hold them with a small body of men, as the first step I should take on my arrival’.²³ This was eventually done, but not for another eighteen months.

Fletcher commented again a few days later on the planned fortification of Lisbon:

The Portuguese are doing little or nothing to their entrenchments immediately covering the town of Lisbon. Sir John Craddock considers the fortifying and defending this line as exclusively a concern of their own. Upon an extent of six miles they have now a hundred and sixty nine men employed though I have [stated] in the strongest way the necessity of having at least some thousands constantly at work if they mean to fortify it. I have twice seen their Minister at War who promises great things; but I confess I have but little confidence of any good effects from his exertions. I have Lieutenant Wedekind in Lisbon to assist the Portuguese engineers.²⁴

Fletcher initially formed a good working relationship with Sir John Craddock, commenting ‘I have the pleasure of being on the best possible terms with Sir John Craddock, and Mr Villiers [Envoy to the Court of Portugal] certainly treats me with the most unlimited confidence. He and the General do not, perhaps pull remarkably well together, so that I hardly know how to manage between them.’²⁵

Most engineer officers were assigned to the army brigades, but Fletcher did not assign Chapman as he found him very useful and wanted him to stay close to headquarters. Mulcaster was also attached to headquarters as Adjutant. Burgoyne and Boothby were assigned to the right column under General Mackenzie, Williams to the centre column and Hamilton and Rice Jones to the left column. Jones had been originally ordered to remain in Lisbon and work on the defences, much to his disappointment, but Chapman had taken up his case and persuaded Fletcher to send Lieutenant Wedekind back to Lisbon and allow Jones to join Murray’s brigade. In a youthful show of ingratitude, Jones now applied to be assigned to the cavalry brigade of Major-General Cotton as he thought ‘he should like the active service of a dragoon brigade’.²⁶

Craddock started moving his troops north out of Lisbon, establishing his headquarters at Sobral, and Fletcher travelled with him, stopping at Runa on 15 April and Caldas the next day. On 18 April, Fletcher rode to Peniche, with a caustic comment in Mulcaster’s diary that they ‘could not find the level country mentioned by Landmann to exist near this place’.²⁷ This I assume is a reference to the report that Landmann was ordered to produce in 1808 and took some months to be completed. Chapman and Mulcaster were sent to repair a bridge on the army’s route to Alcobaça, but finding it could not be repaired to take the weight of artillery they improved the riverbed at the nearby ford. By 23 April the advance guard under General Hill had reached Pombal. News now arrived that Wellesley was at Lisbon. Fletcher was anxious about how he would get on with Wellesley, writing:

As an individual I am not glad of the change as nothing can exceed the kindness and attention shown me by Sir John Craddock; and as I rather think that any engineer is not likely to be taken into the confidence of his successor. I confess should I not be employed or considered at all. I should be most heartily glad to be removed from this situation, altogether. I find Elphinstone was hardly ever spoken to. However, I hope and trust I may be mistaken.²⁸

Writing a few days after Wellesley’s arrival, Fletcher was clearly still very concerned about how he could work with him: ‘Sir Arthur is very civil to me, but I do not think I shall ever be so much in his confidence … From what I saw in Zealand I do not believe that Sir A attaches much importance to our department.’²⁹

The value of Captain Chapman had been recognised by others and Beresford asked for him to be sent back to Lisbon to co-ordinate the defence of the capital. Wellesley noted in his dispatches, ‘I have sent two officers of Engineers with orders respecting the defence of Lisbon, the Tagus, Palmela and Setuval’.³⁰ Chapman’s brief also included working on the embarkation point at St Julian, a task that was assigned to the second officer, Lieutenant Anthony Emmett. According to Burgoyne this order was to ‘their great annoyance’.³¹

Wellington joined the army at Coimbra on 2 May for the advance on Oporto. He believed that the capital was safe for the moment and he could concentrate his forces against Soult without any chance of support reaching the French. They advanced with minor skirmishing until 11 May, when there was more determined resistance around Grijó before the French retired across the Douro into Oporto, burning the boat bridge behind them.

On 12 May, Fletcher and his adjutant, Lieutenant Edmund Mulcaster, rode to Oporto ahead of the army to obtain intelligence and then remained with Wellesley during the assault. Burgoyne and Rice Jones moved upriver towards Avintes with General Murray’s brigade to look for boats or crossing-points. The French clearly thought they were safe, with the Douro, 250 yards wide at this point, between the opposing forces, but in an area where boats were used for most transport it was inevitable that some would be found. The inattention of the French just made it easier. Several engineer officers were present at the battle with only one casualty, Lieutenant George Hamilton. Mulcaster recorded ‘He had been sent by General Murray to post the German Riflemen – on his return he met the cavalry on the road about [to] charge. He knew it was impossible to get by them therefore turned about and was the first man wounded at their head’.³² A musket ball passed through one thigh, lodging in the second. It was eventually removed but Hamilton never fully recovered from his wounds and died a year later at Lisbon.

Fletcher took command of replacing the boat bridge at Oporto and work was started that night. With assistance from a number of the Royal Military Artificers the bridge was completed on the following evening.³³ The other good news following the capture of Oporto was that the engineer officers Captain Goldfinch and Lieutenant Thomson managed to escape from the French in the confusion. The Allied army pursued the retreating French until 18 May when they abandoned almost all their equipment to avoid being surrounded, Burgoyne and Mulcaster reporting repairing a bridge near Ruivães to assist the pursuit.