As usual Wellington, although not present, directed operations. Writing to Beresford on 20 March 1811, he said ‘lay down your bridge, and make a tête de [sic] pont opposite Jerumenha; and in the first instance invest Badajoz on the left of the Guadiana, doing the same with the cavalry only, or Spanish troops, or militia, on the right’.⁴

Jerumenha was ten miles south-west of Badajoz and was the closest point to Badajoz where the river was fordable with the least chance of French interference. The plan to rapidly cross at Jerumenha and drive on to Badajoz before the French could finish their repairs now came to a complete halt. Beresford had been assured that a pontoon bridge was available for his use at Jerumenha. Unfortunately, the Allied pontoon bridge had been captured at Badajoz, even though Wellington had asked Mendizabal to remove it during the early part of the French siege. Anticipating the need for pontoons, Captain Wedekind, one of the engineers from the King’s German Legion, had been ordered on 8 March to bring up six pontoons from Lisbon. They arrived at Elvas on the 23rd.⁵ Unfortunately, these were nowhere near sufficient to bridge the river which was about 200 yards wide at this point. Having surveyed the area, Squire decided that a bridge could be built by putting the pontoons in the deepest part of the river with trestles at either end. Work started on 30 March, with Squire promising to have it ready by 3 April. Through great effort in collecting materials locally, the bridge was completed on time and plans were made for the troops to cross early in the morning of 4 April. Unfortunately, fate once again turned against Beresford’s plans. Overnight, the Guadiana rose three feet, washing away the trestles and making the bridge unusable. Although the first of four flying bridges was set up during the day, it left the picket on the left bank of the Guadiana very exposed. The largest of the ferries could only take 100 men or 25 horses,⁶ the smallest ‘were not able to carry over more than 16 persons at a time. They were so little buoyant that the smallest weight made them sink.’⁷

The picket was reinforced slowly over the next three days and nights until the bulk of the army was on the left bank by the morning of 7 April. The French commander, Latour-Maubourg, retreated south to protect his lines of communication, leaving 3,000 troops in Badajoz under the governor, Phillipon. On the morning of 9 April Beresford’s force advanced towards Olivenza. When they arrived there, it became clear that the French had retired, leaving only a small garrison of 400 to block the advance. ‘The Marshal sent Colonel Reynell, his English Adjutant General, to summon the place … the Governor, a Colonel named Neboyer, [said] that he was determined to defend the place to the last extremity; that if his garrison was small he could depend upon it.’⁸

Although the garrison was totally inadequate to defend the fortress, the decision was made not to risk an escalade and to make a formal approach to the place. A reconnaissance on the afternoon of the 9th determined that the abandoned work to the south of the fortress was the ideal site for a breaching battery. Dickson set off the same afternoon to Elvas to arrange the necessary artillery for the siege. There he selected six 24-pounders which were dispatched on 11 April, each with 300 rounds of ammunition. The same night, the 4th Division, which had remained to carry out the siege, took possession of the abandoned outwork and started work on the battery under the command of Squire, who was still working on securing the passage of the Guadiana at Jerumenha. He reported:

We have completed an infantry bridge of casks across the Guadiana which may be passed by a front of three and have [built?] a tête du pont on the left of the Guadiana for 15 or 1600 men and leave Captain Wedekind to take charge of these works while I am engaged in establishing a breaching battery of five guns against Olivenza.⁹

It took until 14 April for the guns to arrive, due to the difficulty of getting heavy artillery across the Guadiana at Jerumenha. General Cole, who had been left in charge of the siege, reported:

Having succeeded in getting the guns into the battery during the night, and got everything ready before daybreak on the 15th … I sent a summons to the Governor, a copy of which I have the honour to enclose with his answer, which being a refusal to accept the terms I offered, our fire immediately commenced, and was returned with some spirit from the town. At 11 o’clock a white flag was hoisted by the enemy, and an officer came out with a letter from the Governor, a copy of which I have the honour to enclose with my answer and the Governor’s reply, to which I sent none, and recommenced our fire. After a few rounds a white flag was again hoisted, and they surrendered at discretion, and the Franciscan gate was taken possession of by the grenadier company of the 11th Portuguese Regiment.¹⁰

The French gained no benefit whatever from the defence of Olivenza, and lost 400 good troops.

The First Siege of Badajoz

The focus now turned to the greater challenge of Badajoz, which was a major fortress with a strong garrison and an able governor. The main problem Wellington faced was that because the loss of Badajoz had been unexpected, no provision had been made for siege equipment in that area. Oman criticised the British government for not providing a siege train for Wellington’s use, writing, ‘The British army in Portugal was absolutely destitute of artillery destined for and trained to the working of siege guns’.¹¹ On this point he was wrong. At that time, there was a brand-new British siege train aboard the transports at Lisbon. Wellington knew it was there and planned to (and did) use it for the future siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. There was simply no practical way to move it quickly from Lisbon to Badajoz, even if its safety could be guaranteed.

Timeline for the First Siege of Badajoz.

20 April 1811	Wellington visits and agrees plan for siege
23 April 1811	Bridge at Jerumenha swept away
29 April 1811	Bridge at Jerumenha restored
4 May 1811	South side of Badajoz invested
8 May 1811	North side of Badajoz invested
8 May 1811	Trenches started that night
10 May 1811	French sortie against Fort San Christobal
11 May 1811	Allied guns opened fire against Fort San Christobal and Fort Picurina
11 May 1811	All stores moved to north bank in preparation for raising siege
11 May 1811	Work started on attack against castle at night and stopped in early hours of 12 May
13 May 1811	Siege raised

Wellington, still in the north, was considering his next move. He ordered Fletcher to carry out a close reconnaissance of the fortress of Almeida to determine if it could be carried by escalade. Fletcher’s opinion was that this could not be achieved without significant loss. Having discarded that possibility, Wellington and Fletcher now hurried south to review the situation at Badajoz, arriving on 20 April 1811.¹² After speaking to Dickson and Squire about the artillery and engineering requirements, he decided to make a personal reconnaissance of Badajoz and arrangements were made for Alten’s brigade of the King’s German Legion light infantry and two squadrons of Portuguese dragoons to escort him. Coming across a French working party, Wellington’s escort was caught between them and a relieving force from Badajoz and roughly handled. George Ross, who had recently arrived from Lisbon, described the incident as follows:

The Duke of Wellington crossed the Guadiana at the ford of Lavadora (just below the Caya) from Elvas and reconnoitred Badajoz. The morning was fine, the ford passable notwithstanding considerable rains had fallen, and the reconnaissance was completed. But I plainly saw an instance of what I had often heard. His Lordship’s unwillingness to leave the slightest operation to any of his generals. General Alten had moved … to cover the reconnaissance. Which instead of being left to him to manage; and notice given him of the points from whence the noble commander meant to view the place, he was desired occasionally to send on two companies as his Lordship was going to such a point, which he did without waiting a moment. To General Alten’s evident surprise he found by this means his little corps quite dispersed. When we came to the first ground before the place, information was given that a detachment of the garrison was in our rear; having gone out with a number of wagons to cut timber on the Valverde road. This was sneered at, and not even a patrol sent to ascertain it. But as his Lordship was returning from his recce on the east side of the place, he had the pleasure of seeing this small detachment with a number of heavy wagons drawn by horses, pass through his scattered troops and enter the place, covered by a detachment which came out of the garrison. Instead of taking this escort which would have depressed the spirits of the garrison, our reconnaissance cost us above 30 killed, wounded or prisoners and I do not hear of more than 2 Frenchmen being taken. Of course the garrison must laugh at such bungling, as it must have appeared to them, and will gain confidence.¹³

Wellington returned north on 24 April but left three instructions with Beresford. The first outlined the strategy he should follow for the siege and how he should respond if a French relief force was sent. The most important point in this letter was that Wellington authorised Beresford to fight a battle if he felt it was appropriate. It also included clear instructions that if the siege was raised, any stores from Elvas must be returned as the fortress’ resources had been severely depleted to furnish stores for the siege.

The second detailed the siege operations which were to be carried out against Badajoz. As was typical of Wellington, the instructions were very detailed and left nothing to chance. The main points were:

• To establish a flying bridge over the Guadiana below the junction with the Caya.

• To simultaneously lay siege to the outworks of San Christobal, Picurina and Pardaleras.

• Only when these three outworks were taken was Beresford to start operations against Badajoz itself.

• Wellington suggested that the most likely point of attack would be the south face, but left the decision to Beresford.

