Melania Nucifora
The cities investigated here are situated in the eastern part of Sicily, an area that changed considerably in the seventies in various ways, especially concerning the economy. The recession that affected the local economy over that decade put an end to a period of unprecedented prosperity. The signs of change, which were already starting to appear towards the end of the sixties and took shape in the years that followed, also touched the issue of protection of cultural heritage and historic urban landscape. Important innovations involved the objects, actors and strategies of protection, the culture of conservation itself and, finally, the nature and dynamics of the conflicts around the historical heritage of the cities in question.
In order to understand the nature and limits of change, we should first briefly trace the terms of the conflicts around the landscape and cultural heritage that accompanied the age of prosperity in Italy, as well as the political and academic debate around the issue in the three decades before the turning point.
The great transformation of the postwar period was brought to a close during the first half of the seventies; in Italy this transformation had epochal proportions that amounted to a transition, late in coming but swift and striking, from a society deeply rooted in centuries-old practices, cultures and traditional values to a modern affluent society. This in large part involved the dissolution of a rural world, which took place through a tumultuous movement of collective migration towards urban centers that saw many Italian cities swell with new inhabitants from the provinces and the country.
The impact of the great transformation on the cultural heritage and Italian historical landscape was so strong that it left an indelible mark on the collective memory. The new citizens of rural origin who invaded the urban centers, first of all, had basic needs (housing, water and roads), little or no previous shared urban identity, aspired to different types of consumption, and their main concern was modernization and economic growth, barely disguising the desire to put behind them a past that for many evoked poverty and exclusion. The country witnessed mass abandonment of mountain and hilly areas and inland villages that made up the physiognomy of the landscape that was typically Italian and largely homogeneous, at least along the Apennine Ridge. In this way, there was a consolidation of that demographic and economic imbalance between inland and coast that had more distant origins, and that Rossi Doria fixed with the vivid image of the »flesh« (the coastal, urbanized areas where industries and services were concentrated) and the »bone« (the poverty-stricken inland country areas and mountain villages whose inhabitants left for the urban areas and were thus reduced to the bone).682
The burgeoning housing demand subjected the historical areas of large and medium-sized cities to unprecedented building pressure. The system of peri-urban agricultural land was changing rapidly and established urban areas underwent land revaluation and swift, unscrupulous demolition and replacement. The cities underwent a transformation that happened too rapidly, within the cities and in the surrounding areas, while the pre-war legal framework concerning urban growth management, inadequate and incomplete, was not immediately updated.
It was for this reason that after the Second World War the issue of the protection of urban landscape and cultural heritage was inextricably intertwined with that of the public management and control of the land. The protection issue no longer concerned just individual archaeological sites or monuments, but also the surrounding contexts, entire minor heritage sites—that is, those areas that would soon be in the national and international spotlight.683 At the same time, the scientific debate widened its spectrum of those areas of urban landscape and cultural heritage considered to be worthy of protection, from outstanding areas to other parts of the region, both natural and manmade, which were previously unprotected simply because they were not subject to threat.
Between the fifties and sixties, the so-called reformist urbanism developed in Italy, the main aim of which was to reform the national framework of urban and regional planning. The main advocates of this trend devoted much of their work to this, which involved not only drafting plans, but also communicating regularly with local stakeholders. Through the effort of explanation and disclosure of planning principles, with an attitude that can best be defined as pedagogical, the reformist urban planners took it upon themselves to overcome the elitism of conservative discourse and called the citizens’ attention to local government as a moment of political democratization.
Relationships between urban planners and local governments were characterized throughout the whole of the Golden Age by complex dynamics that were often conflictual in nature. The former based their projects on an advanced debate that had developed within the INU (the National Institute of Urban Planning) around two key subjects: public control of urban development and the protection of historic centers. The latter were susceptible to pressure from local interests, primarily those of construction entrepreneurs for whom many people worked, especially in areas where other industries were poorly developed. In general, across the country, from the Reconstruction onwards, construction was considered to be a driving sector of the economy for its capacity to stimulate the more traditional forms of manufacturing and to employ low-skilled workers. Throughout the fifties an atmosphere of great tolerance towards urban abuses and disorder prevailed.684
In this respect, both Catania and Syracuse are exemplary cases of the uneasy interaction between technical and political aspects due to two important figures in national planning who were around for a long time: the old Luigi Piccinato, founder of the INU, and the young Vincenzo Cabianca, one of a new generation of planners who, under the guidance of Adriano Olivetti and Giovanni Astengo, viewed urban planning as a social science and threw himself into reforming the sector. The work of the INU produced a concrete result only at the end of the sixties with the enactment of the Mancini law, also known as »the bridge law« (Legge Ponte, Number 765 of 1967) as it was supposed to provide transitional regulations towards a more complete urban reform that never actually materialized. As we shall see shortly, the law established a major break with the previous period, a factor that significantly changed the rules governing the building of urban spaces.
