Daniel Dennett notes that in the opening lines to The Natural History of Religion David Hume distinguished two questions: ‘As every enquiry, which regards religion, is of the utmost importance, there are two questions in particular, which challenge our attention, to wit, that concerning its foundation in reason, and that concerning its origin in human nature’ (Dennett, 2006, p. 26; Hume, Green and Grose, 1875, vol. 2, p. 309) Whether science challenges religion’s ‘foundation in reason’ is a familiar question of the philosophy of religion. Both the general epistemological stance of the natural sciences and particular claims that have scientific warrant have often been presented as challenges to religion. The focus of this volume, however, is on Hume’s second question, which has received far less attention from philosophers despite its impressive intellectual lineage and its prominence in contemporary science and popular culture.
Hume’s second question is whether religious behaviour, institutions and experiences can be explained in natural terms. Attempts to ‘naturalize’ religion seek to locate it alongside war, trade and the manufacture of pottery as simply one more characteristic human activity.1 This is an old project, arguably going back to the classical world. But it has recently become an active focus of research in evolutionary biology. The results of this research have become a hot topic for both scientific technical writing and popular science writing.
Over the last decade, a strident public debate has arisen about the nature and origin of religions. The core question is the adaptive nature of religion –whether it is socially beneficial or a malign influence that ‘infects’ people, as has been recently claimed by such authors as Richard Dawkins (2006), Sam Harris (2004), Daniel Dennett (2006) and Christopher Hitchens (2007). Controversies include how exactly religion evolved, whether by individual or group selection, if it is adaptive, and if not, whether and how it is a side effect of evolution. The topicality of this debate can be seen from its role in ‘culture wars’ in the US and increasingly in the rest of the world, and in attacks on evolution by religious figures, both in the US and elsewhere. Evolutionary biology has been identified as one aspect of a ‘naturalistic world-view’ endemic among scientists and essentially incompatible with religious commitments (Plantinga, 1993; Johnson, 1995; Ruse, 2001).
Historically there have been three main approaches to explaining religion naturalistically, each of which can be placed in the broader context of a theory of evolution. The first, which was very popular in the late nineteenth century, explains religious sentiment as a universal human psychological trait (Baring-Gould, 1892; James, 1902; Wells, 1918). Edward Burnett Tylor (1871) offered an influential account of this kind based closely on positivist concepts of the stages of civilization. The second approach, derived from the work of Émile Durkheim (Durkheim and Lukes, 1982), sees religion as a socioeconomic phenomenon which either maintains or challenges the status quo, depending on the politico-social interests of its adherents. The third approach sees religion as a distinct cultural evolutionary process, decoupled from biological evolution (Dennett, 2006).
The reason this has become a hot-button issue stems from the current prominence of scientific accounts of the origin of religion. Religion is a focus of research in a cluster of scientific disciplines focused on evolutionary biology and its applications to human behaviour. The resultant prospect of ‘naturalizing’ religion is a key battleground in the ongoing culture war between religious advocates who are critical of some aspects of the scientific world-view and those who take it upon themselves to defend science in the public arena (Johnson, 1995; Ruse, 2001; Shanks, 2004; McGrath, 2005; Dawkins, 2006), including the media stars commonly labelled the ‘new atheists’ (Harris, 2004, 2006; Dawkins, 2006; Dennett, 2006). Hence, it is crucially important at this point to critically analyse current efforts to naturalize religion, to understand how cultural, psychological, and biological forms of naturalization relate to one another, and to assess claims about the implications of the science for religion itself and for its role in our society.
The main approaches to naturalizing religion today draw their explanatory resources from evolutionary biology, or from quasi-Darwinian accounts of cultural evolution, or from some combination of these two. Early Darwinian approaches to explaining religious conformity and morality in evolutionary terms appealed to the benefits they confer on social groups, following a comment of Darwin’s in The Descent of Man in which he explained the evolution of ethical behaviour in terms of the differential success of ‘tribes’ (1874: 162). Ethically inclined groups, Darwin argued, would do better on average than purely egoistical groups (note that then and now naturalistic explanations of religion are often intertwined with naturalistic explanations of morality). Darwin’s account seems to require a group selectionist view of social evolution, and since the 1960s both biologists and philosophers of science have argued against this on theoretical grounds (Bradley, 1999; Dow, Chapter 5, this volume). However, in recent years group selectionist accounts have had a dramatic resurgence, following the revival of group selection models more generally (Wilson, 1997b, 1997a; Wilson and Sober, 1998; Wilson and Wilson, 2007).
