In this chapter a number of related problems are raised, discussed and dropped in somewhat bewildering succession. The central themes are (a) the contrast, indeed the tension, between the personal rule of a king and the rule of law, and (b) the assessment of their relative merits.
The first four types of kingship described in the preceding chapter were all in some way restricted; the fifth was unrestricted. Hence there are really only two main classes. Of the four limited monarchies the Lacedaemonian is now taken for comparison because it is the most restricted of all. But for that very reason it is not typical of monarchy; and since limitation of royal authority involves some distribution of power, which takes place also under any other system of government, it seems that only absolute kingship needs to be discussed. Now this at once raises a problem. When Aristotle was discussing distribution of power under oligarchy or democracy, he came to the conclusion (at the end of III xi) that where possible the law should be sovereign. But at the end of the last chapter and the beginning of this, he postulates a king who makes his own laws and whose superlative excellence appears to entitle him to do so. The answer to the question what is to be done in such an event is not given till the last two chapters of the book (xvii–xviii), and the discussion in the present chapter and the next has relevance to any form of slate in which personal authority and legal authority could exist side by side. On the Platonic background, see e.g. Politicus 294a ff.
Towards the end of the chapter Aristotle digresses to speculate on the origin of kingship and on the course of early constitutional development. The reconstruction he gives in IV xiii is different; but in an age when adequate source-material for writing exact and detailed history of early times barely existed, it is hardly surprising that both Plato’s and Aristotle’s historical accounts are somewhat generalized and free, and commonly adjusted to the theme in hand.
The chapter closes with a discussion of some practical difficulties of kingship; the observation that even the rule of law needs to be backed by a degree of force is chilly and realistic.
1285b33 We may say then that there are really only two types of kingship to be considered – the foregoing and the Lacedaemonian. Most of the others fall between these two extremes, as having sovereign power over fewer matters than absolute kingship has, but over more than the Lacedaemonian. So there are two questions to be asked, first whether or not it is expedient for states to have a perpetual general, appointed either on grounds of birth or by turns, and second whether or not it is expedient that one man should have sovereign powers in all matters. The former question, relating to generalship of the kind mentioned, is of a type concerned with laws rather than constitutions, since it is possible for such a thing to exist under any constitution. I am therefore leaving it aside and concentrating on the other style of kingship, since it is a type of constitution. We must therefore examine it and run over the problems that we find there.
1286a7 We begin by asking whether it is more expedient to be ruled by the best man or by the best laws. Those who believe that to be ruled by a king is expedient think that the laws enunciate only general principles and do not give day-to-day instructions on matters as they arise; and so, they argue, in any skill it is foolish to be guided always by written rules. In Egypt a doctor is allowed, rightly, to depart from his treatment if the patient is not well after four days; if he does so earlier, he does it at his own risk. For the same reason, it is obvious that the constitution which goes by laws and written rules is not the best. On the other hand, rulers cannot do without that general principle in addition: it provides something which, being without personal feelings, is better than that which by its nature does feel. Every human soul must have feelings, whereas a law has none; but in compensation, one might say, a man will give sounder counsel than law in individual cases.
1286a21 It seems clear then that this man must be a lawgiver, and that laws must be laid down, which shall be sovereign in all cases, except those in which they go awry.1 But when the law either cannot decide at all or will only decide badly, ought the power to rule to rest with the one best man or with all? In our own day verdicts are given, deliberations are carried on, and decisions are arrived at by men acting together; and all these decisions refer to separate problems and individual cases. Now any one of these individuals, measured by his own contribution alone, may be inferior. But the state consists of many men, and this gives it the same kind of superiority as a communally provided banquet has over a single simple meal. So a crowd is, on numerous occasions, actually a better judge than one man, whoever he may be.2 Again, the many are less easily corrupted. As a larger amount of water is less easily polluted, so the multitude is less easily corrupted than the few. The judgement of one man is bound to be corrupted if he is in a bad temper or has very strong feelings about something. But in the other case it would take a lot of doing to arrange for all simultaneously to lose their temper and go wrong.
1286a36 But we must make sure, first, that the multitude are also the free-born, and second that they depart from the provisions of the law only in cases which the law itself inevitably fails to cover. This second proviso may not be at all easy where numbers are large; but if the good, that is good men and good citizens, are in the majority, then when we put the question, ‘which is the less liable to be corrupted, the sole ruler or the numerical majority who are all good?’, the answer is obviously, ‘the majority’. And if it is urged that the many will split into factions, which the one cannot do, perhaps the answer must be that they too are sound souls,3 no less than your ‘one man’. If then we are to describe this rule of the majority who are all good men as aristocracy,4 and the rule of one as a kingship, then aristocracy in a state will be preferable to kingship, whether or not rule is exercised by armed force, provided it is possible to get a homogeneous majority.
1286b8 Perhaps we have here a clue to the reason why royal rule used to exist formerly, namely the difficulty of finding enough men of outstanding virtue, all the greater since in those days the states they inhabited were small. An especial function of good men is to confer benefits, and it was in recognition of the benefits that they had conferred that men were appointed to be kings. Then, when a large number of men of similar virtue became available, people no longer tolerated one-man rule but looked for something communal, and set up a constitution. But the good men did not remain good: they began to make money out of that which was the common property of all. And to some such development we may plausibly ascribe the origin of oligarchies, since men made wealth a thing of honour. The next change was to tyrannies, and from tyrannies to democracy. For the struggle to get rich at all costs tended to reduce numbers,5 and so increased the power of the multitude, who rose up and formed democracies. And now that there has been a further increase in the size of states, one might say that it is hard to avoid having a democratic constitution.
1286b22 If anyone should hold that it is best for states to be ruled by kings, he will have to consider a question relating to the king’s children. Are his offspring also to be kings? Considering what kind of persons some of these have turned out to be, we would have to say that hereditary succession is harmful. You may say the king, having sovereign power, will not in that case6 hand over to his children. But it is hard to believe that: it is a difficult achievement, which expects too much virtue of human nature.
1286b27 Then there is this question of armed force: is the intending king to have about him a force with which he will be able to impose his will on those who seek to resist his rule? How else is he to exercise his authority? For even if his sovereignty is such that he can act only in accordance with law, and do nothing of his own volition that is illegal, it will still be necessary for him to have sufficient armed force to give the laws protection. This question, in so far as it relates to this kind of king,7 is perhaps not difficult to answer. He must indeed have a force, and it should be made strong enough to overpower one man or a band of men, but not the multitude. This is the principle which was followed in earlier times, when guards were assigned to a man who was being appointed as ‘tyrant’ or ‘aisumnētēs’, as they called him, of the state; so too, when Dionysius asked for these guards, somebody advised the Syracusans to limit them to just the number required for that purpose.