OVERVIEW
II. The Role of Presuppositions
A Definition of Presupposition
Science vs. Metaphysical Naturalism
In the coming chapters, we will consider evidence for matters such as the reliability of the Bible, the deity of Christ, and the historical resurrection of Jesus, revealing strong historical evidence that confirms the Christian worldview. If we have the authentic words of Jesus claiming to be God, evidence that he genuinely performed miracles, and confirmation that Jesus resurrected from the grave, then Christianity is undeniably true.
But there is another way to approach our task. Rather than beginning with the historical data, we can evaluate the scientific and philosophical evidence of whether we live in a theistic or atheistic universe, and then consider what this means for the probability of the Christian worldview. If we live in an atheistic universe, then Christianity is certainly false. But if we live in a theistic universe, or if we at least have good reason to believe we do, then Christian claims become more probable. The late deist philosopher Antony Flew (who was formerly an atheist) said, “Certainly given some beliefs about God, the occurrence of the resurrection does become enormously more likely.” (Habermas and Flew, DJRD, 39)
In our experience of study and dialogue with so many people who seek answers to the great questions about life’s meaning—and in particular, whether they can believe in God or Christianity—we have found that resistance to the miracle claims of Jesus does not arise primarily from problems with the evidence, but from the worldview lurking behind consideration of the evidence—naturalism. Professor and apologist David Baggett notes:
The presumed adequacy of naturalism is a huge driving force in the minds of those rigidly skeptical of all miracle claims. It’s not necessarily an irrational position to hold; there are very intelligent atheists out there whose secular presuppositions radically differ from my own, but who strike me as fair-minded and intellectually honest. If they hold what they sincerely consider to be very principled reasons for supreme confidence in naturalism to provide all the explanations we need, it’s, well, natural for them to put up great resistance against miraculous claims, or even claims likely to point in that direction.
To my thinking, naturalism encounters some severe difficulties. It’s challenged in explaining seemingly answered prayers and documented cases of evidentially significant near-death experiences. It fares poorly in accounting for qualia [interior awareness], consciousness, the emergence of life and the start of the universe. It lacks resources in accounting for human reason itself—if we’re complicated organic machines whose every choice is caused by antecedent conditions and the physical laws of the world. I think naturalism is especially vulnerable when it comes to accounting for such realities as moral regret, moral obligations, moral rights and moral freedom, all of which makes considerably more sense from a theistic viewpoint. Naturalism certainly doesn’t deserve the sort of unbridled allegiance and undying devotion that some would give it, and it certainly doesn’t qualify to be what sets the terms for surrender in this debate. (Baggett, DRH, 137–138)
Needless to say, one’s prior commitment to naturalism (or some other non-Christian worldview) will powerfully influence how one evaluates the evidence for the historical Jesus. Yet if we have reason to doubt naturalism, then the case for Christianity becomes more probable. New Testament scholar and philosopher of religion Gary Habermas explains,
If it can be successfully argued that naturalism is insufficient as an explanation of the universe and that an explanation like theism, which incorporates an external intelligent source, is plausible, then it may also be rational to believe that the resurrection of Jesus was an act performed in accordance with God’s attributes and will. If this is a theistic universe, then we might require even less direct evidence to affirm God’s intervention in this or other historical occurrences, since miracles might follow, due to what we would know concerning the nature of the universe. (Habermas, RJFH, 53)
In this prologue, we have three goals: (1) explain the role and nature of presuppositions, (2) define naturalism, and (3) highlight six lines of evidence that undermine naturalism and point positively towards theism. Our goal in this chapter is not to prove the existence of God, but to show that theism is a reasonable position. In fact, we believe that, when properly understood, the universe reveals evidence of an Intelligent Mind. Naturalism simply fails to account for certain features of the universe, which by comparison, are at home in a theistic worldview. And as a result, as Flew observed, “the occurrence of the resurrection does become enormously more likely.”
II. The Role of Presuppositions
This section discusses the definition of presupposition, followed by a short list of synonymous terms, and concludes with the nature of presuppositions.
A. A Definition of Presupposition
A presupposition is something assumed or supposed in advance. Generally, a presupposition is a basic belief—a belief that one holds as self-evident and not requiring proof for its validity. A presupposition is something that is assumed to be true and is taken for granted. Synonyms include: prejudgment, assumption of something as true, prejudice, forejudgment, preconceived opinion, fixed conclusion, preconceived notion, and premature conclusion.
B. The Nature of Presuppositions
Presuppositions serve as the glue that holds arguments together. Philosopher John Frame identifies presuppositions with a priori knowledge:
A priori knowledge is knowledge possessed independent of experience—that knowledge which we bring to our experience in order to analyze and evaluate it. Some philosophers have tried to make the case that all our knowledge is a posteriori—that the mind begins as a “blank slate” (Locke) to be written out by experience. But we know some things that do not seem to be derived from experience. For example, the proposition that two times two is four—necessarily and everywhere in the universe—does not seem to be derivable from any experience. The term presupposition . . . captures much of the meaning that philosophers have sought to include under the label a priori. (Frame, CVT, 132–33)
Philosophers and apologists Steven Cowan and James Spiegel assert that,
All truth claims which are assumed without argument are called presuppositions. While we could argue for each of our presuppositions . . ., every argument we used would itself make several presuppositions. In turn, we could provide arguments for those presuppositions, and so on. However, this process cannot go on forever. This shows that one cannot avoid having presuppositions. (Cowan and Spiegel, LW, 6)
No discipline operates without presuppositions guiding its study and investigation—even science, which some perceive as objective and bias-free; that is, everyone has a worldview—and worldviews inform both how we understand the world and how we answer life’s ultimate questions. The beliefs comprising our worldview are intricately connected; some are basic, requiring no proof, and these are our presuppositions. Other beliefs are directly informed by presuppositions, supporting other beliefs. Every belief, then, connects to and ultimately finds its root in one or more of our presuppositions.
So we must identify our presuppositions and understand why we affirm these presuppositions as opposed to others, and we must ask whether our presuppositions are reasonable and true. After all, not everyone’s presuppositions are valid; one may hold as basic a false belief. We might question beliefs due to faulty presuppositions, or note that even good presuppositions do not necessarily give rise to beliefs that are true.
Before analyzing the presuppositions of naturalism, the term naturalism must first be clearly defined.
The worldview of naturalism has a long and storied past. Ancient Greek philosophy—the seedbed of modern Western philosophy—witnessed influential thinkers who operated from a naturalistic perspective. Thinkers such as Democritus and Epicurus still wield significant influence for those who attempt to construct a view of the world devoid of the supernatural. Relative to its long history, however, naturalism’s role as a formidable challenge to Christianity is fairly recent. As the Enlightenment emphasized human reason over divine revelation, philosophers, theologians, and scientists increasingly appealed to naturalism as a more satisfactory and sufficient explanation of the universe.