An alternative kind of explanation relies on the ideas of the population geneticist William Hamilton (1964a, 1964b) and his followers, particularly those concerning ‘kin selection’. On this account, altruistic behaviours such as self-sacrifice are explicable, because they tend to increase not the individual’s fitness, but their ‘inclusive fitness’, which includes the fitness of the copies of their genes that exist in their relatives. Hence insofar as religious behaviours contribute to the flourishing of kin, they can be explained without recourse to selection on groups as such. Apparently fitness-reducing behaviours like celibacy and other-regarding behaviours that are often associated with religious rules become explicable when viewed in the light of Hamilton’s evolutionary models (Wright, 1994). Explanations of this kind are popular in contemporary ‘evolutionary psychology’ (Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; Badcock, 2000).
Methodological and philosophical problems arise with each of these evolutionary accounts of social institutions and behaviours. There is continuing debate over the scientific legitimacy of sociobiology and its recent incarnation, evolutionary psychology.2 This question –essentially whether human behaviour can be explained in the same way as animal behaviour and human physiology –turns on several of the basic issues in the philosophy of the life sciences, such as the levels of selection,3 the limits of ‘adaptationism’,4 the nature of mind5 and whether there is any such thing as human nature.6 Evolutionary explanations of collective, institutional phenomena like religion raise specific issues of their own. Several theorists allege that this makes cultural evolution the more relevant framework for naturalizing religion (Grinde, 1998; Dennett, 2006; Dow, Chapter 5, this volume). Still more specific issues facing evolutionary accounts of religion, whether biological or cultural, concern what religion is an adaptation to, or if not an adaptation itself, what the traits it is a by-product of are adaptations to, and in general what is the social and ecological ‘selective environment’ of religion (Jacobson, 1993; Reynolds and Tanner, 1995).
Recent research on primates indicates that there are some shared behavioural and psychological traits between them and humans that may shed light on human religious behaviour.7 This approach would seem to have some unique methodological advantages. In applying the evidence of social organization and rule-following from primate studies the unwarranted analogies made by early sociobiologists, who analogized behaviour in distant species like gulls or gazelles (Morris and Morris, 1966; Morris, 1967; Tiger and Fox, 1989), can be avoided (Griffiths, 1996). Moreover, evolutionary explanations of behaviour are on sounder ground when conducted in conjunction with neurobiological and developmental studies (Griffiths, 2007).
A key part of the topic is to locate current naturalistic theories of religion within the overall problems such theories address. These can be presented as a series of issues on which any theorist must make choices.
The first issue is how directly the proposed explanation relates to religion. In the broadest terms we can distinguish functionalism, or the view that religion fulfils some social or biological task, from consequentialism, in which religion is a consequence of some other process that is functional. In the evolutionary context, this becomes the distinction between adaptationist accounts and by-product or ‘spandrel’8 accounts. A ‘spandrel’ is a by-product of selection for some function other than the one that the spandrel serves.
A second issue is which theory will provide the needed explanatory resources. The choices include (1) individual explanations based on the adaptiveness of the underlying biology (Dow, Chapter 5, this volume); (2) group selectionist explanations based on the benefit of the trait to whole groups, or to groups formed by kin (Wilson, 2002); and (3) cultural evolutionary accounts in which religions are simply traditions that evolve along with the rest of culture.
Cultural evolutionary explanations themselves are of several kinds: (1) memetic accounts (Dennett, 2006), according to which religions are parasitic cultural replicators –a variant of this is that religions are autonomous cultural replicators but not necessarily disadvantageous to the ‘host’; (2) social ecology accounts, in which religion adapts to the cultural, economic and social needs of the believers’ environment (Reynolds and Tanner, 1995); (3) costly signalling of commitment, in which religions serve to identify commitment to the group in virtue of the high cost of adherence (Sosis and Bressler, 2003; Dow, Chapter 5, this volume); and (4) classical anthropological ‘cultural evolution’ which tended to have a quite non-Darwinian flavour, being orthogenetic or directed, and was once considered to be rationally driven (Carneiro, 2003).
These different sources of explanatory resources stand in complex relations of coherence, compatibility and mutual support. The costly commitment account is compatible, for example, with a cultural evolution account and also a group selectionist account. These and many other possible combinations exist in the literature.
