To complement the work to make the defences as difficult as possible for the French to attack, significant work was also expended on roads and bridges. In front of the Lines, roads and bridges were broken up or mined to inhibit French movement, while behind them roads were built or improved and bridges repaired to facilitate the movement of Allied troops. Wellington intended to keep the bulk of his regular troops mobile to react to any attack and was able to move his troops faster than the French could.

The Lines were also part of a wider defensive network in southern Portugal. Setuval to the south of Lisbon was strengthened as a potential embarkation point, as was Peniche. Abrantes was strengthened to deny access to the French both to the locality for supplies and to the major crossing-point on the Tagus. Whilst the French were in front of the Lines, Abrantes and Peniche were used to launch attacks on French convoys and foraging parties. Work on strengthening these three towns was under way long before work on the Lines themselves began.

Timeline for the Building of the Lines of Torres Vedras

October 1809	First visit by Wellington accompanied by Fletcher
20 October 1809	Memorandum from Wellington to Fletcher on the lines
November 1809	Work started on redoubts at St Julian, Sobral and Torres Vedras
February 1810	Second visit by Wellington. Work at Castanheira scrapped
February 1810	Work started on defences of the passes
April 1810	New redoubts 103–108 started at St Julian
25 June 1810	Fletcher reports that 108 redoubts are complete
6 July 1810	John T. Jones left in charge of construction work
July 1810	New redoubts 114–120 started at Alhandra
August 1810	Works at Setuval completed
August 1810	Further work agreed at St Julian
September 1810	New redoubts 121–124 started at Calahandrix
September 1810	Final clearance work commenced
8 October 1810	Allied army entered lines
11 October 1810	Masséna arrives before lines at Sobral
October 1810	New redoubts 128–130 started at Monte Agraça
10 December 1810	Work started on defences on south of Tagus
1811	New redoubts 131–144 started
July 1811	Four permanent jetties built at St Julian

The majority of the work to build the Lines was carried out by Portuguese civilians, generally under the control of officers of the British or King’s German Legion Engineers. Two militia regiments were involved from the start to provide labour. As the scale and urgency of the work grew, thousands of Portuguese civilians were conscripted to help. There were constant problems with getting sufficient labour and there were numerous complaints to the Portuguese Secretary of War about the local governors and town officials not providing the required numbers.

As well as the small number of engineer officers, never exceeding twenty, there was a similarly tiny number of Royal Military Artificers. An additional number of tradesmen were provided through volunteers from the British line regiments stationed at Lisbon, although this number never exceeded 150. Spread in one and twos across the works, at the peak of activity they managed the work of several thousand Portuguese.

According to John Jones, the historian of the building of the Lines, there were very few Portuguese engineer officers involved in the construction. Fletcher’s letter passing command of the construction to Jones, names three of them.¹⁷ The Portuguese have a different view and claim that many more were involved. It is highly likely that this was the case as their local knowledge, language and understanding of the culture would have made managing the authorities and population much easier. My research had identified several other Portuguese engineers who worked on the Lines at some stage during their construction. This does not include those working directly on the defences around the city of Lisbon. Mulcaster names two engineers officers not mentioned by Jones, and Rice Jones a third. On 12 November 1809, Mulcaster wrote that:

I forgot to tell you I have an old Captain of Portuguese Engineers here under my orders. He complained to Thomson that I don’t tell him my plans. I must treat him with more confidence in the future. I think I have been too civil and formal with him … There is a [Portuguese] Major at Sobral under their orders [that is, of Williams and Forster]. We don’t treat our allies with much respect.¹⁸

The officer working for Mulcaster was Captain Bellegarde and the officer working for Williams was probably either Major Lourenco Homem da Cunha D’Eça, or Major Manuel Joaquim Brandaão de Sousa. The issue of ranks is interesting as it is unlikely that a major in the Portuguese engineers would agree to work under a British captain. Wellington was clear that he expected the most senior officer to command although there was always some ability to be flexible in its application. It is more likely that the Portuguese major was under the direct command of Fletcher or his Portuguese superiors and not Captain Williams.

