THE CONTEXT
The Life of Plotinus and the Order of his Books was written by Porphyry more than thirty years after the death of Plotinus. Porphyry first evokes the memory of his stay in the School between 263 and 268. He relies subsequently on the testimony of Plotinus himself for the period between 212 and 246, on that of Amelius, Plotinus’ most senior disciple at Rome, for the period between 246 and 263, on his own eye-witness reports for the period between 263 and 268, and finally on that of Eustochius for the circumstances and date of Plotinus’ death. He then gives us several indications concerning his editorial work.
The information Porphyry provides us on Plotinus’ personal life is rather meagre, for the master did not like to talk about it. We do, however, learn a great deal about Plotinus’ activities: his philosophical position, audience, teaching method, writing practices. All these details allow us better to understand Plotinus’ style and manner of argumentation.
Biography
Plotinus is said to have been born in 205, and, according to some testimonies extraneous to the Life of Plotinus, it would have been at Lyco, identified with Lycopolis, a town of Upper Egypt corresponding to modern Assiout.1 We know nothing about his family, which need not, however, have been of Egyptian origin. Plotinus is a name of Latin formation, and Plotinus himself displays a lack of knowledge of the workings of hieroglyphic writing (see Enn. V.8[31].6). His family must have been a wealthy, cultivated Roman family, which had relations at the highest level. At the time, the offspring of wealthy families were handed over to a nursemaid right from their birth, and this was the case with Plotinus. He received a good education: he went to a schoolmaster since the age of seven, and at twenty-seven he was in Alexandria with Ammonius, who was to be his philosophy teacher. All indications are that if Plotinus joined the court of the emperor Gordian III in his expedition against the Persians, it was because his family (probably high civil servants) had strong connections with the imperial court. At the age of twenty-seven, Plotinus launched into philosophy (Plot. 3.6–14) at Alexandria. If he was indeed born in 205, this “conversion” must have taken place in 232. From this time on, he remained with Ammonius for a total of eleven years, thus until 243. Practically nothing is known of this Ammonius and his school, which can be explained by their “Pythagorean” attitude to communication: Ammonius wrote nothing (Plot. 20.36), and his disciples had to keep his doctrines secret (Plot. 3.24–7). Under Ammonius, who had taught Longinus (Plot. 20.36–8), Plotinus had Herennius and Origen as his fellow disciples, and all three had made a pact not to reveal the doctrines that Ammonius had set forth to them (Plot. 3.24–30).
It was to familiarize himself with the philosophy of the Persians and the Indians that Plotinus joined the court of Gordian III, the eighteen-year-old emperor who was launching an expedition against the Persians. The army left Rome in the spring of 242, but it was not until the good weather of the following year that it marched into combat, after having assembled at Antioch. Since Plotinus left Ammonius in 243, one can imagine that it was at Antioch that he joined the emperor’s court. The following year, however, the emperor died at Zaitha, probably assassinated: this is what one may suppose when we learn that Plotinus owed his safety only to his flight to Antioch (Plot. 3.21–2). A few months later, probably in the spring of 244, he left Antioch to come to Rome (Plot. 3.23–4). He was then forty years old, and the accession to power of Philip the Arab, who was accused of the death of Gordian III, did not present problems for him. Amelius attached himself to Plotinus two years after the latter’s arrival at Rome (Plot. 3.38–41). As Longinus implies (Plot. 20.32–3), Amelius was Plotinus’ disciple and assistant as soon as he opened his school at Rome in 246.
Plotinus, assisted by Amelius for twenty-four years, was not a holder of an imperial chair, nor was he a head of a private institution. He provided open instruction to all, without any institutional character; that is, without structures based on law and custom. This explains why when Plotinus left Rome (at the same time as Amelius), the school dissolved. Yet this did not prevent Plotinus from having an influence on the Platonists who taught in the great intellectual centres of the empire, particularly Apamea and Athens. At Rome, he lived in the house of Gemina, a woman of the aristocracy who had been won over to philosophy (Plot. 9.2), and who may have been the widow of Trebonianus, emperor from 251 to 253. His school seems to have been under the protection of the emperor Gallienus himself and of his wife Salonina (Plot. 12.2). In the summertime, he continued his teaching in another place (Plot. 5.3–5), probably in Campania, on the property of Zethus (Plot. 2.18–20), which had previously belonged to Castricius (Plot. 7.22–4).
Anyone who wished could attend Plotinus’ classes (Plot. 1.13–14), as Porphyry remarks when drawing up an inventory of students at the beginning of chapter 7, distinguishing the simple auditors (akroatai) from the disciples (zēlōtai). Among the former, we must distinguish the painter Carterius (Plot. 1.13–14), several senators (Plot. 7.29–30), and even people who were far from agreeing with Plotinus, whether they were Gnostics such as Adelphius and Aquilinus (Plot. 16.1–9), a financial civil servant like Thaumasius (Plot. 13.12–17), the rhetorician Diophanes (Plot. 15.6–17), or even Origen, his former fellow disciple under Ammonius (Plot. 14.20–25). Among Plotinus’ disciples one finds women, including Gemina and her daughter (Plot. 9.1–5). Among the men, one finds in the first place those who devoted themselves exclusively to philosophy: Amelius and Porphyry; then some physicians: Paulinus of Scythopolis (Plot. 7.6), Eustochius of Alexandria (Plot. 7.8) and Zethus (Plot. 7.17–24), who was of Arab descent. There was also the poet Zoticus (Plot. 7.12), and several senators, including Castricius Firmus (Plot. 7.24–9), Marcellus Orrontius (Plot. 7.31), Sabinillus (Plot. 7.31) and Rogatianus (Plot. 7.32). Finally, there was only one representative of the business echelon, Serapion of Alexandria (Plot. 7.46–7), who receives a negative portrayal.
The instruction dispensed by Plotinus consisted of two aspects: exegetic and dogmatic. In his classes, exegesis, which occupied a considerable place (Plot. 14.10–18), constituted only the initial part of the exposition of a doctrine inspired by that of Ammonius (Plot. 14.15–16), and, through him, by Numenius. Plotinus’ doctrine could be characterized as Platonism strongly permeated by Stoicism, which it combated and interpreted through a Neopythagorean grille (Plot. 20.71–3). Plotinus was even accused of having plagiarized Numenius; the testimony of Porphyry (Plot.13–14) coincides with that of Amelius on this point (Plot. 3.35–8). Plotinus avoided any rhetorical elaboration in his classes (Plot. 18.4–5) and favoured discussion over systematic exposition, which disconcerted Porphyry upon his arrival at the school (Plot. 18.8–19) and was the subject of complaint on the part of some auditors, such as Thaumasius (Plot. 13.1–10). Although he pronounced some words poorly, Plotinus was an excellent pedagogue. All these qualities were accompanied by a genuine competence that extended to domains other than philosophy: “He had a complete knowledge of geometry, arithmetic, mechanics, optics and music, but was not disposed to apply himself to detailed research in these subjects” (Plot. 14.6–10); “He studied the rules of astronomy, without going very far into the mathematical side, but went more carefully into the methods of the casters of horoscopes. When he had detected the unreliability of their alleged results he did not hesitate to attack many of the statements made in their writings” (Plot. 15.21–6).2
The written work
For ten years, from 244 to 253, Plotinus contented himself with not writing anything. It was in 254 – the first year of the reign of Gallienus – that he began to write. Thus, when Porphyry arrived in 263, he discovered twenty-one treatises.
During the period when Porphyry remained with him, that is, a bit more than five years, from 263 to 268, Plotinus wrote twenty-four treatises. Porphyry’s stay with Plotinus ended sadly: a personal problem, a theoretical opposition between Porphyry, who admired Aristotle, and Plotinus, who had just written the treatises On the Genera of Being against Aristotle, or emotion inspired by the perspective of the emperor’s overthrow and its consequences for the life of the school? No one can say. Towards the fifteenth year of the reign of Gallienus, that is, shortly before the emperor’s assassination, Porphyry, suffering from melancholy, was seized by a desire to commit suicide. Plotinus sensed this, and prescribed that Porphyry retire to Sicily (Plot. 11.11–19). Porphyry left for Lilybaeum, where he received the last nine treatises written by Plotinus.
