Abstract In his essay, “Is the Spell Really Broken?,” cognitive psychologist Justin L. Barrett evaluates several ways in which critics of theism might employ various bio-psychological theories of religion to discredit basic theistic beliefs. Although appreciative of the substance of his evaluations, I nonetheless find reasons for challenging both Barrett’s wording of some anti-theistic objections, and his advice on how theists might proceed to build an epistemological foundation for theistic beliefs—a foundation that would withstand erosion by the new and noteworthy criticisms of cognitive science. If the phenomenon of religious belief in general is a fully natural outcome of human brain evolution, can the content of specific theistic beliefs still be convincingly warranted?
Key words: Cognitive science; Evolution; Religious belief; Theism; Warrant
Justin Barrett deals courageously with a sensitive topic in his essay, but he begins it with what I find to be a series of unfortunate word choices. “The long and adversarial relationship between Darwinism and theism continues,” says Barrett in his opening line. And in the next paragraph he poses the rhetorical question, “Will evolutionary sciences finally win the war and defeat theism once and for all?”2
Speaking candidly, I must say that I have grown extremely weary of seeing the term Darwinism, without any qualification whatsoever, used as if it were a synonym for atheism. In spite of the efforts of the Intelligent Design movement and other religiously energized anti-evolution movements to make it so, it is not.
Furthermore, it is not theism, broadly conceived, that sees itself at war with evolutionary science. No, it is episodic creationism—with its inclination to reduce the concept of divine creative action to episodes of irruptive, form-imposing, supernatural intervention—that has declared war on the acceptability and/or adequacy of biological evolution.
Whether from the pen of a theist or an atheist, rhetoric that blurs the distinction between, on the one hand, a cluster of scientific theories regarding the formational history of living organisms, and on the other hand a comprehensive metaphysical system, is rhetoric more likely to amplify rather than to diminish the confusion that persists in the discussion of scientific and religious beliefs regarding the phenomenon of biological evolution. There is indeed a war of worldviews going on, as has long been the case; but identifying this as a battle between evolutionary science and theism encourages the propagation of a wearisome misunderstanding of the issues.
A number of scholars cited by Barrett have called for the application of scientific investigation and analysis to the phenomenon of religious belief. Barrett himself is an active participant in this enterprise, and has been credited with playing a major role in founding the particular field of study now called the “cognitive science of religion.”
These scientific approaches should, I believe, be welcomed by all parties. Even by religious “believers”? Sure, why not? Persons confident of their own worldview should welcome any open and competent investigation of its “bio-psychological” dimension. If the human capacity and proclivity for religious belief can be understood, at least in part, in terms of the mental tools that evolved in our formational history, why not pay respectful attention to this insight?
But theism’s welcome mat is not always out, and self-appointed spokespersons for science sometimes fail to honor the limits of science’s domain of competence. Mutual antagonism is likely to thrive whenever worldviews become the targets of reciprocal criticism. In the essay under review, Barrett offers his critical examination of five possible arguments against theistic belief that appeal to the results of recent scientific studies. Recognizing that some representatives of science do occasionally employ rhetoric that is dismissive of religious truth-claims, Barrett is especially eager to restore confidence to religious believers who have come to fear “that these new treatments of religion are fundamentally dangerous or even hostile to theism.”3 (For the record, I think it only fair to note in passing that some spokespersons for theism have also been known to speak dismissively of scientific truth-claims. But that’s another story.)
The wording of the five arguments is Barrett’s, not that of any particular critic. Unfortunately, this opens Barrett to the criticism that these may be straw-man arguments. Indeed, some of them seem to be stated by Barrett in such a strident tone that they would be very difficult to defend, difficult even for an ardent critic of theism. Following are my thoughts on four of Barrett’s responses to the arguments as he stated them.
