Chapter 8

1813 – The Road to France

Wellington, having made a trip to Cadiz to discuss his role as commander of the Spanish Army, had returned to his headquarters at Freneda to start planning his next campaign. This was going to very different from previous years, in that the Allied army would be moving into new parts of Spain. Communications, both roads and bridges, would now be extended into these new areas. The barriers of the Tagus, Douro and Guadiana were less important, as they were not now on the front line.

There was extensive correspondence through the winter about the availability and condition of pontoons, as 1813 would be the first time that Wellington would move a pontoon train with the army. On 20 December 1812, he wrote to Lieutenant Piper RE asking him to obtain details of the number of pontoons and carriages at Lisbon and also to do the same with the equipment at Elvas, and for Piper’s report to be ready in ten days’ time.¹ Following receipt of the report, Wellington ordered Dickson to organise the large pontoon train at Lisbon ‘until the arrival of Mr Pakenham’ the Bridge Master.² Once the pontoon train was complete, the intention was to ship it up to Abrantes, and on 28 January 1813 Dickson applied for twenty-five large river boats to be made available to ship the thirty-four pontoons, carriages and equipment.³

Planning continued through the early weeks of 1813. A unit of Portuguese seamen was attached to the pontoon train in Lisbon and two companies of Portuguese artificers, with their engineer officers, were attached to the army.⁴ A small siege train of 18-pounders was also put together to travel with the army, there being a number of larger siege guns available at Almeida and Elvas if required.⁵ Orders were also issued to put the rope bridge back in place at Almaraz.⁶ Lieutenant Wright RE was ordered to fully destroy Fort Napoleon and the fort at Miravette near Almaraz and was then sent to build a bridge over the Alagon at Galisteo.

On 27 April, Lieutenant Harry Jones, who was attached to the 5th Division, was ordered by Murray, the QMG, to report on the means of passing ‘troops, horses or artillery’ over the Douro at Peso da Regua ‘and what can be done towards increasing the means of passing the river’. Jones reported back two days later that 13,000 troops could cross in ten hours, a brigade of artillery in five hours and 1,000 dragoons in the same time. He went on to describe in some detail the work required to collect the boats and prepare the river banks, also commenting on the impact of the river level rising and proposing alternative crossing-points. When the 5th Division crossed the river at this point on 14 May, Harry Jones crossed with them and two days later was employed repairing the roads to make them passable for the divisional artillery.⁷ Jones remained with the artillery for the next few days, working with the artillery officers to get the guns up and down the steep inclines. About the same time as Jones received his orders to report on the crossing-point for the 5th Division, Burgoyne received a similar order to do the same for the 3rd Division. Travelling with Lieutenant Hulme RE, they prepared crossing-points at Collegio and Villarinho. Part of the 3rd Division crossed here on 18 May.

In early May, Wellington wrote to Colonel Fisher, commanding the Royal Artillery, informing him that 264 horses were to be taken from Cairns’ artillery brigade and from the reserve artillery to equip the pontoon train that was made up of forty-four pontoons. This will have been extremely unpopular with the artillery but Wellington clearly wanted the pontoon train to be as mobile as possible and felt it necessary to swap the bullocks for horses.⁸ It will have been some consolation that this was a temporary measure until replacement horses arrived from Lisbon. Cairnes commented that ‘Although perhaps considered necessary by his Lordship unavoidable and essential to the service, [it] has mortified and vexed me beyond all possible expression … His Lordship was. I hear, pleased to express his regret at knocking up my Brigade.’⁹ Cairns went down to deliver the horses personally and remarked that he was unconvinced that the replacement of the oxen would improve the poor progress made by the pontoon train. His view was that the carriages were too light and unwieldy and the substitution of horses would make the situation worse as ‘nothing but the slow steady pull of the ox prevents it either from upsetting or breaking something’.¹⁰

Wellington’s plans for the campaign were delayed due to the difficulties in getting the pontoon train to the army. He wrote to Bathurst on 11 May informing him of his plans to establish a bridge over the Douro near Zamora but the pontoon carriages had suffered many breakages on the way and this had slowed its progress. On the 14th, Wellington rode to inspect the pontoon train himself. Writing to Fletcher, he said it would be two days before it would be ready to move and that he had asked for twenty pairs of wheels to be supplied by the Royal Artillery, making it clear that the pontoon train’s needs were in his opinion greater than those of the artillery. Wellington had asked Fletcher to personally check the road that was planned to be used by the pontoon train and make sure it was passable.¹¹ A few days later, Wellington wrote to Bathurst enclosing a report from Fletcher on the condition of the pontoon train and asking that ‘good carriages constructed as proposed by Lieutenant Colonel Sir R Fletcher’ were sent out to Corunna (see Appendix 4 on military bridging for more details).

By mid-May nearly everything was ready for the advance. Essentially, the plan was for the Allied army to move in two columns, one up the main road to Salamanca and the other to sweep round the French flank to the north. In Wellington’s instructions for movement, issued to Sir Thomas Graham on 18 May, he informed him that ‘Captain Mitchell [QMG Department] is now employed in the examination of the fords and other passages of the Esla’. He also informed him that he intended to

lay the bridge of pontoons at the Barca de Villal Campo, about a mile below the junction of the Esla with the Douro, where it is expected to arrive on the 30th … the object of these movements is first to turn the enemy’s positions on the Douro and next to secure the junction of the right of the army with the left, as far up the river as may be practicable.¹²

If all went to plan, around 30 May the two wings of the Allied army would arrive at the junction of the Esla and the Douro on the same day that the pontoon train arrived to connect the two forces. The first of the Allied columns set off on 20 May, with Wellington leaving his headquarters at Freneda two days later. Concerned that the two wings of the army could be vulnerable to a French attack, having a river between them, he decided to split the pontoon train and make an earlier crossing at Espadacintra until the main crossing-point on the Douro/Esla was established. Whilst there were some delays, the Allies moved forward, with Hill’s corps nearly catching the French at Salamanca as they delayed their retreat, trying to obtain accurate information on the forces moving against them. The bridge at Alba de Tormes was captured intact, Lieutenant Wright RE describing the French repairs to the bridge a few days later.¹³

Orders to lay the pontoon bridge over the Douro at Barco de Villal Campo were given on 28 May 1813 but two days later Wellington wrote to Hill saying the order had been countermanded as he needed the pontoon bridge over the Elsa, where the river had risen and the fords become impassable, Harry Jones noting ‘I attempted to cross on horseback, but was very near being carried away; water above horse’s chest.’ This sudden rise in the water level caused a day’s delay until the pontoon bridge was put in place.