These historical and philosophical movements resulted in naturalism’s omnipresence throughout Western culture. We see it whenever clergy or professors of religion explain the miracles of Jesus as “crowd psychology.” We hear it whenever a PBS nature program credits nature for some remarkable wonder like the march of the penguins, rather than God. We see it when psychologists, ignoring that we are fallen beings created in the image of God, claim that we lie or cheat on our spouses because our supposed cave ancestors transmitted lying or cheating “genes” to us.
Naturalism is a nuanced term, and many use it ambiguously, referring both to how we practice science and how we use it as a worldview. Such ambiguity might give the impression that the scientific endeavor itself is at odds with faith. That idea assumes that science is atheistic in its methodology and resulting knowledge. The Christian, however, need not conflate the scientific endeavor with naturalism as a worldview. As we saw in the introduction in the beginning of this book, the scientific revolution emerged in a culture shaped by a Christian worldview. And, in fact, some of the greatest scientific pioneers believed that design could be detected throughout nature. Philosopher Stephen Meyer explains,
As I studied the history of science, I soon discovered, however, that many of these scientists did not just assume or assert by faith that the universe had been designed; they also argued for their hypothesis based on discoveries in their disciplines. Johannes Kepler perceived intelligent design in the mathematical precision of planetary motion and the three laws he discovered that describe that motion. Other scientists perceived design in many of the structures or features of the natural world upon which the laws of nature operated. Louis Agassiz, the leading American naturalist of the nineteenth century, for whom Agassiz Chair is named at Harvard, believed that the patterns of appearance in the fossil record pointed unmistakably to design. Carl Linnaeus argued for design based upon the ease with which plants and animals fell into an orderly groups-within-groups system of classification. Robert Boyle insisted that the intricate clocklike regularity of many physical mechanisms suggested the activity of “a most intelligent and designing agent.” Newton, in particular, was noteworthy in this regard . . . he made specific design arguments based upon discoveries in physics, biology, and astronomy. (Meyer, SC, 145)
As I studied the history of science, I soon discovered . . . that many of these scientists did not just assume or assert by faith that the universe had been designed; they also argued for their hypothesis based on discoveries in their disciplines.
Stephen Meyer
Philosophers and apologists J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig provide a helpful definition of metaphysical naturalism:
The term naturalism has many different meanings, but a standard use of the term defines it as the view that the [material] universe alone exists. Since most current forms of naturalism are physicalist in flavor, naturalism has come to mean that reality is exhausted by the spatiotemporal world of physical objects accessible in some way to the senses and embraced by our best scientific theories. (Moreland and Craig, PFCW, 184)
By the “universe,” Moreland and Craig mean physical objects that are in some way accessible to the senses and scientific investigation. Thus, the universe includes individual things like rocks, atoms, rivers, flashes of lightning, and processes like osmosis.
Physicist Stephen Barr says that naturalism is the view that “nothing exists except matter, and that everything in the world must therefore be the result of the strict mathematical laws of physics and blind chance.” (Barr, MPAF, 1)
Three important conclusions follow from metaphysical naturalism:
1. No immaterial entities exist, such as souls, morals, purposes, minds, angels, and God. Since these objects are not physical, the consistent naturalist concludes that they do not exist.
2. Scientific investigation becomes the primary (or sole) means of gaining knowledge about the world. According to philosopher John Cowburn, scientism is the view that “only scientific knowledge is valid . . . that science can explain and do everything and that nothing else can explain or do anything: it is the belief that science and reason, or scientific and rational, are co-extensive terms.” (Cowburn, Scientism, 14)
3. Naturalism shapes how people live. Philosopher Alvin Plantinga explains,
It [naturalism] isn’t clearly a religion: the term “religion” is vague, and naturalism falls into the vague area of its application. Still, naturalism plays many of the same roles as a religion. In particular, it gives answers to the great human questions: Is there such a person as God? How should we live? Can we look forward to life after death? What is our place in the universe? How are we related to other creatures? Naturalism gives answers here: there is no God, and it makes no sense to hope for life after death. As to our place in the grand scheme of things, we human beings are just another animal with a peculiar way of making a living. Naturalism isn’t clearly a religion; but since it plays some of the same roles as a religion, we could properly call it a quasi-religion. (Plantinga, WCRL, ix–x)
C. Science vs. Metaphysical Naturalism
Metaphysical naturalism in Western culture has posed a significant challenge to Christianity. Because of its appeal to science, both Christians and non-Christians alike have often conflated the discipline of science with metaphysical naturalism. As a result, many well-meaning Christians have unnecessarily viewed science as hostile to the Christian faith. For such believers, science and the Christian faith are diametrically opposed to each other.
If viewed properly, however—that is, if science is held distinct from the worldview of metaphysical naturalism—then science can be of significant service to Christianity, explaining the many wonders of God’s creation, demonstrating the orderliness of the universe, and confirming the truth of Scripture. On the other hand, metaphysical naturalism is directly opposed to Christianity because it denies the existence of the supernatural.
As a worldview, metaphysical naturalism fails to make sense of certain features of the universe. In the next section, we consider six characteristics of the world that resist a naturalistic explanation but which fit seamlessly within theism: the origin of the universe; the fine-tuning of the universe; the origin of life; consciousness; free will; and morality. We will see that these six features of the world provide good reason to believe we live in a theistic universe.
Up until the twentieth century, we had no scientific means to judge whether the universe was eternal or had a beginning. Atheists claimed the universe alone was eternal, which would have meant it was largely static and uniform. Theists countered that God is the ultimate cause of the world and that he alone is infinite and eternal. But this began to change in the early part of the twentieth century—when Einstein developed his general theory of relativity. Einstein’s equations suggested that the universe was not static, but that it was either expanding or contracting. An expanding universe (measured by Hubble in 1929) coupled with general relativity strongly implies that the universe began to exist at some point in the past. After Einstein, others have discovered additional, powerful evidence that the universe had a beginning.
This has brought newfound support for an argument known as the kalam cosmological argument, popularized today by philosopher William Lane Craig (see Craig and Sinclair, KCA, 101–201). It has three premises:
1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.
Craig has ably defended each of these premises. As for the first premise, Craig says,
First and foremost, it’s rooted in the metaphysical intuition that something cannot come into being from nothing. To suggest that things could just pop into being uncaused out of nothing is to quit doing serious metaphysics and to resort to magic. Second, if things really could come into being uncaused out of nothing, then it becomes inexplicable why just anything and everything do not come into existence uncaused from nothing. Finally, the first premise is constantly confirmed in our experience (Craig, RF, 111–112).