Towards the end of August 268, the emperor Gallienus was assassinated, and Claudius, a soldier of Illyrian origin called “the Goth” because of his success against the peoples by that name, was chosen to succeed him. Whether or not Claudius was an accomplice in this assassination, we may assume that his accession to power had repercussions in the political class that provided support for Plotinus and formed his entourage. Amelius left Rome in the first year of the reign of Claudius (Plot. 3.41–2); that is, in 269. In 270, at the time of Plotinus’ death, Amelius was in Apamea (Plot. 2.32–3). On the way, he brought copies of Plotinus’ treatises to Longinus (Plot. 19.32), who was then in Phoenicia, probably in Tyre. Plotinus, gravely ill, also left Rome around the same time, at the end of a stay that lasted a full twenty-six years (Plot. 9.20–21).
Plotinus continued to write in his Campanian retreat, and in 269 sent five treatises to Porphyry, who was in Sicily at the time. Then, at the beginning of the second year of Claudius, that is, in 270, he sent him the last four treatises he was to write. This was shortly before his death, for Plotinus died in Campania, at the end of the second year of Claudius (Plot. 2.29–32), probably from the consequences of tuberculosis that affected his respiratory tract, if we can believe the description given by Porphyry (Plot. 2.5–15).3
The Porphyrian edition of the Enneads
The Life of Plotinus, which must have been preceded by a portrait of the master, is an introduction to the new edition that Porphyry had just carried out of the treatises he collected for the occasion into six Enneads, or groups of nine. We can assume that this classification was inspired by numerological considerations, which were quite natural in a Neopythagorean context that was highly sensitive to the symbolism of numbers. Two is the first even number and three the first odd number; six comes from the multiplication of two by three, and nine from the multiplication of three by itself. All this leads one to believe that Porphyry divided some treatises in such a way as to arrive at the number fifty-four. Evidence for this includes the fact that Enn. IV.4[28] begins in the middle of a phrase from Enn. IV.3[27], together with the brevity of several other treatises: Enn. IV.2[4], IV.9[8], V.2[11], III.9[13], II.2[14], I.9[16], II.6[17], V.7[18], IV.1[21], II.8[35], II.7[37], I.5[36], IV.6[41], III.3[48] and I.7[54]. In addition, Enn. III.9[13] presents a kind of free-for-all thematic mixed bag.
Porphyry claims to have begun his editorial work during Plotinus’ lifetime:
This, then, is my account of the life of Plotinus. He himself entrusted me with the arrangement and editing of his books, and I promised him in his life-time and gave undertakings to our other friends that I would carry the task. So first of all I did not think it right to leave the books in confusion in order of time as they were issued.
(Plot. 24.1–6)
This is certainly also implied by the last lines of the Life of Plotinus. Yet this edition was not published until 300–301. Thirty years passed between Plotinus’ death in 270 and Porphyry’s systematic edition. We may assume that in the course of this period a chronological edition was in circulation. This is confirmed by Eusebius’ division (EP XV.22 [des Places]) of Enn. IV.7[2], which differs from that of Porphyry, and the fact that Eusebius (EP XV.10) preserves a passage on the soul as entelechy that is not to be found in the manuscripts of the Enneads. In this context, it is likely that what is called the “edition of Eustochius” (on the basis of a scholium to Enn. IV.4[28].29.55) must have been the copy given by Plotinus on his deathbed to the doctor Eustochius, the only disciple who was with him at the time.4
Porphyry divided the six Enneads which he constituted from Plotinus’ work into three volumes. In fact, these were three codices, books composed as quaternions, or sections containing four folios folded in two, resulting in eight folios and sixteen pages, bound together and attached to wooden covers. The Enneads occupied three of these “books”, the first one including the Life of Plotinus by Porphyry as an introduction, which was itself probably preceded by the portrait of Plotinus made by Carterius.5
The first volume, which comprises treatises with a primarily moral theme, contains the first three Enneads. The second volume contains the fourth Ennead, which includes the treatises concerning the soul. Finally, the third volume comprises the treatises that deal with the One. In short, this classification, whose numerical combination must have delighted any Neopythagorean, proposes an anagogical reading order that, in a pedagogical perspective, enables one to rise from the sensible world towards the One, by way of the Soul and the Intellect.
After arranging the treatises in this way, Porphyry proceeds to explain the nature of his remaining work on the edition (Plot. 26.28–37). There seem to be traces of summaries and résumés of arguments (for instance, in the final chapter of Enn. III.1[3] and Enn. IV.3[27].5.15–19). In addition, there are some indications for the existence of Porphyrian commentaries on the Enneads, be they Porphyry’s Sentences or the (pseudo-)Theology attributed to Aristotle, which are made up of paraphrases in Arabic, perhaps of Porphyrian origin,6 of some parts of the last three Enneads.
THE QUALITY OF THE GREEK LANGUAGE
The translator of Plotinus who is familiar with Plato’s language cannot help but be disappointed by the quality of the language of the Enneads. At the time of the Roman Empire, the language used by intellectuals, and particularly by philosophers, was Greek. This is why Plotinus taught and wrote in Greek, even though, as we have seen, his mother tongue was not, in all probability, Greek: in view of his origins, Plotinus must have been a Latin speaker.7 This lack of familiarity with Greek language, added to his problems with pronunciation, must have made his speech produce a less than perfect impression. As far as writing is concerned, he did not try to form his letters carefully or separate his words; what is more, since his sight was poor, he did not reread what he had written at the first attempt. Most of these orthographical errors have, however, disappeared from the works that have come down to us, largely as a result of Porphyry’s editorial work. In pointing out his work of correction, Porphyry shows himself to his best advantage. Nevertheless, it was a job well done, for the only real typographical mistake in the Enneads is found at Enn. IV.7[2].85.4, in a passage that appears only in Eusebius,8 who must have possessed Plotinus’ uncorrected manuscripts, which had belonged to Eustochius. The mistake testifies to the state of the text prior to the edition of the Enneads. Thus, the text that has come down to us is not faulty.
But Plotinus’ language is not that of the purists either, such as the Atticists who claimed to follow the great authors, especially Plato and the orators. It borrows considerably from common language, teeming with elements from the Attic and Ionian dialects.9 This can be explained by the fact that Plotinus’ treatises reflect an oral instruction, in which discussions between the master and his audience were customary. As proof, one may cite the frequency of the particle ἤ, used as a marker of dialogue in Plotinus, which is different from its use in the traditional philosophical style after Aristotle. Here, Plotinus meets up in a sense with Plato’s practice as an instrument of education;10 he thereby finds himself a prisoner of a particular state of the language.
The grammar
In order to give an honest description of Plotinus’ grammar, one must avoid appreciating Plotinus’ language on the basis of modern grammars. The Enneads reflect a state of the Greek language that is dated (first half of the third century CE) and situated in space (the Rome of politicians and intellectuals who came from every corner of the Empire). Moreover, Plotinus did not, it seems, intend to create a literary oeuvre. First, let us consider a few particularities of his grammar.
Phonetics and morphology
As far as phonetics is concerned, there is very little that is bizarre, although there are some unexpected forms: ὑγίεια (Enn. VI.1[42].10.28), ὑγεία (Enn. III.2[47].8.40 [a later form, condemned by the Atticists]), τέλεος (Enn. I.8[51].5.7), τέλειος (Enn. I.8[51].4.29); instead of the usual οὐδεν, μηδέν, ἀεί, one finds οὐθεν (Enn. V.6[24].6.28, Enn. IV.4[28].13.14), μηθέν (Enn. II.5[25].1.14), αἰεί (Enn. IV.7[2].83.10). Different forms co-exist for nouns and pronouns: the Attic declension υἱέος (Enn. V.8[31].13.11) is used instead of υἱοῦ; but the Attic second declension is maintained with ἵλεως, ἵλεων (Enn. I.4[46].12.8) and with νεῷ (Enn. V.1[10].6.12); hesitation between νεῷ and ναῷ (Enn. VI.9[9].11.19); νοῦς has as its nominative plural either νόες (Enn. VI.7[38].17.27) or νοῖ (Enn. VI.2[43].22.27); Attic crasis ἅτερος for ὁ ἕτερος (Enn. I.5[36].4.1).
