Aristotle has one more chapter of preliminary discussion before coming to detailed recommendations for the educational programme of the ideal state. He discusses first the virtues required for the procuring and employment of leisure (srholē). and then, in a careful paragraph of teleological and empirical argument, concludes that the education of the body and of the appetitive element of the soul must precede that of the soul’s rational part. The aim of the educational programme as a whole is to inculcate the virtues needed for the proper employment of leisure in cultural, intellectual and political’ activities.
A modern educationist may not wish to criticize Aristotle’s recommendations about the chronological priority of the education of the body and the emotions over that of the intellect; but he will almost certainly object to Aristotle’s teleological mode of reasoning. No doubt in natural processes earlier stages lead up to and are in some sense ‘for’ the later; but that does not entail that since intellectual training is a late stage in the educational process, the other and earlier stages are ‘for its sake’, as something grander and better and the real natural ‘aim’ of the whole sequence. Put differently, Aristotle’s view of the development of human faculties is reasonable enough, though the distinction between appetite/emotion and reason may seem over-simple; subject to the same caveat, his recommended sequence in education is similarly reasonable; but his imposition on all this of a value judgement about the natural superiority of reason and the intellect is perhaps to be resisted. The cultured leisure of an educated man – perhaps the ‘gentleman scholar’ of a later age – is as an aspiration civilized and superb; but are Aristotle’s arguments for it good enough? If they are, do we have to conclude that those who do not attain to it are morally inferior?
1334a11 Since it seems that men have the same ends whether they are acting as individuals or as a community, and that the best man and the best constitution must have the same definitive purpose, it becomes evident that there must be present the virtues needed for leisure; for, as has often been said,1 the end of war is peace and leisure is the end of work. Of the virtues useful for leisure and civilized pursuits, some function in a period of leisure, others in a period of work – because a lot of essential things need to be provided before leisure can become possible. Hence a state must be self-restrained, courageous and steadfast; for as the proverb says, ‘no leisure for slaves’, and those who cannot bravely face danger are the slaves of their attackers. We need courage and steadfastness for our work, philosophy2 for leisure, and restraint and a sense of justice in both contexts, but particularly in times of leisure and peace. For war forces men to be just and restrained, but the enjoyment of prosperity, and leisure in peacetime, are apt rather to make them arrogant. Therefore a great sense of justice and much self-restraint are demanded of those who are thought to be successful and to enjoy everything the world regards as a blessing, men such as might be living, in the poets’ phrase, in the Isles of the Blest.3 For these especially will need philosophy,2 restraint, and a sense of justice; and the greater the leisure that flows from an abundance of such blessings, the greater that need will be. Clearly then the state, too, if it is to be sound and happy, must have a share in these virtues. For if it is a mark of disgrace not to be able to use advantages, it is especially so in a period of leisure – to display good qualities when working or on military service, but in leisure and peace to be no better than slaves.
1334a40 Training in virtue, therefore, should not follow the Lacedaemonian model. The difference between them and other nations lies not in any disagreement about what are the greatest goods but in their view that there is a certain4 virtue which will produce them with particular effectiveness. Since they value good things and their enjoyment more than the… of the virtues,… and that… for its own sake, is clear from these things; and we have to consider how and by what means.5
1334b6 We have already6 distinguished three essentials – nature, habit, and reason. Of these we have already dealt with the first,7 determining the qualities we should have by natural endowment; next we must ask whether education should first proceed by means of reason or by the formation of habits. Certainly these must chime in perfect unison; for it is possible to make an error of reason about the best principle, and to find oneself equally led astray by one’s habits.
1334b12 One thing is clear from the start: just as in everything else, so here too coming into being originates in a beginning, and the end which originates in some beginning is itself the beginning of another end;8 and for us, reason and intelligence are the end to which our nature tends. Thus it is to these that the training of our habits, as well as our coming into being, must be directed. Next, as soul and body are two, so also we note two parts of the soul, the reasoning and the unreasoning; and each of these has its own condition, of intelligence9 in the former case, of appetition10 in the latter. And just as the body comes into being earlier than the soul, so also the unreasoning is prior to that which possesses reason. This is shown by the fact that, while passion and will as well as desire are to be found in children even right from birth, reasoning and intelligence come into their possession as they grow older. Therefore the care of the body must begin before the care of the soul, then the training of the appetitive element,10 but this latter for the sake of the intelligence, and the body’s training for the sake of the soul.