Chapter 3

The Lines of Torres Vedras and the Defence of Portugal

Most people interested in the Peninsular War will have heard of the Lines of Torres Vedras, but probably not much more. Even modern works on the Peninsular War have treated it very lightly. For example, Esdaile’s recent single-volume work has a chapter of twenty-eight pages entitled Torres Vedras, but all mention of the Lines has ended by the second paragraph of the second page.¹ David Gates’ book takes even less space to deal with them. Oman sets aside seventeen good pages of description (out of 5,000 in total) and Fortescue a mere three pages out of several thousand. Recently, we only have Norris and Bremner’s rare booklet, Ian Fletcher’s Osprey book and John Grehan’s work on Torres Vedras as the only serious attempts to describe the Lines since John T. Jones’s secret work of 1829, which later became Volume 3 of his third edition of 1846 on the sieges of the Peninsular War. It is understandable that there is less interest in this part of the war as it does not involve any battles and the Lines were never assaulted. However, the Lines of Torres Vedras were every bit as important to Wellington as his victories on the field of battle.

The situation in the Peninsula at the end of 1809 was not good for Britain, neither politically nor militarily. Initial enthusiasm for the defence of the Iberian Peninsula had waned in the light of events. Wellesley’s early victories at Roliça and Vimeiro were followed by the deeply unpopular Convention of Cintra. Worse followed with Moore’s valiant attempt to assist the Spanish that turned into the costly retreat and evacuation of the British army from Corunna in January 1809. Wellesley’s return to the Peninsula in April that year had early success at Oporto followed by the dubious victory at Talavera, and the year ended with the British still in the Iberian Peninsula but back in Portugal with no-one being happy with the situation, neither the Spanish, the Portuguese, the British nor even the French! If we take into account the wider strategic context of the last few years, including the British surrender in South America and the problems in Sweden and Walcheren, the public perception of the British military was not good.

The Anglo-Portuguese and Spanish military only survived in 1808–9 thanks to the difficulty the French had concentrating their more numerous troops, but the French knew they could not allow this to continue. The British presence needed to be crushed quickly to stop it bolstering the weak Spanish and Portuguese resistance. The main difficulty for the French in achieving this was their war with Austria. An Austrian success would distract Napoleon’s attention from the Iberian Peninsula for the foreseeable future, but a defeat would allow the massive French military machine to swing in the direction of Spain. Events in central Europe were being watched anxiously in both London and Lisbon and when Austria’s defeat at Wagram in July 1809 was announced, everyone knew this meant that Napoleon would send more troops to the Peninsula. Wellington, writing to Castlereagh in August 1809, commented: ‘Napoleon is reinforcing his armies in Spain, you may depend on it. He and his marshals are desirous of revenging on us the different blows we have given them, and when they come to the Peninsula, their first and great object will be to get the English out.’² In the army these events were also being followed carefully, Ensign John Aitchison of the 3rd Guards commenting: ‘We have it from the French that peace was signed on 1st October – they say B [Bonaparte] himself is to come to Spain.’³ Mucaster commented in a similar manner: ‘There is an account that Austria has given up Trieste to France to settle the existing differences. Should this be the case we cannot expect a very long residence in this country.’⁴

The British government was in a difficult situation. They could not match the size of the vast French armies and were continually concerned about the loss of their largest (and only) land force. It had to be protected from destruction. This left the conundrum that England needed to stay to support the Iberian defenders, but in the last resort it would have to evacuate the army rather than risk losing it.

Wellington would have been aware of his government’s concern when he arrived back in the Peninsula in April 1809 and will have also watched from afar the events unfolding in central Europe even whilst he was campaigning in central Spain. As well as the events in Europe, there was also turmoil at home in both the government and the monarchy. About the same time that Wellington heard of the Austrian defeat, he also learnt that the government at home had fallen as a consequence of the ill health of the Prime Minister, Portland, and the political fall-out of the Walcheren campaign that led to the duel between Castlereagh and Canning. King George III was also seriously ill, and as the Prince Regent was aligned to the Whig party, who were strongly against the war, it was likely there would be a change in government soon.

Whilst the pessimists in the British army in Portugal and England, and that included pretty much everybody, were saying that the army was only pausing momentarily before it ran for the ships, some people were thinking about how to stop the French tidal wave. Once the army was safely back at the Portuguese border, Wellington’s thoughts turned to future operations and the security of the Allied forces. He left Badajoz on 8 October 1809 and arrived in Lisbon on the 12th. His party included George Murray, Quarter Master-General, Benjamin D’Urban, QMG of the Portuguese army and three engineer officers; Lieutenant Colonel Richard Fletcher, Captain Stephen Chapman and Lieutenant Rice Jones. The next few days were spent reconnoitring both the hills to the north of Lisbon and the terrain as far south as Setuval.

