māṃsā philosophers recognize “power” as a separate type of entity. The Nyāya school rejects this contention.Now, āgama1 or śabda2 as a pramāṇa3 is being determined.
A sentence is a pramāṇa, if its relatedness to what has become its object by its significative intention is not contradicted by any other pramāṇa.
There are four causes of a cognition generated by a sentence: expectation, appropriateness, contiguity, and knowledge of intention.
“Expectation”4 is (defined as) the appropriateness of the designated entities to be objects of enquiry of each other. On hearing a (word designating a) verb, the idea of the noun to which the verb relates becomes the object of desire to know; on hearing the noun with a case-ending, one wants to know the verb; on hearing what is to be done, one desires to know “how to be done?” . . .
“Appropriateness”5 is (defined as) absence of contradiction of the relatedness amongst the purported (intended) meanings. Thus, since in the case of “He sprinkles with fire” there is such a contradiction of relatedness (between “sprinkling” and “fire”), there is no appropriateness. . . . In the case of sentences like “thou art that,”6 although identity between the designated entities is contradicted, there is non-difference amongst the mediate meanings and so no contradiction, and therefore there is appropriateness.
“Contiguity” is the presentation of the object brought about by a word in immediate succession.7 Here “brought about by a word” is inserted in order to exclude cases where an object is presented by other pramāṇas (such as perception or inference). When a word is not mentioned (as in “the door”), the appropriate word has to be assumed (“close”).
Meanings (or meant entities)8 are of two kinds: the immediate designation and the mediate designation. The immediate relation of a word to an object is called “śakti,” as in the case of the application of the word “pot” to something having the shape of fat belly.
This power or śakti is a separate entity.9 According to us, the power in a cause to produce its effect is a distinct entity. A word’s power produces knowledge of its meaning. The existence of such a power is to be inferred from the effect, i.e., the appropriate cognition. To be the object of such power is to be a śakya.
This property of being the śakya (i.e., the immediate or [primary] meaning) resides in the universal, not in particulars. Particulars are infinite in number, hence (if particular cows are taken to be the primary meaning of the word “cow”), there would be multiplication of entities (i.e., a power corresponding to each particular). How then is cognition of particulars made possible by words such as “cow”? (To this question) we reply: on our view, the universal and particulars (coming under it) are known (together) by the same knowledge, or (alternately, we can reply), the words such as “cow” possess the power which by itself, not as known, signifies the particulars, whereas in the case of universal, the power must be known in order to signify it. To suppose that also in the case of particulars, knowledge of power is required, would be unnecessary, for knowledge of particulars immediately follows from knowledge of a word’s power to designate the universal.
Whatever is the object of known power, is the direct referent of a word. That is why the particular is not a direct referent, only the universal is. Alternately, the particular is known by mediate meaning, just as in “blue pot.” The word “blue” indirectly signifies “having the blue color.” Likewise, a word directly refers to a universal but may be regarded as mediately signifying particulars who are qualified by that universal. What cannot be known by mediate signification is the direct referent, such is the universal.
Now, the mediate designation is being determined. The object of mediate designation is called the lakṣya. The meaning is of two kinds: “meremediate meaning” and “mediately mediate meaning.” The former is the case when there is a direct relation to the primary meaning, as in the case of “the village on the Ganges.” The word “Ganges” mediately designates the bank of the river which is directly related to the stream of water (which is the primary meaning of the word).
The second i.e., “mediately mediate meaning” obtains where a quite different object is presented by relatedness to the primary meaning through a chain of relations. For example, the word “dvirepha” primarily means a word which has two occurrences of “r,” mediately designates the word “bhramara” (which has two occurrences of “r”), and mediately—mediately designates the honey-bee (primarily designated by the last mentioned word “bhramara”).
Considered in another way, mediate meaning is of three kinds: first, where the mediate designation gives up the primary meaning; secondly, where the mediate designation does not give up the primary meaning; and, finally, where the mediate designation partly retains and partly gives up the primary meaning. In the first case, the object that is mediately meant does not include the primary meaning, just as the sentence “take poison” drops its primary meaning and mediately means “do not eat in your enemy’s house.” The second occurs where the mediate designation is presented inclusive of the primary meaning, just as in the expression “white jar,” the word “white” relates to the white substance while still including its primary meaning, i.e., white color. The third occurs where a word primarily designating a qualified entity refers to one part of it while giving up the other part. as in the case of “He is this Devadatta,” where, since identity between the two qualified entities is not possible, the identity holds good only between the two substantives. Or, in cases such as “That art Thou” since identity between the referent of “that” i.e., the being which possesses such qualities as omniscience and the referent of “thou” i.e., being which is qualified by the inner sense, is impossible, in order to establish identity, the mediate designation (in each case) is the own nature (of the entity under consideration). Such is the view of some.
[The last cause of cognition generated by a sentence is knowledge of intention. Here intention (tātparya) is to be understood as: The ability of a sentence to generate knowledge of that, where the speaker does not intend, by uttering the sentence, to generate cognition of something else. The latter clause “where . . .” is meant to exclude cases of ambiguous or equivocal words such as “saindhava” which, in Sanskrit means, both horse (of a certain kind) and salt.
1. “Āgama” means tradition, also scriptures.
2. “Śabda” is sound; in the present context, it means sentence or text.
3. “Pramāṇa” means source or instrument of true cognition.
4. This is the requirement that the succeeding word must satisfy the expectations aroused by the preceding word.
5. Words must be semantically appropriate. In the example given in the text, fire is not appropriate for sprinkling, water is.
6. This is a sentence from the Upaniṣads asserting the identity of the finite individual and the universal self. We get the mediate meanings by abstracting from the individuating features of the individual self.
7. An utterance is not utterance of a sentence, if the word-utterances are not contiguous in time, i.e., if a minute, for example lapses between two word-utterances.
8. Meanings, on the great majority of Indian philosophies, are but meant entities—although there is a difference of opinion as to whether these entities are universal or particulars.
9. The Mmāṃsā philosophers recognize “power” as a separate type of entity. The Nyāya school rejects this contention.
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From Vedānta Paribhāṣā, chapter 4. Translated by J.N. Mohanty.