Chapter 5

1811 – Goodbye to Lisbon

Away from the Lines of Torres Vedras, the French started 1811 with some success. Soult was finally stung into action by repeated demands from Napoleon that he make an attempt to support Masséna’s beleaguered forces, and proposed a diversionary invasion of Estremadura and the capture of Badajoz rather than direct support of Masséna. With this in mind, he set off from Seville with 20,000 men on 30 December 1810. Wellington, aware of the risk but assuming Soult was advancing to the support of Masséna, asked for the bridges at Merida and Medellin to be destroyed and for the ferries on the Guadiana to be removed, forcing Soult into a lengthy detour. Unfortunately, this was not done and the French took control of the bridge at Merida on 7 January 1811. Whilst Soult waited for his main siege train to arrive, he besieged the weak Spanish fortress at Olivenza, which was defended against Wellington’s wishes by 4,000 good Spanish troops. This decision may have had more to do with politics than strategy. Olivenza had been part of Portugal until 1801 when it was ceded to the Spanish as part of the peace treaty after the War of the Oranges. It was possible that if the Portuguese had thrown a garrison into the fortress, they would have taken advantage of the significant improvements in their armed forces to decline to return it to the Spanish at a later date. Soult’s guns opened against Olivenza on 22 January and the weak walls collapsed immediately, with the Spanish governor surrendering the same day. The Portuguese telegraph system meant that Wellington was informed of this by 24 January. Soult now moved on Badajoz, destroying the large Spanish army under Mendizabal at Gebora on 19 February before the fortress surrendered on 10 March.

This could not have come at a worse time for Wellington. Masséna had finally started his retreat from the Lines on 5 March and Wellington was cautiously pursuing him north, only to find his flank threatened. Wellington had hoped that he could dispatch a force south to relieve Badajoz, but the late arrival of expected British reinforcements meant that he did not have sufficient troops to act against Masséna and Soult at the same time.

The unexpected loss of Badajoz to the French disrupted Wellington’s whole strategy for 1811. His intention when Masséna retreated from the Lines of Torres Vedras was to advance and re-take the fortresses of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo and then, having secured the northern passage, turn his attention to the south. The loss of Badajoz left both the southern and northern routes into Portugal in French hands, and put Wellington on the defensive. Replying to a question as to his priorities from Lord Liverpool on 7 May 1811, he wrote that retaking Badajoz was his first priority as it dictated his whole strategy for the rest of the year.¹ Speaking to Earl Stanhope in October 1836, Wellington said ‘Had it not been for the last, [the surrender of Badajoz] I could have blockaded Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo at once; and when I had taken them carried the war to the south’.² Strategically, it was vital that Wellington recover the fortress as quickly as possible.

Fletcher and John Jones travelled north with Wellington’s headquarters. A number of engineer officers remained at Lisbon to continue work on the defences north and south of the Tagus, while others, including John Squire and Lieutenant Forster, were with the Allied force on the south bank of the Tagus. As Wellington pursued Masséna north, the French destroyed several bridges to impede pursuit, so the Royal Staff Corps constructed crossings at Pernes, Foz d’Arouce and Ponte de Murcella. The first was constructed from wood taken from local buildings, the second was a trestle bridge thrown across the river Ceira and the third was ‘an ingenious’ raft bridge.³ Masséna having been chased back across the Coa, the RSC now repaired the bridge below Almeida.

While this was going on in the north, the French continued their operations in the south. They commenced the siege of Campo Mayor on 14 March, which after a brief but heroic resistance surrendered on the 21st. The governor, Tallia, had been told on 19 March that the Allies were marching to his relief but there was no way he could have resisted until they arrived on the 26th.

It was mid-March before Wellington was confident enough about Masséna’s retreat to dispatch a force south for the relief of Badajoz. These troops under Beresford concentrated around Portalegre before moving forward to Arronches on 24 March. The Allied army was now within ten miles of the French at Campo Mayor, who did not appear to be aware of the threat. March 25th saw the French surprised at Campo Mayor and they rapidly retreated back to the safety of Badajoz. Badajoz is located on the river Guadiana and the only bridge in the area ran through the city itself. The next bridge, also under French control, was at Merida, forty miles to the east, so Beresford’s first challenge was to get his army across the river.