Most of the responsibility for the failure of the first two sieges against Badajoz must lie with Wellington, as these orders were clearly not practical, as we shall see.

The third memorandum was a letter to three senior Spanish generals in the area, Castaños, Blake and Ballesteros, asking for explicit acceptance of Wellington’s operational plan. Any move against Badajoz was dependent upon their agreement.¹⁴ Wellington made his views absolutely clear to Beresford on 6 May, writing ‘If General Blake does not positively agree to everything proposed in my memorandum, and does not promise to carry it strictly into execution, I think that you ought not to be in a hurry with the siege of Badajoz’.¹⁵ The following day he informed Liverpool that he had told Beresford to delay the siege until agreement had been received from the Spanish generals.¹⁶ It is significant that Beresford did not take any positive steps to start the siege until 8 May, following the Spanish generals’ agreement to the proposals in Wellington’s memorandum. Beresford had been ready to start a few days earlier and the artillery and engineer officers were puzzled by the delay. Overall, the siege was not off to a good start. The lack of siege stores at Elvas, the loss of the temporary bridge at Jerumenha, which provided their primary means of communication across the river Guadiana, and the delays in resolving issues of command meant that eight weeks had passed since the French had taken Badajoz. Beresford heard that Soult was marching to relieve the fortress on 10 May, before the first gun had even opened fire. The day the first gun fired, 11 May, Beresford was already making preparations to raise the siege.

There is some debate about the plan chosen for the siege of Badajoz. According to John Jones, when Wellington arrived at Elvas on 20 April he was

determined to lay immediate siege to Badajoz, if any plan of attack could be offered which should not require more than sixteen days open trenches, as in that period, and the time required to make the necessary preparations for the siege, it was calculated that Marshal Soult would be able to collect a force equal to its relief.¹⁷

The preference of most of the officers, including Wellington, was for an attack on the southern front. No plan could be developed that would meet the sixteen-day target, normal calculations for such an attack indicating that twenty-two days would be required. Jones continued that ‘it was of the greatest consequence to the future operations of the army that Badajoz should be retaken’.¹⁸ Probably under pressure from Wellington, Fletcher proposed a plan that he felt could be achieved within the sixteen days. The plan was to take the fort of San Christobal which overlooked the castle and once it was taken, to form batteries to batter the old castle walls which would then be stormed when there was a practicable breach. It was also proposed to make simultaneous feint attacks on the other two outworks to mask their real intentions. According to Jones’ diary, these discussions occurred before Wellington’s reconnaissance on 22 April, and Wellington approved this plan after he had examined the fortress.

There is a confusing difference in the accounts at this point. Jones’ published Journal described Fletcher’s plan above. This Journal also printed Wellington’s memorandum of 23 April, but crucially left out his last point, which stated that all three outworks must be taken before the attack on the fortress began. He also made no mention of feint attacks and suggested an attack on the southern front. Wellington’s instructions do not appear to be the same as Fletcher’s plan. Jones’ original diaries, which he kept at the time, do not specifically detail Fletcher’s proposal. He did, however, detail Wellington’s memorandum including the crucial last point, which was not printed in his published Journal. On 8 May, he noted in his diary ‘Fletcher marked out a work against the Picurina redoubt and to conceal from the enemy the real point of attack, it was decided to carry out a false attack against the Pardaleras’.¹⁹ Later in the diary entry for that day, he noted troops breaking ground for the feint attack against the Pardaleras fort, but no mention was made of the attack on the Picurina being a feint. In his published Journal, and in his original diary, Jones made continued reference to feint attacks on the Pardaleras.²⁰ Alexander Gordon, who was one of Wellington’s aides-de-camp travelled with him to Badajoz. He commented on 23 April, the day Wellington inspected Badajoz, that he expected the attack would come from the south side, after opening against the three outworks.²¹ A later letter still talked about taking all three outworks.²²

Oman was highly critical of the decision to attack San Christobal and puts the blame firmly on the shoulders of Fletcher, the commanding engineer. He criticised the decision to make it a requirement to capture all three forts before attacking the castle, noting that ‘none of these were to be mere false attacks’.²³ In Oman’s work there is no mention of Jones as a source for the first siege although he does use Jones for the subsequent sieges of Badajoz. Although Oman’s text is explicit, the map of Badajoz in his book marks both the Pardaleras and Picurina forts as ‘False attacks’.²⁴ It is possible that Oman did not have, or chose not to use, the comprehensive third edition of Jones’ work when writing about the first siege. The original first edition of Jones’ Journal, published in 1814, had a shortened account of the first siege. This edition described the attack on San Christobal, but did not mention the false attacks on the Picurina or Pardaleras. Fortescue used Jones’ Journal and recognised that the engineers had a preference for taking San Christobal over the other two outworks. He also criticised the decision to attack San Christobal rather than follow the French lead and attack the southern front.

The above analysis leaves two unanswered questions:

• Was the decision to attack San Christobal due to the time constraints reasonable?

• Why did Jones’ published account completely ignore Wellington’s final instruction to take all three outworks before attacking the fortress?

In answer to the first question, it is necessary to acknowledge the experience of the engineers. Their judgement was that twenty-two days would be necessary to attack from the south. This did not meet Wellington’s requirement of sixteen days. The plan proposed by Fletcher was certainly risky, but quickly taking the outwork would have given the army a great chance of meeting the short timescale. Certainly, the strength of San Christobal had been underestimated by everyone, Dickson noting that it ‘might easily be taken’.²⁵ On 26 April, Wellington sent Beresford copies of the French plan of Badajoz and their plan of attack which had been intercepted by Castaños. With this information, there was time to change the Allied plan of attack, but no change was made. In the end it was the limited resources that led to failure against San Christobal, not the decision to attack it.

The answer to the second question is more difficult. The plan followed by the engineers, which is clearly reported in Jones’ Journal, was to attack all three outworks, but only the attack on Pardaleras was meant to be false. The map in Dickson’s Diaries shows the attack on the Cerro del Vinto (Pardaleras) as being a ‘false’ attack.²⁶ Rice Jones similarly talks about only this attack as being false.²⁷ These do not match Fletcher’s original proposal described in Jones’ Journal. Neither does it appear to follow Wellington’s instructions of 23 April. His instruction to take all three outworks, does not appear to be logical when time was critical. It would have taken significantly longer to capture all three outworks, where the possession of two or even one would allow the start of an attack on the fortress. The plan that was actually followed will be discussed below.

The biggest problem Wellington faced with the loss of Badajoz was getting together the resources to try and re-take it. Both Oman and Fortescue criticise Wellington’s preparations but neither are accurate. Fortescue stated that Wellington did not ask about resources at Elvas until 6 April, with deficiencies being made up from the ‘English’ battering train at Lisbon.²⁸ Wellington did not actually write ‘English’ battering train, but ‘our’ battering train, probably just referring to resources at Lisbon. Wellington was reluctant to use the new train, writing that it would ‘cripple’ future siege operations.²⁹ He did subsequently send a number of siege guns from Lisbon, but these were not from the new train. Oman wrote that Wellington did not start preparations for assembling the guns until 18 April, when Dickson was sent to Elvas.³⁰ Dickson, the commander of the artillery, was writing as early as 21 March that the artillery would come from Elvas.³¹

Wellington’s first letter to Beresford on the subject of the siege was written on 27 March 1811, where he stated: ‘Elvas must supply the means [for the siege of Badajoz], if possible: if it has them not, I must send them there; this will take time, but that cannot be avoided.’³² Writing to Beresford again on 6 April, Wellington explained: ‘In respect to Badajoz, the first thing to do is to blockade it strictly … and I am most anxious to receive the accounts of what Elvas can supply for this purpose that I may order up from our battering train the deficiency’.³³ Beresford had sent for Dickson on 2 April and asked him to prepare a return of the ‘ordnance, ammunition etc’ in Elvas for Wellington.³⁴ Clearly the answer he received was that Elvas could not provide the necessary resources,³⁵ because on 9 April Wellington was ordering siege material to be sent up from Lisbon.³⁶ At the same time, he also ordered heavy guns to be sent from Lisbon to replace the guns that were being moved from Elvas.³⁷

Writing to Beresford the next day, Wellington stated:

I was in hopes that the return of ordnance at Elvas would have been accompanied by a return of stores in the garrison, by which I should have seen what the garrison could spare for the siege of Badajoz, and we should have been spared the time, the trouble, and expense of sending up the articles of which I enclose the list. I enclose the list of our ordnance and ammunition at Elvas, which Fletcher thinks ought to be prepared to be taken out for the siege of Badajoz, and a list of stores, which I have ordered from Lisbon to Setuval.³⁸