Critics of this argument often respond to the first premise by asking, “What caused God?” (see Dennett, BS, 242) But this misconstrues the argument. The first premise does not say that everything needs a cause, but whatever begins to exist has a cause. Since God did not begin to exist, he does not need a cause. This criticism also commits the category fallacy, in which things from one category are incorrectly applied to another. For instance, it would be a category mistake to ask, “What does the color red smell like?” or “How much does the musical note ‘C’ weigh?” Colors and smells, as well as musical notes and weight, are different categories. Similarly, it is a mistake to ask, “What caused God?” because, by definition, God is uncaused. God could not be caused and still be God. Asking what caused God is essentially asking a nonsense question, namely, “What caused the uncaused Creator of the universe?”
Additionally, even critics recognize that the universe beginning to exist requires something uncaused. While denying a personal, loving God, they usually argue that the “laws of physics” just exist, and given the laws of physics, the universe inevitably pops into existence. (Hawking and Mlodinow, GD, 142)
As for the second premise, Craig offers both philosophical and scientific arguments. As to scientific arguments, he points to the evidence from the second law of thermodynamics, the success of the Standard Cosmological Model (which implies an expanding universe), and the failure of other cosmological models such as the Steady State Theory and Oscillating Models. Even Vacuum Fluctuation Models, String Scenarios, and Multiverse Models don’t avoid a beginning. However, a final answer to the question will require the right Quantum Gravity Model. He concludes, “The history of twentieth century cosmogony has, in one sense, been a series of failed attempts to craft acceptable non-standard models of the expanding universe in such a way as to avert the absolute beginning predicted by the Standard Model.” (Craig, RF, 139)
As for the philosophical support of the second premise, Jonathan Morrow and I (Sean) put one of the arguments this way:
Imagine you went for a walk in the park and stumbled across someone proclaiming aloud, “. . . five, four, three, two, one—there, I finally finished! I just counted down from infinity!” What would be your initial thought? Would you wonder how long the person had been counting? Probably not. More likely, you would be in utter disbelief. Why? Because you know that such a task cannot be done. Just as it’s impossible to count up to infinity from the present moment, it’s equally impossible to count down from . . . infinity to the present moment. Counting to infinity is impossible because there is always (at least) one more number to count. In fact, every time you count a number, you still have infinite more to go, and thus get no closer to your goal. Similarly, counting down from infinity to the present moment is equally impossible. Such a task can’t even get started! Any point you pick in the past to begin, no matter how remote, would always require (at least) one more number to count before you could start there. Any beginning point would require an infinite number of previous points. Here’s the bottom line: we could never get to the present moment if we had to cross an actual infinite number of moments in the past. Yet, since the present moment is real, it must have been preceded by a finite past that includes a beginning or first event. Therefore, the universe had a beginning. (McDowell and Morrow, IGJHI, 75–76)
The reality that the universe had a beginning brings us to the question of cause, the third premise. Flew puts this finding into perspective:
When I first met the big-bang theory as an atheist, it seemed to me the theory made a big difference because it suggested that the universe had a beginning and that the first sentence in Genesis (“In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth”) was related to an event in the universe. As long as the universe could be comfortably thought to be not only without end but also without beginning, it remained easy to see its existence (and its most fundamental features) as brute facts. And if there had been no reason to think the universe had a beginning, there would be no need to postulate something else that produced the whole thing. But the big-bang theory changed all that. If the universe had a beginning, it becomes entirely sensible, almost inevitable, to ask what produced this beginning. (Flew and Varghese, TIG, 136)
Even if this argument succeeds, it still does not get us all the way to the Christian God. The kalam argument cannot demonstrate that the Bible is reliable, that Jesus is God, or that Christianity is true; it reveals only that the universe was made and that someone made it—in short, that metaphysical naturalism does not fully account for the universe. Further, though, the kalam argument helps narrow the range of possible causes to a nonphysical, spaceless, timeless, changeless, and powerful being. William Lane Craig and James Sinclair conclude:
The first premise of the kalam cosmological argument is obviously more plausibly true than its contradictory. Similarly, in light of both philosophical argument and scientific evidence, its second premise, although more controversial, is again more plausibly true than its negation. The conclusion of the argument involves no demonstrable incoherence and, when subjected to conceptual analysis, is rich in theological implications. On the basis of the kalam cosmological argument, it is therefore plausible that an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful (Craig and Sinclair, KCA, 196).
To be sure, debates continue about the efficacy of the kalam cosmological argument. But the argument provides a significant challenge to naturalism and positive support that we live in a theistic universe. Philosopher and mathematician David Berlinski, a secular Jew, concludes:
The universe has not proceeded from everlasting to everlasting. The cosmological beginning may be obscure, but the universe is finite in time. This is something that until the twentieth century was not known. When it became known, it astonished the community of physicists—and everyone else. If nothing else, the facts of Big Bang cosmology indicate that one objection to the argument that Thomas Aquinas offered is empirically unfounded: Causes in nature do come to an end. If science has shown that God does not exist, it has not been by appealing to Big Bang cosmology. The hypothesis of God’s existence and the facts of contemporary cosmology are consistent. (Berlinski, DD, 80, emphasis original)
One of the most remarkable scientific findings of the twentieth century is the delicate fine-tuning of the laws that govern the universe, which enable the emergence and sustenance of intelligent life. Like the scientific confirmation of the beginning of the universe, fine-tuning poses a significant challenge to naturalism.
Scientists have been struck by how precisely the laws of physics seem to be calibrated for life. “There are many such examples of the universe’s life-friendly properties,” says science and nature writer Tim Folger in Discover magazine, “so many, in fact, that physicists can’t dismiss them all as mere accidents” (Folger, SAIC). British astronomer Fred Hoyle remarked, “A commonsense interpretation of the facts suggests that a super intellect has monkeyed with physics, as well as chemistry and biology, and that there are no blind forces worth speaking about in nature.” (Hoyle, quoted in Davies, AU, 118)
Let’s consider some examples.
1. The Right Kind of Dimensions in Space and Time
Often, space and time are taken for granted. We live in a 3+1 universe (three large spatial dimensions + 1 time dimension), but scientists recognize that the actual number of dimensions can be fluid. They even contend that our universe contains many extremely small spatial dimensions. However, if those tiny dimensions had grown like the three large spatial ones, no life could exist. Fewer than three spatial dimensions would prohibit the complexity that life requires, but more than three would result in no stable atoms or planets. More or fewer than one time dimension would remove the predictable, reliable order to the universe that life demands. Only a 3+1 dimensional universe permits life. (Tegmark, ODS, 69–75).