Although the conscription of Portuguese civilians was compulsory, the workers were paid. Men women and children were employed, with differing levels of pay. Whilst the money was probably gratefully accepted by the displaced civilians, many of the labourers were from the surrounding villages, and were taken away from their normal employment in the fields. As the numbers grew it became more difficult for the civilians to find food. Eventually, they were also provided with rations, which were of course deducted from their pay. The engineer officers found themselves single-handedly managing not only the engineering work on the Lines, but also the administrative side of obtaining, feeding and paying the workers. This put an additional demand on their already limited resources. Eventually, commissariat staff were appointed to undertake the administrative duties, leaving the engineers to concentrate on their proper priorities.

The engineer John Squire writing to Henry Bunbury, Undersecretary of State for War, on 27 May 1810, reported nearly seventy redoubts had been constructed including the major forts at Torres Vedras and Sobral. By 25 June, Fletcher was reporting to Wellington that 108 forts had been completed.¹⁹ This was a considerable achievement in about eight months and averaged about three forts per week. A week later, Fletcher wrote home updating the Board of Ordnance on his progress. His letter is really surprising in that he was still uncertain that the Lines could be defended, writing:

The length of the lines to be defended is however so great that but a small proportion of them can be occupied by troops, and as the ground is in many places practicable for artillery … and in general very easy for infantry to pass over, I do not feel sure to say that against any superior numbers we are by any means secure.²⁰

With the work progressing well, Fletcher and Chapman left Lisbon to join Wellington’s army on 6 July and Captain John T. Jones was left in charge of completing the works with full authority. The work was not without its difficulties in dealing with civilians who were unhappy about the damage to their land and possessions. Most civilians were given no choice (e.g. the destruction of mills) but some had to be handled with more consideration. On 12 July, Jones reported:

I am going to Via Longa to examine into a complaint by the Marchioness of Abrantes of the injury we are doing to her salt pans. I have in consequence of a memorandum from Mr Stewart stopped the cut and will after seeing it again make some proposition to you for another expedient if I find I cannot give the cut a direction by which it shall do no harm to the pans.

The problem was resolved to everyone’s satisfaction, as Jones reported a few days later:

Arranged with Stanway to widen and deepen an old ditch which crosses the whole breadth of the ground a few yards in advance of the salt pans of the marchioness of Abrantes and which I think will answer every purpose of the originally requested cut without causing the slightest damage to the property of anyone.²¹

After the disaster at Almeida (see next chapter), Fletcher wrote to Jones on 29 August, saying movement towards the Lines had started and that they should be made ready for immediate occupation.²² Fletcher identified completion of the defensive works around the embarkation point at St Julian as a priority.²³ Two days later, after he had discussed the situation further with Wellington, Fletcher wrote again to Jones asking for the abatis to be formed by felling trees, for several bridges and roads that had been previously identified to be mined, and for ammunition to be moved into the forts. Wellington still held back on breaking the banks of the Tagus to flood the salt pans at Via Longa, but a week later, on 7 September, he gave the order to do so. Between July and October 1810, around 50,000 trees were felled for use in the Lines.

As we now know, the French did not move directly on Lisbon and another three months was gained to work on the defences. This time was used primarily to strengthen the first line to a point where it would stop the French rather than just delay them. The scale of the works completed when the lines were occupied was 126 redoubts with 427 guns requiring 30,000 men, plus the thirteen forts at St Julian which housed a further 94 guns and 5,350 men.²⁴ By 1812 the number of forts had grown to 152 redoubts with 524 guns requiring 34,000 men, excluding the fortifications to the south of the Tagus where another seventeen forts were erected.

In December 1810 Captain Goldfinch RE, assisted by Rice Jones, started work on redoubts to the south of the Tagus comprising of seventeen redoubts and repairs to the castle at Almada.²⁵ The original plan had been for thirty-five of them,²⁶ but this was considered excessive and was cut back. The works to the south of the Tagus had been under consideration for some time. Wellington had originally intended to do it in April 1809 but did not. He wrote to Admiral Berkeley in March 1810 on the subject, referring to a report from Fletcher.²⁷ Fletcher’s letters from early 1809 also mention the threat to the south of the Tagus. What is not clear is, if Wellington expected a French attack on Portugal to use both sides of the river Tagus, why did he leave reinforcing the south side so late?

Improvements and repairs went on throughout the war. As many of the redoubts were built of earth, the heavy rains took their toll, and keeping the defences in good condition took constant attention. Even through the first winter of 1810, there are numerous comments on having to repair the defences. As late as February 1811, Fletcher reported there were still ‘several thousands of workmen employed’.²⁸ Whilst the Lines were never used again, Wellington had greater confidence to press the French knowing that he had an impregnable position he could retire to if the need arose.