Selection pressures (operating on either groups or individuals) have led to various dispositions or propensities in human minds that happen to give rise to religious belief. Religious beliefs are, therefore, accidents or byproducts of evolution. As such, religious beliefs cannot be trusted. Belief in gods amount to cognitive illusion.4
In response, Barrett points out that just because certain kinds of beliefs (or propensities for these beliefs) may be “accidents” or “byproducts” of evolution, that fact by itself tells us nothing about whether the beliefs are illusory or true. “To be able to call genuinely religious beliefs ‘illusions’ we need to be able to demonstrate that they … upon further examination, are in error.”5
Agreed, of course; but that sword cuts both ways. Accidental beliefs are not necessarily false, but neither are they necessarily true. In his book, Why Would Anyone Believe in God?,6Barrett argues ardently that belief in gods generally (and in the God of Abrahamic traditions in particular) can be well understood as the outcome of natural human mental tools operating without coercion and without unusual environmental requirements. But the naturalness of religious belief is no more a guarantor of truth than is its accidentalness a guarantor of falsehood.
What critics of theism need to do, if they wish to discredit some religious belief, is to construct a line of reasoning from substantial evidence to the conclusion that this particular belief is false, or at least unwarranted. Theists, on the other hand, must own the burden of demonstrating that the belief is true, or at least warranted by something other than loudly repeated assertions or cocksure private judgments—not Barrett’s style, of course, but one that is familiar to us nonetheless. Hard proof may be out of reach for both, so that the best approach for advocate and critic alike is to examine the warrant (evidence, reasons) for either belief or disbelief. That being the case, perhaps the stridently worded criticism crafted by Barrett could profitably be restated in a more balanced form as follows:
Selection pressures (operating on either groups or individuals) have led to various dispositions or propensities in human minds that naturally give rise to the holding of religious beliefs. Religious belief is a natural phenomenon. However, whether or not any particular religious belief is warranted is an entirely different matter that will have to be settled outside the court of scientific inquiry.7
Stated in this non-inflammatory way, perhaps this proposition could initiate a constructive conversation between persons of good will who, for whatever reasons of nature or nurture, of accident of biology or accident of cultural heritage, hold vastly differing worldviews.
Religious beliefs have utility (e.g. in social arrangements) leading to their natural selection. As religious beliefs are selected for their utility and not their truth, they should not be trusted in terms of their truth-value.8
The logic of this objection flows in the opposite direction relative to the previous one. Here, the argument is that if belief in gods does have survival value (and is not simply a byproduct or accident of evolution), then its truth-value must be doubted. As Barrett himself correctly notes, “When it comes to natural selection, Truth is expendable.”9
But Barrett goes on to argue that this utility-based objection (whose specific wording he fine-tunes a couple of times) “still fails as a def eater for religious belief … [T]o say that being the product of evolution undermines religious belief is overstating the opposition between natural selection and Truth-representing minds. Natural selection does not discriminate against Truth; it just does not attempt to preserve it.”10
Point well taken, but the problem of “overstating the opposition” is, in the context of this essay, a problem entirely of Barrett’s own making! The wording of the objection is Barrett’s wording, not the wording of any named or quoted critic of theism (although I’m sure that Barrett could find examples in this style).
But my principal criticism of Barrett’s rhetorical strategy here is centered on his use of the word, “defeater.” If I understand Barrett correctly, he is saying that the religious utility argument fails to be able to deliver a knockout punch to religious belief. True, perhaps; but intellectual arguments, like boxing matches, are routinely won or lost on the cumulative effect of punches far less damaging than a smashing knockout. Critics of religious beliefs need not knock their opponents unconscious in order to win an argument. Suggesting otherwise, as Barrett here seems to be doing, is also a form of overstatement. Knockout or not, the critic of religious belief is still in a viable position to carry on with the contest.