Another choice that theorists must make is between targeting the genesis of religion as a putatively universal human trait or the evolution of particular religions or religious traditions. To explain the latter, one must appeal to the properties of the particular religion in its social context, and whether these properties are culturally adaptive (that is, functional) or not. To explain the former, one has to give an account of how the tendency to religiosity might have developed over time, and whether it is biologically adaptive. For instance, one might say that religiosity evolved from cognitive and emotional capacities still seen in other species. A biological or cognitive explanation will not explain directly why, for example, Christianity has displaced traditional animisms in Africa.
The definition of ‘religion’ itself is highly contested. Some hold that a world-view is not a religion unless it posits supernatural agents or afterlife, in which case some religions turn out not to be religions at all –perhaps Zen Buddhism or Confucianism, although popular forms of these religions, such as Mahayana and Vajrayana, usually involve ancestor spirits, supernatural demons and devas, and even divine beings borrowed from other religions, such as Brahmin. Moreover, there is a crucial distinction between elite and popular forms of a religion that must be held in mind. Elite forms are often more sophisticated and philosophical, but that doesn’t mean the popular forms will be as well, and the phenomenon to be explained by theories of religion is usually the popular form, not the ‘Spinozan’ form (see, for example, Dawkins, 2006).
Others hold that this sort of definition relies too heavily on the familiar religions of the Western tradition, particularly Christianity, and attempt a more general definition that includes overall metaphysical world-views, in which case Marxism-Leninism may turn out to be a religion. It can be argued that in single tribal societies, such as semi-nomadic societies and village or small town societies before the rise of large-scale sedentary agrarian civilizations, there is little traction to be had from distinguishing ordinary social rituals from ‘religious’ rituals (Liénard and Boy er, Chapter 13, this volume), although there is one ritual site that predates agriculture and may have been involved in its evolution (Heun, Haldorsen and Vollan, 2008). The choices a theorist makes on this issue will constrain and be constrained by the choices made on the issues listed above. For example, it may be that cultural evolutionary accounts of religion necessarily explain only the development of particular religions and not the overall phenomenon of religion. The definition of religion implicit in a theoretical approach also interacts with whether the explanation offered from that approach has the effect of undermining the religious commitments it seeks to explain.
Attempts to explain religion naturally go back a long way. Cicero, in his On the Nature of the Gods (De Natura Deorum), attempted to deflate popular religion in favour of an Epicurean notion of gods as distant and unconcerned with human lives, and therefore presented arguments that religion was more like
the dreams of madmen than the considered opinions of philosophers. For they are little less absurd than the outpourings of the poets, harmful as these have been owing to the mere charm of their style. The poets have represented the gods as inflamed by anger and maddened by lust, and have displayed to our gaze their wars and battles, their fights and wounds, their hatreds, enmities and quarrels, their births and deaths, their complaints and lamentations, the utter and unbridled license of their passions, their adulteries and imprisonments, their unions with human beings and the birth of mortal progeny from an immortal parent. With the errors of the poets may be classed the monstrous doctrines of the magi and the insane mythology of Egypt, and also the popular beliefs, which are a mere mass of inconsistencies sprung from ignorance. (Book I)
In the fourth century bce, Euhemerus, working at the court of Cassander of Macedon in a work now lost, argued that the gods had been historical individuals, kings, heroes, benefactors, who had been venerated and turned into mythological figures. His ideas were influential on early Christians, who used Euhemerus’ views to deflate the pagan deities in favour of their universal god. Snorri Sturlsson, a twelfth-century Icelandic historian and Christian, also did this for the Norse pantheon in the Prose Edda (Brown, 1946). Hume himself suggested a similar account for mythical figures like Hercules, Theseus and Bacchus (Hume, Green and Grose, 1875, vol. 2, p. 313).
After the Enlightenment began, various authors also invoked a kind of euhemerism, including David Friedrich Strauss. In the post-evolutionary era, however, naturalizing religion became popular, with the Religionsgeschichteschule (History of Religion school) developing out of the new ‘higher criticism’ approach to biblical texts, arguing that religion as we now see it is a sociological and historical outcome of previous cultural developments, such as the monotheism of Akhneton (Hinnells, 2005).