The same holds true for morphology. For adjectives and adverbs, the comparatives and superlatives are usually fashioned in the traditional way; however, one finds a considerable number of original expressions,11 some of which are pleonastic.12 The use of cases is sometimes surprising.13 Plotinus makes little use of the dual, except for δύο and ἄμφω.14 As far as verbs are concerned, he uses either pure (Attic) forms or ordinary (common) forms,15 verbs in -νυμι being the most irregular.16 The ποῖ that is common in Hellenistic Greek is replaced by ποῦ.17 Plotinus also has a notable tendency to substantivize other parts of speech, as is often the case in philosophical language.18
Syntax
One also finds a certain number of peculiarities on the level of syntax, especially as far as questions of agreement, articles, nouns, pronouns, negation and the verbal system are concerned. A masculine or feminine subject is often found with a neuter predicate.19 In addition, subjects in the neuter plural often govern a singular verb, as is quite regular in classical Greek. Singular and plural may be found alongside one another in asyndeta, or groups of words without combining particles.20 One notes a hesitation as far as the gender of the first principle is concerned: sometimes it is masculine, and sometimes neuter (Enn. V.1[10].6.40–53). Plotinus also speaks of the intellect21 and of the soul22 in the neuter. This variation indicates the difficulty encountered by a philosopher who uses terms that in ordinary language are attributed a gender that overlaps with sexual categories (masculine or feminine), whereas such differences are no longer in force in philosophical language. The use of the article with an interrogative or indefinite pronoun (for instance, τὸν μέν τινα νοῦν, Enn. II.9[33].1.26) is reminiscent of Aristotle;23 one notes this particularly original formulation: “he must come … to Beauty, and not only to some particular beauty” (οὐ τό τι καλὸν μόνον, Enn. I.3[20].1.33). From time to time, one finds a noun lacking an article with an attribute or an apposition with the article (Enn. IV. 1[21].1.6; IV.3[27].2.22). The pronouns ἑαυτῶν or αὑτῶν are used as pronouns for the first or the second person plural (Enn. V.1[10].6.10; VI.2[43].19.23); likewise, αὐτῷ is used for the second person singular (Enn. I.6[1].9.17).
The use of moods and tenses in the verbal system often features peculiarities. The imperative sometimes has a concessive sense (Enn. VI.1[42].10.28). The future may feature several values, whether unreal or potential; it may also express the expectation of an event. Irreality and potentiality are manifested in the main clause by means of ἂν.24 This ἂν may be repeated; nevertheless, one notes several errors concerning the use of the conjunction ἓως, indicating a future event with the subjunctive but without the necessary ἂν;25 in contrast, ἳνα ἂν ᾖ is surprising (Enn. IV.4[28].4.17). The uses of ἳνα are often unusual; ἳνα may be construed with subjunctive and optative in the same phrase.26 What is more, it often features a meaning that is not final (“in order that”) but consecutive (“so that”).27
The use of negation is also highly particular: one often finds μή where one would expect où,28 although où should be reserved for objective negation. One often finds οùδέ … οùδέ where one expects οὒτε … οὒτε (Enn. III.4[15].5.9). In addition, Plotinus makes frequent use of participial constructions, even when one expects an inflected verb (Enn. III.7[45].1.7–16); likewise, one finds a genitive absolute (including one without a subject) whereas a simple genitive is expected (Enn. II.9[33].17.16). Tenses are sometimes combined in an odd way: “But behold Intellect, pure Intellect, and look upon it with concentrated gaze (άτενίσας, an aorist participle), not seeing it (μή δεδορκώς, perfect participle) with these bodily eyes of ours” (Enn. VI.2[43].8.7). The same holds true of cases (Enn. III.2[47].14.4).
Phrase construction
The difficulties are most appreciable at the level of the construction of phrases and their coordination. It seems clear that this is a consequence of the oral nature of the discourse Plotinus is writing down. Informed listeners may be content with allusive or even incomplete phrases. In addition, the coordination of these phrases seems to them automatic, as it were.
The verb “to be” (ἐστίν, εἰσίν, ὂντος, etc.) must often be supplied (Enn. V.9[5].10.18; I.1[53].5.17; III.9[13].1.11). The correlation between τὸ μέν and τὸ δέ is not always to be found.29 One often does not find οὺ before οὺδέ (Enn. IV.7[2].3.6). It is not unusual for εϊτε to lack a consequent term (Enn. IV.8[6].2.5). The indefinite pronouns τις or τι are often lacking; what is worse, sometimes a word is omitted and the context provides no clue about what it is: “and admitted that the stars (ἀστέρες is lacking) contribute (διδόντες) a great deal corporally to the constituents of the body” (Enn. III.1[3].6.5–6). One often comes across phrases with a subject in the accusative and a verb in the infinitive, although no declarative verb is to be found in the vicinity.30 One even finds an infinitival construction in a subordinate clause introduced by ὅτι: “because (ὅτι) it is bodily and a qualified body it is subject to every sort of change and has (ἴσχειν) every variety of desire” (Enn. IV.4[28].21.5–6). This led Kirchhoff to correct the reading of all the manuscripts in this instance, which have ἴσχειν, into ἴσχει. In some cases, a translator must supply δεῖ,31 and in others ἀνάγκη.32
Plotinus makes frequent use of ellipses. Several phrases lack a predicate, which must be supplied with the help of the context: “Let us assume, then, that there is a mixture. But, if this is so, the worse element, the body will be improved and the other element, the soul, will be made worse. The body will be improved by sharing in life, the soul made worse by sharing [μεταλαβόν is missing] in death and unreason?” (Enn. I.1[53].4.1–4). A bit further on, we find this verbless phrase, which also lacks a predicate: “But if we assume it to be like [missing] the shape of an axe imposed [missing] on the iron” (Enn. I.1[53].4.20–21). Sometimes, even a word is lacking, which must be supplied: for instance, “It is called ‘without quality’ (ἄποιος) because it has in its own right none of the qualities (τῶν ποιοτήτων) which (ἃς) it is going to receive and which [αἴ is missing] are going to be in it as their substrate, but not in the sense that it has no nature at all” (Enn. I.8[51].10.2–5).
Word placement is sometimes erratic in Plotinus: “and many adequate (και πολλοὶ καὶ ἱκανοὶ) demonstrations (λόγοι) have been set down (καταβέβληνται) which show it” (δεικνύντες τοῦτο, Enn. III.2[47].1.4–5); compare this with the word order in Plotinus: καὶ πολλοὶ καὶ ἱκανοὶ καταβέβληνται δεικνύντες τοῦτο λόγοι. This seems to be a trace of orality in the discussion. There is a large number of parentheses, indicating an aside remark within a response; a striking example is found at Enn. III.6[26].6.24–32.
The entire third chapter of Enn. VI.8[39] is constructed as an anacoluthon. The answer to the question raised33 begins with two participles, ἀναγαγόντες (line 2) and θέμενοι (line 3), which is understood in the following part of the phrase (εἶτα έν λόγῳ όρθῷ), without any inflected verb being found in the vicinity.34 Then, in order to explain έν λόγῳ όρθῷ, at line 4, a parenthesis opens that ends at line 21. The point is to identify will with reason, which is necessarily right, since it pertains to science, and because of this can give an account of itself. Indeed, if one cannot give an account of a representation that is a right opinion, how can one say that it depends on us?35 Even more, this parenthesis contains within itself an anacoluthon (lines 10–13) that is a definition of representation in the strict sense,36 a definition that is followed by a parenthesis (lines 13–16) explaining in what sense representations vary as a function of the body’s humours.37 After having accounted for the identification of will with right reason (lines 16–21),38 the phrase begins again with ἀναγαγόντες, and ends at line 2639 with φήσομεν παρεῖναι, coordinated with δώσομεν of line 23, which seems to indicate the oral nature of this phrase. Note that the most recent editors, Henry and Schwyzer, eliminate two members of the phrase as glosses: [εἶναι δώσομεν] (line 24) and [ὅσοι νῷ καὶ ὀρέξει τῇ κατά νοῦν ζῶσι] (lines 25–6). These glosses do not belong to Plotinus, but indicate the difficulty a reader of Greek mother tongue had in understanding this phrase. What can one say of the difficulties encountered by a modern translator!