To demonstrate a more even-handed approach, let me suggest the following restatement of this objection that avoids the problems of overstatement:
Religious beliefs have utility (e.g. in social arrangements) leading to their natural selection. Because, in the context of evolutionary dynamics, religious beliefs are selected for their utility and not for their veracity, the question of whether or not any particular religious belief is warranted or true is an entirely different matter that will have to be settled outside the court of scientific inquiry. Let all participants understand, however, that this out-of-(scientific)-court settlement regarding warrant for the content of specific beliefs must be performed in the full awareness of what cognitive science has learned about the general phenomenon of religious belief.11
People are credulous recipients of theistic beliefs (e.g. from parents). Natural selection provided people with the cognitive faculties that contribute to making us credulous recipients. As we now know why people so readily believe in gods through these faculties, their contribution toward belief should be discounted. Hence fewer reasons exist for theistic belief.12
Even in this softened version, edited by Barrett to avoid particular pitfalls built into his original version, numerous word choices ensure that it will elicit a hostile reaction from theists. Barrett himself characterizes it as a “vicious blow against theism.”13 Referring to theists as “credulous recipients” of theistic beliefs is clearly not designed to encourage a constructive conversation. Neither is the term “discounted” likely to evoke a sympathetic hearing or mutual respect.
My main criticism, however, concerns the minimal attention that Barrett pays in this essay to the actuality and effectiveness of the biases that are unavoidably introduced by an individual’s membership of a religious community. Barrett’s own work in the cognitive science of religion does an outstanding job of demonstrating the ‘’naturalness of religion’’ thesis. The human inclination to posit the existence and action of superhuman Agents is the natural product of mental tools built into our evolved brains. Barrett has also convincingly argued that the more numerous and diverse the occasions on which some particular religious belief is reinforced by social experiences with other “believers,” the more credible that belief becomes and the more likely it is to be incorporated into one’s reflective belief system, whether true or not.14
Let me diverge briefly on a bit of relevant personal experience. Some years ago it dawned on me, in the wake of certain unpleasant interactions with an especially feisty and sometimes ill-mannered portion of the religious community, that I needed to re-examine the content of my religious belief system. As I reflect on that awakening experience, I continue to ask myself questions (some stated quite bluntly) like these: Why did it take me so long to realize that this re-evaluation was necessary? Why had I so long been content to remain bound to the stringent requirements of creeds written four centuries ago? Was I dull of mind? Was my brain turned off?
The work of Justin Barrett, Pascal Boyer and other scholars in the cognitive science of religion has been immensely helpful to me in my search for answers to these self-reflective questions.15 I think I now understand my own actions and reactions (as well as those of critics and supporters alike) far better than I did two decades ago in the heat of turmoil. As it turns out, I think that my mind/brain was neither dull nor inoperative. I would even be so bold as to suggest that it was functioning quite normally in the natural manner that the cognitive sciences are now beginning to understand, with one substantive qualification: I would suggest that cognitive science needs to pay additional attention to the way in which membership in a tightly-knit religious community affects the emotional security of its individual members. In the context of a tight, religion-based coalition, tribal dynamics (which have immense power either to amplify or diminish an individual’s emotional security, with its associated survival value) have a strong impact on a member’s behavior and beliefs. With that caveat in mind, let me suggest the following as a modified version of the “inherited belief” argument that, in my judgment, deserves more rigorous examination:
Natural selection has provided people with an inclination toward religious beliefs generally. It has also provided mental tools that enhance the credibility of particular beliefs when they are reinforced by diverse social experiences (e.g. affirmation by believing parents or by other members of one’s belief-based coalition). Even reflective beliefs can be strongly biased by common social dynamics. Since cognitive science now understands the effect of biases introduced by these natural mechanisms, it is imperative that their contribution toward theistic belief be carefully scrutinized and that the warrant for particular theistic propositions be rigorously evaluated.16
The cognitive science of religion demonstrates that cognitive mechanisms of our evolved minds provide most impetus for believing in gods. As these mechanisms are error-prone, they cannot be trusted to give us Truth. As we cannot trust these aspects of our minds to give us Truth, we cannot trust most of our impetus for believing in gods. Therefore cognitive science of religion weakens belief in gods.17
This objection deserves respectful attention because, as Barrett candidly notes, “Certainly, if a belief arises largely because of evidence (or reasons) from sources known to be untrustworthy, the belief is in danger unless other evidences (or reasons) exist apart from this dubious source,”18 Fair enough. The question, then, is this: How error-prone is the cognitive system that leads to belief in gods, or God?