In Catania, and even more so in Syracuse due to the drive of Cabianca, the constant exchange with stakeholders sought by the reformist urban planners through frequent press reports, dedicated meetings and public debates contributed to raising awareness of the cultural values of heritage and the local landscape. Especially in the case of Syracuse, the explicitly educational purpose of the dialogue with the citizens stimulated and consolidated the processes of patrimonialization that would support the battles of the seventies, bridging the gap between a minority »party for protection«, whose members were elitist and cultured, and a »development party« that appealed to large segments of the urban population.
The conflict between modernization and economic growth, on the one hand, and safeguarding values, cultural heritage and landscape, on the other, is one of the dominant issues in Italian postwar history. It has given rise to a narrative that literature and cinema have conveyed and fixed indelibly in the collective memory. At the basis of this story is the harsh condemnation of the damage done to national treasures, a powerful narrative first found on the pages of the weekly Roman magazine Il Mondo. Antonio Cederna began a new narrative genre in this magazine with his famous tale of the sack of Rome by the new Vandals. In this tale, the urban transformation of the capital, the archetype of all Italian cities, is represented and interpreted as the result of speculation and corruption in a language that mocks the poor taste of the »new barbarians« for their ignorance of the past, of history and art, and their sad middle-class view of the world.685 The voice of Cederna, in the minority elite battle for the preservation of heritage and the national landscape, dominated the fifties, the decade in which—in contrast—the national political class adopted a very lenient line towards building initiatives in an atmosphere of poor control of market dynamics and blatantly weak public intervention.
As I have pointed out, however, the postwar period also opened up a phase of great renovation of the Italian urban planning culture, encouraged by the heated debate that took place within the INU and on the pages of the journal Urbanistica, the aim of which was not only methodological renewal, but also social legitimacy of the discipline. Between the fifties and sixties, this debate produced two major policy documents: the Town Planning Code and the Charter of Gubbio.686 The former put forward radical proposals for the revision of the legal framework, targeted to allow public control of land and the income from it so as to promote urban growth in the public interest and respect for the landscape and cultural values. The other aimed to spread a culture of the historic center as an organically complex whole, consisting of imposing monuments and more modest surrounding areas, giving rise to a planning policy that could overcome the passive and selective nature of the traditional constraints. These documents, drawn up at a delicate time of change in the political balance in the country, formed the basis on which the architects and urban planners began a dialogue with the representatives of the new political alliance between Christian Democracy (DC) and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) in the years of the so-called »center-left« (from the early sixties onwards). The sixties were dominated by this tension of urban planners in an exchange with politicians, on the one hand, and society, on the other, and it ended with a third important document of a less theoretical nature than the first two, but equally programmatic in nature: Progetto 80 (1969),687 an ambitious program of territorialization of national economic policies in which the theme of the cultural and natural heritage of Italy was directly linked to the issue of development models and their compatibility with conservation objectives. The new element, which formed a link between the years of the center-left and the seventies, was the notion of heritage and landscape as a »right of citizens« to culture and leisure. It was a prelude to the more explicit claims of decentralization policies for the cultural heritage characteristic of the seventies, in the name of a principle of democratization of culture.688
The two cases discussed here reveal a stark difference in the material outcomes of the conflict (Syracuse faced the threats more successfully than Catania where they led to the disappearance of vast portions of the old town and the devastation of suburban landscapes). They also show a discontinuity between the time of the so-called »centrism« (from the late forties to the early sixties), characterized by the government of the DC, which was in power in the Sicilian cities as well, and that of the center-left both on a national and a local level.689 This discontinuity points to a more careful periodization of the three postwar decades and helps to understand to what extent the origins of the innovations of the seventies lie in the previous decade, even in their nature of rupture.