2. The Right Kind of Space
The universe must expand at the proper rate in order for life’s components (atoms, stars, planets, etc.) to form. The initial expansion rate, mass/energy density, and dark energy (also called the cosmological constant or space energy density) all affect the expansion rate. The gravitational attraction of the mass/energy density results in a slowing of the expansion. The dark energy causes the universe to expand more rapidly—and the larger the universe gets, the more the dark energy accelerates the expansion. The mass/energy density contributed the greatest influence earlier in the universe, but dark energy dominates today. The amount of dark energy measured by astronomers falls far below the value expected by scientists—by a factor of 10120! Imagine dropping millions of planets into a very large pool of water. The expected result would be planet-sized waves. If the surface measured flat down to the atomic level, that would be 1016 times smaller than expected. Not only is the dark energy miniscule compared to its expected value, only a small range of values permit a universe with atoms, planets, and stars (Lightman, AU, 14–18).
3. The Fundamental Forces of Nature
Each of the four fundamental forces of nature had to be carefully fine-tuned for life: gravity, electromagnetism, the strong nuclear force, and the weak nuclear force. In particular, the ratio of the electromagnetic force to the gravitational force must be delicately balanced to one part in 1040 (that is one part in 10,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000). If the ratio varied even slightly, then our universe would not have small and large stars, which are both necessary for a planet to sustain life. Large stars produced most of the elements heavier than helium. These stars burn rapidly and end with explosions that scatter the heavier elements into the galaxy for incorporation into future stars. Smaller stars (like the Sun) burn much longer, providing the stability that a life-supporting planet requires. How delicate a balance is this? Imagine covering one billion continents the size of North America with coins. Stack the coins in columns that reach to the moon. Paint one coin red and place it in one of the columns. Blindfold a friend and have her attempt to pick it out. The odds are roughly 1 in 1040 that she will. (Ross, CC, 117)
4. Rare Conditions on Earth
Recent scientific discoveries confirm that Earth has extremely rare conditions that allow it to support life. The vast majority of the universe is uninhabitable. Let’s briefly consider a few:
• Life must be in the right type of galaxy. Of the three types of galaxies, only spiral galaxies with the right mass (like the Milky Way) can support life.
• Life must be in the right location in the galaxy. We are situated in just the right place in the Milky Way to avoid harmful radiation.
• Life must have the right type of star. While most stars are too large, too luminous, or too unstable to support life, our sun is just the right size and age. There is a window of time in which a sun can support complex life. It can’t be too young or too old.
• Life must have the right relationship to its host star. If Earth were slightly closer to or farther from the sun, water would either freeze or evaporate, rendering Earth uninhabitable for complex life.
• Life needs surrounding planets for protection. A habitable planet must have large surrounding bodies such as Jupiter and Saturn. The early motions of Jupiter and Saturn removed most of the asteroids and comets from the solar system with two beneficial effects. First, the removal process also caused many collisions early in Earth’s history. These collisions added water, ammonia and other life-essential materials to Earth. Second, the loss of comets and asteroids reduced the subsequent rate of impacts on Earth by a factor of one thousand. (Grazer, “Jupiter,” 23–38)
• Life requires the right type of moon. If Earth did not have a moon of the right size and distance, it would be uninhabitable. The moon stabilizes the earth’s tilt, preventing extreme temperatures and thus creating a stable, life-friendly environment. (Gonzalez and Richards, PP, 23)
What happens when we try to assign a probability to the fine-tuning of all the known constants of nature? Theoretical physicist Lee Smolin calculates a much smaller number: the probability of a universe where stars exist. “Perhaps before going further we should ask just how probable is it that a universe created by randomly choosing the parameters will contain stars. Given what we have already said, it is simple to estimate this probability. For readers who are interested, the arithmetic is in the notes. The answer, in round numbers, comes to about one chance in 10229.” (Smolin, LC, 45) Stated another way, if every proton in the universe represented a universe with different laws of physics, the probability calculated by Smolin means that none of those universes would contain stars!
The evidence for design is so compelling that Paul Davies, an internationally acclaimed physicist at Arizona State University, has concluded that the biofriendly nature of our universe looks like a “fix.” In other words, the universe is so uniquely calibrated to support life that it seems to go beyond the reach of coincidence. He writes, “The cliché that ‘life is balanced on a knife-edge’ is a staggering understatement in this case: no knife in the universe could have an edge that fine.” (Davies, CJ, 149) According to Davies, any legitimate scientific explanation must account for this overwhelming appearance of design.
The cliché that “life is balanced on a knife-edge” is a staggering understatement in this case: no knife in the universe could have an edge that fine.
Paul Davies
5. Objections
a. Weak Anthropic Principle
Some argue that since we could not exist in a universe that was not conducive to our existence (i.e., fine-tuned), we should not be surprised that the universe is fine-tuned.
Philosopher John Leslie expands on this need for explanation in his famous “firing squad” analogy. Suppose fifty trained sharpshooters are lined up to take your life, and they all miss. You could hardly dismiss this occurrence by saying, “If they hadn’t all missed me, then I shouldn’t be contemplating the matter so I mustn’t be surprised that they missed.” (Leslie, Universes, 108) You should still be surprised that you are alive given the enormous unlikelihood of all the sharpshooters missing their mark. Your survival demands an explanation. And so does the fine-tuning of the laws of the universe.
b. The Multiverse Theory
Perhaps the most common naturalistic response to the fine-tuning argument is the so-called multiverse theory, or the many worlds hypothesis. According to this theory, there are many universes—perhaps infinite—and each operates according to unique laws and constants. While most universes would not sustain life, inevitably some would. Currently, the scientific community actively debates the validity of multiverse models. Although far from settled, there is scientific support for the existence of a multiverse. The key question remains though: does living in a multiverse undermine the case for God?