Initially the French believed that Hill’s force was the only one advancing and it was several days later before they realised their mistake. The French had to hurriedly evacuate Zamora and retire towards Burgos, Wellington leaving a small Spanish garrison and Lieutenant Hulme to repair the defences there. Anticipating the French retreat, Wellington continued his flanking movement and Burgos was also evacuated on 13 June, the French destroying the fortress that he had failed to take the previous year. Fletcher and Dickson examined the damage the same day, even though the French were still close by, and following their report Wellington believed that he thought ‘it was possible to put in a state of repair for a reasonable expense’.¹⁴

Wellington’s flanking manoeuvre continued to be successful and the French retired again, their forces concentrating at Vitoria from 19 June to protect the retreating baggage train containing the fruits of six years of plunder. Wellington, following closely, realised that he was stronger than the French and launched a co-ordinated assault on the morning of the 21st. Overwhelmed and outflanked, the French were comprehensively defeated and King Joseph’s army disintegrated and fled to the north. Following a trend of bad behaviour that had been growing throughout the war, the Allied army now also degenerated into a mob looting the French baggage train, any though of pursuing the French lost amongst the riches to be gained. Officers were as guilty as the rank and file. It was the following morning before an organised pursuit began, but the French had a head start and, with some skirmishing, retired across the Bidassoa, leaving garrisons in the major fortresses at Pamplona and San Sebastian and the minor fortress of Pancorbo. The Spanish General O’Donnell was ordered to take the latter and Lieutenant Stanway was ordered to assist him. Pancorbo was invested on 25 June, the lower fort was stormed on the 28th and the place surrendered two days later, although this was more due to lack of water than the threat of assault.

Wellington, with the bulk of the army, continued to press the French and Fletcher remained with him. Hill was dispatched to Pamplona with Henry Goldfinch RE in attendance and Graham was sent to San Sebastian with Charles Smith RE. Wellington needed to take these fortresses to capitalise on his success. The French had retreated into the Pyrenees and if Wellington could take the fortresses, he had a much better chance of holding the line of the mountains against any future French advance.

The Blockade of Pamplona

Four days after the Battle of Vitoria, Lieutenant General Hill closely blockaded Pamplona, the original intention being to lay siege to the place. Wellington ordered Major Augustus Frazer RA to ride to Santander and divert to Deba the siege train that was waiting in transports on the north coast of Spain. He also made arrangements for twenty-four 12-pounders captured from the French to be sent there. On 28 June, Wellington wrote to Hill ordering a close blockade of the place and Hill reported that ‘I shall do my utmost to fulfil your Lordship’s wishes relative to the blockade of Pamplona. Major Goldfinch is now out examining the place, with the view of carrying into effect your instructions.’¹⁵ Two days later, Hill sent Wellington Goldfinch’s report on the defences, and on the same day, Frazer reported that the siege train was at Deba and unloading had started. Wellington’s original plan had been to attack Pamplona, but he now decided to attack the weaker fortress of San Sebastian and blockade Pamplona into submission. This also gave Wellington the advantage of shorter distances for the siege train to travel from the northern coast. John Jones suggested that this decision was based on a reconnaissance by Wellington and Fletcher on 1 July where they realised that Pamplona was too strong to take with the resources at hand,¹⁶ but this does not appear to match Wellington’s correspondence. Writing to Graham on 26 June, he said ‘I therefore propose to blockade the place rather than lay siege to it. We shall get the place at a later period.’¹⁷ Wellington ordered the blockade to be taken over by the 6th and 7th Divisions under Lord Dalhousie until O’Donnell’s Spanish army arrived, and for nine redoubts to be built to surround the fortress. Fletcher remained to oversee the construction of these with other engineer officers including Goldfinch, Burgoyne and Pitts. Writing to Dalhousie on 2 July, Wellington said:

I am anxious to establish a strict and close blockade of Pamplona … and to arrange the details with Colonel Fletcher, who has received my instructions on the subject … redoubts should be constructed on certain favourable spots which Colonel Sir R Fletcher will point out, at a distance of 1,000 and 1,200 yards from the place.¹⁸

The strict blockade also included cutting off the water supply, shooting at anyone approaching the river, and removing or destroying any crops in the fields in the vicinity of the fortress. The redoubts were built by Spanish peasants under the direction of the engineer officers and a small number of artificers. Lieutenant Thomas Pitts RE remarked ‘Pasley’s sappers are most valuable and generally extremely zealous’. These will have been some of the first ‘trained’ artificers to have gone through Pasley’s School of Military Engineering at Chatham. The redoubts were armed with French field guns captured at Vitoria. Over the coming weeks a number of buildings were turned into strongpoints and a signalling system was set up to provide rapid communication between the redoubts.

On 11 July, Fletcher reported his progress to Wellington: ‘I am sorry to say that having found much stone or rock in the ditches of the redoubts, their completion will necessarily be delayed somewhat beyond the time I had mentioned.’¹⁹ Three days later, Fletcher and Burgoyne set of for San Sebastian where the siege was just starting. Despite a belief that the garrison was desperately short of food, Pamplona held out until 31 October.

The First Siege of San Sebastian

After San Sebastian was invested on 11 July 1813, Wellington, Major Charles Smith RE²⁰ and Dickson rode around the fortress, and at the suggestion of Smith,²¹ the same basic plan of attack was proposed as had previously been used by the Duke of Berwick in 1719. The plan was to breach the wall on the eastern side where it was fully visible, due to the sea going right up to the base of the wall at high tide and preventing any other form of defence in front of it. At low tide it was possible for troops to cross the tidal estuary of the river Urumea and storm any breach. It would also be necessary to take some of the outworks on the land side to reduce the fire that could be brought to bear on any attack across the estuary and also to give access to the foot of the eastern wall. With this aim in mind, the convent of San Bartolomeo was to be captured and trenches thrown forward to allow the defences to be silenced and for enfilade fire on the proposed breaches.

By the time Fletcher arrived at San Sebastian the plan of attack had been agreed. It is not clear if Fletcher agreed with the plan. Burgoyne certainly did not, but the matter was decided before he had a chance to influence the decision. Graham writing to Wellington reported that Fletcher was concerned about the protection of the troops during an assault and recommended a second breach. Graham later, also made the comment ‘It is evident, however, that Major Smith thought too lightly of the strength of the place.’²²

Timeline for the First Siege of San Sebastian

11 July 1813	Batteries started against San Bartolomeo on night of 11/12 July
13 July 1813	Work started on batteries against eastern wall
14 July 1813	Fire opened on convent of San Bartolomeo
17 July 1813	Convent of San Bartolomeo taken
20 July 1813	Fire opened on fortress
21 July 1813	Governor rejects summons
23 July 1813	Main breach practicable, second breach started
24 July 1813	Assault postponed due to fires in town
25 July 1813	Assault fails
26 July 1813	Siege guns removed but blockade maintained on fortress

As at the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, Wellington had effective siege guns available. A new siege train had been sent out to the Peninsula for use in northern Spain and with the six 18-pounders that travelled with the army and six 24-pounders supplied by the Royal Navy, from HMS Surveillante, Wellington had a siege train of forty guns made up of:

• Twenty 24-pounders including six naval pieces.