The new center-left political experience heralded a new conception of the role of the public in the governance of urban processes and the safeguarding of public interests; during this time the politicians began to take interest in the culture of national urban planning that had an unprecedented opportunity in the new political climate. The »Reform of Urbanism« constituted one of the main key points of the program of the new governing coalition. The sixties was a time of fervid urban planning when the planners spent a long time in the cities they were working on; the »technical aristocracy« of the planners often resulted in a firm commitment to disclosing the principles of reformist urbanism to the citizens.690 From these lengthy exchanges between experts and local stakeholders important new elements emerged only after collective protests at the end of the decade contributed to clarifying and expressing those elements in a more organized form. The particular nature of this dialogue between experts and citizens established during the sixties influenced the presence and status of urban heritage in the debates and protests of the seventies.
The cases studied, with their differences (due to significant diversities in cultures and urban identities in the long-term, and in the strategies implemented by local political forces, both those in power and the opposition), show the sixties to be an incubation period for some innovations that fully developed at the beginning of the new decade and marked the seventies as years of great change.
I will focus on three key aspects of the protection/development dialectics that indicate a turning point in the seventies:
The way of building urban spaces changed radically following the urban reform introduced by the Mancini law (1967–68) that altered the relationship between politics and business. From the seventies onwards, the urban development rules became the basis of a new covenant in which a new subject entered: organized crime that raised its ugly head in Catania in particular.
The issue of the protection of historic centers arose from the debate among the experts on the subject and became a matter of general interest: with the ferment of mass protests the battle took on clearer social connotations and political topics such as »participation« and »decentralization« became part of expert discourse, producing innovative governance guidelines.
The subject of the protection of the landscape went beyond the historical and aesthetic dimension and began to involve environmental issues; a new awareness of the ecosystem arose in the public discourse on protection; this also emerged from the growing perception of the negative impact of industry.
The same factors of innovation occurred to varying degrees in Catania and Syracuse, producing different outcomes and sometimes even opposing ones, in relation to the economic structure of the two cities, on the one hand, and the physiognomy of cultural identity in the long term, on the other.
Catania and Syracuse are both in the eastern region of Sicily. Both cities belonged to what the economist Paolo Sylos Labini described in 1965 as the most modern part of Sicily: a land not yet affected by mafia crime, characterized by more modern agricultural production and greater economic and social dynamism.691
From the early fifties, this area benefitted from grants from the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, which were more strongly oriented to industrial development after the 1957 reform law. Therefore, both cities had their industrial development zones (ASI) which, however, were characterized by radically different productive sectors and sizes of businesses. Angelo Moratti set up Rasiom in Syracuse in 1949 and began the long era of petrochemical development which would see the arrival of Esso and Montedison in subsequent years. In Catania there were mechanics, food and manufacturing industries (wood, furniture, ceramics, sanitary ware, and plastics—largely generated by the building sector) characterized by small production units mostly of local origin.
There was a strong construction industry in both cities. It was a sector of transition from under-employment to full employment and throughout the fifties it consisted mainly of small to medium-sized businesses with semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Active construction companies in the two cities in Sicily between the fifties and sixties operated in a particular way which allowed entry into the market for people with little or no availability of capital: the exchange mechanism, permuta, through which contractors reimbursed the landowners »in-kind« with apartments.
By and large, this mechanism regulated micro building operations on small or very small lots, sometimes within residential urban voids and unused small spaces, and generally following a system of replacing a pre-existing building with a much larger one: owners of properties of small value (but also the wealthy owners of the splendid Art Nouveau villas in Catania) yielded lots and allowed the building to be replaced, thereby becoming owners of apartments with access to a thriving rental market; on the other hand, small and very small building firms could participate in the building venture for a modest initial investment. The social advantage was an employment demand commensurate with the needs and supply of the local market, widespread financial improvement that was well distributed among the population and an answer, albeit selected and dictated by private interests, to the urgent demand for houses.
Both Catania and Syracuse saw their populations grow tremendously in the fifties and sixties, swelling with people from the provinces.692 Catania came from a tradition of great exchange and openness to the province, with many small and medium towns that were relatively thriving both economically and socially, whereas for Syracuse and its ruling class the »invasion« of people coming mainly from the surrounding country was a new and traumatic event. The great attraction was the industrial pole north of the city center, and the areas that lay between the consolidated city and the industries became the preferred places of settlement of a population that formally resided in the city but had turned its back on Ortygia, the historical part of Syracuse whose myths and rituals they did not know; nor were they aware of the urban identity of Syracuse as a city of art and history. The life of this new population, whilst still depending on the traditional center for administrative and commercial services, was developed between the new working-class and middle-class suburbs and the industrial center while the delicate network of medieval Ortygia, unsuited to new urban functions, became the subject of ambiguous hypotheses of renewal and modernization.