Distinguished philosopher Robin Collins provides multiple reasons for God’s existence in the context of multiverse theory. First, we should prefer the hypothesis that naturally flows from the evidence, and for which we have independent confirmation. Collins observes, “In the case of fine-tuning, we already know that minds often produce fine-tuned devices, such as Swiss watches. Postulating God—a supermind—as the explanation of fine-tuning, therefore, is a natural extrapolation from what we already observe minds to do.” (Collins, SAEG, 61)
Second, a “many universes-generator” would seemingly need to be designed as well: “It stands to reason, therefore, that if these laws were slightly different the generator probably would not be able to produce any universes that could sustain life. After all, even my bread machine has to be made just right in order to work properly, and it only produces loaves of bread, not universes!” (Collins, SAEG, 61)
Third, the multiverse theory cannot explain other features of the universe that exhibit apparent design. Collins explains:
For example, many physicists, such as Albert Einstein, have observed that the basic laws of physics exhibit an extraordinary degree of beauty, elegance, harmony, and ingenuity. Nobel prize winning physicist Steven Weinberg, for instance, devotes a whole chapter in his book Dreams of a Final Theory explaining how the criteria of beauty and elegance are commonly used to guide physicists in formulating the right laws. . . . Now such beauty, elegance, and ingenuity make sense if the universe was designed by God. Under the atheistic many-universes hypothesis, however, there is no reason to expect the fundamental laws to be elegant or beautiful. (Collins, SAEG, 62–63)
Astrophysicist Jeffrey Zweerink provides a fair synopsis of the present standing of the fine-tuning argument in light of the multiverse challenge:
Though some multiverse models appear to undermine the teleological argument, they still exhibit design and fine-tuning. Granted the design argument is more subtle and complex if a multiverse actually exists. However, as with the cosmological argument, studies of the multiverse ultimately make the teleological argument more robust. (Zweerink, WOM, 51)
1. The Problem of the Origin of Life
Virtually the entire scientific community agrees: the problem of life’s origin is unsolved. The problem of life’s beginning has become so difficult that Harvard University launched a $100 million research program to address it (Origins of Life Initiative, Harvard University, http://origins.harvard.edu/). As Harvard biologist Andy Knoll said, “The short answer is we don’t really know how life originated on this planet. There have been a variety of experiments that tell us some possible roads, but we remain in substantial ignorance.” (Knoll, HDLB)
How deep is the problem of explaining the origin of life? Geneticist Michael Denton explains:
In Evolution: A Theory in Crisis I wrote, “Between a living cell and the most highly ordered non-biological system . . . there is a chasm as vast and absolute as it is possible to conceive.” Thirty years on, the situation is entirely unchanged. Despite a vast increase in knowledge of supramolecular chemistry and of cell and molecular biology; the unexpected discovery of ribozymes; and an enormous effort, both experimental and hypothetical, devoted to providing a gradualistic functionalist account of the origin of life in terms of a long series of less complex functional replicating systems (e.g., the much touted “RNA world”) leading from “chemistry” to the cell, no one has provided even the vaguest outlines of a feasible scenario, let alone a convincing one. A yawning gap still persists—empirical and theoretical. (Denton, ESTC, 121)
2. The Sophistication of the Cell
Life’s origin is so difficult to explain because life itself is so remarkably complex and sophisticated. During the time of Darwin, scientists believed life was rather simple. And thus, there would likely emerge an explanation for how it could arise naturally. But the opposite has turned out to be true. The more we learn about the cell, the greater complexity and technological prowess we discover. In fact, nearly every feature of our own advanced technology can be found in the cell.
Biologists today describe the cell using language reminiscent of engineering and computer science. They regularly use terms such as genetic code, information-processing system, and signal transduction. Influential atheist Richard Dawkins writes, “Apart from differences in jargon, the pages of a molecular-biology journal might be interchanged with those of a computer-engineering journal.” (Dawkins, ROE, 17)
With the discovery of the structure of DNA in 1953, scientists learned that information is basic to life. The information for organizing proteins is stored in four nucleotide bases: guanine (G), adenine (A), thymine (T), and cytosine (C). These four bases function as letters of an alphabet, creating meaningful arrangements, which is why biologists regularly refer to DNA and RNA as carriers of “information.” The amount of information in the human body is outright staggering.
The human body has an average of one hundred trillion cells. In a single cell, the DNA contains the informational equivalent of roughly eight thousand books. If the DNA from one cell were uncoiled, it would extend to about three meters in length. Thus, if the DNA in an adult human were strung together, it would stretch from Earth to the sun and back roughly seventy times! (Roberts and Whorton, HQGUC, 323)
But DNA does not just store information. In combination with other cellular systems, it also processes information. Bill Gates likens DNA to a computer program, though far more advanced than any software humans have invented. (Gates, RA, 228) This is why Davies says, “Life is more than just complex chemical reactions. The cell is also an information storing, processing and replicating system. We need to explain the origin of this information, and the way in which the information processing machinery came to exist.” (quoted in Flew and Varghese, TIG, 128)
Flew, once an avowed atheist who, following the evidence, came to believe in the existence of God, clearly states the nature of the problem of the origin of life: “How can a universe of mindless matter produce beings with intrinsic ends, self-replicating capabilities, and ‘coded chemistry’?” (Flew and Varghese, TIG, 124)
3. Explanations for the Origin of Life
a. Chance
What are the odds that random interactions of prebiotic soup would generate a single functional protein? Based on the work of Douglas Axe, Meyer concludes:
The calculation can be made by multiplying the three independent probabilities by one another: the probability of incorporating only peptide bonds (1 in 1045), the probability of incorporating only left-handed amino acids (1 in 1045), and the probability of achieving correct amino-acid sequencing (using Axe’s 1 in 1074 estimate). Making that calculation (multiplying the separate probabilities by adding their exponents: 1045 + 45 + 74) gives a dramatic answer. The odds of getting even one functional protein of modest length (150 amino acids) by chance from prebiotic soup is no better than 1 chance in 10164. . . . Now consider that there are only 1080 protons, neutrons, and electrons in the observable universe. Thus, if the odds of finding a functional protein by chance on the first attempt had been 1 in 1080, we could have said that’s like finding a marked particle—proton, neutron, or electron (a much smaller needle)—among all the particles in the universe (a much larger haystack). Unfortunately, the problem is much worse than that. With odds standing at 1 chance in 10164 of finding a functional protein among the possible 150-amino-acid compounds, the probability is 84 orders of magnitude (or powers of ten) smaller than the probability of finding the marked particle in the whole universe. Another way to say that is the probability of finding a functional protein by chance alone is a trillion, trillion, trillion, trillion, trillion, trillion, trillion times smaller than the odds of finding a single specified particle among all the particles in the universe. (Meyer, SC, 212)
b. Energy and Self-Organization
Could there be some self-organizational principle that causes life to emerge through laws of nature? The general problem with this approach is that energy and self-organization can generate order, but there is no evidence they can generate information. Meyer explains,
The astrophysicist Fred Hoyle had a similar way of making the same point. He famously compared the problem of getting life to arise spontaneously from its constituent parts to the problem of getting a 747 airplane to come together from a tornado swirling through a junk yard. An undifferentiated external force is simply too blunt an instrument to accomplish such a task. Energy might scatter parts around randomly. Energy might sweep parts into an orderly structure such as a vortex or funnel cloud. But energy alone will not assemble a group of parts into a highly differentiated or functionally specified system such as an airplane or cell (or into the informational sequences necessary to build one). (Meyer, SC, 257)
c. Design
Naturalistic processes are simply incapable of explaining the complex, information rich nature of the cell. But there is a third option, if someone is open to looking beyond nature itself. Biochemist Fazale Rana explains,
Human experience consistently teaches that information emanates from intelligence. Whether written in plain or elegant scripts, messages initiate in a mind. In whatever form information takes, it’s not limited to communicating ideas, needs, and desires between human minds. Information has become an integral part of modern technology. Designers and engineers routinely develop and refine information systems. Computer technologies, among many other developing innovations, fundamentally depend upon such constructs. Over the last forty years, biochemists have come to recognize that the cell’s biological systems are also, at their essence, information-based. Proteins, DNA, and even oligosaccharides are information-rich molecules. By analogy, these discoveries reinforce the biochemical design argument (Rana, CD, 166).