One of the mind’s cognitive tools that contributes to belief in gods is known as HADD (the hypersensitive agency detection device). HADD alerts a person to the possible presence and action of an intentional agent that may be either beneficial or dangerous. Some of the agents indicated by HADD are familiar embodied agents (animals, other humans) whose capabilities and existence in the natural world are well documented. Other agents postulated by HADD, however, are different in significant ways—superhuman unembodied agents (ancestral spirits, gods, God) whose existence and capabilities are the subject of a great deal of conjecture and debate. In either case, certain environmental signals are quickly (often prematurely) taken by HADD to be indicators of the presence or action of an intentional agent. The move from HADD-initiated non-reflective beliefs to stable reflective beliefs ordinarily requires a slower and more deliberate process.
As Barrett points out, HADD is tuned, for the sake of survival, to err in the direction of over-detection—the “better safe than sorry” strategy. The hypersen-sitivity-based objection that Barrett is here criticizing is this: “Being error-prone, HADD cannot be trusted; so, the evidence HADD contributes to belief in gods should be discounted.”19
I concur with Barrett that a summary dismissal of HADD-initiated agency indicators would be as out of place as would be their uncritical acceptance. What needs more attention, it seems to me, is the critical issue of whether or not there is a systematic difference in the error-proneness of HADD’s postulation of an unembodied superhuman Agent in comparison to its positing a familiar embodied agent. These are two remarkably different categories of agency. Errors in positing action by familiar embodied agents (animals, other humans) are relatively easy to detect. But the question of whether or not HADD errs in postulating the existence or activity of unembodied superhuman Agents (ancestral spirits, gods, God) is precisely the issue at hand, and its answer is far from self-evident.
Is belief in gods or God necessarily weakened by knowing how our cognitive mechanisms, including HADD, work? No; that would be another overstatement. But the more pertinent and difficult question on the table is this: When we do the deliberate reflection on and evaluation of our HADD-generated non-reflective belief in God, is there sufficient warrant to support our raising that intuition to the level of a reflective belief? Knowing how our cognitive mental tools operate does not necessarily weaken belief in God, but it certainly ought to alert us to the need to warrant that belief with something far more convincing than a simple assertion or the unthinking adoption of one’s tribal tradition.
This is not a trivial challenge; in order to meet it, “One will have to build an epistemological foundation using pre- or extra-scientific timber” and, says Barrett, “… whether or not belief in gods is rationally justified remains a question outside of science.”20
Once again, I find myself in agreement with Barrett. Theists must, I believe, bear the burden of demonstrating to critics that theistic beliefs are warranted by a substantial epistemological foundation. Furthermore, I would argue that that foundation-building project, although it necessarily extends far beyond the realm of the sciences, must now be carried out in full awareness of what the cognitive science of religion has so far accomplished. But I am not at all encouraged by Barrett’s specific suggestion for the shape of that foundation:
The theist may build such an epistemological foundation by appealing to the divine as a trustworthy source of Truth that has imparted the ability to conceive Truth (at least under some conditions) through cosmic fine-tuning or supernatural selection or supernaturally generated mutations that then were naturally selected to produce human minds. I leave the details and the coherence of such a theology up to the individual theist.21
In this statement, Barrett acknowledges the necessity of incorporating what we know of both cosmic and biological evolution into theistic thinking about how we got to be the way we are. So far, so good. But there is a serious inconsistency embedded in Barrett’s wording that puzzles me. Barrett’s positive reference to the concept of cosmic fine-tuning suggests that he welcomes the idea of crediting the success of cosmic evolution (the formational history of the physical universe) to a divine choice for the correct numerical values of the universe’s fundamental constants. Cosmic fine-tuning is apparently taken to be a manifestation of divine provision. It would seem, then, that a key trait of divine creative action is the provision, at time-zero, of whatever would eventually be required for the evolution of cosmic structures without need for irruptive, form-conferring interventions in the course of time. That’s what cosmic fine-tuning accomplishes.
But Barrett’s treatment of divine action in relation to biological evolution takes the exact opposite tack. His references to “supernaturally generated mutations” and “supernatural selection” imply that certain episodes of supernatural intervention may have been essential to the formation of humans with Truth-conceiving minds. If so, then it would seem that the key trait of divine creative action in the biological realm is not the provision, at time-zero, of all that would eventually be needed (biological fine-tuning) for the evolution of life forms, but rather the interjection of occasional form-conferring actions to compensate for what had not been provided in the first place. In the absence of biological fine-tuning, form-conferring interventions become necessary.