The idea of redevelopment, still present in many of the reconstruction plans formulated immediately after the war, was often associated with the late nineteenth-century »sanitary approach« based on hygienic ideas to avoid contagion, which involved demolishing very old, tightly built neighborhoods and replacing them with wide, elegant avenues; this notion had been taken up and implemented during the fascist regime. After the Second World War, the argument for demolition of medieval systems for the purpose of modernization and the struggle against social deprivation was strengthened by the perceived need to adapt to traffic requirements and new living standards.
Faced with the problems posed by the postwar reconstruction and development, the administrations of the two cities adopted opposite strategies: Catania proceeded to an adaptation of the 1932 plan, led by a committee of notables and implemented by municipal technicians, while Syracuse started a new planning process from a national competition in 1954, eventually entrusting the task to the group led by Vincenzo Cabianca. The man who pushed for this far more enlightened choice was undoubtedly the then Superintendent of Antiquities for Eastern Sicily, the archaeologist Luigi Bernabò Brea, follower of a prestigious tradition of international figures of scholars active in Syracuse since the eighteen-eighties. Bernabò Brea, a respected member of the board in the competition, became the inspiration for a strategic vision in which the archaeological urban heritage and its monuments scattered around the city became the cornerstone of the future urban project that portrayed the system of the historical and archaeological sites as »a great tourist-cultural infrastructure«. From their first meeting until Bernabò Brea was withdrawn from office in the mid-seventies, the relationship between the archaeologist and the young urban planner Cabianca, which soon turned from collaboration to close friendship, was based on a shared, informal but firm commitment to the continual connection between urban planning and environmental protection.
There was a completely different scenario in Catania where, at the same time, thanks to the activism of a part of the DC connected to the Roman building society Immobiliare Generale, the so-called operation San Berillo suddenly took place. This operation was carried out through the establishment of two private companies: the IstBerillo, aimed at the construction of a lower-class neighborhood on the outskirts of the city to house the old inhabitants of the historic district San Berillo, and the IstiCa, designed to carry out the demolition of the historic district and the construction in its place of a very high-density business area. It all happened quickly under the incredulous eyes of the people of Catania and the silence of the Soprintendenza ai Monumenti della Sicilia Orientale, which had its headquarters in Catania. Protected by a special regional law, the project IstiCa established land-density standards that would influence the future of urban planning processes in Catania, keeping the value of the land high, as declared by the urban planner Piccinato.693 Also in Syracuse, following the example of Catania, a part of the local Christian Democrats made a proposal for a special law that, relying on the same arguments that had supported the operation San Berillo (social degradation of the neighborhood as an old prostitution center), proposed the demolition of the Graziella district in Ortygia. It was a proposal strongly opposed by scholars and intellectuals who, under the moral leadership of the Soprintendente alle Antichità Luigi Bernabò Brea, defended the integrity of the old town several times; this was the preparation for the plan launched by Cabianca in 1956.694
Typical little square in the Graziella district, Ortygia (Syracuse), whose demolition was proposed since the fifties and eventually warded off thanks to the special law for the historic center (1976).
Source: http://sudestsicilia.altervista.org/siracusaortigia-largo-graziella/
Although the decades of prosperity in both cities represented a clash between protection and development, the attitudes of the ruling elites and local politicians in the interpretation and debate around this topic were quite different.
In Catania, the interaction between the Communist Party (PCI) and the DC in the years of intense urban growth took on a more pliable aspect than in Syracuse; while the public discourse reflected the content, language and tone of the national debate, what actually happened was that the local PCI tended to vote for measures that compromised the integrity of the historic center and many sites of landscape value during the thirty years after the war. The IstiCa project of San Berillo at the beginning of the fifties had been unanimously approved of by the city council; similarly, widespread amnesties for land use violation on payment of a fine were unanimously deliberated, which closed the »golden age« in 1969–70.695 The diverse structures of the construction industry in the two cities influenced this. In Catania, not only did it provide the majority of jobs in industry, but the workers were the most unionized. ANCE (the National Association of Builders) was as active in Catania as were the workers’ representatives, and both of them were particularly concerned about the restrictive measures for construction. On the contrary, the PCI in Syracuse found most of its voters in the field of the petrochemical industry, which urged them to concentrate their battles on getting social housing and challenging the political party in power more freely on the issue of urban planning and the protection of the city’s cultural heritage.
