Dismissing the rather humdrum matters of the preceding chapters, Aristotle deals next with what for him is clearly the most important part of the business – the politeia and all that that untranslatable word stands for: the whole social, political, legal and economic structure of the state. At this point we should remember that a politeia is essentially a collection of people. Whether they be many or few, they are a body of ‘sound’ men, united in their acceptance of all the standards, moral and spiritual, intellectual and artistic, which belong to and are prescribed by the constitution by which they live. It follows that these standards will have to be learned by all the citizens; a man must know the nomoi (laws) of his polis (state), and he must start learning them when he is quite young. Hence the most important part of any constitution is, as both Plato and Aristotle saw, the education of those who are going to be its members; and this is especially true when we are looking for the ideal state, for then we must also look for the ideal education. So all the rest of Aristotle’s Politics as we have it, from here to the end of Book VIII, deals with education, its aims and its methods. But first Aristotle discusses happiness, since the aim of education is the good and happy life; and this is a point which Plato, according to Aristotle, had effectively neglected (see II v, at the end).
Nicomachean Ethics I vii ff. will be invaluable background reading for the philosophical argument of this chapter. Briefly slated, Aristotle’s position is that happiness (eudaimonia) is the complete and perfect use of all our faculties under the guidance of aretē (‘virtue’); hence the best constitution, in order to produce happiness, must consist of and be operated by men who are ‘utilizing virtue’ and are therefore ‘sound’ (spoudaioi). In the final paragraph Aristotle swiftly enumerates the three factors which go to make the spoudaios: nature, habit and reason (logos), the last being a distinctively human faculty. All three are open to influence by the educational programme worked out by the legislator.
1331b24 We must now discuss the constitution itself, and ask ourselves what people, and what kind of people, the state ought to be composed of if it is going to be blessed and have a well-run constitution. The well-being of all men depends on two things: one is the right choice of target, of the end to which actions should tend, the other lies in finding the actions that lead to that end. These two may just as easily conflict with each other as coincide. Sometimes, for example, the aim is well-chosen, but in action men fail to attain it. At other times they successfully perform everything that conduces to the end, but the end itself was badly chosen. Or they may fail in both, as sometimes happens in the practice of medicine, when doctors neither rightly discern what kind of condition a healthy body ought to be in, nor discover the means which will enable their goal to be attained. Wherever skill and knowledge come into play, these two must both be mastered: the end and the actions which are means to the end.
1331b39 It is clear then that all men aim at happiness and the good life,1 but some men have an opportunity to get it, others have not. This may be due to their nature, or to some stroke of fortune, for the good life needs certain material resources (and when a man’s disposition is comparatively good, the need is for a lesser amount of these, a greater amount when it is comparatively bad). Some indeed, who start with the opportunity, go wrong from the very beginning of the pursuit of happiness. But as our object is to find the best constitution, and that means the one whereby a state will be best ordered,2 and since we call that state best ordered in which the possibilities of happiness are greatest, it is clear that we must keep constantly in mind what happiness is.
1332a7 We defined this in our Ethics3 (if those discussions were worth anything), and we here state, again, that happiness is an activity and a complete utilization of virtue, not conditionally but absolutely. By ‘conditionally’ in this connection I refer to things that are necessary, and by ‘absolutely’ I mean moral.4 For example, actions relating to justice, the infliction of just chastisements and punishments, spring from virtue; but they are ‘necessary’, and whatever good4 is in them is there by necessity. (It is preferable to have a state of affairs in which such things would be unnecessary both for state and for individual.) But actions directed towards honours and abundant resources are noblest5 actions, in an absolute sense. For the former actions are but the removal of some evil, the latter sort are not; they are on the contrary the creation and the begetting of positive goods.
1332a19 A sound man will nobly4 utilize ill-health, poverty and other misfortunes; but blessedness requires the opposite of these. (This definition too was given in our ethical discussions6 – that the sound man is the sort of man for whom things absolutely good are good, on account of his own virtue; and clearly his utilization of them must be sound and noble4 absolutely.) Hence men imagine that the causes of happiness lie in external goods. This is as if they were to ascribe fine7 and brilliant lyre-playing to the quality of the instrument rather than to the skill of the player.
1332a28 From what has been said it follows that, while some things must be there from the start, others must be provided by a lawgiver. Ideally, then, we wish for the structure of our state all that Fortune has it in her sovereign power to bestow (that she is sovereign, we take for granted). But it is not Fortune’s business to make a state sound; that is a task for knowledge and deliberate choice. On the other hand, a state’s being sound requires the citizens who share in the constitution to be sound; and for our purposes all the citizens share in the constitution. The question then is, ‘How does a man become sound?’ Of course, even if it is possible for all to be sound,8 and not just each citizen taken individually, the latter is preferable, since each entails all.
1332a38 However, men become sound and good because of three things. These are nature, habit, and reason. First, nature: a man must be born, and he must be born a man and not some other animal; so too he must have body and soul with certain characteristics. It may be of no advantage to be born with some of these qualities, because habits cause changes; for there are some qualities which by nature have a dual possibility, in that subsequent habits will make them either better or worse. Other creatures live by nature only; some live by habit also to some extent. Man, however, lives by reason as well: he alone has reason, and so needs all three working concertedly. Reason causes men to do many things contrary to habit and to nature, whenever they are convinced that this is the better course. In an earlier place9 we described what men’s nature should be if they are to respond easily to handling by the legislator. After that it becomes a task of education, for men learn partly by habituation and partly by listening.