13) THE LONDON REVOLUTION IN POWER (1642)
Anyone who is seeking an explanation of the internal logic of the historical process certainly must understand that the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century, which re-created Great Britain from top to bottom, would have been impossible without the political revolution in the seventeenth century.
~Leon Trotsky1
On the heels of their victory, 15 March 1642, Parliament took a fateful step: the implementation of the previously passed Militia Bill “for the safety and defence of the kingdom” despite the king’s refusal to approve it. The bill gave Parliament, instead of Charles, the right to appoint the county Lords Lieutenant who controlled the Trained Bands. From now on, Parliamentary Ordinances had the force of law.2 “The militia issue, more than any other, propelled men along a path of radicalism, prompting the strongest attack on the King and the strongest assertion of Parliamentary supremacy that had been made.”3 Having succeeded in taking power in London, Parliament now had to establish control over the rest of the country.
The Ordinance was an escalation of the tense intra-ruling–class struggle, one that could not help but subvert the feudal political system, thereby advancing the goals of the London Puritan movement. Parliament here asserted itself as the dominant power in the land, even as it still defensively and absurdly postured as being merely opposed to the crown’s “evil counselors.”4 By this action it completed the long process of converting the 1215 Article 61 security clause,
that the barons choose five and twenty barons of the kingdom, whomsoever they will, who shall be bound with all their might, to observe and hold, and cause to be observed, the peace and liberties we [King John] have granted and confirmed to them by this our present Charter,5
into a bourgeois political institution. What had made this development possible were the unique conditions that existed in England: the historically evolved semi-independence of parliament; the secular reformation of religion by Henry VIII and Thomas Cromwell; and most organically, the long, uninterrupted growth of capitalist market relations. These factors resulted in the peculiar incongruity that gave a section of the aristocracy a leading, and limiting, role in the revolution. This accounts for the retention and partnership of the monarchy and aristocracy in the bourgeois order after 1688; indeed, down to the ludicrous but still reactionary role they play in Britain today.
Despite the revolutionary effect of some of their actions, the political conceptions of most MPs remained entangled with the feudal inheritance. Their aims were limited to redressing the “imbalance” between the king’s prerogative and Parliament’s “ancient liberties.” The sharpening effect of events forced those MPs and Lords who were determined to resist the king’s absolute power to counterpose their own power against it. Two months after the Militia Ordinance was proclaimed law,
…with war just weeks away, Lords and Commons agreed that the King was bound “to pass such Bills as shall be presented to him by both Houses.” Perceived need and the King’s intransigence brought both Houses to the position articulated by [Sir Henry] Marten alone less than nine months before.6
The contradiction in gentry politics, stemming from their twofold social position, here becomes glaring:
While it is imperative that the conservatism of most M.P.s, even after 1642, be recognized, it should not be forgotten that however moderate Pym and his followers seem in retrospect, the members of the House of Commons who remained at Westminster after the spring of 1642 were in many respects a revolutionary group. They were not consciously revolutionary like the Levellers. But they were revolutionary enough to contest the king’s religion and policy, execute his most trusted advisor, and take up arms against him.7 [Emphasis added]
It is this contradiction that so many historians have stumbled over, one way or the other. Pym’s position as leader of the opposition, a role he almost single-handedly invented, was predicated on his personal faithfulness to the institution of the monarchy.8 For Pym it was necessary to be, in effect, a loyal oppositionist (a concept that did not exist at that time).9 He “had been repeating since 1628, that the subversion of the fundamental laws was being attempted because the fundamental laws were an obstacle to the introduction of popery.”10 He did not try to force his program when there was serious opposition in the Commons, but waited until events favored a particular bill. By playing off the more extreme factions on the left and right against each other, providing justifications to placate reluctant MPs and peers, or proposing tactical compromises as events demanded, he continued to maintain a precarious unity in the Commons.11 Just how precarious would be revealed in the summer of 1643 when the House would very nearly vote to surrender to Charles.12
For his part, Charles marched his entourage to take control of the city of Hull with its large store of munitions, but was refused entrance by the governor. The Commons support for the governor’s action caused a general decampment of royalists: 32 noblemen and 60 MPs left London to join the king at York at the end of May.13 But during the spring and summer of 1642 Charles had little success in recruiting soldiers. “The crown had lost control over local government, over collection of taxes, over the army. ‘The King did not have the physical power to force the major part of his subjects to perform actions that they did not want to perform.’”14 Charles had no army or bureaucracy, no immediate rewards to offer potential supporters, no ability to make anyone fight for him, or to penalize any who opposed him. “The monarchy was reduced to its bare essence — the sentiment of loyalty to the person of the king.”15
Charles could only turn to the nobility and greater gentry. On 22 August, in the quaint, time-honored feudal manner, he “raised his standard” in Nottingham, formally calling on his nobles to come to his aid with their vassals. He called them to York, and announced “his intention of taking no important decisions without their agreement.” The parliamentary reform program was a threat to the ruling class of landowners, he argued. Destruction of the monarchy would lead to “‘a parity and confusion of all degrees and conditions.’”16 In a word, equality.