I suppose one could posit that there is no a priori requirement that a Creator proceed in a consistent fashion for both cosmic and biological evolution, but this two-style approach (cosmic fine-tuning, yes; biological fine-tuning, no) has all the marks of an ad hoc hypothesis framed in the style of the old ruse, “heads I win, tails you lose.”22 This hybrid mechanism of empirically accessible natural processes episodically punctuated by a series of conjectured but empirically invisible supernatural interventions is straight from the rhetoric of the Intelligent Design movement, a movement whose claims I have evaluated for more than fifteen years, a movement that, in my judgment, has done nothing to strengthen the warrant for theistic belief.23
If, in the context of the important discoveries that Barrett and other cognitive scientists have made concerning the way in which we naturally build religious belief systems, this ad hoc and inconsistent approach is the best that theists can do to build a foundation of rational warrant for belief in God, then the cause seems hopeless to me. An epistemological foundation fabricated from little more than the recitation of restated tribal myths involving supernatural feats of form-imposing action may enhance the emotional security of persons who are already true believers, but I see nothing in these highly conjectural and ad hoc insertions of irruptive intervention that would be attractive to anyone else. Given the probative force of the naturalness of religion thesis that Barrett and other cognitive scientists have demonstrated, ad hoc conjectures will not provide the firm epistemological foundation that theism desires.
1 Justin L. Barrett, “Is the Spell Really Broken?” Theology and Science, vol. 5, no. 1 (2007): 57–72.
2 Ibid., 57, emphasis added.
3 Ibid., 60.
4 Ibid., 62.
5 Ibid., 63.
6 Justin L. Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (Lanham, Md: AltaMira Press, 2004).
7 Compare to Barrett, “Is the Spell Really Broken?,” 62.
8 Ibid., 64.
9 Ibid., 65.
10 Ibid.
11 Compare to ibid., 64.
12 Ibid., 66.
13 Ibid., 67.
14 As one example of these influential social experiences, consider the hearing of repeated proclamations from tribal religious leaders. “Those who work in the persuasion and propaganda fields, such as advertising, know the power of proclamation. When people hear similar claims repeatedly, even though they receive no evidence or proper justification for the claim, they tend to believe the claim. The more familiar the claim, the more intuitively true it seems. Thus, someone who hears the truth of the Divine Trinity affirmed weekly for years will tend to accept its truth, even if no strong evidence or justification has ever been offered” (Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God?, 69).
15 In addition to Barrett’s Why Would Anyone Believe in God?, see also Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought (New York: Basic Books, 2001) and Todd Tremlin, Minds and Gods: The Cognitive Foundation of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
16 Compare to Barrett, “Is the Spell Really Broken?,” 65–67.
17 Ibid., 67.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 68.
20 Ibid., 70.
21 Ibid.
22 A two-style approach similar to Barrett’s was offered by Intelligent Design advocate Stephen C. Meyer in Science and Christianity: Four Views, ed. Richard F. Carlson (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 2000), 127–174, with my response on 188–194.
23 For a sample of my evaluation of the ID movement and its specific claims for scientific support, see my essay, “Are Bacterial Flagella Intelligently Designed? Reflections on the Rhetoric of the Modern ID Movement,” Science and Christian Belief, vol. 15, no. 2 (October, 2003): 117–140.
Howard J. Van Till is Professor Emeritus of Physics and Astronomy at Calvin College, located in Grand Rapids, Michigan. After graduating from Calvin College in 1960, he earned his Ph.D. in physics from Michigan State University in 1965. His research experience includes both solid-state physics and millimeter-wave astronomy. His current interests include the assessment of belief systems and the processes by which we construct them. Professor Van Till is a founding member of the International Society for Science and Religion, has served on the executive council of the American Scientific Affiliation and the advisory board of the John Templeton Foundation, as well as being a member of the editorial boards of both Science and Christian Belief and Theology and Science.