Style
It is hard to speak of Plotinus’ style in general, because it is necessary to make distinctions as far as the quality of writing is concerned. Those made by Porphyry have no other goal than to show himself in a favourable light. The treatises Plotinus wrote during Porphyry’s stay at the school (263–8) are more extensive and powerful, in terms of style and argumentation, than those he found upon his arrival, while the final ones testify to the decline in the sick master’s strength (Plot. 6.30–37). In contrast, the distinction made by Schwyzer between classes and lectures seems more relevant. Indeed, one notes that although all Plotinus’ treatises are related to his teaching, some are better written than others, when discussion gives way to lengthy expositions; but one ought not to be too systematic in this area.
In any case, Plotinus was hard to understand, even to his contemporaries. We find two testimonies in favour of this impression in the Life of Plotinus. First, there is the letter in which Amelius defends Plotinus against the accusations of plagiarism of which he was the victim on the part of the philosophers of Athens: Plotinus plagiarizes Numenius of Apamea, robs the Christians, and is a big blowhard (πλατύς φλήναφος, Plot. 17.16–24). Although Amelius considers that the Athenian philosophers react in this way to show “their glibness (εύστομία) and readiness of speech (εύγλωττία)”, in the commentary Porphyry gives of this letter he admits some of these facts, and tries to explain them (Plot. 18.1–9).
In Porphyry’s words, Longinus, “who was the greatest literary critic of the time”, then residing at Apamea, did not understand him, and attributed his difficulties to the poor quality of the manuscripts in his possession (Plot. 19.20–26). Porphyry’s comment is that if Longinus, influenced by ignorant people, considered Plotinus to be an unimportant author, it was because he was ignorant of Plotinus’ usual way of expressing himself (Plot. 20.1–9). How can we explain this?
Longinus judged his contemporaries’ writings by the standard of the epideictic speech, which enabled orators to display their virtuosity. This kind of speech had to follow the rules of rhetoric; that is, it had to present a complex but obvious structure, giving preference to counterbalancing and ample phrasing. As Porphyry testifies, however, Plotinus’ works must be placed in relation to his lectures. They therefore maintained the qualities and defects of oral style. Plotinus is hard to read, because he expresses himself allusively, as is normal in front of a group of well-informed listeners. His writings are therefore characterized by particularly condensed expression: he loves concision and subtlety.40 In addition, since his expositions are often interrupted by questions that raise objections or demand technical clarifications, his phrase is uneven, since it accumulates explanations and remarks layer upon layer, like a layer cake.
Vocabulary
In his choice of philosophical terminology, Plotinus was, as is quite natural, influenced by Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. It should be noted, however, that he even takes over forms from the poets: αγλάισμα,41 άριπρεπής,42 προσεννέπειν,43 which indicates the high proficiency in Greek literature. He also invents many new words by means of (a) an ἀ-privative ἄζων,44 ἄογκος,45 ἀσκέδαστος,46 άυλότης;47 by adding a suffix: αἴνιξις,48 δυνάμωσις,49 φρόντισις;50 or (b) a prefix: παμπρόσωπον,51 έκστάζω,52 πολυπραγμόνησις.53 He also creates a variety of compounds with αὐτό: αὐτογῆ,54 αύτοδέκας,55 αύτοουσία,56 while he creatively ascribes a new meaning to others: ἄθεος,57 ἐπίνοια,58 ἐπικοσμέομαι.59
He also takes up the etymological speculations of the Cratylus and the Stoics. For the Stoics, it was the same λόγος that expresses itself in language and serves to produce nature. Such a conception was compatible with Cratylus’ position in his namesake dialogue, since this position inflects etymology in the direction of an allegorical interpretation. Here are a few examples. In the soul, the discursive capacity (διάνοια) is acquired by means of the intellect (νοῦς) (Enn. V.3[49].6.20). Justice (Δίκην) thrones alongside Zeus (Δία, Enn. V.8[31].4.41–2). In the Intellect, all realities are filled with life (ζωῆς) and are boiling (ζεόντων).60 In the heavens, the gods (θεῶν) always contemplate (θεῶνται, Enn. V.8[31].3.28). The world (κόσμος), whose etymological origin is connected with order and therefore with beauty, is associated with the verb that signifies “to embellish” (έπικοσμεῖν, Enn. IV.3[27].14.1–5). We also find a play on words concerning eternity: “For ‘eternity’ is derived from ‘always existing’ (αἰὼν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος, Enn. III.7[45].4.42–3).” The term is explained as follows: “but there, Plato says, is the archetype, which ‘has the form of good,’ because it possesses the Good in the Forms (έκεῖ δέ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον τὸ ἀγαθοειδές φησιν, ὅτι έν τοῖς εἴδεσι τὸ άγαθὸν ἔχει, Enn. VI.7[38].15.9–10).” The body (σῶμα) must have its salvation or its conservation (σῴζοιτο) assured, as in the Cratylus.61 The names of the gods are also of etymological interest to him. He says of Pandora (Πανδώρα) that “Aphrodite gave her something and the Graces, and different gods gave her different gifts, and she took her name from the gift (δώρου) and all the givers (πάντων τῶν δεδωκότων)” (Enn. IV.3[27].14.8–10), while with regard to Apollo, he says: “This is why the Pythagoreans symbolically indicated it to each other by the name of Apollo, in negation of the multiple (ἀποφάσει τῶν πολλῶν)”(Enn. V.5[32].6.28). Plotinus recalls the etymological analysis of Kronos, whom he assimilates to the pure Intellect, proposed by Plato in the Cratylus: “and let him see pure (ἀκήρατον) Intellect presiding over them, and immense wisdom, and the true life of Kronos (Κρόνου), a god who is fullness (κόρου) and intellect (νοῦ)”.62 We also find explained the relation between Aphrodite (Ἀφροδίτη) and grace (άβρόν) (Enn. III.5[50].8.17); between Eros (’Έρως) and vision (ὁράσεως) (Enn. III.5[50].3.15); and between Hestia (Ἑστία) and rest (ἔστη) (Enn. V.5[32].5.16–18). This interest in the interpretation of divine names must be associated with the practice of allegory. Plotinus associates his metaphysics and psychology with mythology, in which he finds the broad outlines of his thought expressed in an allusive way (Brisson 2004: 74–81).
In Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus, Plotinus sees a mythical transposition of the three main hypostases of his system (cf. P. Hadot 1981a). There can be no doubt that Ouranos represents the One, but this correspondence is more presupposed than it is developed (Enn. III.8[30].11.33–45). In contrast, the correspondence between Kronos and the Intellect is the subject of several developments in the first treatise of the fifth Ennead (see above). Most of the details describing the relations between Zeus and Kronos are taken into account in this interpretation. Thanks to a ruse thought up by Rhea, Zeus, the last of Kronos’ sons, escapes his father, who has been swallowing his children. This detail is to be understood as follows: the Intellect, filled with Intelligibles, engenders the Soul as its last offspring, who is to transmit to the outside an image of its father and its siblings who have remained with their father.63 As the hypostasis Soul, Zeus can be assimilated to the Demiurge, who sets the universe in order and guides it (Enn. IV.4[28].9.1–18). By extension, he can also be assimilated to the World Soul (Enn. IV.4[28].10.1–4, 10.4–29), and even to human souls (Enn. IV.3[27].12.6–19). We can continue, however, and descend even further along the scale of realities. In the last chapter of the treatise On the Impassibility of the Incorporeals (Enn. III.6[26].19.25–41), he, basing himself on the name “Mother” given to the receptacle in the Timaeus (51a4–5), assimilates matter to Cybele, considered as “Mother of the gods”. Finally, for Plotinus, the “Great Mother”, as sterile as the eunuchs that escort her, personifies inert matter, while ithyphallic Hermes represents the divinity that distributes the spermatic reasons (λόγοι σπερματικοί) that generate the sensible world.