A substantial part of the political debate in the second half of the sixties concerned the effects of the Mancini law, a result of the reformism of the center-left. The law Number 765 of 1967, which was enacted at the end of a tormented debate on public/private balance in the building of the city, introduced important innovations: the charging of infrastructure costs to the owners, the obligation of detailed plans, the almost complete limitation of individual licenses and the establishment of quite large zones called comparti edilizi, known by their buildings that had to be built in a homogenous way (concerning facades, height etc.), with the agreement of all the owners. All these measures meant that many construction companies were forced out of business and only large developers with large amounts of capital to invest survived. The town plans that Piccinato and Cabianca delivered to the administrations at the end of the decade, which prioritized functional aspects and large scale zoning on a regional level, indicated the change of scale that characterized the building of new urban spaces in Italy between the sixties and seventies with its inclination towards gigantic infrastructure, with urban highways, major business centers and the concentration of residential zones in the New Town in areas where traditionally urban development did not take place. On the political and academic level, the principle of »correcting imbalances«, which inspired modern economic and planning theories and which was affirmed with the famous Nota Aggiuntiva (1962) by Ugo La Malfa (a true manifesto of the center-left), supported these changes.696 However, the underlying theory that inspired the Nota was not unique to Italy, but reflected the thoughts that were developing in the young European Economic Community. From an academic perspective, regional planning strategies were aimed, therefore, at what Manfredo Tafuri effectively defined as »the rebalancing myth« because of the often utopian nature of plans and projects that arose in the late sixties.697 They aimed to create urban attractors on a regional scale in order to boost construction, especially of homes, and to counteract urban sprawl. For this reason, the New Towns designed for Catania and Syracuse as integral parts of plans at the end of the decade represented safeguarding tools for the landscape defenders: by polarizing and densifying the town into designated areas, the planners of the New Towns pursued their aims to save precious suburban landscapes (hilly and coastal) from the threat of urban sprawl and mushrooming expansion.
The political debate around the Mancini Law and the implementation of the New Town (the sheer size of which threatened to drain all urban resources and finances) was equally intense but had opposite effects in the two Sicilian cities. In Syracuse, the Christian Democrats tried to safeguard the old way of building urban spaces: individual licenses, exchange of land for property, and small and medium-sized enterprises. While in Syracuse the PCI fought for the construction of the »linear city« designed by Cabianca, which envisaged the establishment of a New Town in the South, the ruling Christian Democrats scuttled the project.698 In Catania, in contrast, the increased level of organization of the construction industry pushed the local Christian Democrats to make the Mancini Law the basis of a new, more evolved speculative business. Unlike what happened in Syracuse, some prominent members of the Catania Christian Democrats fought for the construction of the New Town of Librino that, with its large residential size and infrastructure, the impressive labor-intensive public works which constituted an essential requirement and through a vast system of tenders, became an aspiration for the privileged entrepreneurs who had emerged from the cauldron of the fifties and sixties—after the ruthless selection induced by the new law. These were the so-called cavalieri del lavoro of Catania, a small number of local construction companies whose links with the Mafia were to emerge in the eighties after the sensational murder of journalist Giuseppe Fava, who investigated the relationships between construction companies, politics and the Mafia.699
The intervention of organized crime, which exploited the great building companies in order to launder money and manipulate the job market, became part of the new pact between politics and construction. Because of this, the discontinuity with the past that marked the seventies was radical; this fact is often overlooked because of the indiscriminate use of the term »building speculation« in subsequent interpretations of these processes, interpretations that not only homogenized the entire three decades of the Golden Age, but also assimilated the following years to that period. This assimilation did not foster a deeper analysis of these processes nor an understanding of the changes in the production of urban spaces or of the attitude of the political class, whose decisions have been indiscriminately interpreted as an effect of corruption and even of criminal intent.700
Residential towers in Librino, the modernist new town in southern Catania (detailedplan: 1972–1979).
Source: Photograph by Melania Nucifora.
It was not only the structural data of the urban economy that pushed the Communist Party of Catania towards a much softer line regarding the housing mess and resulting damage to the cultural heritage and landscape of the city. There was also a cultural component that Giuseppe Giarrizzo has discussed and reiterated in his long reflection on the history of Catania as a disconnection between politics and urban culture.
In Catania, reformist urbanism was well represented in the University’s Faculty of Engineering and it addressed the issue of urban transformation: the focus of the debates, often high profile, was the topic of land rent; much more rarely did it touch on the issue of the conservation of the historic urban landscape, which in those years was changing rapidly. The discussion on the management of urban transformation was, however, largely confined to academia and in the debate between technicians and academics, with scant ability to penetrate local politics and society.