At this time Fletcher was still in the north with Wellington, in the vicinity of Almeida, and was clearly providing advice. On 12 April, Squire received a comprehensive enquiry from Beresford:

The Marshal requests you to give out an estimate of all that may be requisite to undertake the siege of Badajoz. It is my[?] desire to commence against that place with as little delay as possible. Elvas cannot probably furnish much more than guns, powder and shot of which Major Dickson can probably give you information. He begs you will consider and specify the means which you conceive the country on both banks of the Guadiana can supply in gabions, fascines, timber for platforms etc. which the Marshal imagines can be prepared in the neighbourhood of the place and that the Militia and country people can make them [from] the dimensions or models being given – sand bags it will probably be difficult to obtain in sufficient quantities – Entrenching tools will be my principal want but the Marshal begs your attention to the working tools made use of by the country people, and whether with those from Elvas or now in your possession, it may not be possible to undertake the siege of the place applying to this object the means of every description which Elvas, the army, and the country can provide. Should the country tools be considered applicable, you will be so good as to state the nature and numbers required and the other articles likely to be procured in the country – and which the Marshal will endeavour to obtain. He desires me to remind you although it will not have escaped your attention, that the repaired breach may not be very perfect, and that you may judge it advisable to conduct your approaches by those recently made and since filled up by the enemy and which may render the insufficiency of the tools less a matter of importance than it would otherwise be. He also desires that you will take into consideration the circumstance of the strength of the enemy garrison which he has reason to suppose does not exceed 1,500 men.³⁹

Squire responded the following day:

I enclose a return of stores and according to the Marshal’s wish; the difficulty with respect to our bridge satisfies me that no timber for platforms etc. can be had at or near Elvas. By a requisition made on the country as I before said, I think we may collect a sufficient number of entrenching tools. From what I observed in the works at Elvas, I should have no doubt that gabions and fascines may be made in the neighbourhood. If the enemy intend seriously to defend Badajoz I am of the opinion that to undertake the attack of that place we ought to be provided with the stores specified in the inclosed return and also think that twelve officers of Engineers besides Forster and myself indispensible. It will also be necessary to create a corps of artificers or Sappers and Miners.⁴⁰

The criticisms of Oman and Fortescue mentioned above appear to be unfounded. Similarly, Fortescue’s comment that Beresford must have told Wellington that Elvas could supply the stores appears equally unfounded.⁴¹ Heavy material for a siege took time to get together and Wellington had no warning that this would be required for Badajoz. In comparison, it took from May to October 1811 to transport the siege train by sea and land to be ready for use at Ciudad Rodrigo in January 1812.

There were also problems with the delivery of the requested stores. Wellington was informed that there was insufficient transport to move all the stores he had requested from Lisbon and on 23 April, he reduced the amount of stores to be brought forward. The stores ordered from Lisbon did not arrive at Elvas until 12 May, and the first items did not get to Badajoz until that evening, by which time the siege was effectively over.

There were similar difficulties with the guns. There were no modern siege guns immediately available for this operation. The guns that were used were supplied from Elvas and, as has been widely recorded elsewhere, they were generally old and in poor condition. Through the efforts of Dickson, a siege train of thirty guns was put together.⁴² Some of these were the guns used at the siege of Olivenza and were still there. Yet again, the most immediate problem was transport. Dickson reported on 22 April, that there were only three carriages at Elvas for transporting guns. To get the guns to Badajoz would require moving the six guns at Olivenza as soon as possible so that their carriages could then be sent to Elvas to move the remainder.

Apart from material, the engineers were concerned about the availability of experienced troops. Although this became more prominent in the later sieges, the concern was there from the very first siege. Squire raised concerns before the siege started about the lack of sappers and miners and the need for men who ‘know how to carry on an approach under fire’.⁴³ He knew that in their siege of Badajoz the French sapped right up to the glacis and this required trained and experienced sappers. Squire’s view was that if the British had to do the same, there would be significant casualties.

Wellington was impatient to get started on the siege. On 30 March, he wrote to Beresford commenting that ‘the breach can be barely more than stockaded’.⁴⁴ He wrote again on 6 April, stating that Badajoz must be blockaded as soon as possible. Writing to Liverpool three days later, he mentioned that he ‘hoped’ Beresford would have been blockading Badajoz from 3 April. These timescales all appear unrealistic as there had been problems establishing a crossing-point over the river Guadiana in early April due to the level of the river rising unexpectedly. Beresford also had to take Olivenza before he could move on Badajoz. At that time he also did not know the exact whereabouts of Soult. Wellington also wrote to Beresford on 21 April, when he heard that Soult was fortifying Seville. He saw this as indicating that he could be planning to relieve Badajoz. He explained that it was even more urgent that not a moment was lost in starting operations against Badajoz.⁴⁵

Immediately after the siege of Olivenza was concluded, Dickson and Squire were ordered to start preparing for the siege of Badajoz,⁴⁶ and from 19 April they were preparing the siege train of thirty guns and howitzers. On the 27th, Beresford issued an order for one hundred troops to be permanently assigned to the engineers as artificers. John Squire, who was the engineer in charge of the siege of Olivenza, had requested these on 10 April:

I request you will submit to His Excellency Marshal Beresford the propriety of forming a corps of artificers amounting to 100 men from the British Regiments of the line who would be attached to the Engineers Department during the attack of Badajoz. Viz. Miners – 50; Carpenters – 20; Masons/bricklayers – 24; Smiths – 6. Such men as have been employed in the lines in front of Lisbon will be best calculated for this service.⁴⁷

Ten days later, Beresford confirmed he could have them.⁴⁸ The men arrived at Olivenza on 2 May, and some were immediately put to work cutting timber and making siege materials. The remainder were given some basic training in siegecraft along with the small number of Royal Military Artificers who were present, none of whom had any previous training in siege works.⁴⁹ In addition, eighty-four carpenters and miners from the British divisions and twelve officers were to serve as assistant engineers (these were officer volunteers from the army). Beresford told Wellington in a letter of 3 May that he was waiting for Fletcher to confirm that all the stores were ready and would then order the investment of the north side of the river Guadiana.⁵⁰ Dickson and Squire certainly thought everything was ready to start the investment of Badajoz before this date.⁵¹ The final delays were likely to have been caused by waiting for confirmation that the bridges had been restored at Jerumenha; that the troops allocated to assist were present; and that the additional shovels had arrived from Abrantes. All these events happened on or around 2 May.

Following the investment of the fortress on the south side of the river Guadiana on 4 May, the guns at Olivenza were moved up and placed in the park behind the Cerro del Vinto on the 6th. The carriages were then sent off to Elvas to be available to bring up the next batch of guns. The guns for the attack on San Christobal had been available since 5 May, and were only waiting for the north side of the river to be invested. Dickson recorded that it would take two trips (that is, two days) to transfer the eight guns required for the north side. In the same letter he mentioned he was still waiting for two companies of Portuguese artillery, who were essential to progress the siege on the south side of the river.⁵²

Dickson expressed his confusion on 1 May, and again on 7 May, as to why the siege had not commenced.⁵³ Similarly, there were a number of comments from engineer officers, the earliest being 25 April.⁵⁴ The engineers believed that arrangements had been made for the right bank of the river Guadiana to be invested on 4 May. They moved stores and pontoons up and had to make rapid arrangements for their protection when no troops arrived on the right bank. Jones commented on 8 May that the stores for the attack on San Christobal had been waiting on carts for two days.⁵⁵

There appears to have been a change of plan around this time. Jones’ diary recorded that the plan of attack was put ‘on paper’ on 5 May, and agreed by Beresford on the 7th. Wellington’s earlier memorandum had not specified exactly how the attack was to be carried out, noting that after taking the three outworks, Beresford was to decide where to attack the castle. Although Wellington had suggested the south side of the fortress, he had not ordered it. The engineers had a clear preference under the time constraints for an attack on the castle, rather than the south side. It may have been the lack of trained sappers and miners that influenced the decision to attack San Christobal and breach the walls from a distance, as such an attack would require fewer sappers and miners. Based on the comments at the time from the engineers, it is probable that the plan Fletcher presented to Beresford on 7 May included a proposal to start the attack on the castle before San Christobal was taken. It was necessary to attack the Picurina outwork to do this; but it was not necessary to take the Pardaleras outwork. This was earlier than had been proposed in Fletcher’s original plan as documented in Jones’ Journal. Fletcher would have been looking for quicker ways to take the fortress to mitigate the impact of the additional delays since the original plan had been agreed. It was now two weeks since Wellington had sent his memorandum to the Spanish generals (and eight weeks since the French took Badajoz) and as yet, there had been no answer from them. That there was a change in the plan is indicated by the numerous comments from engineer officers which refer to attacks on San Christobal and Picurina and false attacks on Pardaleras. These include:

It had however been previously decided to attack the castle at the east extremity of the town … the intention was to breach the castle, while batteries were established on the right bank of the Guadiana to take in flank and reverse. With this view it was necessary to take Fort Christobal … The whole was intended to be a simultaneous operation, so as to have divided the attention of the enemy. If we had had sufficient tools it was also proposed to make a fake attack to the westward by re-opening the trenches of the enemy.⁵⁶

On the 8th … we broke ground on this side against Fort Christobal in earnest and they in joke opened the old French parallels on the other side.⁵⁷

The project was to commence a parallel embracing the castle having its right on the river, and to attack that part, the castle being like most others on a hill accessible and the wall not covered; at the same time attacks were to be carried on against the fort of San Christobal on the opposite side of the Guadiana.⁵⁸

The attacks to be directed against the castle and Fort Christobal.⁵⁹

On the same day that Beresford approved the plan (7 May), Jones recorded that a working party was preparing materials near the spot where it was intended to start the battery against Fort Picurina.⁶⁰ This would suggest the plan to attack the castle had been accepted. Significantly, Jones also noted that Lieutenant Forster RE was employed that night to cross the Rivellas stream and ascend the height to the castle wall to determine the feasibility of British troops approaching the walls. It is difficult to think of any reason to carry out such a dangerous reconnaissance unless the plan was to attack the castle at this point. It is probable that the actual plan followed by the engineers was what had been agreed with Beresford, but it has not subsequently been recorded in that way. It is inconceivable that the engineers would have been allowed to alter Wellington’s plans without his or Beresford’s agreement.

Fletcher was marking out the positions for the trenches against the Picurina during the day on 8 May and Squire was doing the same on the other side of the river against San Christobal. The trenches were started against all three outworks on the night of 8 May. Jones started marking out the ground for the attack on the castle the following morning with the expectation that the trenches would be started that night. However, Beresford ‘forbade’ any work to start. Jones then wrote that the noon reliefs on 10 May for the attacks against the Picurina and Pardaleras were ‘nominal’ to make a ‘show of work’. Beresford agreed to start the attack on the castle on that day, but on hearing news of the French plan to move against him, he deferred the work again.⁶¹ At the evening relief on 10 May, because ‘Beresford was still forbidding’ work against the castle, ‘it became necessary to devise some means to amuse the enemy’,⁶² and further trenches were dug against the Picurina and Pardaleras. Jones again mentioned small parties working against the two outworks the next day.⁶³

The delay in starting the attack against the castle also had a major impact on the attack against San Christobal in that the fire from Badajoz was almost wholly directed against the attack on that fort. On the morning of 10 May, the French made a sortie against the works around San Christobal. They briefly took control of the trenches. They only did minor damage before they were repulsed, but the British covering party rashly chased them up to the very walls of the fort and suffered 400 needless casualties. Squire, who was commander of the attack on San Christobal, reported:

I have the honour to report to you that at 7am the enemy made a sortie from Fort Christobal and from the line between that place and the bridge – They gained the [?] of our battery, but were immediately repulsed – our loss I believe has been rather severe – Lt Reid [RE] was in the battery at the time and he has received a slight contusion but is not incapacitated from doing his duty – it gives me the greatest pleasure to report to you the very handsome manner in which Col. Harcourt and all the officers of the covering party speak of the gallantry and zeal of that officer.⁶⁴

The delays caused by Beresford not allowing work to start against the castle was causing some frustration amongst the engineers:

Still we were urged on … with the reason … that we were to take the fire off the main attack … by attracting it to ourselves!!!!!! … The daylight of each succeeding day however affording us the mortification of seeing that our promised support from the main attack had been withheld … Marshal Beresford not allowing the original plan to go on.⁶⁵

The project was to commence a parallel embracing the castle … at the same time attacks were to be carried on against the fort of San Christobal … This latter one however only was commenced, Marshal Beresford, who commanded saying he would take that first, the consequence was that the small attack [on San Christobal] … had to support for three days the whole fire and efforts of the place and fort.⁶⁶

On the evening of 10 May, Beresford finally gave permission for work to start against the castle on the following evening but insisted that it must not start until Fletcher could guarantee that the workmen would be fully protected from French fire by the morning. To achieve this the tools ordered from Lisbon were needed, and these were expected to arrive until the next day. The batteries finally opened against San Christobal on the morning of the 11th. D’Urban and Oman both suggested that the battery at San Christobal started too early⁶⁷ and took all the return fire from Badajoz. Ross, one of the engineers working at San Christobal, wrote clearly that ‘on the 11th by order, our battery of three 24-pounders and two 8-inch howitzers opened upon San Christobal having [the whole of] Badajoz opposed to it’.⁶⁸

The battery against the Picurina had been ready since 9 a.m. on the 10th. There is no specific information on when this battery opened fire, but Jones commented that the Picurina battery fired 160 rounds on 11 May, hitting the target only four times.⁶⁹ This would strongly suggest that the battery had been firing for most of the day.

Dickson said that his and Fletcher’s wish ‘was not to begin the fire from any one battery until the whole attack should be more advanced’.⁷⁰ Their view was that the Picurina battery was not sufficiently far forward to support San Christobal. The effect of the two batteries fire was negligible due to the inexperience of the artillerymen and the faults in the guns. The battery against San Christobal was overwhelmed by fire, with four of the five guns being disabled by mid-afternoon. It was decided to build another battery next to the one that had been badly damaged, and this was started on the night of 11/12 May. This battery did not open fire before the siege was raised.

At 5 p.m. on the 11th, Fletcher received news that the tools required to begin the attack against the castle would not arrive that night. He complained to Squire that the tools they had were so defective as to be almost unusable and told Beresford that the works against the castle could not start until the following night. When the new tools finally arrived, the trenches were started against the castle on the night of 12 May. Good progress was being made when at 1 a.m. an order was received from Beresford for the work to stop immediately and for the troops to be withdrawn.

Activities over the next 48 hours became very confused, with most of 13 May being spent removing stores. However, work was still continuing against the forts of San Christobal and Pardaleras. According to Jones, at 6 a.m. on the 14th, Beresford wrote to Fletcher and suggested that the attack could continue against San Christobal, as he believed the French were only manoeuvring. Fletcher had started recalling the stores when he was informed that orders had been issued to the army to raise the siege and he then had to countermand his orders. On the night of 14 May, the batteries were dismantled and any remaining stores that could not be removed were burnt. Beresford, who had advanced to meet Soult, was very concerned about his rear as the temporary crossing-point over the Caya river had been dismantled and floated down to Jerumenha, leaving the bridge at Jerumenha as his only point of retreat if his army was beaten. He would have been very aware that these crossing-points had twice been made impassable in the last few weeks. He wrote to Fletcher asking him to make sure it was secure ‘as the ultimate safety of the army might depend upon it’.⁷¹ Fletcher personally inspected the bridges on the evening of 15 April ‘on his way to join the army’. The final covering forces did not leave Badajoz until the night of 15/16 May and marched straight to the battlefield at Albuera. Thus ended the first siege of Badajoz.

Oman’s account of the siege is flawed in a number of places. He claimed that Wellington’s orders were for the siege of Badajoz to begin the moment that the guns and material were ready.⁷² This is not true. Wellington had told Beresford not to start the siege until the Spanish generals had agreed to his memorandum of operations. This did not happen until 8 May. The evidence shows that the siege was ready to start before that date. Oman states that the south side was invested on the 6th and the north side on the 7th.⁷³ He also wrote that Beresford only invested the south side after Fletcher and Dickson said all the stores were ready on the 5th.⁷⁴ These dates should in fact be 4 and 8 May, respectively. Wellington’s only comment on the investment dates are in a letter to Liverpool on 15 May, where he said both sides were invested on the 8th. Beresford, writing to Wellington on 3 May, stated that he intended to invest Badajoz on the 4th, but this did not happen.⁷⁵

Oman’s summary of the strategy accurately reports Wellington’s memorandum of 23 April 1811. He goes on to say that none of the attacks were to be false attacks and that the engineers had given Wellington ‘bad counsel as they certainly did to Beresford during the subsequent weeks’.⁷⁶ He then concluded by saying that planning three attacks when the engineers knew they had limited resources was inexcusable. Oman’s criticisms are based on the premise that the engineers were following the plan described by Wellington on 23 April, but the diaries of the engineers show that they were not. A more plausible explanation is that the engineers were operating to a plan based on that originally proposed by Fletcher, but with a change to bring forward the attack on the Picurina and castle to make up some of the additional lost time and this is what was agreed with Beresford on 7 May.