Before moving on from the building of the Lines of Torres Vedras, I am going to review some particular aspects of them.

The Portuguese Thought of it First, or Did They?

There were two contemporary proposals for the defence of Lisbon that are frequently mentioned. The first was prepared by the French engineer officer Vincent for Junot after he arrived in Lisbon in 1807. This report focusses on the defence of the city and the harbour by fortifying both banks of the Tagus. It does not really cover the hills to the north of Lisbon. The second was prepared by the Portuguese engineer, José Maria Neves Costa, for the Portuguese government. Neves Costa produced the report in May 1809 describing his plans for the defence of Lisbon and subsequently claimed that the original idea was his.

There is certainly evidence that the Portuguese were working on defensive positions around Lisbon in early 1809, but that is not to confirm that they were working on the proposals made by Neves Costa. However, I have to say that I think it is possible. Stephen Chapman, the Commanding Royal Engineer, reported as early as March 1809 that the Portuguese Chief Engineer had presented a proposal for the defence of Lisbon to Beresford.²⁹ It is probable that Wellington was aware of the earlier plans of Vincent and Costa but he never acknowledged that they were the basis of his proposals in 1809.

The Portuguese certainly believe that Neves Costa had a role in the development of the proposals for the defence of Lisbon and that his contribution has been overlooked. The memorial erected to Fletcher by the Portuguese Engineers in 1911 has two plaques on its base, one to Fletcher and one to Neves Costa.

Who Led the Work on Building the Lines?

Mistakenly, the credit tends to be given to John Jones (working under Fletcher) as he published the comprehensive book on the subject. But the majority of the work was overseen by Captain Stephen Remnant Chapman. He had been involved from the very start, arriving in Portugal on 4 March 1809. He was the Commanding Royal Engineer until Fletcher arrived on 2 April and was working on the defences from that time. By July 1810, when he handed over to John Jones, much of the planned work planned originally had been completed. Jones did not arrive in the Peninsula until April 1810, Fletcher having asked for him to be sent out to act as Brigade Major. Although it is fair to give credit for Jones’ effort to complete the defences in the final months before the Allied troops arrived, he was only in overall command from July to October 1810, when Fletcher arrived back at the Lines with the Allied army. Through that period Jones was in constant communication with Fletcher and indirectly with Wellington.

Whilst Chapman’s contribution is not well understood today, it was at the time, which is why he is mentioned in Wellington’s dispatches and Jones is not: ‘We are indebted for these advantages to Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher and the officers of Royal Engineers; among whom I must particularly mention Captain Chapman who has given me great assistance upon various occasions.’³⁰ Wellington agreed to a request to write in support of the claim for a brevet majority for Chapman in 1811. This can only have been for his work on the Lines.

When did Construction Start and When did it Finish?

The common view is that the work on the defence of Portugal started in October 1809 when Wellington visited Lisbon. Typical comments being:

[Work on the] celebrated Lines commenced in Oct 1809 [and] were fully completed late in 1810.

The lines which were to check Masséna had been thought out in the British general’s provident mind exactly twelve months before the French army appeared in front of them.

Exactly a year had passed since Wellington had had the foresight to investigate the viability of a project that was taking shape in his mind.³¹

This view is not correct, either for the Lines or for the wider defence of Portugal. The earliest work started in some of the surrounding towns. Captains Patton and Landmann of the Royal Engineers, along with Lieutenants Stanway and Williams, had been in the country since August 1808 and were employed strengthening the defences at both Setuval and Abrantes as well as making plans of the various towns and countryside including Peniche and Coimbra. In September 1808, Fletcher reported that he had seven officers working on drawings of the area around St Julian.³²

The Portuguese had started work on the defences around Lisbon in early 1809. On 22 March, Chapman reported that Portuguese plans for the defence of Lisbon had been put to Beresford and that he was planning to start work on them straight away.³³ In the same letter Chapman reported that he had sent Lieutenants Jones and Stanway to investigate the feasibility of using gunboats on the Tagus as far upstream at Abrantes to protect the flank of the army, a key component of the final scheme of the Lines of Torres Vedras. Richard Fletcher, who took over command of the Royal Engineers on his arrival on 2 April 1809, wrote the next day to say that work was underway for the defence of Lisbon.³⁴ In a separate letter of the same date, Fletcher reported ‘arrangements are being made for entrenched positions in front of Lisbon – The outer line is I fear very extensive but I have not been over the ground’. Three weeks later Fletcher was still concerned about the progress with the defences:

