The ‘middle’ constitution which Aristotle recommends so enthusiastically in this important chapter seems to be the ‘mixed’ constitution of IV viii and ix (cf. Ill vii), considered from sociological, psychological and economic points of view rather than from a strictly constitutional one. He advocates that a large number of the citizens should each have moderate and adequate property, less than that of the rich and more than that of the poor. The effect of such a ‘middle’ population will be to diminish conflict between rich and poor, and to prevent the constitution from being an extreme one. In short, this chapter gives the conditions in which the technical, political and constitutional arrangements of the ‘mixed’ constitution or ‘polity’ are likely to prove acceptable and workable.
Aristotle attempts to justify the argument of this chapter by reference to one of his best-known philosophical principles, namely that virtue is a mean between two extremes. This ethical rule of thumb suggests the doctrine of a constitutional middle way easily enough, yet somewhat unconvincingly: what real parallel or affinity is there between a mean in conduct and a mean in the level of wealth of a section of the population or in the character of a constitution? Evidently Aristotle would make the connection by arguing that a middle class with a moderate income is disposed to ‘mean’ conduct, which suits a ‘mixed’ constitution. But this, if true, can be so only ‘for the most part’, to use one of Aristotle’s favourite expressions: rich men have been known to act moderately, and people of moderate wealth can be savage in its defence.
In order to avoid possibly misleading associations with the technical Marxist concept of ‘class’, or with modern middle classes, I have, at the cost of some slight awkwardness, excluded the term ‘middle class’ from the translation. Aristotle usually says in this chapter merely hoi mesoi, ‘the middle people’, or to meson (neuter singular), ‘the middle’ the nearest he comes to the notion of class is in his use of the word meros, ‘part’ or ‘section’, e.g. at the beginning of the third paragraph, and in IV xii. As he makes clear at the beginning of the third paragraph, his analysis in this chapter of the structure of the state is based firmly on the amount of wealth possessed by each ‘part’.
1295a25 What is the best constitution and what is the best life for the majority of states and the majority of men? We have in mind men whose virtue does not rise above that of ordinary people, and whose education does not depend on the luck either of their natural ability or of their resources; and who have not an ideally perfect constitution, but, first, a way of living in which as many as possible can join and, second, a constitution within the compass of the greatest number of states. The ‘aristocracies’, as they are called, that we have just been discussing1 do not fall within the competence of most states, but some of them do approximate closely to what we call polity (hence we ought to speak of both constitutions as though they were one and the same).
1295a34 The decision on all these points rests on the same set of elementary principles. If we were right when in our Ethics2 we stated that virtue is a mean, and that the happy life is a life without hindrance in its accordance with virtue, then the best life must be the middle life, consisting in a mean which is open to men of every kind to attain. And the same principles must be applicable to the virtue or badness of constitutions and states. For the constitution of a state is in a sense the way it lives.
1295b1 In all states there are three state-sections: the very well-off, the very badly off, and thirdly those in between. Since therefore it is agreed that moderation and a middle position are best, it is clear that, in the matter of the goods of fortune also, to own a middling amount is best of all. This condition is most easily obedient to reason, and following reason is just what is difficult both for the exceedingly rich, handsome, strong and well-born, and for their opposites, the extremely poor, the weak, and those grossly deprived of honour. The former incline more to arrogance and crime on a large scale, the latter are more than averagely prone to wicked ways and petty crime. The unjust deeds of the one class are due to an arrogant spirit, the unjust deeds of the other to wickedness. Add the fact that it is among the members of the middle section that you find least reluctance to hold office as well as least eagerness to do so; and both these attitudes. eagerness and reluctance, are detrimental to states.