Without even looking at the actual work undertaken during this first siege, the timescale for its completion was unrealistic. The whole operation started too late and was too hurried. Wellington was desperate to recover Badajoz, as his whole strategy was dependent on it being in Allied hands. Wellington pressured the engineers to come up with a plan to meet his tight schedule. The plan was risky, but could have worked. The strength of San Christobal was certainly underestimated but at the time both the engineer and artillery commanders believed it was possible to take the fort in a few days.

There was real confusion both at the time and amongst later writers about which plan was being followed. The plan Wellington wrote up was not that proposed by Fletcher. The plan implemented was not that proposed by Fletcher either, but was much closer to it. The engineers believed they were working to a plan that Beresford would not let them implement fully, after he had approved it. Their frustration comes through clearly in several of their letters.

The resources required were not available, either in terms of guns or siege materials. The siege train was too small and ineffective. Although thirty-two guns were available for the siege, only thirteen of these made it into the batteries. Five guns⁷⁷ opened against San Christobal on 11 May, four of which were damaged the same day and were not replaced before the siege was raised, although a new battery for four guns was started. The eight guns for the attacks on the two outworks on the south side were too far away to cause any significant damage. During the whole siege there were only five siege guns firing to make a breach from 7 a.m. to around noon on 11 May. The stores in terms of tools, shot and powder were insufficient and had to be shipped in from Lisbon. Even the reduced stores ordered from Lisbon did not arrive until the 12th.

There were too many delays in starting the siege. It appears that the decision to besiege Badajoz had developed a level of momentum and rather than stop it, each problem just delayed the start, with no-one re-evaluating the costs and benefits of continuing with the siege. Most of the delays were not the fault of the engineers. These included the problems with the bridging across the Guadiana, getting the stores to Badajoz and getting the agreement of the Spanish commanders to Wellington’s operational plan. The loss of a week between 24 April and 1 May, due to the river rising, was the last in a series of delays that severely affected the plan to attack Badajoz. Wellington’s correspondence shows that the deciding factor for starting the siege was the agreement of the Spanish commanders to his memorandum. Beresford did not want to commit to starting the siege until he knew he would have their full support. Neither Oman, Fortescue or later historians pick up on this.

Beresford knew on 10 May that Soult was advancing to relieve Badajoz. He was in a difficult situation. There was no way that there would be sufficient time to complete the siege before Soult arrived. But if Soult was just making a demonstration, or decided that his force was not strong enough and retired, Beresford would be criticised for raising the siege too early.

The engineers all wanted to start the attack on the castle on 9 May, but Beresford would not allow them. From the 11th, Beresford was trying to protect the siege materials and conduct the siege at the same time. The result was that neither was done successfully. The siege was half-hearted in its application and many stores had to be destroyed when the siege was raised. A better strategy would probably have been to suspend the siege and keep a tight blockade around Badajoz until Soult’s intentions were clear and then restart with all the materials and resources immediately at hand. In the end there was no way that the siege could have succeeded. There were only five days between the investment of the fortress and the raising the siege. It was impossible to take the fortress in that time. It should be remembered that the French took forty-two days to take Badajoz and that was through surrender. It would have taken them longer to take the fortress by storm.

One impact of the first siege of Badajoz was the effect it had on Beresford’s reputation. There was a growing lack of confidence in his leadership that had started with the action at Campo Mayor. Gordon, Wellington’s ADC, had very little good to say about Beresford before they rode down to sort out the problems. Squire described the leadership as all ‘doubt and indecision’.⁷⁸ Boutflower, the surgeon of the 40th Foot, complained that they were ‘victims of some shameful mismanagement’.⁷⁹ Following the Battle of Albuera, there were many more officers complaining about Beresford’s leadership.

The first siege resulted in nearly 750 casualties with no visible benefit, although the bulk of the casualties were caused by the reckless pursuit of the French sortie on 10 May. Of the twenty-one engineers present, two were killed and three wounded, all in the attack on San Christobal.⁸⁰ The troops were despondent, and after the bloodbath at Albuera they were to come straight back to Badajoz to try again.

The engineers played no part in the battle, being employed removing or destroying the siege stores. Fletcher, who was at Jerumenha on the morning of 16 May, heard of the battle and rode with Rice Jones, arriving after the battle was over. The two of them spent an uncomfortable night out in the open and waited the next day with Beresford to see what Soult intended to do next. On the 18th Rice Jones followed the retreating French with the Allied advance guard and was used as a messenger between the Spanish cavalry and Beresford. Realising that Soult was indeed retreating, Beresford ordered Hamilton’s Portuguese division and Madden’s cavalry brigade to re-invest Badajoz. That night the engineer officers retired to Olivenza and ‘procured good quarters’, their thoughts going back to the challenge of besieging Badajoz.⁸¹ In the period since the siege had been raised Phillipon, the governor, had worked hard to make repairs. He also ordered the soil to be removed from the area where the batteries would be sited for any subsequent attack on San Christobal.

The Second Siege of Badajoz

Wellington arrived at Elvas on 19 May 1811, having ridden from the north after defeating the French under Masséna at Fuentes del Oñoro. While Beresford followed Soult south, he took control of the plans for a second attempt on Badajoz. He ordered Dickson to collect the necessary siege materials. Jones believed that it would take around eleven days to have the guns ready, primarily because the carriages used to transport the siege pieces needed significant repairs after the first siege.⁸²

Timeline for the Second Siege of Badajoz

19 May 1811	South side of Badajoz invested by Hamilton
25 May 1811	North side of Badajoz invested by 7th Division
25 May 1811	Flying bridge installed at the mouth of the Caya
27 May 1811	3rd Division joined investment on south side
29 May 1811	Work started on false attack against Pardaleras
30 May 1811	Work started against San Christobal and Picurina
3 June 1811	Guns opened fire on both sides
4 June 1811	Seven guns moved forward to new battery on night 4/5 June
5 June 1811	Seven guns opened from Battery No. 6, south side
6 June 1811	1st assault on San Christobal, night 6/7 June
7 June 1811	Three guns opened from Battery No. 7, south side
8 June 1811	Ten guns opened from Battery No. 7, south side, including six iron 24-pounders which had arrived from Lisbon
9 June 1811	2nd assault on San Christobal, night 9/10 June
10 June 1811	Siege raised and guns removed by that evening

It was not until 29 May that the convoy set off from Elvas. During this ten-day delay, Allied reinforcements had also arrived to replace the losses at the Battle of Albuera. The 7th Division arrived on 25 May and re-invested the northern bank of the Guadiana, once again completely cutting off the fortress. General Picton arrived with the 3rd Division on the 27th and took up a position on the southern bank. Wellington was in no doubt that this siege would also have to be conducted against the clock. Although Soult and Masséna had been temporarily repulsed, it quickly became apparent that the French were preparing once again to come to the aid of the fortress. As early as 23 May, Wellington noted the movement of reinforcements to the south which would give the French 50,000 troops to use against him. Whilst the French still held Ciudad Rodrigo to the north, Wellington could not bring enough troops south to face this force. Consequently, when Soult advanced, Wellington would once again be forced to raise the siege unless the fortress could be taken by that time. Fletcher also reported that ‘it seems highly probable that our siege may again be interrupted’.⁸³

Wellington now considered the plan to be followed for the second attempt, Jones noting that ‘After much consideration, [he] determined … to follow the plan … for the last attack’.⁸⁴ This infers that the plan that the engineers actually followed for the first siege was known to Wellington, even though it was not documented, as discussed above. The plan was for attacks against the San Christobal and Picurina outworks (which would ultimately become the attack against the castle), with a false attack against the Pardaleras outwork. Some changes were made to the overall plan, to increase the number of guns available, to set up counter-battery fire and to start both attacks simultaneously. There was one major boost to the planning, in that the stores that Wellington had ordered from Lisbon in April 1811, for the first siege, had eventually arrived at Elvas and were now available for use. But there were still not enough tools for the planned activities as 1,000 more picks and shovels were ordered from Lisbon on 22 May.⁸⁵

The siege train that Dickson put together comprised thirty 24-pounder and four 16-pounder guns, and eight 8in and four 10in howitzers. As before, these were all supplied from Elvas and were of the same age and poor quality as those used previously. To bolster these limited resources, orders were sent to expedite the arrival of the six iron guns that had been ordered from Lisbon around 10 April and also to assign a company of British artillerymen to support the Portuguese artillerymen. Wellington, clearly still had no intention of using the new battering train that was at Lisbon. As early as 14 May, he was arranging for it to be moved north for the planned siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. Fletcher also requested that Beresford assign 250 soldiers to the engineers and that the assistant engineers who volunteered for the first siege would be made available again.