Evolutionary accounts of religion begin with Auguste Comte, who held that societies and civilizations pass through three stages: from the theological, through the metaphysical, to the positive state. This typology was at the same time both formal and ahistorical, allowing classification of societies at a synchronic point, and historical, indicating how the society in question had developed and would evolve in future. Theological stages were, in effect, the default state of humans before they had advanced. Herbert Spencer, a friend of Darwin’s, presented a similar view. But the best representatives are Caird (1894) and Martineau (1888), who offered historical and psychological accounts. Edward Burnett Tylor (1871) offered an evolutionary account based closely on Comtean stages. The default or ancestral religion was, he said, animism, a term he coined, in which humans projected an anima or motivating soul on ordinary objects in the world. Subsequent evolution of religion was cognitive and conceptual, as cultures acquired more and better knowledge of the world.
Historical and psychological accounts of the origins of religion have dominated discussions since (for example Hopkins, 1923). Anthropological studies also add the notion of ritual as a social cohesion force. All of these rely in some way or another on natural properties of humans, whether they call it human nature or not. Sociology provides economic explanations. Max Weber (1963) suggested that individuals with ‘charisma’ held psychological sway over others, and that worship derived from abstracting this property to the natural world. He famously held that different ideas affect social development and that, in particular, the Protestant ethic was responsible for the capitalist revolution in the West (Weber, 1930). Émile Durkheim, in contrast, held that religions were out-workings of the socioeconomic conditions of the believers and that religion acted to cohere society by affecting the beliefs of individuals (Durkheim, 1915; Durkheim and Pickering, 1975). He held that the primordial religious distinction was between the sacred and the profane, and that the original religion was totemism, in which a clan or tribe is watched over by a totem or sacred object or entity.
The psychological approach is exemplified by William James’ classic study, The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), in which he argued that all religious dispositions were at base biological and evolved. Psychoanalysts also took this up, and Karl Jaspers, an existentialist psychiatrist, held that we are disposed towards the transcendent by nature. Jaspers also coined the term ‘Axial Age’ for the period roughly from 800 to 200 bce in which most of the modern world religions came into being. Jaspers thought that this simultaneous development was unconnected in different regions and cultures, although few would now hold that (Jaspers, 1951: 99–102 cf. Armstrong, 2007). Freud, on the other hand, thought religion to be a kind of infantilism that the mature healthy individual grew out of, a view shared by some modern psychological researchers (Bering, McLeod and Shackelford, 2005; Bering and Shackelford, 2005; Bering, 2006a, 2006b).
In the period following the development of the modern evolutionary synthesis, so-called, in the period from 1930 to 1950, researchers began to consider what role biology played in the behaviour of organisms, and out of the study of animal behaviour, or ethology, developed several strands of research. One came to be known as ‘sociobiology’ (Wilson, 1975; Wilson and Wilson, 2007), and such things as moral behaviour and religious conformity were given evolutionary explanations in terms of the benefit to groups, following Darwin’s comment in The Descent of Man, discussed earlier. Ethically inclined groups would, on average, do better than the purely egoist groups. This seems to require a group selectionist view of social evolution, and many have argued against that on theoretical grounds.
Another strand relied on the ideas of William Hamilton (1964a, 1964b) in which behaviours that benefited kin were selectively favoured. Hence, on this account, altruistic behaviours such as self-sacrifice were explicable, because they tended to increase not the individual’s fitness, but their ‘inclusive fitness’, which was the fitness of the same genes they had in all their relatives. So insofar as religious behaviours contribute to the flourishing of kin, they can be explained without recourse to selection of groups as such.
Others rejected this interpretation as being unduly adaptationist (Rose and Rose, 2001). And so a dispute arose between those who held that evolution was usually if not always adaptive and those who thought that much of evolution was the result of chance or a by-product of other things that were adaptive. The by-product theory is sometimes called ‘spandrelism’, after spandrel, a term of Gould and Lewontin’s (1979) taken from architecture where it denotes the triangular space formed when arches form a rectangular support for a dome. The space is necessary, but not useful as a support, and so it was used, for example, in churches to paint images of saints on. Religion has been claimed as a by-product of various cognitive and neurological features: of our social capacities, of epilepsy, of our empathy with others and so on. Of course, if something began as a spandrel, it does not follow that it will remain one. Once some feature enters the population, it is subjected to selective pressures like any other, and so it can become adaptive very rapidly, even if it began as a spandrel. The origin and subsequent history of adaptive features needs to be distinguished.