This is not a God-of-the-gaps argument, using God as an explanation for a phenomenon presently inexplicable. While scientists certainly have an incomplete understanding of life’s chemistry, the argument to design from DNA is based upon positive evidence of what we do know about the abilities of intelligent agents to produce information rich systems. As with the origin of the universe, and the fine-tuning of the laws of nature, the origin of life poses a seemingly intractable problem for naturalism.
D. The Origin of Consciousness
1. The Challenge of Consciousness
The existence and reality of consciousness present one of the most pressing challenges to naturalism. As we have said, metaphysical naturalism is the view that only physical things exist. As a result, everything that exists should be describable in physical terminology, including properties such as weight, size, and location. But there are certain subjective aspects of the world that resist such explanation.
Analytic philosopher Paul Copan explains the challenge posed by consciousness:
Here’s the problem, though: When we consult physics textbooks to understand what matter is, there’s nothing psychological, subjective, or mental about matter. Matter might be described as having the properties of spatial location, spatial extension, weight, texture, color, shape, size, density, mass, or atomic or chemical composition. But what will always be missing in these textbooks describing matter is consciousness as a characteristic or property of matter. The assumption is that matter is different than [sic] mind. We’re left wondering: how could matter produce mind? How could nonconscious material produce consciousness? (Copan, HDYKYNW, 100, emphasis in original)
Even atheist philosopher Thomas Nagel notes how consciousness raises a problem for naturalism:
Consciousness is the most conspicuous obstacle to a comprehensive naturalism that relies only on the resources of physical science. The existence of consciousness seems to imply that the physical description of the universe, in spite of its richness and explanatory power, is only part of the truth, and that the natural order is far less austere than it would be if physics and chemistry accounted for everything. If we take this problem seriously, and follow out its implications, it threatens to unravel the entire naturalistic world picture. Yet it is very difficult to imagine a viable alternative. (Nagel, MC, 35)
2. Naturalistic Explanations for Consciousness
Naturalists have offered a variety of explanations for consciousness. We will consider three popular explanations (although there are many more):
a. Behaviorism
Definition: While various behaviorist explanations hope to account for consciousness, they commonly reduce mental attributes to some observable behavior.
Response: Nagel observes: “It is certainly true that mental phenomena have behavioral manifestations, which supply our main evidence for them in other creatures. Yet all these theories seem insufficient as analyses of the mental because they leave out something essential that lies beyond the externally observable grounds for attributing mental states to others, namely, the aspect of mental phenomena that is evidence from first-person, inner point of view of the conscious subject: for example, the way sugar tastes to you or the way red looks or anger feels, each of which seems to be something more than the behavioral responses and discriminatory capacities that these experiences explain. Behaviorism leaves out the inner mental state itself.” (Nagel, MC, 38)
b. Evolution
Definition: Consciousness emerges from the process of natural selection, acting upon random mutation, and offers survival advantages to species.
Response: Philosopher Colin McGinn notes, “But in the case of consciousness the Darwinian explanation does not tell us what we need to know, for the simple reason that it is unclear how matter can be so organized as to create a conscious being. The problem is in the raw materials. It looks as if with consciousness a new kind of reality has been injected into the universe, instead of just a recombination of the old realities. Even if minds showed no hint of design, the same old problem would exist: How can mere matter originate consciousness? How did evolution convert the water of biological tissue into the wine of consciousness?” (McGinn, MF, 13)
c. The Mind Is the Brain
Definition: This approach claims the mind is the brain. In other words, mind and brain are simply two different terms that refer to the same physical reality.
Response: Copan notes, “The fact that we can’t locate, weigh, or dye thoughts—as we can physical objects—reveals the inadequacy of a view identifying the physical with the mental/soulish—or reducing the mind/soul to the physical. Brains just don’t have the same properties that minds (or souls) have, and minds don’t have the same properties brains do. Therefore, the mental can’t be identical with the brain—or even produced by the physical brain.” (Copan, HDYKYNW, 101, emphasis in original)
3. Worldview Implications
There are other naturalistic attempts at explaining consciousness beyond what we have explored here. Nevertheless, “The truth is,” says Moreland, “that naturalism has no plausible way to explain the appearance of emergent mental properties in the cosmos.” (Moreland, AC, 340) And yet this leaves naturalism in a bind, as philosopher Richard Swinburne observes: “We cannot describe the world fully if we use only terms denoting physical properties. Any world-view which denies the existence of experienced sensations of blueness or loudness or pain, does not describe how things are—that this is so stares us in the face.” (Swinburne, EG, 165–166)
According to noted neuroscientist Robert Lawrence Kuhn, “Neuroscientists and many philosophers have typically planted themselves firmly on the materialist [naturalist] side. But a growing number of scientists now believe that materialism cannot wholly explain the sense of ‘I am’ that undergirds consciousness.” (Ghose, ME) Given how intractable the problem of consciousness is for naturalism, philosopher and Brown University professor Jaegwon Kim concludes, “But if a whole system of phenomena that are prima facie not among basic physical phenomena resists physical explanation, and especially if we don’t even know where or how to begin, it would be time to reexamine one’s physicalist commitments.” (Kim, MPW, 96)
And yet along with the origin of the universe, the fine-tuning of the universe, and the origin of life, the existence of consciousness fits naturally within the theistic worldview. If God is a supremely conscious being, and he has created us, then it makes perfect sense for human beings to be conscious agents who experience the world. God has both the power and incentive to create conscious beings.
1. Is Free Will an illusion?
The perception of free will is an unavoidable aspect of human experience. Although influenced by our environment and genes, we believe we make choices that are truly up to us. We condemn terrorists for their immoral actions because we believe they should have known better. And we praise individuals who personally sacrifice for the betterment of others because we realize they didn’t have to be selfless. And yet if naturalism were true, our belief in free will would be baseless.