• Six 18-pounders.

• Four 68-pounder carronades (short-barrelled and not accurate but useful for spraying the breaches with canister).

• Six 8in howitzers.

• Four 10in mortars.

Whilst at first glance this looked like a substantial siege train, it was not for a fortress on the scale of San Sebastian. There were only twenty-six guns to batter the walls, of which six were the smaller 18-pounders which had significantly less battering effect. Of the larger 24-pounders, the six naval guns had shorter barrels, which reduced the accuracy that was vital for bringing down walls. Dickson noted in his journal that ‘Fletcher thought this scanty for such a fortress and it certainly is so, at least in heavy guns’.²³

The engineering personnel commanded by Fletcher included seventeen officers and over 300 rank and file from the Royal Sappers and Miners.²⁴ This was the first siege at which there were a significant number of them present. Although John Jones’ published Journal does not record the employment of assistant engineers (officers volunteering from the army to assist), both Burgoyne and Fletcher mention that a number were used on the left attack.²⁵ In addition there was a party of fifty Portuguese artificers and engineers. Overall command of the siege was given to Sir Thomas Graham, Wellington staying with the army to monitor the activities of the French forces under Marshal Soult.

The initial attack was made against the convent of San Bartolomeo. Two batteries were constructed and they opened fire on 14 July. The following day, a force of Portuguese infantry was sent forward, but they encountered strong resistance and retired. The guns continued firing on the convent for two more days, and it was taken on the 17th, though not without considerable loss thanks to an undisciplined charge by British infantry against the main French positions. Two new batteries were started near the convent and the plan was to dig a parallel right across the isthmus.

The batteries against the eastern wall opened on the morning of 20 July and once the French realised where the main point of attack was going to be, they began establishing defences behind the wall being breached. The same night, the attackers started work on the main parallel across the isthmus, but due to the poor weather the majority of the Portuguese troops allocated for the work did not turn up and only a third of the planned work was completed. The following night, whilst completing this parallel, a large drain was found which had supplied water into the town until the supply was cut off. This was explored by Lieutenant Reid RE, who found it went up to the western side of the hornwork and it was decided to place a mine at the end of the drain with the intention of breaching the hornwork.

Burgoyne was sent by Graham with the first summons on 21 July, which was refused.²⁶ Burgoyne regularly was used in this sort of role, a task that you would expect would be given to permanent members of a general’s staff. Clearly he possessed some skills that were judged useful in these situations. It may have been his language skills but I think it more likely that it was an opportunity to get a close-up, professional view of the defences.

The breach in the eastern wall appeared practicable on the 22nd, but the French were making great efforts to clear away the debris despite the Allies continually sweeping the breach with grapeshot and shells. On the following day, the breach was declared practicable and the guns were directed to make a second breach in the wall at a location that locals had suggested was particularly weak. This second breach was ready that night, although the continuous shelling had started numerous fires in the houses behind the two breaches. Graham ordered the assault for the 24th, but in the morning it was cancelled as it was thought the fires that were still raging would impede the troops.²⁷ This delay gave the French an extra twenty-four hours to improve the defences, although they were working under a continuous bombardment from the attackers.

The plan of attack was for troops from the 5th Division to assault the two breaches, starting from the right (eastern) end of the parallel across the isthmus and skirting the foot of the wall until they reached the breaches, the siege batteries providing heavy covering fire from across the bay. The plan was dependent upon the time of low time and daybreak, which were both expected to be around 5 a.m. The signal for the start of the assault would be the blowing of the mine in the drain by the hornwork.

On the morning of the 25th, the mine was blown before daylight and the assault commenced. Filing out of the parallel was very slow and the first troops arrived at the breach only in small numbers. Although initially successful, there were not sufficient men present and they were quickly driven back, having been stopped by a twenty-foot drop from the breach into the town itself. In doing so, they became mixed up with the group who were tasked with assaulting the secondary breach and all retired in some disorder. The assault had failed completely before there was enough daylight for the artillery across the bay to provide any support, casualties amounting to 570 killed and wounded. There were five engineer casualties during the assault. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Fletcher, Lieutenants Harry Jones and Reid were wounded, Captain Lewis lost a leg and Lieutenant Machell was killed. Another officer, Lieutenant Hammond Tapp, had been severely wounded earlier in the siege on 13 July.

When Wellington heard about the failure of the assault, he rode over from his headquarters determined to continue the siege. However, he accepted that it would have to be postponed temporarily as powder and shot were running low and new supplies needed to be delivered. In the meantime, as Soult was still threatening to attack, Wellington ordered most of the siege guns to be removed and returned to the boats where they would be safe until further ammunition was available. He ordered a tight blockade to be kept in place.

Analysis of the First Siege

Both contemporary and more recent writers have criticised the performance of the engineers in a number of areas. Fortescue²⁸ leads the attack with an unjustifiable apportioning of blame for the failures at San Sebastian, while Oman²⁹ only holds the engineers partially to blame but identifies them as the primary culprit. Their assessments in both cases appear to be led by the opinions of one particular army officer who clearly had a dislike for the ‘scientific soldiers’. The analysis below will look at the criticisms and compare them with to the available facts.

Oman, and more recently Myatt,³⁰ criticised Major Smith’s proposal to follow the Duke of Berwick’s plan of attack of 1719. Oman wrote that Graham, Wellington, Fletcher, Dickson (commanding the Royal Artillery) and Frazer (commanding the siege batteries) all agreed with the plan and they ‘forgot’ that the Duke of Berwick did not have to assault the fortress.³¹ It is inconceivable, even excluding the other officers, that Wellington ‘forgot’ about the possibility of another costly assault. The strength of the fortress was directed against the land approaches for obvious reasons and once again the view was that there would be insufficient time to formally approach from the land side. Fletcher’s view on the proposed attack on the eastern side was that ‘it would certainly save much time [my italics] … compared with a regular siege of the very powerful defences crossing the isthmus’. An attack on the land front would be a ‘work of great difficulty’ requiring a larger battering train and thirty to thirty-five days’ effort.³² Burgoyne initially supported the proposed plan, although with the benefit of hindsight he thought that finding the drain tipped the balance in favour of an attack across the isthmus. He did, however, acknowledge that this would have taken more time. Oman and Fortescue both wrote that when Wellington arrived after the assault he was insistent that the siege would continue and required the engineers to come up with a plan for a formal attack from the land side. Burgoyne and Frazer indicate that an alternative plan of attack was discussed at the meeting with Wellington on 25 July. Jones, in his diary entry for that day, noted that ‘after some consideration, it was decided to persevere in the same plan of attack’.³³ Fletcher also wrote to Wellington on the 27th noting that Wellington’s opinion was for an extended attack using the original plan.³⁴ Lack of ammunition prevented any progress in the short term. By the time the new supplies had arrived, the plan, as Jones noted, remained the same as before, with an attack on the east-facing sea walls. Any thoughts of using a different plan were clearly put aside very quickly.