Rice Jones, writing to his father who was a Captain in the Denbeigh Militia, commented:

I know that his Lordship and the Col [Fletcher] have been riding all over the country for 30 miles round, and have nearly knocked up Colonel Fletcher’s stud; from which it is easy to conclude that the ground to be occupied for the defence of Lisbon is a material part of the Commander of the Forces’ business at this place.⁵

Rice Jones continued in the typical style of the British officer of that period writing home and divulged confidential information: ‘I will also tell you what is an impenetrable secret at present even to our officers; viz., that all our Corps are ordered from the army to a place called Castanheira … and understand there are a great many works in contemplation.’ His letter concludes with the other typical theme of officers writing home:

These measures look too much like a determination … to defend Portugal to the last extremity; that extremity will certainly arise as soon as the French are able to advance in any force, and we shall then very likely have just such a scramble to get off as the army at Corunna last year.

It appears that Fletcher was not always with Wellington when looking at the area. Fletcher and Chapman visited St Julian on 15 October and Fletcher reported his finding to Wellington in a letter of the same date.⁶

The result of this visit led to Wellington’s famous memo to Fletcher of 20 October 1809, describing the work that was to be carried out. This was an outline of the task which he would have developed through riding through the hills, by talking to the Portuguese and looking at previous analyses of the area, particularly by the French engineer Vincent and the Portuguese engineer Neves Costa. Wellington had also operated in this area during the previous year’s campaign and would have built up some knowledge of the terrain. The detailed design of the Lines was developed over the coming months by Fletcher and the British, Portuguese and German engineers. Each redoubt was individually designed to fit the terrain and its operational needs. If you break down the many paragraphs of Wellington’s memorandum into general tasks it looks like this:

Wellington’s Instructions, 20 October 1809

Build dams	3
Destroy bridges	2
Construct redoubts	15
Scarping	1
Build roads	3
Destroy roads	4
Build signal posts	1

Of the twenty-nine activities listed, only just over half were related to building forts. The original plan was to build a single line of defence. This eventually became the second line. In front of this line, two major forts were to be built at Torres Vedras and Sobral to blunt any French advance. As more time became available, the basic plan for the Lines was expanded to include many more forts and other defensive measures.

Wellington’s memorandum was very detailed in terms of where needed to be surveyed and the purpose of the defences, but there was generally no detail about what was to be built. The only exceptions were for the major forts at Torres Vedras, Montachique and Sobral, but even for these Wellington described no more than the capacity of the fort (e.g., for 4,000 men) with no specifics on the design or the number of guns. These details was left to the engineers to plan and implement. Wellington wrote to Beresford on 26 October ordering nearly 2,000 Portuguese militia to report to Torres Vedras, Sobral and St Julian and on the 31st ordered the commissary to prepare 19,000 palisades and 10,000 fascines. Wellington returned to Badajoz on 27 October 1809 and then travelled on to Seville, leaving Fletcher to co-ordinate the work.

The primary purpose of the Lines of Torres Vedras was to defend the four main routes to Lisbon though the passes at Mafra, Montachique and Bucellas and the river route past Alhandra. Descriptions of the Lines usually focus on the two defensive lines to the north of Lisbon and the embarkation point at St Julian. In addition, a fourth line was built on the left (south) bank of the Tagus opposite Lisbon and defences were strengthened at Setubal and Peniche. There were also defensive works around the perimeter of the city of Lisbon. The key defences were:

Following the issue of Wellington’s memorandum of 20 October, Fletcher issued a general recall to all Royal Engineer officers except two, Burgoyne and Emmett who were with the army at Badajoz. By the end of the month almost all the engineer officers in the Peninsula had arrived in Lisbon.⁸ Work started in early November 1809, as soon as the engineer officers began arriving. The initial focus was on the embarkation point at St Julian and the two major advance posts at Sobral and Torres Vedras. Once these were under way, the focus moved to the extensive fortifications of what became the second line.