Nagel, an atheist philosopher, asserts, “There is no room for agency in a world of neural impulses, chemical reactions, and bone and muscle movements.” (Nagel, VN, 111) In slight contrast, skeptic Michael Shermer believes free will is ultimately insoluble, and so we might as well just pretend we have it: “Free will is a useful fiction. I feel ‘as if’ I have free will, even though I know we live in a determined universe. This fiction is so useful that I act as if I have free will but you don’t. You do the same. Since the problem may be an insoluble one, why not act as if you do have free will, gaining the emotional gratification and social benefits that go along with it?” (Shermer, SGE, 121, emphasis in original)
2. The Intuition of Free Will
Belief in free will is an intuition held by people of varying worldviews, including many atheists. Copan notes, “But if this intuition is so common, maybe there is something to it! According to the commonsense principle of credulity, we should accept the basic reliability of our everyday intuitions—whether about our freedom, the general trustworthiness of our rational faculties and sense perceptions, or our moral intuitions about the wrongness of murder, rape, and theft. The burden of proof is upon the one who would deny these obvious features of our daily lives.” (Copan, HDYKYNW, 106–107, emphasis in original)
3. A Problem for Determinism: Denying Rationality
Recently I (Sean) led a group of high school students to Berkeley to interact with some skeptics, agnostics, and atheists. One evening, for a public conversation about the evidence for and against God, we met with a “free thinking” student group from Cal Berkeley. After the discussion, I met a student who said she had recently converted from believing in free will to being a determinist. I simply asked her why she changed her mind. And she effectively said, “I used to believe in free will until I really examined the evidence. I studied both the philosophy and science behind the issue and have become convinced that free will is an illusion.” After a moment of reflection, I simply asked her another question: “So, you weighed the evidence on both sides of the debate and freely chose to give up belief in free will and become a determinist. Is that right?” She hesitated to respond because she saw the tension. In other words, she claimed to be a determinist (which implies that her beliefs are not up to her) but then offered intellectual reasons for her decision, as if she were a free agent who could rationally examine evidence and follow it where it leads. She wanted it both ways, but unfortunately, her naturalistic worldview wouldn’t allow it, leaving her two options: (1) Give up naturalism and adopt a worldview that allows for free will (such as Christianity), or (2) Become a more consistent naturalist and admit that free will is an illusion and that her beliefs really weren’t up to her in the way she thought they were.
Influential atheist Sam Harris, after rightly emphasizing the importance of the question of free will, also concludes that free will is an illusion. In his book Free Will, Harris claims we are not the conscious source of our actions and could not have behaved differently in the past from how we did. He says, “I, as the conscious witness of my experience, no more initiate events in my prefrontal cortex than I cause my heart to beat.” (Harris, FW, 9) Harris explains: “The brain is a physical system, entirely beholden to the laws of nature—and there is every reason to believe that changes in its functional state and material structure entirely dictate our thoughts and actions” (Harris, FW, 11–12).
Harris rightly points out that there are three main approaches to the problem of free will: determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism. He then says, “Today, the only philosophically respectable way to endorse free will is to be a compatibilist.” (Harris, FW, 16) But if determinism were true, as Harris’s view seems to imply, why would any position be philosophically respectable or unrespectable? After all, on his view, people are determined to hold their beliefs—whether compatibilist, libertarian, or determinist—by forces outside of their control. If the people who hold beliefs couldn’t have believed differently, there is no need to critique or praise another’s position. If his critique results merely from chemicals moving in his brain, nothing could make his chemicals more respectable than others.
Furthermore, Harris argues that giving up free will (and becoming more aware of the background causes of our feelings) allows people to have greater creative control over their lives. “Getting behind our conscious thoughts and feelings,” says Harris, “can allow us to steer a more intelligent course through our lives.” (Harris, FW, 47) However, clearly the idea of “steering” a more intelligent course through life seems to imply an agent view of causation—that there is a “self” beyond the physical world of cause and effect. According to naturalism, however, the belief that we can steer our lives is an illusion. All of our beliefs and behavior are entirely the result of forces outside our control. In one breath Harris says all our beliefs are determined, but then in another he seems to speak as if we really should take control over the course of our lives.
Determinists might push back and suggest that minds can be changed with the right stimuli of forces and counterforces, which are part of the larger cause-effect realm. Thus, we feel as if we are making free choices, but in reality, these feelings are explainable by prior physical states and interactions. This is an important objection, which comes at a high cost—the undermining of rationality. According to J. P. Moreland, rationality seems to require an agent view of the human person, which involves these four theses:
1. I must be able to deliberate, to reflect about what I am going to do. I deliberate about my behavior and not that of others, future events and not past ones, courses of action which I have not already settled. These facts of deliberation make sense only if I assumed that my actions are ‘up to me’ to perform or not perform.
2. I must have free will; that is, given choices a and b, I can genuinely do both. If I do a, I could have done otherwise. I could have chosen b. The past and present do not physically determine only one future. The future is open and depends, to some extent, on my free choices.
3. I am an agent. My acts are often self-caused. I am the absolute origin of my acts. My prior mental or physical states are not sufficient to determine what I will do. I must act as an agent.
4. Free will is incompatible with physical determinism. They cannot both be true at the same time (Moreland, STSC, 95).
Of course, this doesn’t prove that free will is real and that naturalism is false. Free will may ultimately be an illusion, as determinists such as Harris suggest. But embracing determinism comes at a cost that undermines our common sense understanding of free will and rationality.
4. Conclusion
We recognize that we have only scratched the surface of the issue of free will. We have not considered many objections to the existence of free will, nor their responses. For a helpful resource that considers various attempts to explain free will using naturalistic explanations, and why these explanations fall short, see God’s Crime Scene by J. Warner Wallace. (141–158, 250–259)
For the sake of our discussion, we simply note that the experience of free will is inexplicable for naturalists, which they themselves often admit. Consistent naturalists must either admit that free will is an illusion or hope that someday an explanation emerges. Naturalism cannot account for our deep-seated, common sense, and daily experience that we are agents who make decisions that are up to us. Theists, though, have no such problem. After all, if God is a personal, free being who can choose to act, and has created us in his image, then we have good reason to believe we genuinely experience free will.
F. The Existence of Objective Morality
1. Universal Morality
Like the issue of consciousness and free will, humans have a universal belief in right and wrong. While people do vary over specific behaviors they consider right or wrong, there is universal agreement on the underlying principles of objective morality. C. S. Lewis explains,
If anyone will take the trouble to compare the moral teaching of, say, ancient Egyptians, Babylonians, Hindus, Chinese, Greeks and Romans, what will really strike him will be how very like they are to each other and to our own. . . . I need only ask the reader to think what a totally different morality would mean. Think of a country where people were admired for running away in battle, or where a man felt proud of double-crossing all the people who had been kindest to him. You might just as well try to imagine a country where two and two made five. Men have differed as regards what people you ought to be unselfish to—whether it was only your own family, or your fellow countrymen, or everyone. But they have always agreed that you ought not put yourself first. Selfishness has never been admired.1 Men have differed as to whether you should have one wife or four. But they have always agreed that you must not simply have any woman you liked. (Lewis, MC, 19)
Which worldview best explains the existence of objective morality? The question is not whether naturalists can be moral—or even whether they can know morality—but whether naturalism as a worldview can adequately account for the existence of objective morality.