On the contrary, due to its strong tradition of historical and archaeological studies, the Soprintendenza alle Antichità of Syracuse became a reference point for a cluster of small cultural associations, initially set up by an elite group of intellectuals, local and otherwise, then by educated middle classes and finally by groups of young people who had learnt the importance of protection also thanks to the bond that the previous generation had developed with national associations, particularly with Italia Nostra. Without a specific academic dimension, the debate on the transformation of the historic urban landscape of Syracuse ended up penetrating local society and engaging in politics more directly than in Catania. The question of the future of the historic center quickly polarized public opinion around two alternative positions, both capable of mobilizing the participation of citizens, especially starting in the late sixties when the problem of the depopulation of Ortygia became more evident. The proposals to modernize were made by an ambiguous »pro-Ortigia Committee« led by the owners of grand buildings that had dropped in value due to increasing dilapidation, but also by a number of professionals; on the other hand, the so-called Gruppo Archeologico, led by young Syracusans who were cultured and on the warpath, quickly objected and carried out a tireless awareness-raising campaign against the destruction and demolition projects. On the cusp of the sixties and seventies, at the same time as the launch of Cabianca’s second plan (1970), local non-academic professionals and ordinary people formed the Centro di Studi Urbanistici (Urban Studies Center), of which the explicit purpose was to inform and involve citizens in land use decisions of the administration.
This difference between these two cities in their sensitivity towards the change in the historic landscape marked the spell of the age of protest. In Catania, most of the protests were held by (mainly humanities) university students. The arguments debated by students and young intellectuals of the left were well-developed and closely linked to the national network of mobilizations, but at the same time they had a strong ideological connotation with an intellectualist orientation, on the one hand, and an ideological attention to the working class, on the other; however, they had a very tenuous connection to the physical urban heritage, with the exception of some groups of the Catholic milieu, which was heavily hit by protest and internal generational opposition in Catania. Overall, the people of Catania watched collective movements from afar and prepared for the »black vote« of 1971–72.701 In the seventies the process of abandonment and decay of the historic city intensified: it would reach its peak in the eighties, when the depopulated eighteenth-century city center remained at the mercy of petty crime while services and businesses moved further and further north in the twentieth-century expansion areas and the radius of urbanization invested the hilly wooded area on the slopes of Mount Etna, compromising the landscape forever.
The only thing that went against this tendency was the start of the restoration of the monumental complex of the former Benedictine monastery. The project got underway in the first half of the seventies on the initiative of the Catania city council. It would result in the redevelopment of a vast inner-city lower-class area (corresponding to the old neighborhood of the Antico Corso and in part to the neighborhood of the Angeli Custodi). The Council discussions of that period, as well as the minutes of the subsequent meetings with the University, clearly show that the plans arose because the city council needed to dispose of an asset whose maintenance had become overly burdensome for the municipal coffers.702 The divestment proposal sparked an internal debate at the University which at that time was investing significant resources in the construction of the Cittadella Universitaria (university campus) on a hill to the northwest of the city, where it was initially planned that the Faculty of Humanities would be decentralized and in a modern building for which lavish regional funding was already available.703 When the initial misgivings had been overcome, the long journey to return the Monastery to the city was completed in 1974 when the Council sold the property to the University for the symbolic price of one lira.704 In 1976 the Faculty of Humanities celebrated the start of the gradual transfer to the Benedictine Monastery with a party whose playful poster represented this historic architecture in which fragments of the work of Le Corbusier were hidden with a clever photomontage.705 The relationship between the neighborhood and the University was tense for a long time, and there was no shortage of moments of conflict; however, the restoration of the Benedictine Monastery soon became an ambitious cultural project of the University that, in 1978, would bring to Catania such important architects as Piero Sampaolesi, Roberto Pane and especially Giancarlo De Carlo, who played a vital part in the work.706 Giuseppe Giarrizzo, who was Dean of the Faculty of Humanities for many years, initially doubted the decision of the Rector Sanfilippo to restore the Monastery. Instead he wanted the Faculty to be in the Cittadella Universitaria (as funds were available for it). He correctly foresaw that the process of regeneration of the complex and its surroundings would be long and difficult. However, once the decision was taken, and until the end of his life, Giarrizzo became one of the main actors engaged in the Monastery’s restoration against the indifference of the citizens and often the hostility of the city’s institutions. Years later, the director of the Technical Office of the University would effectively sum up the situation by saying: »We could do so because the people of Catania were distracted …«.707