There is one domain, however, in which myths intervene constantly: that of the soul in general. It is no accident that the example that best illustrates this is the myth of the birth of Eros, as told by Socrates in Plato’s Symposium. Plotinus gives various interpretations of this famous myth. In his treatise On Love (Enn. III.2[47]), almost entirely devoted to the myth of the birth of Eros, Plotinus begins by recording the various versions Plato gives of the genealogy of Eros. In the Phaedrus (242d–e), Eros is the son of Aphrodite; but in the Symposium (203c), he is born of Poros and Penia. This duality can be explained by the fact that there are two Aphrodites (Smp. 180d–e). One is the celestial Aphrodite, daughter of Ouranos or Kronos; she is therefore the hypostasis Soul, who, by uniting with Kronos in uninterrupted contemplation, gives birth to Eros; that is, the higher Soul (Enn. III.5[50].2). The other Aphrodite, born of Zeus and Dione, embodies the soul of the sensible world. She engenders a second Eros, who is her vision. Within the world, this Eros presides over marriages and helps well-disposed souls to recollect the Intelligibles (Enn. III.5[50].3). Finally, since each individual soul, even that of animals, is an Aphrodite, it engenders its particular Eros, which corresponds to its nature and merits. Hence, there are three kinds of Eros: a universal Eros, a cosmic Eros, a plurality of individual Erotes. The first is a god, whereas the two others are demons (Enn. III.5[50].4). Finally, Plotinus associates another myth with that of the birth of Eros: the myth of the loves of Eros and Psyche. Psyche, of course, is the soul, and her intimacy with Eros is a sign that the love of the One-Good is connatural to her (Enn. VI.9[9].9.28–34).
Many other examples could be given.
Figures
If Porphyry insists on the fact that Plotinus “was completely free from the staginess and windy rant of the professional speech-writer” (τῷ πάσης σοφιστικῆς αὐτόν σκηνῆς καθαρεύειν καὶ τύφου, Plot. 18.5–6), it is probably, as Bréhier (1924: xxvi-xxviii) thought, in order to distinguish him from the orators of his time, and from the philosophers who sought an elevated style. This does not prevent Plotinus from being familiar with and using a few rhetorical tropes.
Anaphora is a figure of style consisting in repeating a word or even a syntagma in verses, phrases, or sets of phrases or verses. Here are a few examples: “able in this way to pray alone to him [the One] alone” (μόνους πρός μόνον, Enn. V.1[10].6.11 [see also Enn. I.6[1].5.57; VI.9[9].11.51; VI.7[38].34.7–8]); “Now when light of this kind [the light of the stars] stays on high, in the place in which it is set, pure in the purest region (καθαροῦ ἐν καθαρωτάτῳ), what kind of outflow could there possibly be from it?” (Enn. II.1[40].8.1–2); “this is what it thinks, a dim thing dimly and a dark thing darkly (νοεῖ ἀμυδρῶς ἀμυδρὸν καὶ σκοτεινῶς σκοτεινόν), and it thinks without thinking (καὶ νοεῖ οὐ νοοῦσα)” (Enn. II.4[12].10.30–31). This stylistic figure is found rather often in Plotinus, who uses it to highlight terms and hence ideas.
One finds many alliterations: “The soul of the All [that is, its lowest part] would be like the soul in a great growing plant, which directs the plant without effort or noise (ἀφόνως … καὶ ἀψόνως)” (Enn. IV.3[27].4.27).64 Another example: “for since the soul is one nature in many powers, sometimes the whole of it is carried along with the best of itself and of real being, sometimes the worse part is dragged down (καθελκυσθέν) and drags (συνεφελκύλσασθαι) the middle with it; for it is not lawful for it to drag down (καθελκύσαι) the whole” (Enn. II.9[33].2.6–9).
Anaphora may even be discerned in this second example. It should be noted that alliteration was a very characteristic trope for Gorgias and the Sophists. Plotinus does not hesitate to make use of plays on words: “We must understand, too, from this that this nature is time, the extent of life of this kind which goes forward in even and uniform changes progressing quietly (ἐν μεταβολαῖς προιὸν όμαλαῖς τε καὶ όμοιαῖς ἀψοφητὶ προιούσαις), and which possesses continuity and activity” (Enn. III.7[45].12.1–3).
Plotinus makes frequent use of antithesis, especially in the form of oxymorons, which aim at bringing together two terms (a noun and an adjective), which their meaning should keep separate, in a formulation that seems to be contradictory. This is the only way to conceive what is unlimited: “One will conceive it as the opposites and at the same time not the opposites” (τὰ ἐναντία ἅμα καὶ οὐ τὰ ἐναντία, Enn. VI.6[34].3.28). The Soul is compared to a circle whose centre is the Intellect: “For the soul of this kind is a noble thing, like a circle fitting itself round its centre, the first expansion after the center, an unextended extension” (διάστημα ἀδιάστατον, Enn. IV.4[28].16.22); the Soul is also compared to such a circle in the preceding treatise (Enn. IV.3[27].17.12); and for the oxymoron, see Enn. V.8[31].9.20 and Enn. VI.5[23].8.32. Another beautiful example in support of the Soul’s “unextended extension” is found in άσχημάτιστα σχήματα, the “unfigured figures” of intelligible numbers (Enn. VI.6[34].17.25–6).
Several times, Plotinus makes use of correction and rectification. Enn. V.2[11], On the Generation and Rank of Things that Come After the First, aspires to be a commentary of a phrase from Plato’s Parmenides, a phrase taken out of context which Plotinus wants to make say something quite different from Plato. The beginning of the treatise is also a good example of the use of correction and rectification:
The One is all things and not a single one of them (Plato, Prm. 160b2–3); it is the principle of all things, not all things (ἀρχὴ γὰρ πάντων, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνως πάντα), but all things have that other kind of transcendent existence; for in a way they do occur in the One (ἐκεῖ γὰρ οἷον ἐνέδραμε); or rather they are not there yet, but they will be (μᾶλλον δὲ οὔ πω ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔσται).
(Enn. V.2[11].1.1–3)
In Enn. VI.7[38], Plotinus takes up the same idea, but he situates himself in another viewpoint: “If then all the other things exist before it, it would already be affected by them; but if they do not, then this Intellect generated them all (εἰ δὲ μή ἔστιν, οὗτος τὰ πάντα ἐγέννα), or rather was them all (μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ πάντα ἦν)” (Enn. VI.7[38].13.27–8).
Use is also made of paraenesis (exhortation) and prosopopoeia (representation of a voiceless being as speaking or acting). When he launches into an exhortation, Plotinus uses the second person singular form. We find two examples in the treatises On Providence. One of them is classic:
Then, again, all these kinds must be brought together under the one genus “living creature”; then also the things which are not living creatures must be classed by their kinds, and then included in the one genus “non-living”; then both together, if you like (εἰ βούλει), must be included in being; and then in that which makes being possible.
(Enn. III.3[48].1.15–19)
The other leads to a prosopopoeia: “Since, then, what has come into being is the whole universe, if you contemplate this, you might hear (τάχα ἂν ἀκούσαις) it say” (Enn. III.2[47].3.19–20). There then follows the speech given by the world, which goes on for more than twenty lines in Henry and Schwyzer’s edition. At Enn. III.8[30].4.3–14, it is Nature who explains how she fashions things by contemplating. Similar prosopopoeias are found in other treatises. The Intellect speaks at Enn. V.5[32].7.35; the discursive part of the Soul (Enn. V.3[49].3.4); while in chapter 13.24, it is the Intellect. What is more, Plotinus often uses prosopopoeia as a counter-example, justifying on several occasions the impossibility for such and such a reality to pronounce anything at all, such as sensation (Enn. VI.4[22].6.15), time (Enn. III.7[45].12.38) or matter (Enn. III.6[26].15.28), or else even to emphasize the uselessness for a star to express itself in words (Enn. IV.4[28].7.14).
Images: comparisons and metaphors
In rhetoric, “image” is a generic term that includes comparisons and metaphors. The former compares two elements that contain a common characteristic or an analogy between that which is compared and that to which it is compared by means of a comparative word or phrase: “as”, “like”, “similar to”, “it seems” and so on. A metaphor is a comparison without a comparative term, the most condensed form of an image. This direct assimilation of that which is compared and that to which it is compared may create images that are surprisingly dense. It is often hard, however, to distinguish between these two kinds of figure. Plotinus constantly uses images in his exposition and sometimes even repeats the same image or the same metaphor within the same treatise (Bréhier 1955).
Here, based on the work of Ferwerda (1965), is an incomplete inventory of the images Plotinus uses in the Enneads.
1. Mathematical figures: point, line, circle and sphere. The Intellect is around the One like a circle of which it is the centre (Enn. I.7[54].1.24); the Soul, as we have seen, is a sphere whose centre is the Intellect (see above p. 137). Some images refer to the sensible world, resembling a sphere, which the soul penetrates from all sides (Enn. V.8[31].9.4 (a thought experiment)).