Oman’s narrative stated that when the mine was blown, the hornwork was to be assaulted by Portuguese troops from the parallel on the isthmus. He continued that the engineers were unsure how much damage would be caused by the mine and because of this no concrete proposals were made to make use of the explosion. He noted that for the attack on the 25th, ‘a little more attention, but not nearly enough, was given’, but overall described the engineers’ plans as ‘half-hearted’.³⁵ Burgoyne clearly understood that the mine was to be used ‘as a signal only and with the chance of alarming them [the French defenders]’.³⁶ Jones makes no mention of an assault on the hornwork. Dickson’s view before the assault was that blowing the mine would ‘create such an alarm as may make them evacuate … and so produce a favourable diversion’, a view shared by Lieutenant Harry Jones.³⁷ After the assault, Dickson noted, ‘A party of Caçadores [Portuguese Light Infantry] availing themselves of the consternation produced amongst the enemy … made … their way into the ditch … but the defenders … commenced a fire … which obliged them to make … their way back’.³⁸ It would appear that Oman based his suppositions on the comment above from Dickson, which does not give any real indication that it was a pre-meditated action. There does not appear to be any evidence to back up his claim that an attack on the hornwork was planned and that it was badly organised by the engineers. It should also be noted that it was not the engineers’ responsibility to organise the troops for any attack, but that of the commander of the troops, so any blame should have been directed at Graham, not the engineers.

There are a number of criticisms of the delay between the first breach being practicable and the assault, thereby giving time for the defenders to reinforce the damaged areas. These criticisms are not helped by some confusion amongst the Ordnance officers themselves. Frazer complained in his letter of 23 July that ‘after [making] this excellent breach, they hesitate about using it … I am now ordered to make another breach … by which time the original breach will be entrenched’. His view was clearly that the failure of the assault was caused by ‘delay and indecision’.³⁹ According to John Jones, the general plan as had been used in previous sieges was to open a second breach at the last minute to stretch the defenders. Frazer did not appear to be aware of this, perhaps because this was the first siege at which he was present. Oman and Fortescue both criticise the two-day delay between the first breach being ready and the assault. Fortescue in particular seized on Burgoyne’s remarks after the first siege where Burgoyne commented that the ‘whole of the batteries … were constructed on the right bank … giving them immediate insight into the nature of the attack … and the breach was practicable two days before the trenches’.⁴⁰ Careful review of the dates shows that the trenches were ready on the morning of the 23rd,⁴¹ the breach was declared practicable the same morning and the assault was planned for the following morning. The two-day delay is calculated because the assault was then delayed for twenty-four hours due to the fires behind the breach. This delay may have been unfortunate and significant, but it was not due to the trenches not being ready. It is difficult to see how the work on the breaching batteries could have been delayed to hide the point of attack. They were started on the 13th, which was four days before the convent of San Bartolemeo was taken. It is unlikely that they would have all been ready on the 20th, if they were not started until the 17th, and this would then have lengthened the siege. In every siege in the Peninsular War, time was a critical factor. San Sebastian was no different and the decisions taken were to save time. Graham wrote to Wellington on 24 July, pointing out that the artillery had nearly run out of 24-pounder shot. If the assault had not gone in on the morning of the next day, the siege would have had to revert to a blockade, as there was insufficient ammunition to continue.⁴² One other factor that must be taken into account is the problems with working parties. The working parties absenting themselves on the night of 20 July cost the attackers twenty-four hours. They should have been ready on the morning of the 22nd, which would have been the day before the breaches were declared practicable.⁴³

There were a number of criticisms around the assault on the morning of the 25th itself. The plan required daylight so that artillery support could be given to the assault. Dickson had told Graham that the artillery would be able to suppress the defenders’ fire during the assault. Graham’s official report stated that the attack took place ‘soon after daylight’, and Fletcher stated that the assault was given at daylight … the mine having been previously sprung’.⁴⁴ However, the artillery officers recorded that the assault had failed before there was sufficient light for them to determine what was happening. Dickson stated ‘the column of attack certainly moved forward too early, either from a mistake … or from over anxiety on the part of the directors’.⁴⁵ Frazer was more forthright, writing ‘The assault was … made … stupidly an hour before, instead of after daybreak’.⁴⁶ It is almost certain that the mine was blown before 5 a.m. as Graham’s letter to Wellington informing him of the failure of the assault was written at 5:30 a.m.⁴⁷ In his biography of Sir Thomas Graham, Aspinal-Oglander strongly refutes the claim that the attack commenced before daylight, but seems to base his argument on the fact that Graham’s dispatch reported it was in daylight.⁴⁸ While no account clearly stated who gave the order to start the assault, it is likely that Graham did. Even if he did not, he must, as commanding officer, still take responsibility for the failure.

General Oswald, the commander of the 5th Division, did not plan the actual attack well. Campbell of the 9th Foot was of the opinion that the troops were too extended during the assault and thought that if a compact mass had arrived at the breach they ‘would have bodily forced through all opposition’.⁴⁹ He may have had a point about the organisation of the troops, but his approach would not have worked against the twenty-foot drop that the attackers were faced with in the main breach. Oswald’s plan, bearing in mind the concerns about the narrow area in which the assault had to take place, organised his troops so that those heading for the nearest breach went first followed by those who needed to pass the first breach to go to the second breach. With the failure of the assault on the first breach, the troops destined for the second breach could not get past the retiring troops and were swept back into the trenches with them.

A more contentious issue is the view expressed at the time that the 5th Division had not tried very hard. Oman called this a ‘monstrous injustice’ writing ‘everything that mismanagement could accomplish had been done to discourage them’.⁵⁰ He quoted statements from Frazer and Larpent (Judge Advocate General and part of Wellington’s headquarters) who are generally respected commentators, but pointed out that neither was present at the assault. Burgoyne, recognised by Oman as one of the authorities on the siege, also recorded that the officers ‘could not get the men to follow them’.⁵¹ Jones wrote that the attack was not pressed energetically, but finished cryptically by noting although many officers thought so, it could not be true as the ‘highest authority’, Graham, had stated in his dispatch that the troops had done their best.⁵² One authority not used by Oman was Lieutenant Harry Jones RE, who led the column to the main breach and was captured there after being wounded. He commented:

Finding the descent [from the breach into the town] too great on the inside, I returned for the ladders … but upon reaching the foot of the breach everybody was running back with their heads between their legs as hard as they could. At the foot I waited, expecting them to rally and come on immediately, which not being the case, the enemy’s Grenadiers jumped into the breach sword in hand and made prisoners all who were able to crawl.⁵³

Oman’s comment about the mismanagement has some validity, but this, sadly, was true of every other siege and the troops usually did their best despite the mismanagement of their superiors. Whether the criticism of the 5th Division was fair or not, this was a view held at the time and Wellington was clearly concerned enough to ask for volunteers from the other divisions, which the 5th Division took as a clear insult.