All the officers knew that this was going to be another race against time, Dickson, writing on 29 May, said ‘Reinforcements are on their march from Masséna’s army to the south, so that we must soon take Badajoz, or we probably will be interrupted again’.⁸⁶ Similarly, Jones’ view was ‘anything to be undertaken against Badajoz, must therefore be of a rapid nature’.⁸⁷ As with the first siege, collecting men and material together with the limited resources that were immediately available proved time consuming and it was not until 30 May that everything was in place to start the attacks.

Between 30 May and the morning of 3 June, the batteries and trenches were formed for the attacks against San Christobal and the castle. The attack against San Christobal suffered the same problems as before, through the lack of soil and the incessant bombardment from the French. Due to the limited number of workmen available on the south side, the parallel was not as long as proposed and on the night of 31 May 1811 it was decided to prepare the main battery at the end of the current parallel rather than wait a further twenty-four hours for the parallel to be extended nearer to the walls. The decision was made to accept the extra distance for the sake of speed.⁸⁸ The batteries were completed and opened fire on the morning of 3 June 1811.

There was an impressive increase in the number of guns brought forward. Compared with the first siege, three times the number of guns were available on the morning the firing commenced. On the north side, there were four batteries in action. On the south side all the guns were initially placed in one large battery. Fletcher had written to Wellington on the evening of 3 June, stating that as ‘the guns employed are so uncertain in their effects it may become necessary to push yet further forward’.⁹² He told Wellington that he had ordered work to be started that night on the second parallel and a new battery that would bring the range to the castle walls down to 650 yards. This work was completed and seven guns opened fire on the morning of 5 June. Again that night, the parallel was extended further to the right and another battery was started at 520 yards from the castle. This battery opened with three guns on 7 June, and that night the six iron 24-pounders, which had eventually arrived from Lisbon were installed with one other gun, bringing the battery up to ten guns on the morning of the 8th.

The table above shows the number of guns that were available each morning. The old brass guns continued to exhibit all the problems that had been apparent during the first siege. Most were made inoperative through use rather than through enemy action. Both Jones and Dickson remarked on the improvements when the first iron guns became available on the morning of 8 June.

As predicted by the engineers, the wall of the castle was quickly destroyed on the first day of firing. However, what was not expected was that the wall was actually just a facing for the ground behind which refused to collapse and peeled off in sheets leaving a near-perpendicular slope. This was battered incessantly until 10 June, and it was only at this point that there was some hope that the breach might be practicable. Captain Mulcaster reconnoitred the Rivellas stream on the night of 5 June, and identified two fords where troops could cross near the proposed breach.⁹³ Captain Patton was mortally wounded making a further reconnaissance of the Rivellas stream and the castle walls on the night of 8 June 1811.⁹⁴

The fire against San Christobal was also more successful than it had been during the first siege. The breach was declared practicable following a reconnaissance of the breach on the night of 5 June by Lieutenant Forster RE. An assault was ordered for midnight on the 6th, led by Lieutenant Forster. Writing to the Earl of Liverpool on that day, Wellington said ‘I have strong hopes that they will not be able to keep us out of the place [i.e. Badajoz]’.⁹⁵ His optimism had gone by the following morning, and it seems it had been for public consumption only. Cocks recalled overhearing him talking to Dickson the day before, saying ‘If we succeed with the means we have it will be a wonder’.⁹⁶

The assault failed, primarily due to the prompt action of the French who had cleared away the rubble from the breach between dusk and midnight when the attack was made. The attacking party made valiant attempts for nearly an hour to find a way in, but eventually retired with losses of twelve killed and eighty wounded. Jones noted that ‘the storming party, I am afraid, did not march until midnight’, which suggests that the engineers thought the delay before the assault was too long.⁹⁷

The siege batteries recommenced firing the following morning and battered the walls of the fort for a further two days, when the breach was once again declared practicable. To reduce the time for the French to clear away the rubble, the assault was scheduled for 9 p.m. The size of the assault force was increased but a similar result occurred, with the garrison showing great energy in clearing the rubble from the breach and blocking the breach itself. The leader of the assault, Major McGeechy, and Lieutenant Hunt RE, who was guiding the party, were both killed in the first minutes of the attack. Casualties this time were fifty-four killed and eighty-five wounded.⁹⁸ Squire, writing just before the second assault took place, showed that despondency was creeping in:

This night Fort Christobal will be again assaulted. On the last occasion we lost one of the bravest and finest young men in the Corps of Engineers. He was a real hero, he lived and died like a Roman in the best ages of their glory. In this unfortunate attack I have now buried three of my comrades – two of them, Dickinson and young Forster, I knew intimately and I sensibly feel their loss. I have called our attack unfortunate because of our miserable means. In every other aspect we have done well and the Corps of Engineers have at least endeavoured to deserve an honourable distinction – Our guns are infamous all Portugueze – and two or three became useless every day – I think a practicable breach may possibly be made tomorrow evening in the castle. Captain Patton of the Engineers was severely wounded yesterday.⁹⁹

Two days later, he updated the situation:

On the night of the 9th, the assault of Fort Christobal was again attempted, and a second time it failed although I am persuaded if success had been possible, we should have succeeded. The enemy made a most noble and obstinate defence they had cleared away the rubbish from the foot of the breach and filled the ditch with 5½ inch shells, hand grenades, light balls etc. When our ladders were planted the enemy rolled down upon our men large stones or rubbish or pushed them into the ditch with poles. They cried out from the parapet Venez Monsieurs Anglais, Venez Portugaise. The Portugueze amidst all this fire behaved as nobly as the English. We lost 130 men killed and wounded; amongst the killed Lieutenant Hunt of the Royal Engineers, who was the first man shot on the occasion. Our losses on this side have indeed been severe. I have certainly suffered great anxiety but my calamity is now at its height for we must raise the siege, time and means completely failing us. In a day or two a large French Army will be collected in this neighbourhood; our breach in the castle will not be practicable for three or four days and to take Christobal we must go to the crest of the glacis. We have neither time nor means. Our guns are most infamous, nearly half of them have been disabled by our own fire. The artillery is Portugueze most of the vents of the guns are now 1 ½ inch in diameter! We have had no mortars whatever.¹⁰⁰

At noon the following day, 10 June 1811, Wellington called together his officers and told them he was raising the siege. The guns and stores were removed over the following two days. The comprehensive reasons Wellington gave for his decision were:

• The poor quality of the siege guns.

• The even poorer quality of the gun carriages.

• The resistance of the castle wall. He was ‘astonished’ by it.

• Failure to take the fort of San Christobal.

• The expected arrival of French relief forces.

• The depletion of the ordnance stores at Elvas to a point where it would not be able to defend itself; the lack of replacement stores from Lisbon and the lack of transport to deliver replacement stores.

• The depletion of provisions to the point where there were less than a fortnight of supplies for Elvas.

• The need for the transport used at the siege of Badajoz to replenish the ordnance stores and provisions at Elvas.¹⁰¹

The two sieges of Badajoz were dismal failures. The reasons need to be re-evaluated with emphasis on the performance of the engineers rather than on the events themselves.

There are some common threads running through both sieges:

• They were carried out against time pressures.

• There were limited resources available: manpower, materials and guns.

• There were transport problems.

• The choice of point of attack was strongly criticised both at the time and later.

The two most significant English writers on the war, Oman and Fortescue, are highly critical of the sieges, blaming the engineer officers and to a lesser extent Wellington. Myatt generally takes the same line, but he is more sympathetic to the problems that the Allies faced.¹⁰² In the analysis below both sieges will be treated as one, because they were effectively the same siege, undertaken twice.