2. Springs and water; river water, spring water. All the rest flows forth, as from a spring, from that which is its principle (Enn. III.8[30].10.5): One, Intellect, Soul.
3. Light (Beierwaltes 1961) essentially represents the intelligible, which permeates everything, and which, when it becomes exhausted, becomes the darkness in which matter consists (Enn. IV.3[27].9.20–27). Into this darkness constituted by matter, the lower part of the World Soul deposits the reasons that correspond to the Forms in the soul, in order to produce bodies. The latter can thus be considered shadows, since a shadow is a parcel of darkness endowed with a form. The light of the sun and stars is also involved when other subjects are dealt with, particularly colour.
4. Fire and heat are associated with the vegetative soul. This is why when death occurs, a human being’s higher soul, associated with sunlight, immediately leaves the organic body, in which the vegetative soul, ensuring its organic functions, persists for a certain time, as is shown by the growth of hair and nails (Enn. IV.4[28].29.3–7); its action is therefore associated with the heat produced by sunlight.
5. Walking, motion and paths are most often associated with the soul’s motions as it methodically acquires knowledge, making its way towards virtue, or rises back up towards its principle.65
6. Family and amorous relations: father, mother, seed, love and union are associated with procession from a principle considered as the father.66 Conversion is associated with amorous union with the principle (Enn. VI.7[38].26.23), and all souls are sisters (Enn. II.9[33].18.16).
7. Nature: the lowest part of the World Soul is compared to the life that animates plants.67 Several animals are mentioned, particularly birds with their feathers and wings, associated with the soul;68 horses, associated with the parts of soul, as in the Phaedrus; and worms, bugs and snakes. The same holds true for mud and filth, which are associated with impurity, and for the body.69
8. The parts and activities of the human body, which is a miniature world, are naturally associated with those of the body of the world. The sense of touch is associated with intuition, the eye and vision with the intellect’s contemplation of the intelligible. In contrast, sleep and dreams are related to sense knowledge.70
9. Trades and techniques are often called into service: the action of the lower part of the soul is described with the features of a farmer; the intellect and discursive thought are compared to a judge and a legislator; the soul is the pilot of the world’s body, which is described as a ship.71 Matter is like the bitter deposit left by wine, while its size varies like that of a piece of clothing, embellishing it without modifying it; since Plato and Aristotle, wax and seals serve to describe the effect of sense impressions on the soul.72
10. Reason (λόγος) governs the World Soul and must govern ours, as in a city that is not given over to the whims of corporations or a tumultuous assembly.73 Life in this world is assimilated to a wrestling match or sports competition; the relations between unity and multiplicity are often referred to an army led by a general.74 Order in the universe and in human beings is compared to a person who rules a household, whose beauty he ensures; the parts of the soul are assimilated to those of science, which remains one despite the diversity of its species. The theatre and actors are often called upon. The same holds true of dance and chorus, and of the music evoking the course of the heavenly bodies. Finally, the Intellect, and especially the One, are described within a religious context.75
Metaphor is an essential figure for Plotinus, for he is led to describe the incorporeals with a language intended to describe the world of bodies: One, Intellect–Intelligible, Soul, matter. The power and beauty of Being charm all the things that depend on it.76 The intelligible is known in the mode of the sensible, for it is possible to rise back up from the sensible towards the intelligible.77 Reasonings are already in extension and motion. Being stimulates, strikes and produces in the soul a representation concerning being. Even when “plunged” within the sensible, the Intellect remains autarchic.78 The soul leans forward, manifests audacity, and springs forth out of the all.79 When fatigued, the soul becomes heavy, and sometimes it experiences the pains of childbirth.80 The One accords its favours to that which comes after it.81 It manifests will.82 The power contained in the One enables it to give even what it does not have.83 The Intellect becomes heavy as it becomes multiple, and the soul advances.84 The Intellect sees the Good, goes back on its tracks, hides itself, and is full of strength.85 God is known by the imprint of himself he leaves behind.86 The life of the sage is not “scattered” in sensation.87 We engender time by thought.88 Geometers draw figures while contemplating.89 What is sensible slides over matter, and matter is thrown out of being.90
In short, Plotinus has a good knowledge of rhetoric, of which he makes broad use. One can even wonder whether Porphyry’s insistence in wishing to separate his teacher from rhetoric91 represents a tendency of the time, against which he wants to react, given that he was a student of Longinus, author of a treatise on rhetoric. Philo of Alexandria already protested against a possible confusion between a philosophical treatise and a speech intended to display one’s rhetorical abilities.92 Epictetus often reproaches his students for the rhetorical nature of their interventions.93 Perhaps Plotinus is also following them. In any case, although the level of his language is quite mediocre on a strictly grammatical and basic syntactic level, Plotinus reveals himself as a virtuoso when he undertakes to express himself in a colourful way: his inventiveness on the level of images and metaphors is remarkable. He surprises the reader, inspiring emotion and hence adherence. This is probably what earned him fame: his success in making Platonic rationalism moving.
ARGUMENTATION
The first difficulty encountered by whoever seeks to define argumentation in Plotinus resides in the impression of disorder that reigns in most of Plotinus’ shorter treatises that take up canonical scholastic themes, to the rhythm of an open discussion between the master and his disciples. This impression is attenuated in the treatises or groups of treatises that deal with questions of major importance, for instance: Enn. III.6[26], On the Impassibility of the Incorporeals; Enn. IV.3–4[27–8], On Difficulties Concerning the Soul; Enn. VI.1–3[42–4], On the Kinds of Being; Enn. VI.6[34], On Numbers; Enn. VI.7[38], How the Multiplicity of the Ideas Became Established, and on the Good; Enn. VI.8[39], On the Voluntary and on the Will of the One, and perhaps also Enn. III.7[45], On Eternity and Time and Enn. V.3[40], On the Knowing Hypostases and on What is Beyond. Even here, difficulties subsist: Enn. III.6[26] is divided into two parts: chapters 1–5 deal with the soul’s impassibility, while chapters 6–13 are on matter. Enn. VI.7[38], for its part, deals with three themes: chapters 1–15 examine the relations between the intelligible and the sensible world; chapters 16–35 focus on the relations between the One and the Intellect; and chapters 36–42 deal with the question of whether the supreme hypostasis thinks. One conclusion thus becomes inescapable: one never finds a systematic exposition of a major question in Plotinus.
We can therefore understand Plotinus’ use of argumentation. Argumentation must be distinguished from both demonstration and proof. Demonstration starts out from arbitrary axioms, and, by applying rules that are known to all, seeks to reach a conclusion. To demonstrate is to establish the truth of a proposition by “logical” means. Proof, for its part, seeks to establish a concrete, empirical fact, by means of an experimental verification in physics, or a direct or indirect testimony in a judicial context. To argue, finally, is to exhort a person to do something, by showing that the consequences of such an action entail some good, particularly ethical. Strictly speaking, there is no proof in Plotinus. Although some of the rules of demonstration are known to him, he does not really have recourse to demonstration. He therefore restricts himself to argumentation.
The use of τεκμήριον and τεκμαίρεσθαι is rarely found in Plotinus, and always in a context involving a verification in the sensible. People who weep and moan provide a proof of the existence of evil in the world; the fact that certain functions persist in a corpse – the growth of hair and nails, for instance – is the proof that the lower part of the soul is active in them.94 The fact that the memory of pleasant things is not itself pleasant provides the proof that one must distinguish between memory and desire; the fact that there is an inner beauty shows that beauty is concerned with form, not with mass.95 Astrology lacks proof, whereas the spectacle of the universe is proof that order reigns within it.96 There is no proof that memory belongs to the union of the soul and body.97
As far as demonstration is concerned, Plotinus is aware of the procedures set forth by Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. In Enn. I.3[20], On Dialectic, he rapidly evokes logic, which is interested only in propositions and syllogisms: only part of it is useful (Enn. I.3[20].4.19–24), but it remains at the level of language. In Enn. VI.1–VI.3[42–4], On the Kinds of Being, he provides a lengthy treatment of the Aristotelian and Stoic categories, only to reduce them to the sensible world, since the only real “categories” that concern the intelligible are the five Great Kinds of the Sophist. In the field of methodology, moreover, Plotinus maintains only the Platonic dialectic. Yet he shows originality in this domain as well; he does, of course, evoke the methods of collection and division used in Plato’s Statesman and Sophist, which serve to distinguish between the various kinds (Enn. I.3[20].4.10–14), but these methods lose the heuristic orientation they had in these two dialogues, to become, in agreement with a certain interpretation of Republic VI, the Phaedrus and the Symposium, a path for rising back up to the Intelligible, and thence as far as the One (Enn. I.3[20].4.14–19).
