In the early paragraphs of this chapter Aristotle examines how the various claims to political power (notably wealth, birth and superior strength of numbers) may compete. He admits that each claim has a certain partial or relative ‘justice’, but he denies that any of them is ‘just’ in an absolute sense. Each demands exclusive consideration at the expense of all the others: whichever is adopted, any man, or set of men, who excelled in that respect, would have to be given power, even if he excelled in no other. For instance, on the criterion of wealth, one supremely rich man would have to be allowed to rule, even if he were also a supreme rogue. Aristotle discusses various cases where difficulties could occur: a single man could deploy greater strength than the masses, whose claim to rule normally depends on precisely this – superior strength; or a few persons claiming to rule on the grounds of overwhelming wealth may nevertheless be poorer than the masses collectively (though not individually). All such problems arise if we adopt one claim in preference to the rest: each taken by itself is, as we might say, ‘socially divisive’.
This latter point is the key to Aristotle’s solution. The only claim that is absolutely just is that of ‘virtue’ (aretē), that is, the moral and intellectual ability always needed in a ‘statesman’, a citizen who is ruled and rules by turn in the interests of the whole state, not in those of just one part which might advance one of the ‘partial’ claims (e.g. the masses, who might advance the claim of superior numbers). When a man excels to a superlative degree in ‘virtue’, he must be reckoned as a ‘god among men’ and given supreme power above the law. It is not clear, however, here at least, why superlative ability in ruling and being ruled ought to exempt one from the latter. But Aristotle follows whither he thinks the argument leads him, and comes right out and says that such a person ought to be a permanent king in the state, claiming the glad obedience of all others.
One could argue that Aristotle is here showing himself to be Platonist in spite of himself: Plato too had envisaged (notably in the Republic and Politicus) a supreme individual or individuals above the law and ruling in the interests of the state. But the positions of the two philosophers are instructively different. Plato’s supreme rulers would have owed their power to their metaphysical insight into the supreme moral values, Aristotle’s to (as it were) a claim for a quid pro quo from the state. If each person with a ‘partial’ claim to power (wealth, etc.) deserves some political power in return for the partial contribution he makes to the common good (see III ix), the person with the ‘absolute’ claim (virtue) apparently deserves absolute political power in return for his total contribution to that good. Aristotle’s approach is thus less metaphysical than ‘transactional’.
The chapter closes with the tantalizing statement that those who excel in ‘the virtue of a statesman’ (in the special sense of this latter word) should be permanent kings, but Aristotle does not enlarge on how they may be identified, appointed, or dismissed. He may perhaps even see outstanding individuals as more of a problem than an asset: certainly he seems to have a certain sympathy with the practice of ostracism, of which he has a brief but interesting historical discussion towards the end of the chapter.
1283a23 Some or all of these things would seem to have a proper claim to be contributions to a state’s existence; but I repeat that, in order to secure the good life, education and virtue would have the most just claim of all. But since those who are equal in one particular ought not to enjoy equality in all things, nor those who are unequal in one respect have inequality in all, it follows that all constitutions in which such a state of affairs prevails must be deviations.1
1283a29 It has already been stated that while all men have some kind of justice in their claims, not all of them have a claim that is just in an absolute sense.2 (a) The rich argue that they have a greater share in the land, and the land is of social3 interest; and further, that they are more to be relied upon to fulfil their contracts, (b) The claims of the free and well-born are closely related: the more nobly born are more fully citizens than the non-noble, good birth being held in esteem in every country; and the offspring of the better sort are likely to be better men, for good birth is excellence4 of stock, (c) Next we shall mention the equally just claims of virtue, for we always speak of justice as a social3 virtue, and one which is sure to bring all the other virtues along with it. (d) And surely the majority have a better claim than the minority, as being stronger, richer and better, if we balance the larger numbers against the smaller.
1283a42 Now suppose all these to be present in a single city – that is to say, the good, the rich and the well-born, and beside them a mass of citizens – will there or will there not be dispute as to which should rule? Now in the three types of constitution of which we spoke earlier the decision provokes no dispute, because they differ from each other in just this respect, sovereignty being exercised in oligarchy by the rich, in aristocracy by the sound, and so on. But we have to ask ourselves how to reach a conclusion when these elements are present at one and the same time. Suppose for example that those who have virtue are exceedingly few in number – how is the matter to be settled? Are we to regard their fewness in the light of the work to be done, asking whether they are strong enough to run the state? Or are we to ask whether their numbers are sufficient to make a state?
1283b13 The problem arises in regard to all claimants to honours in the state. Those who base their claim to rule on wealth would seem to have no just claim at all, nor those who base themselves on birth; for if one man is very much richer than the rest, then clearly by the same principle of justice,5 he will have to be sole ruler over them all, and similarly one who is superior in good birth will have to rule over all whose claim is based on free status. This same thing could well happen where the constitution is an aristocracy, based on virtue; for if one man is better than all the sound men in the citizen-body, then on the same principle of justice5 he ought to be sovereign over them. Again, suppose that the multitude ought to be sovereign because they are stronger than the few, and suppose one man, or more than one but still fewer than the many, to be stronger than the rest – then these would have to be sovereign rather than the multitude.