The works carrying on by the Portuguese in the neighbourhood of Lisbon go forward very slowly; though I desired Lieutenant Wedekind [KGL engineer under the command of Fletcher] to make his application for working parties in writing to the Portuguese Secretary at War.³⁵

Fletcher was also expressing concern about the south bank of the Tagus as early as 9 April 1809, commenting that supplying Lisbon by sea would be impossible if the French held the south bank.³⁶ When Wellington moved north from Lisbon in early May, Fletcher and Chapman accompanied him and Fletcher was very unhappy when Chapman was recalled to Lisbon by Beresford to work on the defences.

Captain Chapman is ordered to Lisbon to assist the Portuguese in fortifying the positions for covering that city and to report on the practicability of defending both banks of the Tagus by detachable independent works. He is also to visit Palmela and Setuval, to give his opinions of the strength and local importance of the towns, and of the general state and utility of the works … The loss of this active and intelligent officer from the duties of the field at this moment I cannot but truly regret.³⁷

In the same letter, Fletcher said that Wellington wanted to establish ten to twelve permanent works.³⁸ Wellington also refers to this decision: ‘I have sent to Lisbon two officers of Engineers with orders respecting the defence of Lisbon, the Tagus, Palmela and Setuval.’³⁹ The other officer ordered to Lisbon was Lieutenant Anthony Emmett, who noted in his diary: ‘Ordered to attend Captain Chapman in Lisbon to examine the ground from Belem to St Julian’s for covering the embarkation of the army, should that be necessary.’⁴⁰ Wellington remained concerned about the ability to embark the army if it was threatened and the defences of St Julian were repeatedly reviewed. Even though Emmett did this in May 1809, Lieutenant Rice Jones was sent to look again in October that year. The first detailed British report on the position around St Julian was written by Fletcher himself a year earlier.⁴¹ Finally, on 14 October 1809, Wellington wrote, ‘I am down here to arrange finally for the defence of Portugal’.⁴² This is several months if not a year after work had started on the defences of Portugal.

Signalling

The use of signalling stations was not new to Portugal when the Lines of Torres Vedras were built. They had been used for some time, particularly between the main cities of Lisbon, Coimbra and Oporto and also connected the border fortresses in the north and south of the country. The telegraphs used by the Portuguese were typically either a shutter or single-arm design.

Signalling stations were part of the original design of the Lines, although their actual completion became a bit of a battle against time and circumstance as the occupation approached. The First Line had five main signal stations at Alhandra, Sobral, Pero Negro (Wellington’s headquarters), Torres Vedras and Ponte do Rol at the western end. Jones claimed that these stations were able to send a signal from end to end in about seven minutes. Modern trials have not been able to replicate this feat.

There were two very different types of telegraph used on the Lines. The primary system was based upon signalling used in the Royal Navy with land-based masts on which to display the signals. The codebook was similarly based on Home Popham’s naval codebook with additional phrases added where necessary. The masts were operated by seamen provided by the English Fleet in Lisbon under the command of Lieutenant Leith RN. As a backup, the much simpler Portuguese single-arm telegraph was available at each signal station in case the main mast was damaged.

On 1 June 1810, Rice Jones recorded buying eleven telescopes for use by the signal stations.⁴³ Initial trials showed that reading the signals was very difficult. Attempts were made to improve the situation by clearing hilltops that were in the line of sight of the signal stations. Eventually, it was decided that the telescopes were not powerful enough and John Jones wrote on 18 July that he would purchase better telescopes if they could be found in Lisbon. Modern trials with replicas of the telegraphs have confirmed how difficult it was to read the signals.

As well as the difficulties in reading the telegraphs, there were also problems with their construction. The first examples were not strong enough and collapsed under the weight of yards, lines and balls. Jones reported to Fletcher:

I am sorry I cannot give you a very favourable account of the signal stations – at every post I have visited the sailors in charge say the distance between the stations is too great and that the masts are all too light for the yards – it blew rather hard on Sunday evening and two were sprung, that on Mount Socorro so badly that we were obliged to replace it. I shall endeavour to see Mr Leith the [Royal Navy] Lieutenant in charge of the signals and obtain his ideas as to a new construction and in the meantime I have ordered stronger masts and yards to be prepared for each post.⁴⁴