“In September 1642 Charles…could not trust the loyalty of the trained bands, even in counties which he controlled.”17 As in London, middling class artisans and yeomen were far from pro-royalist in many parts of the country.
The drive and organization that made the citizens’ victory in January possible came from the London Committee of Safety.18 “In the first few months after its election, it drew up practically every petition of the municipality, and all important business was referred to it.” A special tax for the defense of the City provided its funding, which was spent as the Committee saw fit, and it brought to the Council a plan to build watch-houses at strategic sites. The Committee worked closely with the House of Commons which, on 13 January, required the Lord Mayor to convene a Common Council meeting whenever the Committee of Safety requested one. He was also instructed to pass on to the Committee any orders from either House of Parliament. This overthrew the Mayor’s centuries-old traditional right to call the Council according to his judgment. In addition to overseeing disputed elections, on 22 January, the Committee was put in charge of the militia.19 A royalist attacked it for
“being armed with as much power as will serve the most desperate treasonable designes which either Saye or Pym should suggest, they now goe on without checke or controule, and beate downe all before them that stand in their way.”20
The enhanced power and independence of the Common Council and its Committee left the mayor and aldermen little choice but to carry out their decisions. To the same hostile contemporary, the City revolution seemed complete, “‘…my Lord Mayor having no more sway than Perkins the tailor, Rily the bodicemaker, or Nicholson the chandler, they may dispose of the wealth and power of the City as they please.’”21 This was not simply hyperbole; these were real men who now sat in the Common Council.22
But the old guard attempted to fight back. A majority of aldermen, a minority of Common Councilmen, and many officials were still royalists.23 On 16 February, thirteen aldermen and the Lord Mayor introduced a petition in the Lords contesting sole control of the militia by the Committee of Safety, a power they claimed had been their’s since “time out of mind.” Known as “Benyon’s petition,” it was brought a few days later to the Commons, which was alarmed by the more than 330 signatures that included some of the wealthiest and most prominent monopolists and Common Councilmen in London. Forty-six were from the Levant Company alone. The House impeached the City Recorder, Sir Thomas Gardiner, and Sir George Benyon, silk mercer, who were held to be the authors of the petition, on charges some of which dated back to 1639. Parliament found both men guilty and they were imprisoned. Charles however managed to get Benyon freed from the Tower, and he joined the king at Oxford. Almost two hundred signers of Benyon’s petition then prudently retracted their support in a 2 March petition to the Commons.24
Meanwhile, an attempt to have this counter-revolutionary militia petition read in the Common Council, in which the aldermen still sat, was defeated, despite the aldermen splitting 8 to 5 in favor. This was the first time that the aldermanic veto was suppressed. To remedy this and regain what they viewed as their rights, on 10 March the Court of Aldermen ordered that all petitions had to be approved by themselves before being submitted to the Common Council. Three days later, when the Committee of Safety requested a Council meeting, the Mayor refused on the grounds that he was ill. The Committee went to the House of Commons, which ordered him to appoint a replacement. A new petition addressed to Parliament was read at the Council meeting next day, but no vote was taken due to opposition from the majority of aldermen. The Council again took the matter to the Commons, which appointed a committee to investigate. The committee heard testimony from both sides and judged that the aldermen, at least in this case, had violated the Council’s rights.25
The issue did not end there, but dragged on into July 1642, with the royalist Mayor and aldermen obstructing the Council every way they could. On 22 July, Parliament put the Mayor on trial. Among the charges were his obstruction of Parliament’s order for war preparations, and his 10 June proclamation of the king’s Commission of Array, an antique feudal device Charles had resurrected in an attempt to raise troops. “Such commissions were first issued in 1324 but had last been employed in 1557…”26 The Mayor was found guilty on 12 August of these openly counter-revolutionary acts, and “‘imprisoned during the pleasure of the two Houses of Parliament.’”27