1283b27 All these considerations seem to show that none of these criteria is right by which one set of men claim that they themselves should rule and all the rest be subject to them. For surely, whether their claim to sovereignty over the citizen-body rests on wealth or on virtue, it remains true that against their arguments the multitude will have some justice on their side; for it is quite possible on occasion for the multitude to be better than the few, and richer too, when considered not singly but together.
1283b35 So it is possible in this fashion to meet also a difficulty which some people pose and debate, namely whether a lawgiver, who seeks to lay down the laws that are most right, ought, given the circumstance mentioned,6 to legislate for the benefit of the majority or for the benefit of the better sort. By ‘right’ we ought to mean ‘equally’ right, i.e. right with respect to the benefit of the whole state and the common3 interest of the citizens. (A citizen is in general one who has a share in ruling and in being ruled; but he will not be identical in every kind of constitution. So far as the best constitution is concerned, he is a man who is able and who chooses to rule and to be ruled with a view to a life that is in accordance with virtue.)
1284a3 But if there is one man (or several, but not enough to make up the whole complement of a state) of such superlative virtue that the capacity for statecraft7 and the virtue of all the rest are simply not to be compared with his (or theirs), such men we must take not to be part of the state. To judge them worthy of mere equality with the rest would be to do them an injustice, so far unequal to them are they in virtue and in the capacity for statecraft.7 We may reasonably regard such a one as a god among men8 – which shows, clearly, that legislation too must apply only to equals in birth and capacity. But there is no law that embraces men of that calibre: they are themselves law, and anyone who tried to legislate for them would be snubbed for his pains. They might well say what the lions in Antisthenes’ fable said to the hares who asserted their claim to equality with them.9
1284a17 It is for this kind of reason that democratically organized states establish also the practice of ostracism. They appear to attach such immense importance to the principle of equality above all else that they ostracized and removed out of the state for fixed periods anyone whose power was deemed to be excessive, whether this power was due to wealth or popularity or any other influence in the state. (Here is an example from mythology: the Argonauts left Heracles behind for some such reason – because the Argo would not have on board one so vastly bigger than the rest of the crew.) This is why critics of tyranny who disapprove of the advice given by Periander are not to be considered fully justified. It is said that to Thrasybulus’ messenger, who had come for advice, Periander returned no answer; but while walking in a field, reduced all the ears of corn to one level by lopping off the tallest. The messenger did not understand the motive for this action, but reported the action to Thrasybulus, who perceived that he ought to remove the outstanding men.10 The method is useful not only to tyrants, and tyrants are not alone in practising it: oligarchies and democracies are in just the same position, for ostracism has very much the same effect as lopping off and exiling the leading men. And it is the regular practice of the holders of sovereign power, in their dealings with other states and with foreign nations. For example, the Athenians, as soon as their empire11 was strong enough, reduced Lesbos, Chios, and Samos to submission,12 contrary to the terms of the agreement; and the Persian king often trimmed the Medes, Babylonians, and others who prided themselves on their earlier supremacy.11 Indeed this whole question concerns all constitutions, not merely the divergent ones, which resort to such methods for their own advantage, but also right forms of constitution, which aim at the common3 good.
1284b7 This same point may be observed also in the other skills and fields of knowledge. A painter would not allow his representation to have one foot disproportionately large, however magnificent the foot might be. A shipbuilder would not let the stern, or any other part of the ship, be out of proportion. A chorus-master will not allow among the members a performer whose voice is finer and more powerful than all the others. On this showing there is no reason at all why monarchs should not remain on good terms with their states, provided that in taking this action13 their own rule is beneficial to those states. Therefore the theory behind ostracism has some measure of political justice,14 in cases of admitted disproportion. Of course if the lawgiver can so construct the constitution from the start that there will never be any need of this kind of medicine, so much the better. Otherwise the best we can do, if occasion arises, is to put matters right by some such method. (In fact this is not the way it worked out in the states, because instead of seeking the advantage of their own constitution, men used ostracism as a weapon in factional strife.)
1284b22 So in the deviation forms of constitution ostracism is obviously exercised for some personal benefit,15 and is just; though it is perhaps equally obvious that it is just in a limited sense only. But when it comes to the best type of constitution, there is a real difficulty, not in the cases of superiority in the other goods, such as strength16 or riches or popularity, but where a man is pre-eminent in virtue. What are we to do then? Men will not say that such a person ought to be banished or deported; nor yet that they ought to rule over him, for that would be like claiming to rule over Zeus, by dividing up the offices.17 It only remains therefore to let nature take its course; he will govern and we will all gladly obey him. Thus such men will be permanent kings in their states.