Both Oman and Fortescue criticised the decision to attack San Christobal in the strongest terms. Whist criticism with hindsight is always easy, the views of the experts who were making decisions at the time must be considered. On two separate occasions the engineers advised that there was insufficient time to carry out a regular approach. The admittedly high-risk attack on San Christobal and the castle was the only possible solution they could see to meet the time limits.¹⁰³ Wellington and Beresford approved their plan on both occasions. Dickson, the senior artillery officer, expressed no concern about the strategy before, during or after the sieges. On both occasions, the siege was raised because of an approaching army. Oman, when commenting on the second siege, stated that Wellington had four weeks to take Badajoz. The fact is that Wellington only had ten days from opening the trenches to raising the siege. He had even less time in the first siege, just four days. The remainder of the time that the Allies had available was taken up arranging guns and stores or sorting out communications across the river Guadiana. If the plan chosen was believed to be the fastest, then there was absolutely no chance of an attack on the south side succeeding. The French took seven weeks to take Badajoz and that was by surrender, not assault. It is difficult to understand why most writers believe that Wellington could achieve the same in seven days.

D’Urban stated in his diary that the breach in San Christobal was never practicable and noted on 10 June that a French sapper who had deserted said that the castle wall could never be breached at the point chosen as it had solid rock behind (which was shown to be untrue). D’Urban thought the engineers had chosen the wrong point of attack and should have attacked the south side.¹⁰⁴ He reserved more serious criticism for the overall strategy, in that he believed that Wellington should have focussed on destroying Soult’s army first and then turned on Badajoz at his leisure. There is also an interesting comment by George Ross RE who wrote that Beresford believed that the siege of Badajoz should not have been undertaken.¹⁰⁵

The two assaults on the fort of San Christobal need further consideration. It was a small but very strong fort, each side being around 100 yards long. The first assault used less than 200 men and the second a few more. During the first assault, the French had less than 200 troops in the fort and probably not more than 400 during the second assault. Oman and Fortescue both commented that the storming parties were too small.¹⁰⁶ There was no reason why they could not have been larger. With the forces Wellington had available, he could have made an attempt to overwhelm the fort. Brute force may not have led to any greater casualties, as the losses were caused by these small groups spending up to an hour trying to get into the fort. Ladders could have been used at different points as well as at the breach. At no time did the French have enough troops in the fort to defend all the faces at the same time. When Wellington finally took Badajoz in 1812, it was the secondary attacks that succeeded, not the main one. A similar approach, attacking at multiple locations, should have been used in the assault on San Christobal in 1811, particularly due to Wellington’s strong desire to re-take Badajoz quickly.

There is no doubt that the guns available from Elvas were not up to the task of performing siege work. There is no doubt that the lack of trained sappers and miners had an effect in that there were no experienced troops who could take the sap forward. There is also no doubt that the transport problems meant that not all the materials were there when they were required. But the single inescapable reason why these sieges failed was time. None of the other factors would have prevented the sieges’ success had Wellington not been working against deadlines. Wellington had known for days that he could not continue the siege past 10 June.¹⁰⁷ In a letter to Charles Stuart, he wrote, ‘Badajoz may fall; but the business will be very near run on both sides … I have never seen walls bear so much battering, nor ordnance, nor artillery so bad as those belonging to Elvas’.¹⁰⁸ He also knew that Badajoz only had supplies for two weeks.¹⁰⁹

Added to the above, there were some other factors. San Christobal proved to be stronger than Wellington, the artillery and the engineer officers expected. It must also not be forgotten that the governor proved his skill many times during the three sieges of Badajoz. With a less energetic governor, the fortress would probably have fallen in June 1811. Overall there were too many factors working against the sieges succeeding, but they had to be tried because of the strategic importance of Badajoz.

What is surprising in looking closely at the writing of Oman, Fortescue and many modern authors is that the sieges have been skipped over and not really understood by them. Examples of this include Oman’s criticism that Wellington could have ordered up better guns in early May 1811 for the second siege of Badajoz.¹¹⁰ Wellington had ordered additional guns for the first siege of Badajoz around 10 April, a full month earlier than that. The lack of transport made moving them very difficult. These guns finally arrived near the end of the second siege of Badajoz on 8 June, two months after they were ordered. Fortescue gets similarly confused over the guns. First he suggests that time constraints meant that Wellington would not wait for the ‘English’ siege train.¹¹¹ Later he writes that they sent for some British iron guns from Elvas.¹¹² The iron guns from Lisbon were actually Portuguese naval 24-pounders. They were also old and worn, but much better than the old brass 24-pounders that were being used prior to their arrival.

In summary, the first two sieges of Badajoz were attempted with insufficient time and material available. The choice of point of attack was not the preferred option for any officer but circumstances led them to believe that this was the only option that might succeed. The engineer officers felt that they were not allowed to follow the plan that had been agreed. There is no strong evidence to support the view that another point of attack under the same circumstances would have been successful. The French, realising that the Allies were once again intending to besiege Badajoz, in a rare show of cooperation combined their forces into a joint operation. Marmont, who had replaced Masséna, came south with around 30,000 troops and Soult came north from Seville with a similar number.

Once Wellington had made the decision to abandon the siege, the artillery was quickly removed and on its way back to Elvas the following day. By the end of 12 June, all the stores had been removed. Over the next few days Wellington closely monitored the movements of the French, waiting until 16 June before deciding to raise the blockade. The next morning the Allied army crossed the Guadiana, primarily by the fords around Jerumenha. Soult and Marmont met at Merida on 18 June and not knowing that Wellington had already retired, made plans to advance to Badajoz on the 19th. It quickly became clear that there were no Allied troops in the vicinity, the two Marshals triumphantly entering the fortress the next morning, which fortuitously was also the last day for which Phillipon had provisions for the garrison.

Following their withdrawal, Wellington placed his forces in defensive positions to wait the advance of Soult and Marmont. His lines stretched from the village of Oguella on the river Gebora on his left, through Campo Mayor, to the bridge over the Caya on his right. The engineers were employed building field defences to strengthen Wellington’s positions, Burgoyne noting he was employed in this activity near Campo Mayor and Captain MacLeod and Rice Jones were working between there and the castle at Oguella.¹¹³ This activity is interesting since the Royal Staff Corps were officially responsible for field works. This is a good example of the blurring of responsibilities between the engineering services and Wellington’s pragmatic use of whatever resources was available. As there is no mention of the Staff Corps during either siege, it is certain that the bulk of the Staff Corps were with Wellington’s army in the north where they played their part at the Battle of Fuentes del Oñoro (see below).

Having found no sign of the Allies on the south side of the Guadiana, the French pushed out a large-scale reconnaissance on the morning of 22 June, finding the Allies in strength at Jerumenha and Campo Mayor. No further action was undertaken before the 24th, when Soult expressed concerns to Marmont on receiving the information that the Spanish General Blake was not, as believed, with Wellington, but was in fact moving south into Andalusia. Soult argued that the protection of Badajoz was probably of more importance to Marmont than it was to himself and consequently he should take responsibility for its safety. However, Marmont did not agree and believed that Soult was trying to pass the responsibility for Badajoz on to him as some of the other French generals had said he would. He then insisted that unless the whole of V Corps and Latour-Maubourg‘s cavalry were left with him, he too would abandon Badajoz and move off towards Truxillo. The honeymoon period of good relations between the French commanders had lasted less than a week and Soult, realising he had no option, consented.