On the contrary, in Syracuse, a smaller and more provincial city, the new decade began in a climate of participation and decentralization. This was due to Cabianca’s ability to make people reflect on the future of Ortygia in an open exchange with the politicians, the administration, political parties and citizens regarding the local historical and archaeological culture. There were political protests but the youth of Syracuse were much less violent and ideological than those of Catania, and there was a lower generational conflict within the political arena that often led young Syracusans to cooperate with representatives of the traditional parties rather than to assume positions of rupture. The most active representatives of the local civil society took the historic center as a key theme in the demand for democratization, specifically looking at the restoration model of Bologna’s historical center where the preservation of the residential areas and the protection of the most vulnerable groups were significant elements.708 The reference to the Bologna model was not exclusive of the Syracuse leftist groups: that model was also taken up by large transverse portions of the urban ruling class. Both mainly focused on the social strategy aimed at maintaining original residents in the historic center, rather than the typological and morphological choices. The Bologna model was examined and debated at a major conference on the future of Ortygia organized by the PCI in November 1974,709 but also, significantly, carefully studied by a delegation of representatives of public bodies, trade unions and employers associations and journalists, who paid a visit to Bologna in March 1974 on the initiative of the Syracusan municipal tourism agency.710
The conference about the preservation of Ortygia organized by the local PCI in 1974.Source: Vincenzo Cabianca Private Archive, Dossier Historical Center, cover of the conference folder.
In the climate of lesser political conflict that characterized the situation in Syracuse and which moved towards general agreements between the DC and PCI in the middle of the decade, it was on the issue of the historical center that the two main parties found an important point of convergence at the end of a period of intense public debate through cross collaboration among the regional councillors from Syracuse on a regional law for the protection of Ortygia.711 The law was approved by the Sicilian Regional Assembly in its session of 28 April 1976. This was an advanced law that followed the principles of the charters of Gubbio and Venice. It established the extended principle of restoration as a means of intervention on minor environments, excluding any hypothesis of mass demolition. In addition, ample attention was paid to the social dimension of the problem, focusing on the citizens’ right to live in the historic center and the need to combine protection of the architectural and monumental heritage with access to services and maintaining traditional productive functions, with a view to exploiting the local neighborhood councils, which were being set up at that time as a result of political demand »from below«.712
In Syracuse, the petrochemical complex and the appearance of the first pollution problems at the end of the sixties, giving a clearer perception of the connected health risks, contributed to a deeper and more widespread awareness of the importance of environmental protection. This was something new. During the public debate of the sixties the problem of preserving the landscape had been discussed in terms of the preservation of its aesthetic, historical and cultural qualities. The public discourse that accompanied the long planning process had been characterized by the importance of the role of »green space« in the urban system, according to the prevailing view throughout the sixties also present in Progetto 80, the only experience of national town planning in Italy in which Cabianca participated directly.
An exemplary case of how this concept changed over the seventies are the projects for the coast of Syracuse, in general, and the area of the salt flats of the river Ciane in the area south of Syracuse, in particular. Cabianca’s project for the area of the proposed salt flats at the end of the sixties involved the construction of a marina that could accommodate up to 1,000 boats, »with a predominance of large and medium sized vessels«; it was to be equipped with »a sufficient number of complementary services«; a second landing, for yachts and other leisure crafts was expected further south in a place called Sacramento.713 This project did not take into consideration the environmental features of the coast of Syracuse. It was lacking in any awareness of the potential impact of tourism activities (generally mass activities) on the delicate natural system of the mouth of the Ciane, in which the role of the salt flats was fundamentally to act as a protection. The way the landscape was dealt with in the new Syracuse plan was consistent with the underlying sensitivity to Progetto 80: green space was seen as a rebalancing of the dysfunctions of urban and industrial systems from a functionalist perspective, but an analysis of ecosystem relationships, or an exact survey of sensitive areas (for example, the recognition of wetlands as biological stations) were entirely lacking. Tourism, even in the case of seaside tourism and mass tourism, was seen as a productive function that was absolutely compatible with the objectives of protection. The landscape evoked in the project description—the landscape for which intellectuals and Syracuse associations fought—was still without doubt, despite the emergence of new elements, the beautiful scenery, the »framework« evoked by the law of 1939.714 To understand the massive amount of transformation that was expected near the mouth of the Ciane, with the approval of what might be called the party of protection, comprised of intellectuals, scholars and associations of citizens, we only need to think that the marina designed by the project team would have had to be equipped with »piers, docks, pier moorings, columns with access to water supply, electricity