VII ix
(1328b24–1329a39)
CITIZENSHIP AND AGE-GROUPS

This chapter contains some of Aristotle’s most characteristic observations on society. The governing element in the state, he maintains, must be the citizens, all of whom have by definition sufficient ‘virtue’ to enable them to make legal and political decisions, to bear arms, and to live a kind of gentleman’s life. Now, however, Aristotle finds himself in some slight difficulty: if all citizens are to share in the central activities of the state – military, legal etc. – then we have the odd result that old men will have to be soldiers, and young men (who typically have an undeveloped judgement) will function as judges and ‘statesmen’; and yet if these age-groups do not perform these functions they will not be doing what citizens should. He therefore prescribes, sensibly enough, that the citizens will, in their various ‘primes of life’ (the Greek for ‘age-group’, in effect), be successively (a) soldiers, (b) judges and statesmen, being finally pensioned off to (c) priesthoods – a provision which nicely reveals the non-professional nature of that office in ancient Greece.

1328b24 This enumeration being finished, it remains to consider whether they should all take part in all these activities, everybody being farmer and skilled workman and deliberator and judge (for this is not impossible) – or shall we postulate different persons for each task? Or again, are not some of the jobs necessarily confined to some people, while others may be thrown open to all? The situation is not the same in every constitution; for as we have said,1 it is equally possible for all to share in everything and for some to share in some things. These features are what make the constitution different: in democracies all share in all things, in oligarchies the opposing practice prevails.

1328b33 But since our present inquiry is directed towards the best constitution, that is to say, the one which would make a state most happy, and since we have already said2 that happiness cannot exist apart from virtue, it becomes clear that in the state with the finest constitution, which possesses just men who are just absolutely and not relatively to the assumed situation,3 the citizens must not live a mechanical or commercial life. Such a life is not noble, and it militates against virtue. Nor must those who are to be citizens be agricultural workers, for they must have leisure to develop their virtue, and for the activities of a citizen.

1329a2 The state has within it one element concerned with defence, and another with deliberation about what policy is expedient and with deciding about questions of justice; and these elements are obviously to a special degree parts of it. And when we ask whether these roles are to be assigned to different persons or to be kept both together in the hands of the same people, our answer is clear here also: partly the one alternative and partly the other. In so far as the two tasks themselves differ in the prime of life best for their performance, one requiring practical wisdom, the other strength, they should be assigned to different people. But in so far as it is impossible to secure that those who are strong enough to resort to force or stand up to it shall tolerate being ruled by others for ever,4 to that extent the tasks must be assigned to the same people. For those who are in sovereign control of arms are in a sovereign position to decide whether the constitution is to continue or not. So we are left with this conclusion: that the constitution should put both these tasks into the hands of the same persons, but not simultaneously.5 Rather we should follow nature: the young have strength, the older have practical wisdom, so it seems both just and expedient that the distribution of tasks should be made on that basis, to both, because this is a division which takes into account fitness6 for the work.

1329a17 Property too must belong to these people; it is essential that the citizens should have ample subsistence, and these are citizens. The mechanical element has no part in the state nor has any other class7 that is not productive of virtue.8 This is evident from our principle: for being happy must occur in conjunction with virtue, and in pronouncing a state happy we must have regard not to part of it but to all its citizens. It is also clear that property must belong to these, since the agricultural workers must be slaves, or non-Greeks dwelling in the country roundabout.9

1329a27 Of the list which we made earlier there remains the class7 of priests. The arrangement here too is clear: no farmer or mechanic should be made a priest, since it is only right and proper that the gods should be worshipped by the citizens. Now as we have divided the citizen element into two parts, the military10 and the deliberative, and as it is right and proper that those who have thus spent themselves in long service should both serve the gods and enjoy their retirement, it is they who should be appointed to the priestly offices.

1329a34 We have now stated what the essential requirements of a state are, and how many parts it has. There must be farmers and skilled workers and hired labourers; but as to parts of the state, these are the military10 and deliberative elements. Each is separated, either permanently or successively.11