Most often, Plotinus makes use of argumentation, but in a particular sense. His goal is to bring the reader (as he had done for his listening audience) to subscribe to the Platonic position in every area. The aim was no longer to display originality, but to point out a truth already set forth by Plato, by comparing it to the competing positions of Aristotle, the Stoics, and sometimes even of Epicurus and the Sceptics. One must admit, however, that Plotinus had only an indirect relation to Plato and Aristotle, for even if he read them directly, he did so through the interpretative filter of the interpreters who preceded him. Yet we must go further. For Plotinus, leading his readers to adhere to Platonic thought features an ethical dimension. Such an adherence implies a way of life that must lead to the goal set for all Platonists: that is, assimilation to the divinity, understood as contemplation of the intelligible, and hence to happiness. This project is reflected in the reading order Porphyry proposed in his classification of the Enneads.
In fact, the interpretation of Plato proposed by Plotinus cannot be reduced to an academic exercise. Its goal is to introduce the reader to a way of life, as was the case for the Epicureans and the Stoics. The argumentation Plotinus deploys seeks to demonstrate the superiority of this way of life over that which was proposed by other philosophers, and even by the Christians, who were on the way to becoming a social majority. Above all, dialectic and knowledge constitute the highest degree of virtue, as is emphasized in the last chapter of Enn. I.3[20], On Dialectic, which immediately follows the treatise On the Virtues: “Dialectic (διαλεκτική) and theoretical wisdom (σοφία) provide everything for practical wisdom (φρονήσει) to use, in a universal and immaterial form” (Enn. I.3[20].6.12–14). There can be no question here of reducing Plotinus to the status of a preacher who uses the instruments of rhetoric to persuade his audience, but it must be admitted that he turns even logic and dialectic into instruments in the service of a happy life, oriented by a knowledge that enables the soul to return towards its principle. We can therefore understand why Neoplatonism very quickly became the only philosophical adversary to Christianity.
To understand the thought of Plotinus, it must be re-situated within its time, when philosophy had become a way of life. The regularity and permanence one had to find in the sensible world in order to be able to talk about it, think about it, and act upon it, were ensured by the activity of the Soul, which derived from the Intellect, which emanated from the One. Plotinus provided a coherent vision of this system, with a view not only to showing his superiority over other philosophical systems and Christianity, but to ensuring for each human being who lived in conformity with that world-vision a happiness consisting in becoming similar to the divinity; that is, in becoming perfect in so far as was possible. Plotinus’ style and argumentation must be placed within this context, lest they be misunderstood. By his qualities as an author, Plotinus made attractive and engaging the original interpretation of Plato that he developed throughout his work.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I am most grateful to Michael Chase who translated this chapter in English and who made many valuable comments on my interpretations.
NOTES
1. Eunapius, Vit. Soph. III.1.1–2, p. 5.18–20 [Giangrande]; Pseudo-Elias, in Isag. 27.3 [Westerink]; David, in Porph. 91.23–6 [Busse]; Suda Π 1811, t. IV, p. 151, 23 [Adler].
2. For instance, Enn. II.3[52]. Hereinafter translation of the Enneads is according to Armstrong (1966–88), with slight modifications.
3. On this controversial diagnosis, see Grmek (1992).
4. Goulet Cazé (1982, 1992) in answer to Brisson (1992). See also D’Ancona (2007).
5. For other examples of portraits of an author in the beginning of an edition, see Martial, Epigrams IX.47, XIV.186; Galen, III, p. 776 [Kühn].
6. For an exposition of views on this subject, see DPA (1989: I.241–90).
7. We know nothing about Plotinus’ family, but the comparative frequency of the names Plotinus and Plotina in Latin seems to point in this direction.
8. Porphyry reads ψυχικοῦ instead of φυσικοΰ in Eusebius: see Henry (1938: 120).
9. The sections of this work are based on Schwyzer (1951, esp. 512–30; 1978: 321–3).
10. The translation of Plotinus’ complete works under the direction of Brisson & Pradeau (2002–10) insisted strongly on this point.
11. Ἀγαθοειδέστερον (Enn. VI.7[38].22.33); ἀγαπητότατον (Enn. VI.7[38].30.30); αἰτιώτατον (Enn. VI.8[39].18.38); ὰθροωτέραις (Enn. III.7[45].1.4); ὰνθρωπινωτέροις (Enn. II.9[33].9.9).
12. Such as μᾶλλον αὐταρκέστερον (Enn. III.5[50].1.47); μᾶλλον άπαθέστερον (Enn. III.6[26].9.19).
13. In “about her (= Aphrodite), one can ascertain that she is a god and not a daemon” (ἣν δή καὶ θεόν … οὐ δαιμόνα, Enn. III.5[50].2.25), we have the relative in the feminine gender, although θεόν remains masculine; “there are, in the world, many Aphrodites, which have come into being in it as daemons” (καὶ Ἀφροδίτας ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ πολλάς, δαίμονας ἐν αὐτῷ γενομένας, Enn. III.5[50].4.18–19). Here the phrase γενομένας δαίμονας is feminine, although only a masculine form is known of the noun; likewise, μάγος is feminine (Enn. I.6[1].8.18) although only masculine forms are known.
14. But one finds ὰνθρώπους δύο (Enn. VI.6[34].16.16) and δύο φιλοῦντας (Enn. II.3[52].4.15).
15. For instance, διατιθεῖσι instead of διατιθέασι (Enn. VI.1[42].12.29).
16. For instance, έδείκνυον (Enn. V.1[10].9.32) and μιγνύων (Enn. IV.3[27].7.10).
17. Enn. V.1[10].4.12; V.2[11].2.12; V.3[49].10.19; V.5[32].19.20.
18. Τὸ εὖ (Enn. I.4[46].2.29); τὸ ὧδε καὶ ὧδε (Enn. VI.4[22].13.4).
19. For instance, ψυχὴ δὲ νῷ καλόν (Enn. I.6[1].6.27); οὐχ όρατὸν γῆ (Enn. II.1[40].6.21).
20. For instance, ἓν πάντα (Enn. V.3[49].15.23); ἕκαστα τὰ ἄλλα (Enn. VI.8[31].13.4).
21. For instance, τὸ (= τὸ ὰγαθόν) δ’ ἐστίν ὰν ἐνδεές … δοὺς ἐξ αὐτοῦ νοῦν (Enn. I.8[51].2.4–6); πρὸς αὐτὸ (= the Intellect, neuter) βλέπει … ζωῆς γὰρ αἴτιος (= the Intellect, masculine) (Enn. I.6[1].7.11).
22. At Enn. IV.7[2].13, ή ψυχή is spoken of first in the neuter (lines 4–8), then as feminine (lines 9–20).
23. See τὸ τὶ μέγεθος (Aristotle, Pol. III.12.1283a4).
24. One must be very cautious with the use of ἂν, many occurrences of which must have been added by scribes in order to normalize the text.
25. For example, Enn. I.3[20].5.4; I.8[51].13.24; II.4[12].5.5; III.8[30].10.22.
26. Enn. I.8[51].15.26; II.1[40].7.3; III.6[26].14.33.
27. Enn. VI.7[38].10.5; VI.8[39].17.26.
28. Enn. V.8[31].3.10; IV.7[2].83.24; III.2[47].12.4; III.5[50].15.10.
29. Enn. IV.3[27].4.3; IV.9[8].4.10; VI.1[42].7.31.
30. Enn. I.4[46].14.12; II.1[40].3.14.
31. Enn. I.4[46].14.12; II.1[40].3.14; II.9[33].5.1; III.6[26].2.62; III.7[45].9.33; IV.4[28].1.22; V.8[31].6.17; VI.7[38].35.20.
