The seventh and eighth books belong closely to each other and stand somewhat apart from the preceding six. They make an unfinished essay on a favourite theme of Greek thinkers, ‘What is the ideal form of state and constitution?’ The first three chapters of VII form a philosophical introduction: Aristotle debates, in the light of his own teleological moral theory, the nature of that ‘best life’ which the ideal state facilitates. The ‘best life’ is of course a well-worn but inexhaustible subject: both the Ethics and the Politics are full of it, and so are Aristotle’s more popular works and public lectures – if indeed either of these are what he means by the ‘external discourses’ to which he refers here and in III vi.
Although in VII and VIII Aristotle is seeking to define the conditions of an ideal or perfect state, he still wants it to be within the bounds of possibility (see iv. where he begins to discuss practical details). His method and approach are therefore far removed from those of Plato’s Republic, and much more like those of the Laws.
The phrases used in the fourth paragraph of VII i about the happiness of an individual or a state are impossible to translate effectively; yet they are important, since Aristotle reinforces his argument by certain verbal similarities, not to say ambiguities. Newman comments:1 ‘When Aristotle sought to show… that the chief ingredient in eudaimonia [happiness] is virtue, his work was half done for him by the ordinary use of the Greek language.’ Aristotle argues that a state cannot (a) be ‘happy’ unless it (b) prospers (the common Greek expression prattein kalōs, literally ‘do well, finely’); but it cannot prosper unless it (c) does good actions (prattein kala, literally ‘do good things’); and it cannot do good things/actions unless it (d) has virtue (aretē). Requirement (c), particularly in view of its dependence on (d), seems to be a moral one; and its verbal resemblance to the prudential prattein kalōs facilitates Aristotle’s argument that prosperity is dependent on virtue. And in so far as this argument applies to an individual also, it seems to follow that the same kind of activity – i.e. way of life – is required for the happiness both of the individual and of the state, which is, after all, individuals in the mass.
The connection between (a) and (b) is perhaps obvious, or at least plausible enough. But what are we to make of the rest of the argument? Aristotle can hardly be asserting, in the connection he makes between (b) and (c), that one cannot be prosperous unless one performs prosperous actions: that would seem sterile indeed. On the other hand an argument that ‘moral’ (kala) acts (i.e. acts which may be other than prudential), are needed for being prosperous (prattein kalōs) would hardly be supported by experience. The crucial connection for Aristotle is between (d) and (cb): the kala, ‘prosperous’, deeds essential to prattein kalōs, prosperity, will not be done in the absence of virtue, aretē, which is a state of the soul which disposes and prompts the person to do them. The argument is therefore purely prudential: the expression prattein kala is a bridge between ‘virtue’ and prosperity, neatly calculated, by its similarity to prattein kalōs, to facilitate a connection between prosperity and mental or spiritual dispositions. In short, human happiness depends, in Aristotle’s view, on ‘virtue’ (separated out in this chapter into the traditional four ‘virtues’) – a theme which is a fitting introduction to discussion of the ‘best’ state and, in Books VII xiii–xvii and VIII, its educational system, by which ‘virtue’ is fostered.
The identity of the schools of thought reported in these first three chapters is not known for sure; for suggestions, see the commentaries.
1323a14 If we wish to investigate the best constitution appropriately, we must first decide what is the most desirable life; for if we do not know that, the best constitution is also bound to elude us. For those who live under the best-ordered constitution (so far as their circumstances allow) may be expected, barring accidents, to be those whose affairs proceed best. We must therefore first come to some agreement as to what is the most desirable life for all men, or nearly all, and then decide whether it is one and the same life that is most desirable for them both as individuals and in the mass, or different ones. 1323a21 In the belief that the subject of the best life has been fully and adequately discussed, even in the external discourses,2 I propose to make use of this material now. Certainly nobody will dispute one division: that there are three ingredients which must all be present to make us blessed – our bodily existence, our intellectual and moral qualities, and all that is external.3 (No one would call blessed a man who is entirely without courage or self-control or practical wisdom or a sense of justice, who is scared of flies buzzing past, who will stop at nothing to gratify his desire for eating or drinking, who will ruin his closest friends for a paltry profit, and whose mind also is as witless and deluded as a child’s or a lunatic’s.) But while there is general agreement about these three, there is much difference of opinion about their extent and their order of superiority. Thus people suppose that it is sufficient to have a certain amount of virtue, but they set no limit to the pursuit of wealth, power, property, reputation, and the like.
1323a38 Our answer to such people will be twofold. First, it is easy to arrive at a firm conviction on these matters by simply observing the facts: it is not by means of external goods that men acquire and keep the virtues, but the other way round; and to live happily, whether men suppose it to consist in enjoyment or in virtue or in both, does in fact accrue more to those who are outstandingly well-equipped in character and intellect, and only moderately so in the possession of externally acquired goods – more, that is, than to those who have more goods than they need but are deficient in the other qualities. Yet the matter can be considered on the theoretical level too, and the same result will be seen easily enough. External goods, being like a collection of tools each useful for some purpose, have a limit: one can have too many of them, and that is bound to be of no benefit, or even a positive injury, to their possessors. It is quite otherwise with the goods of the soul: the more there is of each the more useful each will be (if indeed one ought to apply to these the term ‘useful’, as well as ‘admirable’). So clearly, putting it in general terms, we shall maintain that the best condition of anything in relation to the best condition of4 any other thing is commensurate in point of superiority with the relationship between the things themselves of which we say these conditions are conditions. Hence as the soul is a more precious thing (both absolutely and relatively to ourselves) than both property and the body, its best condition too will necessarily show a proportionate relationship to that of4 each of the others. Moreover, it is for the sake of our souls that these things are to be desired, and all right-minded persons ought to desire them; it would be wrong to reverse this priority.
1323b21 Let this then be agreed upon at the start: to each man there comes just so much happiness as he has of virtue and of practical wisdom, and performs actions dependent thereon. God himself is an indication of the truth of this. He is blessed and happy not on account of any of the external goods but because of himself and what he is by his own nature. And for these reasons good fortune must be something different from happiness; for the acquisition of goods external to the soul is due either to the coincidence of events5 or to fortune, but no man is just or restrained as a result of, or because of, fortune. A connected point, depending on the same arguments, applies with equal force to the state: the best and welldoing6 state is the happy state. But it is impossible for those who do not do good actions to do well,6 and there is no such thing as a man’s or a state’s good action without virtue and practical wisdom. The courage of a state, or its sense of justice, or its practical wisdom, or its restraint have exactly the same effect and are manifested in the same form as the qualities which the individual has to share in if he is to be called courageous, just, wise7 or restrained.
1323b36 These remarks must suffice to introduce the subject; it was impossible to start without saying something, equally impossible to try to develop every relevant argument, for that would be a task for another session. For the present let this be our fundamental basis: the life which is best for men, both separately, as individuals, and in the mass, as states, is the life which has virtue sufficiently supported by material resources to facilitate participation in the actions that virtue calls for. As for objectors,8 if there is anyone who does not believe what has been said, we must pass them by for the purposes of our present inquiry and deal with them on some future occasion.