Rice Jones’ excitement diminished rapidly when he was left in Lisbon by Fletcher to co-ordinate the various activities for his commander whilst the other engineers started work on the Lines. He complained ‘I am the only officer here except Hamilton who continues so lame since he was wounded at Oporto.’¹⁰ The reason Fletcher had left him in Lisbon was because Jones’ health was not good. One of the tasks that fell to Rice Jones was paying the civilian workmen. He noted in his diary on 29 November, riding ‘to Sobral where I mustered and paid the artificers’ and similarly on 17 December he ‘rode to Torres Vedras … and settled with the artificers’.

Fletcher continually moved around the area north of Lisbon and corresponded with Wellington on his findings and his recommendations. He wrote a long and detailed report to Wellington on 25 December making recommendation on redoubts to be built at various points. He also noted his concern that the number of workers requested for St Julian and Sobral had not been provided despite a number of requests through Marshal Beresford and this would delay completion of the defences. Complaints about the shortage of workmen were a constant theme thoughout the whole period of the construction, with Fletcher, Beresford and Wellington writing to the Portuguese authorities at different times. Fletcher finished his letter by reporting that Captain Goldfinch was assisting the Portuguese engineers on the defences of Lisbon¹¹ ‘as requested by Marshal Beresford’ as well as superintending the work at St Julian. Another engineer officer had been sent to Abrantes to assist Captain Patton in fortifying the town. A few days later, Fletcher wrote another extensive letter on the position at Castanheira on the Tagus. Although he did not make any specific recommendations, leaving the decision to Wellington, the work to make the area defensible appeared significant. Although initially Wellington was in favour of carrying out the works, when he visited a few weeks later the decision was made to move the position back to Alhandra.¹²

Through December 1809 and January 1810 Fletcher and Wellington kept up a detailed correspondence that described the planned and actual work at Castanheira, Mafra, Montechique and Ericeira. Wellington showed particular concern about both extremities, describing the western end as being the most important to the ‘English’. In early January 1810, Mulcaster, who was leading the building work at Torres Vedras, reported the progress to his friend Burgoyne:

My entrenchments are getting on, but not so rapidly as I had hoped … I wish you could see my entrenchments, unlucky dogs that ever want to attack them if they are defended by Englishmen. They will bite the dust wholesale. The Merinos had not arrived when Goldfinch wrote but he was entreating for a passage for them … I like his system on this occasion, which is ‘damn the expense’.¹³

Whilst war was a serious affair, it did not mean that some private business could not be conducted. Burgoyne had arranged to buy twenty Merino sheep on behalf of a number of officers to ship back to England, the others being the engineers Mulcaster, Goldfinch, Major Dundas of the Royal Staff Corps and Mr Pickering the Commissary. He noted on 20 December that ‘he had shipped off some Merino sheep consigned to Goldfinch at Lisbon, four of them belonging to me’.¹⁴ Whilst Mulcaster might have been proud of his work on the Lines, he, like most of his colleagues, wanted to be with the army. Writing a few days later: ‘I wish that I could get to the army afterwards but fear some [more] vile redoubts are in store for me. I have as yet been afraid to ask Fletcher what is to become of me. He is here to stay and flies about the Country like a Jack Snipe.’¹⁵

The importance of this defensive work is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that during his visit in February 1810 Wellington gave orders that all requests made by Fletcher were to be accepted without question: ‘All orders … drawn by Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher upon the Deputy Commissary General may be paid … [and] … the Deputy Commissary General may supply to Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher … without waiting for further orders from me.’¹⁶ Wellington was not known for giving any authority or decision-making powers to his subordinates, but throughout this period the senior engineer officers were given such authority. These included Fletcher, Captain John Jones and later Captain Henry Goldfinch when he was building the defences to the south of the Tagus. The engineer officers were given similar civilian powers to make demands for men and materials in any of the districts in which they were working.

As mentioned earlier, the Lines of Torres Vedras were not just made up of forts but included a range of other defensive features. There were extensive salt pans on the banks of the Tagus near Via Longa, and the banks of these were broken to flood the whole area, and at the western end of the Lines the river Zizandre was dammed to achieve a similar result. On the low-lying area around Alhandra, extensive abatis were constructed by cutting down cork and olive trees and laying them down whole in a continuous line. All other cover was removed by destroying walls and buildings so that the French would be exposed to Allied fire when advancing to attack the defences. The hilly terrain to the west of Alhandra was made impassable by scarping over a mile of the hillside, using gunpowder to blow away the crests of the hills to create an impassable vertical face. Both ends of the Lines were covered by the Royal Navy with warships patrolling the Atlantic coast and gunboats patrolling the river Tagus.