Anthropological accounts of religion focus heavily on the role of ritual in social organization. Some, such as Richard Sosis and colleagues (Sosis, 2000; Sosis and Bressler, 2003; Sosis and Alcorta, 2005), argue that religion is a form of ritual behaviour which has the function of enforcing collective action and social cohesion. Defining religion in terms of ritual behaviour, however, means that religion is not a unique trait, as ritual behaviour applies in most social institutions (consider sport). Loyal Rue (Chapter 6, this volume), on the other hand takes this conclusion seriously: religion is not about gods or the supernatural at all; it is about us and our society. Atran and Norenzayan (2005: 713) use a hybrid definition: ‘passionate communal displays of costly commitments to counterintuitive worlds governed by supernatural agents’. In this account, religion is a set of rituals and beliefs that are hard to fake, and signal commitment to the community. The ‘honest advertising’ account here is both evolutionary and anthropological. A similar account has been given by Sanderson (2008), in which religion is a substitute for kin attachments in urbanized environments.
The use of primate studies (primatology) has recently entered the discussion again, after a long hiatus. In the 1970s, sociobiologists like Tiger and Fox (1989) argued by analogy with other animals that humans were motivated by social bonds. More recently, Frans de Waal and his colleagues (de Waal, 1982, 1996, 2001, 2005; de Waal and Tyack, 2003; de Waal et al, 2006) have drawn a number of conclusions about human nature based on our shared evolutionary heritage with apes (or, rather, other apes, as we ourselves are members of the ape clade) as a way into the much more complex topic of purely human traits, overlaid as they are with cultural and social biases of observers. In other words, sociobiological accounts should start with apes in order to avoid projecting our prejudices onto the biology. Barbara King (2007), a specialist in ape and baboon social communication, has argued that religion is a side effect of ordinary ape empathy and social grooming played out in complex symbolic societies.
Modern sociobiologists appeal to various kinds of theories of social adaptation. Kin selection accounts are based on the work of Trivers (1971) and Hamilton (1964a, 1964b), in which one’s fitness is increased by engaging in acts that are reciprocally beneficial, a process Trivers called ‘reciprocal altruism’ and which is encapsulated by people saying ‘you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours’. In situations where the members of your group are kin, this increases your inclusive fitness by aiding those who carry similar genes to you. But in an increasingly urbanized society, as Sanderson (2008) notes, these kin relationships are correspondingly disrupted, and so more abstract deities may play a role in uniting people in the new forms of social structure that appeared around the middle of the Axial Age, by encouraging attachments. On this account, monotheisms are a way of ensuring that individuals are not isolated, and that mutual love, respect and mercy are practised against genetic interests of xenophobia.
Cognitive psychology often appeals to the view that humans evolved to see agency in things, as our cognitive abilities had to make rapid inferences on the reasons for the actions of other humans (Atran and Norenzayan, 2005; Barrett and Malley, Chapter 10, this volume; but see Sperber, 2004 for a dissenting view). Consequently we have a strong ‘agency detector’, which Barrett (2000) dubbed the Hypersensitive Agency Detector Device or HADD. This is very similar to Dennett’s ‘Intentional Stance’ (1987), which is the native approach humans take to causal reasoning, ascribing intentions to things (and echoes the view presented by Tylor in the nineteenth century). As a result, we find agency in natural processes such as thunderstorms, disease, natural disasters and crop failures, and infer that an agent caused them. The widespread religious ritual of propitiating or satisfying these supernatural agents with sacrifices or duties is a result. In many pre-agrarian societies, the form of religion known as shamanism often involves making ancestors happy in this way, and ancestor worship is widespread in many cultures.
Particular kinds of religious experiences are also explained as psychological by-products, and have been since James’ The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902). James distinguished between the institutional or public forms of religion and the personal and mystical forms, which he focused upon.
How well these arguments stand up is a matter of future research. At this point, as Richerson and Newson (2008) note, we simply do not know enough to be sure if religion in general, or particular types of religions, are adaptive or side effects.
Intelligent design (ID) in the modern period is more than a revival of the natural theology that began with Harvey and Ray and culminated with Paley and the Bridgewater Treatises in the early part of the nineteenth century (Bowler, 2007). Nor is it a continuation of the ancient argument that design indicates the universe is the product of intelligence (Sedley, 2007). Instead, modern intelligent design is an outgrowth of the creation science movement (Shanks, 2004) that had its beginnings in the 1960s.