A figure that appears to have generated much of the criticism of the engineers was Lieutenant-Colonel William Gomm, who was with the Quarter Master-General’s department attached to the 5th Division and also an officer of the 9th Foot, one of the regiments involved in the failed assault. Gomm’s criticisms are extensively used by Oman, Fortescue and Myatt with variants of:

The successes [at Ciudad Rodrigo and the third siege of Badajoz were] … owing to the almost miraculous efforts of our troops has checked the progress of science among our engineers … the artillery have become as summary in their proceedings as our engineers … providing they can make a hole in the wall … they care not about destroying its defences.⁵⁴

Of the above writers, only Fortescue uses the portion of Gomm’s letter that reads: ‘had we … attended to the niceties of the art in the attack of Ciudad Rodrigo or of [the third siege of] Badajoz it is possible we should have taken neither’. Gomm appeared to recognise that the sieges were being undertaken using methods that were not typical, and commented in the same letter that in his opinion there were sufficient resources to attack according to the normal rules of siege warfare. This was clearly not a view shared by Wellington, the artillery officers or the engineers. Gomm’s scathing comments continue in his subsequent letters with phrases such as: ‘escaping from the hands of those Philistines, the engineers’ and ‘when we commence [the siege] again, I dare say we shall do it a little less en charlatan and more en regle’.⁵⁵ In this same letter he also notes that ‘the enemy made a sortie this morning upon our lines, and, as we did not expect them, gave us more trouble than was necessary’. Perhaps the army officers should have been paying more attention to their own duties before criticising other branches of the military. Gomm was not untypical of the ambitious, confident officer who had a view on everything, which sometimes did not match the views of their superiors or the actual circumstances. A number of the engineer officers would also fall into this category from their private letters.⁵⁶ They may be entertaining to read but that does not make them accurate. It is a little more surprising that Gomm is so outspoken about scientific soldiers, because he was one of them, having attended the Royal Military College in 1805. It is possible that there was an element of professional jealousy in his opinions.

One final puzzling fact from the first siege of San Sebastian is the complete lack of comment on the presence of a large body of the Royal Sappers and Miners for the first time. Connolly’s history of the corps details their efforts in the siege and the assault,⁵⁷ but there is no mention of them by either engineer or army officers

Roncesvalles and Sorauren

Soult was determined to try and relieve the invested French fortresses. On 25 July, the same day as the first assault on San Sebastian, he launched two attacks on the Allied positions at Maya and Roncesvalles. Although the 3rd and 4th Divisions were initially surprised and pushed back, the Allies regrouped and then held their ground over the next few days until Soult realised that his attack had failed. He had got within a few miles of Pamplona but could not break through. Lieutenant Wright RE, who was with the Allied troops, reported trying to warn General Byng, brigade commander in the 2nd Division, of the danger to his left flank ‘but in vain; I had not an opportunity of doing so to General Hill until the day it happened. General Hill then became very anxious about that point, but before any order could be sent the attack took place’. Wright remained with Hill until 28 July, working on repairing roads in the area and then asked for permission to return to San Sebastian. Hill ordered Wright to stay and later he was ordered to fortify the ground around Roncesvalles. He remarked ‘I have never had so much work in my life.’⁵⁸ Wellington realised that Soult’s attack had nearly succeeded and, writing to Fletcher, said: ‘A great deal can be done to strengthen the positions on the right; but engineer officers and intrenching [sic] tools will be required. I beg to know where the field equipments [sic] of intrenching tools are, and what officers can be sent on this service, without loss of time.’⁵⁹

In the period between the two sieges, whilst the Allies waited for new supplies of ammunition to arrive, Wellington made use of the pause by ordering an engineer officer to the port of Guetaria, as he wanted to provide the maximum number of safe anchorages for Allied shipping, particularly as winter was approaching. He asked for an investigation into ‘the time and expense would be required to construct wells’ as well as an estimate of the size of the garrison required. If wells could not be dug, then water would need to be supplied in casks. Captain Stanway was given this task and Graham reported back to Wellington on 14 August that Stanway thought ‘the making of the wells would be tedious’.⁶⁰ The following day, after receiving an update from Beresford, Wellington gave up on the idea and ordered the engineers to destroy the place.

The Second Siege of San Sebastian

Whilst Wellington was busy repelling Soult’s attacks at the end of July, Graham remained at San Sebastian with sufficient troops to maintain the blockade and keep the French from recovering any of the ground that had been taken. It was not possible to stop them making repairs in the town but there was only a limited amount that they could achieve.

Timeline for the Second Siege of San Sebastian

19 August 1813	Supply ships arrive from England
21 August 1813	Remaining supply ships arrive from England
24 August 1813	Work on batteries resumes
26 August 1813	Guns open on fortress
26 August 1813	Island of Santa Clara seized on night of 26/27th
31 August 1813	Town stormed successfully, French retire to castle
1 September 1813	Bombardment starts on castle
3 September 1813	Governor refused second summons to surrender
8 September 1813	French surrender

Following Wellington’s orders, the siege guns were returned to the transports until it was judged safe to land them again. Everything was on hold, waiting for the additional guns and ammunition from England. Four transports arrived on 19 August containing two full siege trains and a further full siege train arrived on the 21st. There was now sufficient roundshot to consider restarting the siege. For the first time in the Peninsular War, the Allied army had more heavy guns than it could use.

All the guns were back in place and fifty-seven guns opened fire on the morning of 26 August. The plan, as mentioned above, was similar to that used in the first siege. The larger number of guns on the eastern attack would attempt to destroy the whole south-eastern corner of the fortress. There were fewer guns used on the attack on the left (isthmus) and they made poor progress due to the distance from the walls. Graham complained about this on the 26th and 28th,⁶¹ and Wellington ordered a new battery to be constructed. Frazer noted that ‘Wellington wisely ordered another and more advanced battery’.⁶² This battery had an immediate impact on the wall of the fortress when it opened fire.

A false attack was made on the night of the 29th, to try to get the French to blow any mines they had placed in the defences of the town, but they were not taken in. By the next day, the damage caused by the batteries formed one continuous breach in the walls, and many of the guns were turned to attacking any remaining defensive armament, the intention being to assault the town the following morning at low tide.

The assault was scheduled for 11 a.m. on 30 August. The situation with regard to the perceived lack of effort from the 5th Division in the first assault was resolved to no-one’s satisfaction. General Leith, who had returned as commander of the 5th Division on the 27th, refused to have the volunteers lead the assault and they were to be held in reserve, with the 5th Division making the attack. The attack started on time and once again the troops could not get through the breaches due to the fire and defences of the French. The volunteer reserves were also thrown in without effect. An attack was also made across the estuary by the Portuguese but they did not make any better progress. After about an hour, Graham gave the risky order for the siege guns to open fire and sweep the walls and defences of the town over the heads of the attacking troops. Twenty minutes later, when the guns ceased firing, the assault had finally made some progress with the French retreating into the castle. By 2 p.m., the town was in Allied hands, but it was also in ruins and large parts of it were on fire due to the shelling. Following what was now becoming the norm, many of the troops dispersed in an orgy of looting and destruction that took two full days to settle down. During this period, Graham and Wellington were genuinely concerned that if the French made a sortie from the castle, the Allies would be hard-pressed to hold the town. Fortunately, the French were in no fit state to do so.