32. Enn. I.1[53].6.5; III.8[30].9.37.
33. Enn. VI.8[39].3.1–2: “We must therefore enquire about these matters: for [in doing so] we are already also coming near to our subject of discourse, the gods.”
34. Enn. VI.8[39].3.2–4: “Well then, we traced back what is in our power to will, and then placed this in the context of discourse, and then of correct discourse.”
35. Enn. VI.8[39].3.4–10: “but perhaps we ought to add to ‘correct’ that it belongs to rational knowledge; for if someone had a right opinion and acted on it he would not indisputably have the power of self-determination if he acted, without knowing why his opinion was right, but led to his duty by chance or some representation; since when we say that representation is not in our power, how can we put those who act by it in the class of the self–determined?”
36. Enn. VI.8[39].3.10–12: “But we do say this about the representation which one can properly call representation, that which is roused by the experiences of the body.”
37. Enn. VI.8[39].3.12–16: “(for being empty, or again full, of food and drink in a way gives the representations shape, and one who is full of semen has different representations, and so it is according to the qualities of the bodily fluids)’.
38. Enn. VI.8[39].3.16–21: “and we shall not class those who are active according to representations of this kind among those whose principle of action is self-determined; therefore, we shall not grant to bad men, who do most things according to these, either having something in their power or voluntary action, but we shall grant voluntary action to one whose doings depend on the activities of Intellect and who is free from bodily affections”.
39. Enn. VI.8[39].3.21–6: “We trace back what is in our power to the noblest principle, the activity of Intellect, and shall grant that the premises of action derived from this are [είναι has been transposed from the gloss at line 24] truly free, and that the desires roused by thinking are not voluntary, and we shall say that the gods who live in this way have self-determinations.”
40. As Macrobius writes in Somn. Scip. 2.12.7 [Willis]: “Plotinus magis quam quisquam verborum parcus.”
41. Enn. III.5[50].9.9 from Aeschylus, A. 1312.
42. Enn. II.3[52].8.7 from Homer Il. VIII.556, also cited in the Oracle of Apollo, Plot. 22.51.
43. Enn. II.9[33].18.18 from Aeschylus, A. 242 and Euripides, Hipp. 793, Tr. 50, Or. 428.
44. Enn. III.4[15].1.7; III.6[26].6.26: “being lifeless”.
45. Enn. VI.1[42].26.29; VI.4[22].5.14; VI.6[34].8.9: “without mass”.
46. Enn. VI.5[23].8.36: “not being scattered”.
47. Enn. I.2[19].7.5: “immateriality”.
48. Enn. VI.8[39].19.14: “speaking with a hidden meaning”.
49. Enn. IV.6[41].3.30: “empowering”.
50. Enn. IV.3[27].4.25: “care”.
51. Enn. VI.7[38].15.26: “all faces”.
52. Enn. II.7[37].2.7: “exude”.
53. Enn. VI.3[44].23.4: “curiosity”.
54. Enn. VI.7[38].11.35: “the earth as such”.
55. Enn. VI.6[34].5.39–40 & 14.49: “the decad as such”.
56. Enn. VI.8[39].12.8 & 14: “being as such”.
57. Enn. V.3[49].17.33: “without seeing”.
58. Enn. VI.6[34].6.36: “afterthought”.
59. Enn. IV.3[27].14.2: “further set in order”.
60. Enn. VI.7[38].12.23; see Aristotle, de An. 1.2.405b28.
61. Enn. IV.4[28].22.30–31; see Plato, Cra. 400c7.
62. Enn. V.1[10].4.8–10; see Plato, Cra. 396b6–7.
63. Enn. V.1[10].7.35–6; cf. also Enn. V.5[32].3.20–24.
64. Note, moreover, the magnificent image that assimilates the world, which is a living being, to a tree containing the soul that makes it live (Enn. IV.3[27].4.26–31; for another occurrence of this image, see Enn. III.3[48].7.10–16).
65. Knowledge, Enn. I.3[20].3.3; virtue, Enn. VI.9[9].4.14–15; rises back up, Enn. I.6[1].8.22.
66. Enn. V.9[5].4.9–11; VI.1[10].1.1.
67. Enn. IV.3[27].4.26, 8.45, 13.16; VI.7[38].22.15; IV.4[28].1.29, 11.11, 32.31, 40.13.
68. All these passages refer to Phdr. 246c: Enn. I.3[20].3.2; I.8[51].14.20; V.3[49].4.13; II.9[33].4.1; IV.3[27].7.19; IV.8[6].1.37; VI.9[9].9.24.
69. Horses, Enn. II.3[52].13.15–16; III.3[48].1.12; worms, bugs and snakes, Enn. IV.4[28].4.26–33; mud and filth, Enn. I.6[1].5.42–4; body, Enn. VI.7[38].31.26.
70. Body of the world, Enn. III.2[47].3.14, 3.38, 7.6, 7.37; III.3[48].5.3, 6.4, 6.34; touch, Enn. II.1[40].6.9; eye and vision, Enn. I.8[51].5.19; II.4[12].5.9; IV.4[28].5.9, etc; sleep and dreams, Enn. III.6[26].5, 10, 18, 25, 6.68, 7.41; V.5[32].11.19.
71. Farmer, Enn. II.3[52].16.33; II.4[12].16.13; IV.3[27].4.31; judge, Enn. VI.4[22].6.9; legislator, Enn. V.9[5].5.28; ship, Enn. III.4[15].6.48; IV.3[27].17.23, 21.6.
72. Wine, Enn. II.3[52].17.24; clothing, Enn. III.6[26].18.20; embellishing, Enn. III.6[26].11.20.
73. World Soul, Enn. IV.4[28].39.12; our soul, Enn. II.9[33].7.5; whims, Enn. IV.4[28].17.23; VI.4[22].15.23.
74. Wrestling match, Enn. III.2[47].5.4; IV.3[27].32.27; army, Enn. II.3[52].13.29; III.3[48].2.4.
75. Person who rules a household, Enn. I.2[19].1.42; I.6[1].2.25, 3.6; II.9[33].18.3; V.5[32].4.31; theatre, Enn. III.2[47].11.13, 15.21, 33, 43, 16.8, 35, 17.18, 35, 18.22; dance and chorus, Enn. IV.4[28].8.46, 33.6, 34.28, 35.13; Intellect and the One, Enn. I.6[1].7.6, 19; 8.2; V.3[49].14.9; V.5[32].11.12; VI.9[9].11.13, 18, 30.
76. Enn. VI.6[34].18.48.
77. The sensible, Enn. I.4[46].10.14; the intelligible, Enn. II.9[33].16.33–56.
78. Reasonings, Enn. VI.9[9].5.12; Being, Enn. VI.6[34].12.5; Intellect, Enn. VI.7[38].9.44.
79. Leans forward, Enn. IV.4[28].3.1–3; IV.3[27].15.1; audacity, Enn. V.1[10].1.4; springs forth, Enn. VI.4[22].16.29.
80. Fatigued, Enn. IV.8[6].4.10–12; heavy, Enn. IV.3[27].15.6; childbirth, Enn. IV.3[27].13.31.
81. Enn. V.3[49].15.24.
82. Enn. VI.8[39].13.38.
83. Enn. VI.7[38].15.20.
84. Multiple, Enn. III.8[30].8.33; advances, Enn. VI.9[9].3.4.
85. Sees, Enn. VI.7[38].41.33–5; tracks, Enn. III.8[30].9.29; hides, Enn. V.5[32].7.31–3; strength, Enn. VI.2[43].21.8.
86. Enn. V.8[31].11.15.
87. Enn. I.4[46].10.32.
88. Enn. III.7[45].11.7.
89. Enn. III.8[30].4.9.
90. What is sensible, Enn. III.6[26].14.23; thrown out of being, Enn. II.5[25].
91. Porphyry, Plot.13, 18.
92. Philo, Life of Moses II.212; Questions on Genesis IV.92.
93. Epictetus, Dissertationes II.1.29–33.
94. Evil in the world, Enn. III.2[47].15.60; lower part of the soul, Enn. IV.4[28].29.8.
95. Memory & desire, Enn. IV.3[27].28.19; beauty, Enn. V.8[31].2.24.
96. Astrology, Enn. III.1[3].5.25; order reigns, Enn. III.2[47].13.18.
97. Enn. IV.3[27].26.12.