sockets, telephones, etc«.715 The same magnitude characterized the plans for sports facilities to be built in the large regional park. A sports city was to be constructed »on the left of the Ciane and Anapo rivers« to house facilities for shows and competitions and complementary facilities for the training and care of the athletes or services for the spectators.716 Just a decade later, the citizens’ associations, including the local branch of the WWF, would campaign against the marina project for the salt flats and for the establishment of nature reserves in the wake of a campaign for the protection of the Sicilian coastal wetlands and the shock caused, in 1977, by the sudden blight of the Ciane papyrus. The campaign was based on a vision of the natural landscape that now incorporated the debate on sea pollution that had arisen from conflicts in the industrial area, the idea of the environmental media and an ecosystem-based vision of the territory.717 This more developed form of environmentalism, which became more widespread in Syracuse, depended undoubtedly on the devastating environmental problems in the industrial area; a critical step, in 1975, was the protests of the inhabitants of the village of Priolo against the construction of a new plant for the production of aniline. Such protests reached moments of high tension and led to the administrative separation of the Priolo area, a fact fraught with consequences for the city of Syracuse, which lost administrative control over the industrial pole.718 However, the constancy with which the urban planner Cabianca had worked as a mediator between the urban culture of conservation (prestigious, connected to the national network, but elitist) and the citizens contributed to the development of awareness of the new environmental problems. A clear example of Cabianca’s engagement in the construction of a shared consciousness about the urban landscape and cultural values and their role as common goods and strategic resources, was his broad dialogue with local stakeholders during the intensive Prima conferenza dei servizi sul piano regolatore, a widely participated urban conference about the development of the territory and the new plan strategy held on 25 and 26 October 1968.719 Launched by the local administration and directed by Cabianca himself, the Conference represented an important step in the definition of a shared strategic framework for the future of Syracuse in which the topic of natural and historical urban landscape emerged as a pillar of the new city. The 1970 plan, widely debated in many political and cultural venues, outlined a development model in which the preservation of the quality of the historic urban landscape, coastal areas and cultural heritage was a central aspect and certainly formed the basis of a more aware environmentalism in the decades to come.
In Catania, in the mid-seventies, once again it was the University that denounced the excessive environmental costs of development with an analysis of the environmental conditions of the urban system conducted by the Institute of Architecture and Urban Planning (IDAU) and published in 1975. It highlighted the impact of unregulated and unbalanced growth. As early as then, the most problematic environmental issue was identified in the traffic system and the absence of an adequate public transport network. However, the citizens of Catania were distracted by other problems, including the »southern suburbs« comprised of the young New Town Librino, which soon reached the same levels of degeneration as the historical districts; consequently, they protested more readily on purely political and social issues rather than on the environmental problems which are still pressing to this day.
The comparison between Catania and Syracuse shows that in both cases the seventies represented a turning point determined by the economic decline itself, which attenuated the anthropic pressures on the historic urban landscapes by the legislative changes that closed the previous decade and by the new national and international guidelines that inspired the new projects on cultural heritage and landscape. Nevertheless, the scope of the breakthrough varied considerably from one city to another. Some differences are due to long-term urban cultural identity and the different structure of the urban economy in each city. Other important differentiating factors emerged in the course of the urban planning and development processes and in the kind of public debate that had taken place during the previous decade: the sixties can therefore be defined as an incubation period for the turning point. One important factor was the nature of the interaction between the two main parties, the DC and the PCI. An additional factor was the constant and intense interaction between reformist planners, politicians and local society in Syracuse. Finally, the attitude of urban cultural institutions and their attention to the planning process played a decisive role. The cultural leadership of the Soprintendenza alle Antichità also played an important role by continually pushing through crucial public interventions so that heritage and the historic urban landscape would constitute the core of the urban project. The Soprintendenza ai Monumenti di Catania took a different attitude, limiting itself merely to the bureaucratic function of surveillance and sanction. This deficiency was only partially remedied by the University, which had a much weaker role in guiding public opinion than the Soprintendenza alle Antichità in Syracuse, in part due to the different size of the two cities; however, it succeeded in handling the complex restoration project of the Benedictine Monastery that over time would prove to be a strong point and a model for the enhancement of urban heritage.
In both cities, the areas saved from degradation and destruction in the seventies were given a boost in the nineties through the Joint Initiative Urban Programs funded by the EU when the huge project of restoring the historic centers of the two cities began.720