The Allied guns were now turned on the castle. Beginning on 1 September, they bombarded it for the next six days during which time fires continued to rage through the town. The French governor, Rey, refused another summons on the 3rd, and new batteries were prepared to attack the castle. At 10 a.m. on 8 September, fifty-six guns opened on the castle, which had no shelters for the French or their prisoners. Rey finally accepted the inevitable and raised the white flag around noon.

Casualties during the siege and assault were high, with nearly 2,400 killed and wounded. Engineer casualties were three killed, including Fletcher, and three wounded, including Burgoyne,⁶³ but his wound was not serious and he temporarily took command of the engineers.⁶⁴ Across both sieges, of the eighteen engineer officers present, four were killed and seven were wounded. Captain Stanway was left to repair the fortress with a company of Royal Sappers and Miners, work continuing until six months after the end of the war.

Analysis of the Second Siege of San Sebastian

During both sieges, Wellington was again pushed for time due to the very real threat from Soult, who made two determined attempts to disrupt the siege and the blockade of Pamplona. There is no doubt that there would have been fewer casualties had San Sebastian been besieged according to the established rules, but, as Fletcher pointed out, this would have taken much longer. In both sieges, the time from opening fire to the assault on the town was five days, which only allowed the walls to be breached and did not allow sufficient time to destroy the defenders’ artillery and reduce the garrison both physically and morally. Ironically, Wellington had given orders to limit the amount of shellfire so as to reduce the damage to the town, with a consequent reduction in damage to the defenders. Unfortunately the town was pretty much destroyed by fire anyway and Wellington was accused by the Spanish of deliberately burning the town to the ground as a punishment for the Francophile tendencies of its population. Like the previous three sieges at Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz and Burgos, Wellington cut corners to reduce the time required due to external pressures. The impact of the time reduction was measured in the increase in casualties that occurred.

The biggest single criticism of the siege concerned the strategy selected for the attack. It is inconceivable that Wellington was not aware of the risk and costs associated with the plan selected. He wanted the fortress taken quickly to avoid the very real chance that Soult would relieve it. Blaming the engineers for the plan is unreasonable since they were producing plans that met the requirements given to them by Wellington. With hindsight, it may have been better to go for the formal attack, as the twin sieges took nearly two months in total, but that was not known or expected when the first one began. However, the plan agreed by Wellington was to continue the same basic plan of attack for the second siege.⁶⁵ The criticism of the engineers, and to a lesser extent the artillery, suggesting that they were indifferent to the casualties in the army, is unfair and ignores the fact that it was usually an engineer officer who was leading these desperate attacks and their casualties reflect this. The high casualties in the besieging army were caused by rushing the sieges and the responsibility for that rests with the commander. This was compounded on the first assault by it taking place before daylight, an action that Wellington had strongly discouraged.

In terms of the operations of the engineers, both sieges were managed reasonably well. There were some problems with the use of short naval 24-pounders (accuracy), the supply of working parties and the distant positioning of some batteries, but nonetheless the breaches were still made very quickly. Neither assault would have been quicker if these events had not occurred, as there were other tasks that had to be completed before the assault could happen. The siege was under the control of Sir Thomas Graham, who corresponded with Wellington daily. In some of these letters, Wellington was personally critical of Fletcher and Dickson, particularly of their demands for working parties.⁶⁶ Such criticism must have undermined the credibility of these officers with Graham. Wellington knew Dickson and Fletcher well, trusted them and had worked with them for a number of years, but Graham did not know them and such criticism must have affected his view of their competence. Graham had no experience of commanding at a major siege and his lack of experience cannot have helped the situation.

The availability for the first time of significant numbers of troops from the Royal Sappers and Miners does not appear to have had any material effect. There is a surprising lack of comment on their presence by both engineer and army officers. Harry Jones makes one comment about the lack of training – ‘sappers and miners who have never seen a gabion made!’⁶⁷ – but this is in a letter complaining about the number of engineer and sappers present at the siege, which is full of errors. Neither John Jones nor Burgoyne made any comment at the time, but it is telling that when Burgoyne was asked to carry out some mining activities between the sieges, he requested volunteers from the line regiments.⁶⁸ Though most of the sappers present were troops who had been in the Peninsula for some time, the company that arrived on 15 August was the first to have been through Pasley’s School of Military Engineering. Unfortunately, the company did not initially live up to expectations. Writing several weeks later Burgoyne reported:

On the subject of the Sappers, my complaint lies not to their want of ability but, I am sorry to say, to their irregularities and insubordination … Many of them, as individuals, showed ability, spirit and regularity as was highly useful and creditable. They commenced [the second siege of San Sebastian] however by such insubordination, almost amounting to mutiny, and proved in many instances so little trustworthy, disappointing us in the execution of important services, that although many, and perhaps most of them, were very good men, we lost all confidence in them and did not therefore reap much benefit from their employment…. I have, since the siege, given the command of this company to Captain Pitts, an active officer who, having them with him, attached to repress their irregularities, and I fully expect that at the next siege they will render us good service and enable the Commanding Engineer to give a more favourable account of them than I feel myself justified doing on this occasion.⁶⁹

A few weeks later, Burgoyne was able to give a more positive report

I send a further note from Pitts on the latest company from you. I learn from him that they are ‘excellent, able, useful and steady’, in short, he now has a good military view of them which was all they wanted and he is delighted with them.⁷⁰

The first assault on San Sebastian was a very poor attempt that was never going to succeed, mainly thanks to the bad planning on the day of the assault. The second assault on the town barely succeeded and could very easily have failed also. The pinpoint artillery fire during the second assault just tipped the edge in the attackers’ favour. It could easily have gone either way. Again, Wellington was lucky.