The first indications of Soult’s return to Seville came to Wellington on 27 June, when he heard that the defences at Olivenza had been destroyed. On the 28th, Soult set off for Seville. Wellington held his position to protect Elvas and the Portuguese countryside from French attention. This standoff continued until mid-July when Marmont had managed to collect six months’ supplies for Badajoz. Marmont retired north towards the Tagus and D’Erlon, re-established links with Soult. Wellington, as soon as he was certain that the French had dispersed, took the opportunity to do likewise. The countryside around the Guadiana and the Caya was known to be unhealthy due to the marshy terrain, and plans were in hand to move the Allied troops away as soon as practicable. As early as 30 June, Cocks clearly knew what was intended:

We have been quietly encamped here between Elvas and Campo Mayor and scarcely see anything of the enemy; indeed, I believe the greater part of his force has already been drawn off from our front and that the remainder will go as soon as Badajoz is revictualled. In this case it is said we shall go into cantonments during the unhealthy season.¹¹⁴

Between 18 and 24 July, the bulk of the Allied troops moved away to their summer quarters, with Wellington‘s headquarters moving back to Portalegre. Squire had recovered from his earlier despondency and was able to reflect on the events of the last few months:

Every branch of the service has had an opportunity to profit by the extraordinary events, which have occurred. They will give rise to reflections, perhaps not very agreeable to our feelings, but highly important to us; who are now contending against the first military nation in the world. Those who command will see the necessity of proportioning their means to the end they have in view: – they will feel, that first to think deeply and combine with precision – then to execute with promptitude and secrecy is the surest road to success. When the passage of rivers is the object, they will, it is to be hoped, look forward and be provided with the means of passing them: they will not for the future despise difficulties, but be prepared to meet them: – when they intend the attack of fortified places, they will be previously provided with ample means for such an operation. The moment of execution is not the time to deliberate yet have I observed this to occur in more than one instance during our late campaign…. The Engineer Department (I speak without partiality, for you know I am a lover of truth) is capable of being made one of the best Departments in the Army: – but, as it is without means or organisation, it is one of the most inefficient from my own observation and experience I have no hesitation in saying, that there is more zeal, spirit and intelligence in that Corps, than in any other Department of the Army. Its best executions are however checked and though we may try (as I think we always shall) to deserve a reputation, it is almost impossible to obtain it.¹¹⁵

The army spent the remainder of 1811 quietly, but typically there were many things for the engineers to do. Before I describe these activities, I need to pick up the activities of the Royal Staff Corps at the Battle of Fuentes del Oñoro in May 1811. On the second day of the battle, to safeguard his retreat in the case the battle went against him, Wellington ordered the two companies of the Staff Corps under Captain Todd to construct a temporary bridge over the river Coa. Several large trees that were found two miles from the selected location were floated down the river. Two separate bridges were then constructed, each by placing the tree part-way across the river and artificers then crossing the remaining distance to the far side to complete the construction. The bridges were not required, due to Wellington’s victory but would have been vital if he had suffered a reverse.¹¹⁶

Having failed to relieve Almeida, Masséna now ordered it to be abandoned, the garrison escaping on the night on 10 May due to failures in the Allied blockade. Fletcher ordered Captain MacLeod and Lieutenant Trench to work on the repairs at Almeida. It had been extensively damaged during the French siege and further damage was done when the French abandoned it. One of the engineer officers assigned to this task at Almeida was tragically killed whilst trying to clear the ditches, Fletcher reporting ‘it is with infinite regret I have to report to you that Lieutenant Trench died on the 10th instant [June] of several wounds he had received … by the explosion of several barrels of powder and some shells’.¹¹⁷ Progress in repairing Almeida was reported in a letter from Burgoyne:

Lascelles [Lieutenant Lascelles RE] writes from Almeida that they have begun its repair (the Portuguese engineers) for which a regiment of Militia has been assigned, which from various causes can only produce a daily working party of 3 masons and 80 labourers – this is not a rapid way of building up more than three entire fronts of escarp – this scarp work is to be of 12 to 14 feet only the rest of earth. No measures were taken to provision this unfortunate regiment of Militia, many have deserted, many sick and the remainder are starving.¹¹⁸

The Portuguese engineer commanding the repairs at Almeida was probably Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Frederico Bernardo de Caula.

Recognising the impact in the previous two sieges of the lack of trained artificers, engineer officers were ordered to start training line infantry in the basics of sapping and mining to support future sieges. Burgoyne and George Ross worked with the 3rd and 1st Divisions respectively through the late summer. Burgoyne noting in his diary ‘An order arrived from headquarters that I am to instruct 200 men of the 3rd Division in the art of carrying on the sap etc’. Burgoyne made his opinions clear in a later letter:

My principal business now is training 200 men of different regiments to the duties required in a siege, which, to our disgrace and misfortune, we have no regular establishment equal to, notwithstanding the repeated experience of the absolute necessity of such a corps to act under the Engineers in a campaign. For want of such an establishment we are frequently led to the loss of valuable officers, and very undeserved discredit.¹¹⁹

These troops, whilst not perfect, formed a skills base that would be used in the forthcoming sieges. Similar training had been started in England under the control of Charles Pasley. His developments will be discussed later.

In September, Wellington moved forces near to Ciudad Rodrigo to prevent the French getting supplies and reinforcements into the town. Burgoyne wrote that Wellington had been told the fortress was short of supplies and was hoping that a short blockade might force the place to surrender. Several engineers were present preparing for the planned attack on Ciudad Rodrigo but also assisting in resisting any French advance to relieve the place. Burgoyne noted:

Three or four different positions have been sketched by order of our Colonel who has marked on the plans numerous batteries and slight field works; these positions are in front of Guinaldo and between that and Rodrigo having their right on the bold ravine of the Agueda and their left on the steep fall of the range of heights which is about 4 miles in a parallel direction with that river. The object of a position in the situation I cannot conceive as the enemy by attacking have much to lose by defeat and little to gain by success.¹²⁰

When the French advance came, Wellington found himself facing superior forces. Burgoyne was present at the action at El Bolden on 25 September and was ordered by Wellington to stay with the 21st Portuguese Regiment which was under great pressure from the French. Anthony Emmett RE, who was also present, described what happened:

On this day Marmont advanced in great force towards … El Boden and after a little manoeuvring opened his artillery on the position near El Boden held by two Portuguese guns supported by the 21st Portuguese Line … After a smart cannonade the French cavalry cut through the Portuguese guns, which made the 21st Regiment in some trouble and Lord Wellington passed by the regiment and posted himself on the right to see what passed, telling Burgoyne in passing to keep by the regiment and see if he could keep it together.¹²¹

Surprisingly, Burgoyne does not mention this incident in his diary or when he wrote to Squire a few days later. Eighteen months later he wrote in detail about the event:

In talking over the general arrangements of the Corps for the ensuing campaign, his Lordship agreed it would be advisable to attach officers of Engineers to the different divisions of the army, and said they might be useful in a thousand instances. ‘There was Burgoyne,’ said he ‘in the 3rd Division, always took the command of the Portuguese. After the business at El Boden, Marmont told my Aide-de-Camp, who went in with a flag of truce, that he observed we were forced to attach a British officer to encourage the Portuguese regiment on that day and keep it to its duty, and that was Burgoyne’ … This business of El Boden was on 25th September 1811, and Lord Wellington himself was present; our small force retired for six miles across a plain, in presence of a much superior body of the enemy, particularly cavalry. There being some difficulty in moving the 21st Portuguese regiment, I volunteered, to interpret to them all orders, and regulate their movements, and ultimately, the Portuguese Colonel being an inactive old fool, I took complete command of the regiment through the day. They were frequently threatened but never absolutely charged, though it would appear by Marmont’s observation, that he particularly watched for an opportunity against them, as the party on which he was most likely to make an impression. Lord Wellington appeared most pleased at the time, but I imagined it was all forgotten. This remark, of Marmont’s, however, appears to have fixed it in his memory as a point in my favour.¹²²

The flexibility of Fletcher’s officers was demonstrated in a number of ways over this period. Captain Ross and Lieutenant Emmett spent several weeks working on improving the navigation of the river Douro for the next major operation that would occur in early 1812.¹²³ Lieutenant Reid was serving on the staff of the Spanish army under General Carlos D’España at the specific request of the general and with the agreement of Wellington.¹²⁴ Squire, who was still with General Hill in the south, was present at the action at Arroyo dos Molinos on 28 October where Hill surprised a French force under General Girard and destroyed it. Writing to his friend Bunbury a few days later in great excitement, he said:

Never was a surprise more complete than that which took place at Arroyo del Molino [sic] on the 28th October … The Colonel of the 40th French infantry told me that the first notice he had of the attack was the appearance of two British officers galloping through the streets of the village … All the French officers (our prisoners) say that Girard ought to be shot and that General Hill deserves the highest praise for his conduct.¹²⁵

Squire concluded his account with:

During our late excursion General Hill has treated me with the most unbounded confidence, since our return he has expressed himself to me in the most kind and flattering language. He has written to Lord Wellington recommending me very strongly for promotion; should any communication on the subject pass through your office I trust you will exert yourself in my favour; for as I only aim at distinction, military rank is my chief object, and I am conscious of this, that (small as my exertions are) I always do my utmost to deserve it.

Promotion was never far from an officer’s thoughts. As Squire was promoted to brevet Major in December 1811 it looks like the recommendation from Hill was successful.

The year ended with Wellington poised in the north of Portugal waiting for an opportunity that would come sooner than many expected.