1295b13 There are other drawbacks about the two extremes. Those who have a superabundance of good fortune, strength, riches, friends, and so forth, neither wish to submit to rule nor understand how to do so; and this is engrained in them from childhood at home: even at school they are so full of la dolce vita that they have never grown used to being ruled. Those on the other hand who are greatly deficient in these qualities are too subservient. So they do not know how to rule, but only how to be ruled as a slave is; while the others do not know how to be ruled in any way at all, and can command only like a master ruling over slaves. The result is a state not of free men but of slaves and masters, the former full of envy, the latter of contempt. Nothing could be farther removed from friendship or from partnership in a state.3 Sharing is a token of friendship; one does not want to share even a journey with one’s enemies. The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal, a condition found chiefly among the middle people. And so the best-run constitution is certain to be found in this state, whose composition is, we maintain, the natural one for a state to have.
1295b28 It is the middle citizens in a state who are the most secure: they neither covet, like the poor, the possessions of others, nor do others covet theirs as the poor covet those of the rich. So they live without risk, not scheming and not being schemed against. Phocylides’ prayer was therefore justified when he wrote, ‘Those in the middle have many advantages; that is where I wish to be in the state.’4
1295b34 It is clear then both that the best partnership in a state3 is the one which operates through the middle people, and also that those states in which the middle element is large, and stronger if possible than the other two together, or at any rate stronger than either of them alone, have every chance of having a well-run constitution.
For the addition of its weight to either side will turn the balance and prevent excess at the opposing extremes. For this reason it is a most happy state of affairs when those who take part in the constitution have a middling, adequate amount of property; since where one set of people possess a great deal and the other nothing, the result is either extreme democracy or unmixed oligarchy, or a tyranny due to the excesses of either. For tyranny often emerges from an over-enthusiastic democracy or from an oligarchy, but much more rarely from intermediate constitutions or from those close to them. The reason for this we will speak of later when we deal with changes in constitutions.5
1296a7 The superiority of the middle constitution is clear also from the fact that it alone is free from factions. Where the middle element is large, there least of all arise factions and divisions among the citizens. And big states are freer from faction, for this same reason, namely that their middle element is large. In small states it is easy for the whole body of citizens to become divided into two, which leaves no middle at all, and nearly everybody either rich or poor. Democracies too are safer than oligarchies in this respect and longer-lasting thanks to their middle people, who are more numerous and take a larger share of honours in democracies than in oligarchies. For when in their absence the unpropertied preponderate in numbers, trouble arises and they soon come to grief. An indication of the truth of what we have been saying is to be found in the fact that the best lawgivers have come from the middle citizens – Solon, for example, whose middle position is revealed in his poems, and Lycurgus, who was not a king, and Charondas and most of the rest.6
1296a22 These facts also show why most states are either democratic or oligarchic; for the middle being frequently small, whichever of the two extremes is on top, those with possessions or the common people, abandons the middle and conducts the constitution according to its own notions, and so the result is either democracy or oligarchy. Then again, owing to constant strife and faction between the people and the wealthy, neither side, whichever of the two succeeds in gaining the mastery, ever sets up a constitution which is equally based and acceptable all round. Taking supremacy in the constitution as a prize of victory they proceed to set up a democracy or an oligarchy as the case may be. Also, those7 who came to exercise leadership among the Greek states installed democracies or oligarchies in them according to the constitution which each had at home, looking entirely to their own advantage, not to that of the states themselves. So for these reasons the middle constitution has never occurred anywhere, or only seldom and sporadically. Only one8 of a long succession of leaders was prevailed upon to allow a system of this kind. And to this day into whatever state you go, you will find that they have got into the habit of not even wanting equality: their aim is to rule, failing which they accept a condition of defeat.
1296b2 Which constitution is best, and why, will be clear from the above. As for the rest, the different kinds of oligarchy and democracy which we say there are, it is not difficult to arrange them in order of merit, this one better, that one worse, and so on; for now that the best is decided upon, proximity to it must denote better, and the farther away one moves from the middle, the worse; unless of course one judges by a reference to a given situation;9 for often enough, although one constitution is more desirable, there is nothing to stop another from being, for some people, more advantageous.