The Death of Fletcher

Wrottesley, the biographer of John Burgoyne, recounted a story that Wellington wanted to retain Burgoyne and that was why he did not recall Elphinstone from Lisbon after Fletcher’s death.⁷¹ I also think it is likely that Wellington was perfectly happy with Burgoyne commanding the Engineers and was in no hurry for Elphinstone to come up. On 10 September, Burgoyne sent his account of the siege direct to London saying ‘which I transmit to you direct to avoid any circuitous route by Lisbon through Lieutenant Colonel Elphinstone, which I trust will meet with your approbation’.⁷² Elphinstone would have been extremely unhappy about this. Fletcher had led the Royal Engineers for most of the war but he never managed to create any real sense of loyalty in his subordinates. John Jones wrote:

Sir Richard Fletcher possessed in an unusual degree, the knowledge and accomplishments of a finished soldier … but these valuable qualities were … almost paralysed, by what in military language is called a deficiency of moral courage, or in other words, being too sensitive to the awful responsibility of risking human life, and being … distrustful of his own judgement to plan or direct any unusually bold or hazardous enterprise. He also had the military weakness of being far too honest and conscientious to support or advise any … undertaking of his chief, which his military judgement did not approve.⁷³

He went on to say he believed Wellington blamed Fletcher for the heavy casualties at the third siege of Badajoz due to him recommending a day’s delay in the assault. He also said that Fletcher was strongly opposed to the plan for the siege of San Sebastian and arguing against it further set Wellington against him. Elphinstone, not the most reliable of sources, writing in 1813 stated that three of the senior engineers ‘Goldfinch, Burgoyne and Boteler do not speak to Fletcher’,⁷⁴ and Burgoyne, writing after Fletcher’s death, said: ‘Poor Sir Richard had no arrangement whatever, any system or improvement recommended to him, he would highly approve of, but never acted upon it.’⁷⁵

Burgoyne had not been mentioned in Wellington’s dispatch after the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, an error which led to him not receiving brevet promotion, while two junior engineer officers did. In the nineteenth century there was nowhere to get news other than the official dispatches. If you were not mentioned then you had done nothing remarkable. Even worse in this case, two of Burgoyne’s juniors were mentioned, so people might have thought that Burgoyne was being deliberately snubbed due to some failure. It was corrected a few months later but Burgoyne was very angry about it.

Whilst there was some criticism of Fletcher, I believe that Wellington was not unhappy with him. When compared with the way he treated the senior artillery officers during this period it is safe to assume that Wellington could have made life very difficult for Fletcher if he did not want him. Whilst not a dynamic leader, Fletcher showed great competence in coordinating the various wide-spread activities of his officers and managing the difficult boundary between the Army and the Ordnance. Wellington’s anger and frustration at the sieges clearly boiled over into highly critical letters home, but that is different from believing the engineer officers with him were at fault. As Wellington was to find out, Fletcher’s successor was not an improvement.

Elphinstone arrived unannounced at headquarters at Vera on 13 October, ‘so that they were rather surprised at seeing me’ he said.⁷⁶ The following day he dined with Wellington and wrote:

The dinner went off exceedingly well and I now consider myself completely fixed. I therefore send you a list of articles for the canteen. I must keep a table, therefore it is nonsense buying trumpery articles. Indeed considering my pay and station it would be mean and paltry not to do so.

Two days later, he wrote to his wife:

The conduct of the officers of the Corps has been most gratifying to me, indeed Burgoyne wrote to me to say that if Wellington attempted to give him the command, upon his present commission, he would refuse it … My coming up will I fancy make some little bustle at Woolwich, as Ld W. has sent away two Lt. Col’s and put Dickens [sic – Dickson] in command upon his brevet rank over the heads of four senior officers in the country, all of whom are mean enough to remain and serve under him.⁷⁷

Elphinstone was of course referring to the ongoing controversy over the appointment of Dickson to command the artillery. Wellington had made life so difficult for Dickson’s superiors that one after another they had resigned. There were still artillery officers senior to Dickson in the Peninsula, but Wellington made sure they did not come anywhere near his army. Elphinstone half expected that he was going to receive the same treatment to allow Burgoyne to continue in command with Wellington’s forces.

Howard Elphinstone, like Fletcher, had operational experience that equipped him for this role. The son of Admiral John Elphinstone, he had been commissioned in October 1793. His first active service was at the capture of the Cape of Good Hope in 1795 after which he served in India for the next five years. In 1801 he accompanied the division sent from India to Egypt under Sir David Baird, arriving in Egypt in August 1801 after which he returned to the UK serving at Plymouth. In 1806 Captain Elphinstone was attached to Lord Rosslyn and General Simcoe’s special mission to Portugal, to advise the Portuguese government on the defence of Lisbon. In early 1807 he accompanied Major-General Whitelocke to South America as Commanding Royal Engineer, but he never landed in South America, arriving after the expedition had failed. By the time he landed back in the UK he had spent a year on board the fleet. He was then assigned to command the proposed South American expedition under Sir Arthur Wellesley, and when this was diverted to the Peninsula, he travelled with it.

Clearly Elphinstone knew that his coming to HQ was not going to be universally welcomed. It is also clear where his priorities were. Most of his letters home during this period focus on getting the appropriate uniform, stable and canteen for an officer of his station. What is interesting is that there is almost no correspondence between Elphinstone and his subordinates, the Army and the Ordnance. Apart from his letters to his wife, it is as if he never existed. The few letters home are complaints about allowances, refusal to appoint a bridge master and engineer officers not getting medals when he thought they should (including himself). He even records being officially ‘encouraged’ to write home more but making it clear he had no intention of.

The impact of the change of command quickly became apparent. Captain Stanway, who had been left to repair San Sebastian, wrote to Burgoyne two weeks after Elphinstone’s arrival saying: ‘I can get nothing from Colonel Elphinstone neither men nor authorities for the Alcades, so that I shall give it up as a hopeless job … If you have any interest with Col. E. pray get him to represent my want of men.’⁷⁸ Other engineer officers were making similar comments: ‘Now that Sir Richard is dead we have found out his value and I fear we shall not soon see his place as ably filled.’⁷⁹

Elphinstone seemed to delight in fighting with everyone, including the Board of Ordnance, his fellow officers and even Wellington. Whilst there was friction between the generals and some Ordnance officers, there was generally a good working relationship between engineer officers and the senior commanders. One example is demonstrated by a request from Burgoyne to General Cole to write a testimonial for Lieutenant Pitts after the siege was completed. Cole responded:

I enclose a letter you required respecting your friend Pitts … and have done it so as to appear as if it came from myself without the suggestion of others. Independent of my regard for Pitts, I shall feel great pleasure at all times in doing justice to a corps throughout the younger branches of which there is a spirit that no other corps I know of possesses to the same degree.⁸⁰

Actions on the French Border

Whilst the siege of San Sebastian was still underway, Wellington was looking ahead to the next steps. Following Soult’s failed attacks at Maya, Roncesvalles and Sorauren, he considered pursuing the French straight across the Bidassoa. On 1 August 1813, Wellington asked Graham to bring up the pontoon train and prepare for the crossing of the Bidassoa.⁸¹ But he quickly went off the idea when he took stock of his losses and the condition of his troops and equipment. Explaining his decision to Bathurst, he wrote:

It is a very common error, among those unacquainted with military affairs … that we shall immediately invade France; and some even here expect that we shall be in Paris in a month … the enemy still possesses all the strongholds within Spain [the border fortresses] … Then in France … there are other strongholds … [The] army … is much deteriorated … the equipment, ammunition, shoes etc. require renewal. I entertain no doubt that I could tomorrow enter France and establish the army on the Adour, but I could go no further.⁸²