2. Denying Objective Morality
Some naturalists may recognize the implications of their God-less worldview and claim they don’t believe in objective morality.
But again, Lewis points out the inconsistency of such a view:
Whenever you find a man who says he does not believe in a real Right and Wrong, you will find the same man going back on this a moment later. He may break his promise to you, but if you try breaking one to him he will be complaining, “It’s not fair” before you can say Jack Robinson. A nation may say treatises do not matter; but then, next minute, they spoil their case by saying that the particular treaty they want to break was an unfair one. But if treaties do not matter, and if there is no such thing as Right and Wrong—in other words, if there is no Law of Nature—what is the difference between a fair treaty and an unfair one? Have they not let the cat out of the bag and show that, whatever they say, they really know the Law of Nature just like anyone else? (Lewis, MC, 19–20)
3. Can Science Explain Morality?
In his book The Moral Landscape, Sam Harris claims science can provide a basis for objective morality. But apologist speaker and author Frank Turek notes that Harris smuggles in presuppositions his worldview cannot provide:
Science might be able to tell you if an action may hurt someone—like giving a man cyanide will kill him—but science can’t tell you whether or not you ought to hurt someone. Who said it’s wrong to harm people? Sam Harris? Does he have authority over the rest of humanity? Is his nature the standard of Good? To get his system to work, Sam Harris must smuggle in what he claims is an objective moral standard: “well being.” As William Lane Craig pointed out in his debate with Harris, that’s not the fail-safe criterion of what’s right. But even if it was, what objective, unchanging, moral authority establishes it as right? . . . Only an unchanging authoritative being, who can prescribe and enforce objective morality here and beyond the grave, is an adequate standard. (Turek, SG, 100)
In The Abolition of Man, C. S. Lewis points out that logic cannot obtain “ought” from mere descriptions of “is,” that is, of the way things are. (Lewis, AOM, 12)
4. Can Evolution Explain Morality?
A few years ago, I (Sean) participated in a public debate with a skeptic about whether or not God is the best explanation for moral values (McDowell and Corbett, IGBE). My opponent appealed to evolution in his attempt to ground objective morality apart from God. But this explanation falls short. Apologists Francis J. Beckwith and Gregory Koukl explain,
Darwinists opt for an evolutionary explanation for morality without sufficient justification. To make their naturalistic explanation work, morality must reside in the genes. Good and beneficial tendencies can then be chosen by natural selection. Nature, through the mechanics of genetic chemistry, cultivates behavior we call morality. (Beckwith and Koukl, Relativism, 163)
Beckwith and Koukl note that this creates two problems:
First, evolution doesn’t explain what it’s meant to explain. It can only account for preprogrammed behavior, not moral choices. Moral choices, by their nature, are made by free agents. They are not determined by internal mechanics. Second, the Darwinist explanation reduces morality to mere descriptions of behavior. The morality that evolution needs to account for, however, entails much more than conduct. Minimally, it involves motive and intent as well. Both are nonphysical elements that can’t, even in principle, evolve in a Darwinian sense. Further, this assessment of morality, being descriptive only, ignores the most important moral question of all: Why should I be moral tomorrow? Evolution cannot answer that question. Morality dictates what future behavior ought to be. Darwinism can only attempt to describe why humans acted in a certain way in the past. (Beckwith and Koukl, Relativism, 164)
5. God Best Explains Objective Morality
The argument from objective morality to God has two simple premises and a conclusion: (1) If objective moral values exist, God must exist; (2) Objective moral values exist; (3) Therefore, God must exist. In terms of support for the first premise, we have seen that humans have a universal belief in objective morality. And as Lewis noted, those who deny objective morality will inevitably end up in contradiction. The existence of objective morality is certainly reasonable and better accounts for common human experience than its denial.2
As for the second premise, Copan notes:
Just think about it: Intrinsically valuable, thinking persons do not come from impersonal, nonconscious, unguided, valueless processes over time. A personal, self-aware, purposeful, good God provides the natural and necessary context for the existence of valuable, rights-bearing, morally responsible human persons. That is, personhood and morality are necessarily connected; moral values are rooted in personhood. Without God (a personal being), no persons—and thus no moral values—would exist at all: no personhood, no moral values. Only if God exists can moral properties be realized. (Copan, MAGE, 22, emphasis in original)
If these two premises are true, then it follows that God must exist. Even some atheists have noted the connection between God and morality. The late atheist philosopher J. L. Mackie said, “If there are objective moral values, they make the existence of a god more probable than it would have been without them. Thus we have a defensible argument from morality to the existence of a god.” (Mackie, MT, 115–116) And agnostic Paul Draper noted, “A moral world is . . . very probable on theism.” (quoted in Copan, MAGE, 23)
As with the origin and fine-tuning of the universe, the origin of life, the existence of consciousness, and the nature of free will, naturalism fails adequately to explain objective morality. Conversely, objective moral values provide positive support for the theistic worldview.
Naturalism permeates Western culture, claiming not only that only physical things exist but also that all phenomena can ultimately be explained by the combination of chance and natural laws. This worldview underlies much rejection of supernatural phenomena such as the deity of Christ and the resurrection.
And yet, as we have seen, naturalism cannot account for the origin of the universe, the fine-tuning of the universe, the origin of life, the existence of consciousness, the nature of free will, and objective morality. These are universal human experiences. We have argued that any worldview (such as naturalism) that cannot account for these phenomena ultimately fails to describe reality. And yet each of these phenomena also provides positive evidence for theism. We agree with Flew: given these features of the world, “the occurrence of the resurrection does become enormously more likely.”
1. There are some exceptions to Lewis’s statement, “Selfishness has never been admired.” One is Nietzsche; another is the objectivism of Ayn Rand. Both have garnered many followers. A third appears in the admiration for betrayal that Don Richardson encountered in Irian Jaya and related in his book Peace Child. But in defense of Lewis, we can point out that in the BBC talks that became Mere Christianity, he is referring to the consensus of society rather than to individual thinkers or groups within a large historic culture.
2. In The Abolition of Man (the publication of lectures delivered at the University of Durham), C. S. Lewis presents an extensive argument for the unreasonableness of denying moral objectivity—and for the ultimately destructive outcome for humanity if we try to base individual behavior and social polity upon that denial. (Lewis, AOM, 12, 22–24, 33, 46)