The basic difference between the classical and modern forms is that the classical theologians were attempting to discern God’s nature or plan from the order of the universe (and in particular the living world). The modern form is an attempt to establish that there is a God based on the complexities of biological functions and structures (Forrest and Gross, 2004). As such it falls into the long tradition of arguments for the existence of God and is a special case of the cosmological proof.
But it does not end there. ID also sees that naturalistic explanations of biological function or apparent design compete with the basic premises of ID, and so its proponents have targeted ‘naturalism’, and in particular ‘Darwinism’, as being false or at least disputable, inventing a ‘teach the controversy’ strategy for inserting ID into American, and to a lesser extent some European, curricula at the secondary level. A later development of this is ‘academic freedom’, in which teachers in high schools are to be able to question scientific views they do not like.
These are political aspects of ID, and some argue the entirety of it, but a number of philosophers have challenged the epistemology and overall philosophical foundations of ID. The two senses of ‘naturalism’ that, for example, Alvin Plantinga has specified – ‘philosophical’ naturalism and ‘methodological’ naturalism – are in his work defined in terms of excluding God’s existence for the former, and His relevance to investigation and explanation for the latter (Plantinga, 1996, 1993). Hence both topics are of philosophical interest in the wider sense when approaching the topic of religion and evolution. It should be noted that when philosophers talk about explanations in terms solely of physical properties, they tend to refer to ‘physicalism’. And a major reason why scientific methodology or epistemology does not refer to the actions of God is that any event can be explained by divine intervention, and hence its explanatory power reduces, as Darwin said, to a mere restatement of the phenomena.
If evolution explains our religious, moral and other values in natural terms, how does this leave us with respect to meaning in life? If religion is natural, what does this mean about the truth ofthat religion? Can we still accept a religion that is a natural process?
In many ways this is a parallel question to naturalizing ethics and epistemology. If our brains and epistemic capacities evolved, can we trust our reasonings and results in science? And if ethics evolved, does this mean that there are no moral values?
The essays in the final section of this volume address these and similar matters. Chapter 23, William Grey’s essay from 1987, shows how little such matters had been discussed in the philosophical literature a mere twenty or so years ago, but since then there has been a substantial increase in discussions, in part due to the influence of ID. The so-called ‘new atheists’, Dawkins, Dennett, Hitchens and others, have raised the question whether it is even possible to believe in religion now. Oddly, this is a topic that resurfaces in different generations, one of the first being Hume’s discussions on natural religion (1947), and in the late nineteenth century the debate was in full flight. Some historical perspective is very useful to cool the blood.
Darwin himself said that such matters were beyond his abilities, and that he mistrusted the conclusions of a ‘modified monkey brain’; but his ideas continue to have a lasting impression on this debate.
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1 See Grinde (1998); Wunn (2000, 2002); Boyer (2001); Wilson (2002); Hopkins (2003); Atran and Norenzayan (2005); Bulkeley (2005); Kelemen (2005); Landau, Greenberg and Solomon (2005); Martin (2005); Pyysiäinen (2005); Sosis and Alcorta (2005); Bulbulia, Chapter 1, this volume; Dow, Chapter 5, this volume.
2 See Wilson (1975); Boyd and Richerson (1985, 2005); Durham (1991); Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby (1992); Wright (1994); Weingart (1997); Cronk (1999); Badcock (2000); Segerstrâle (2000); Dupré (2001); Rose and Rose (2001); Griffiths (2004); Buller (2005); Richerson and Boyd (2005); Wilson and Wilson (2007).
3 See Brandon (1988); Wilson (1989); Bradley (1999); Keller (1999); Leigh (1999).
4 See Sober (1994); Orzack and Sober (1996); Andrews, Gangestad and Matthews (2002); Lewens (2004); Scher (2004).
5 See Fodor (1983, 2000); Bennett (1990); Pinker (1994, 1997); Dretske (1995); Scholl and Leslie (1999); Carruthers and Chamberlain (2000); Buller (2005); Carruthers (2006).
6 See Hull (1986); Griffiths (2002); Pinker (2002).
7 See McGrew (1998); de Waal (2001); Bekoff, Allen and Burghardt (2002); Russon and Begun (2004); de Waal et al. (2006); Cheney and Seyfarth (2007); Jensen, Call and Tomasello (2007); Pollick and de Waal (2007); Premack (2007).
8 See Gould and Lewontin (1979); Rose and Lauder (1996); Gould (1997); Pigliucci and Kaplan (2000).