Wellington realised that securing his current position should be his priority. Major Charles Smith RE was ordered to Irun to make proposals for fortifying the place. Captain Todd RSC was similarly ordered to the area to survey the terrain. Wellington wrote to Graham on 15 August, in response to his recommendation to start a second line of defences behind the Bidassoa, remarking ‘we cannot make the position between Oyarzun and the Bidassoa too strong … no time should be lost in commencing the works’. On 21 August, Wellington wrote a detailed memo to Fletcher detailing the defensive works he wanted constructing around Irun. The first line would cover the site of the bridge at Irun through to the convent at San Marcial. It comprised three redoubts and ‘breastworks, abatis and musketry posts which the troops on the ground can construct’. Wellington said Captain Todd RSC would point out the locations. A second line would also be prepared overlooking the Bidassoa, which Major Smith RE could point out the locations for. Between Irun and Funterrabia, a third set of defences was to be constructed with a fourth set in the valley of the Bidassoa between Irun and Oyarzun.⁸³ Wellington asked Fletcher to mark out the works and estimate the number of workers he would require. The following day Fletcher received a similarly detailed letter from George Murray, the QMG, confirming that the instructions were based on Wellington riding over part of the terrain with Captain Todd and also from the surveys carried out by Major Smith. Murray asked Fletcher if he could ride over the terrain and ‘exercise your judgement both as to the situation and the form of the works to be constructed’. He expressed the concern that this might not be possible owing to the wound Fletcher had recently received during the first assault at San Sebastian. Murray clarified the purpose of the defences in his final paragraph:

Our first object by these works is present security, until we can get possession of San Sebastian and Pamplona, But besides that, we should look forward to rendering a part of our force disposable for operations more to the eastward, if necessary; also securing tranquillity in the winter and even to something of permanent utility to the Spanish frontier. Our offensive operations have turned out very well, but we have not yet such firm hold of our conquests as we ought to have.⁸⁴

Significant defensive works were also being constructed in the passes to the east. Lieutenant Pitts RE, who was present with the 4th Division during the French attacks at the end of July, was ordered to construct a number of redoubts and breastworks around Maya. Writing to Burgoyne on 25 August, he reported that Wellington had sent for him and asked him to make some changes to the defences that he had already completed.⁸⁵ As mentioned earlier, Lieutenant Wright RE was ordered to construct similar defences at Roncesvalles. Work on improving the defences in this area continued through to October 1813.

By the end of August, the Allied army’s situation had improved significantly. San Sebastian had finally fallen. A final desperate attack by Soult at San Marcial on the 31st failed, in part due to the substantial defensive works that had been prepared over the last few weeks. Pamplona still held out, but the Allies were getting information on its state of supplies and knew the fortress could not last much longer. Wellington was sure that the French were unable to breach his defences and could look to his next move.

On 9 September, the day the castle at San Sebastian surrendered, he wrote to Graham ordering the officer in charge of the engineer department to do two things:

The pontoon train must be got together, with the exception of those boats absolutely necessary for the communication with San Sebastian, and the train should be assembled somewhere near Oyarzun.

He must immediately take measures for securing the place [San Sebastian] against a coup de main, by clearing the rubbish and blocking the breaches and he must let me have without loss of time, a plan and estimate for the repair of the place.⁸⁶

Wellington mentions Dickson, the commander of the artillery, by name in the letter but refers to ‘the officer in charge of the engineer department’. Wellington was fully aware that Burgoyne was the senior engineer so the omission of his name is odd in the context of what happened next. On 17 September, Wellington, with great anger, complained to Graham that:

Lieutenant-Colonel Burgoyne is really too bad: this is the eighth day since he received the orders to collect the pontoon train on the high road and he is not now certain that the orders he sent have reached the officers in charge of them, and he has taken no measures to repeat them.⁸⁷

On the same day, Burgoyne received a letter from the Adjutant General asking for an immediate detailed explanation of how he sent his orders for the movement of the pontoon train and asking for an officer to ride post to Vitoria to order the pontoon train forward. Two days later, Wellington was still angry, telling Bathurst that he had intended to move the army across the Bidassoa immediately after the fall of San Sebastian but it had ‘been delayed by a mistake made by the officer of engineers in transmitting the orders for the collection of the pontoon train’. He continued saying ‘But I acknowledge I feel a great disinclination to enter the French territory under existing circumstances’.⁸⁸

Wellington’s letters around this time have an even greater level of sharpness than was usual for him. One wonders if the pressure was beginning to tell. He was trying to deal with a number of events that could or were impacting on his operations. These included:

• The failure of Royal Navy to blockade the northern coast leading to difficulties for his supplies and the regular supply of the French forces.

• The continued resistance of the French in Pamplona and San Sebastian.

• Murray’s mismanagement at Tarragona.

• The delays in the Board of Ordnance supplying additional siege guns.

• The continued issues with the Spanish government over command of their army.

• Concern about the reaction of the French population when he invaded France.

• Concern about how the Portuguese and Spanish troops would treat the French population.

• Concern about what the European powers were planning around the invasion of France.

Wellington’s complaint about Burgoyne does not ring true. Nothing done by that officer before or after this incident fits the unprofessional picture painted by Wellington. Burgoyne’s diary is strangely silent from 10 September, when the castle at San Sebastian surrendered, until the 27th. The inference is that he was working on the damage at San Sebastian as his diary entry for the 27th notes him completing his report on the repairs of San Sebastian and setting off for headquarters.⁸⁹ Wellington must have had some knowledge that the pontoon train could not be moved immediately as he noted in a letter to his brother on 12 September, ‘I am waiting here till the animals of the pontoon train will be relieved from the work consequent on the siege, when I shall cross the Bidassoa’.⁹⁰ Again, on 15 September, he asked Graham to let him know when the pontoon train was likely to be on the road with its equipment. Looking at Wellington’s original letter of 9 September, the priority of repairing San Sebastian is clear, the movement of the pontoon train less so.

On 15 September, Captain Stanway RE delivered a report on the options for crossing the river Bidassoa in front of the height of San Marcial. The same day Wellington rode over the area with an engineer officer (Stanway, I assume) pointing out where he wanted further redoubts building to support the planned crossing. Wellington was planning on the initial advance being carried out by infantry fording the mouth of the Bidassoa. This was only possible at the lowest tides which were around 23 September. Finding the pontoon train was not going to arrive in time for the fording of the river probably led to his show of impatience.

I expect that Burgoyne got distracted working to make San Sebastian defensible and, having passed the order for the pontoon train to move, lost sight of what appeared to be a secondary task. It is also clear that Graham had done nothing to check on the situation even though the orders had been sent to him. Everyone had taken their eye off the ball. It unlike Wellington to miss an important detail like this. Perhaps, it suited him to have someone to blame for the delay in entering France? The next low tide was around 9 October 1813 and Wellington planned to be ready.⁹¹