When Common Hall assembled to nominate a new mayor shortly afterward, Independent Alderman and MP Isaac Pennington was selected over several more senior members. The colonial trader Randall Mainwaring, a relative of Pennington’s, was made his deputy. The tight grip over the City of the monopoly merchant oligarchy, wedded to the royal court, had been broken. The powerful movement of the middling class — small producers and craft workers, domestic traders, sailors and shopkeepers — with the poor often in their train, led by radical Puritans and Atlantic merchants, and working in tandem with the House of Commons leadership, had carried out a political revolution in the capital. As if to underline the point, the royalist party refused to recognize Pennington, calling him “‘the pretended Lord Mayor.’” The outgoing Mayor refused to hand over the insignias of office which had to be taken from his house by force.28
The social groupings that had made up the old feudal ruling class, while not yet eliminated, had suffered a devastating setback. This enabled the pro-free trade bourgeois merchants, with the support of the bourgeoisified gentry, to come to power in London, the single most important center, not only in England, but in all three kingdoms. The deep division in the overseas merchant community during this entire period is emphasized by the fact that
of some four hundred or more different citizens who associated themselves with the constitutional royalists’ petitions of July 1641 [over nominees for Sheriff] and February 1642 [over control of the militia], only about ten can be found to have been active in the colonial trades.29
Of those who signed three key petitions – one against Colonel Lunsford; one favoring passage of the 1643 Impressment bill; and one in opposition to Benyon’s petition decrying the Militia Committee — twice as many became political Independents as political Presbyterians. Of those who initially served on the London Committee of Safety only one became a future Presbyterian, and two others wavered (“trimmers”). The other fourteen all became political Independents.30 This picture also distinctly contrasts with the pre-revolutionary aldermanic bench: “only five [out of twenty-four] Aldermen who were members of the Bench in September 1640 became energetic supporters of the parliamentary opposition…”31 The most revolutionary section of the capitalist class now ruled London.
The most pressing need of Parliament was money. The City government was already heavily indebted, and until the revolution in January 1642, hostile to the Commons’ requests for loans. So too were the royalist leaderships of most livery companies whose positions remained untouched by the City revolution. Atlantic merchants and their aristocratic Puritan partners offered Parliament one million pounds against confiscated lands for a private expedition to Ireland.32 Authorized by Parliament in June, 1642, an initial investment scheme raised 5,000 infantry and 500 cavalry by July, but these were redirected to meet Parliament’s needs for the Civil War. Despite this, the Irish committee contributed £100,000 to Parliament’s war effort against the king.33
A smaller project known as the Additional Sea Adventure to Ireland was arranged with the Puritan Lord Brooke in overall command of arrangements, Hugh Peter as chaplain, his brother Benjamin as Admiral, the future Leveller Thomas Rainsborough as vice admiral, and Robert Thomson, Maurice’s brother, as rear admiral. The sixteen-member commission overseeing the project included Maurice and eight of his relatives and business associates. Many of the non-merchant investors were or would become leaders in the City radical movement and officials in the Commonwealth of 1649-1653. Other backers were the MPs Sir Arthur Hasilrig, Lord Brooke’s brother-in-law, and Oliver Cromwell. This brought Independent radicals in Parliament and London together in joint activity at an early date. Their expenses were to be recompensed with land in Ireland by grant of Parliament. The Sea Adventurers spent six months fighting and plundering in Ireland before running out of money.34
The political composition of the Sea Adventure anticipated the New Model Army.
Linking new-merchant and nonmerchant radicals, future political independents, and a few future Levellers, the Additional Sea Adventure may be considered in some respects the first autonomous project of that City militant Puritan party, or alliance of forces, buoyed up by new recruits from New England and very much religiously Independent in character, that was to form the hard core of City radicalism, political independency, and republicanism throughout the 1640s.35
During this same period the Atlantic merchants were ramping up their interloping activities in the East Indies.36 In the Caribbean, Maurice Thomson’s extended group invested in sugar plantations, and entered the triangular trade of sugar, slaves and provisions needed to support them. They also carried out extensive raids against Spanish possessions throughout the region. These private pursuits were the forerunners of future governmental territorial conquests which “these traders would be closely involved with and profit from each.” Their aggressive economic program made them all the more determined to prevent any compromise between Parliament and the king.37
The leadership position of the colonizing merchants was due both to their ability to advance money to Parliament, and their ability to mobilize the city’s citizens through their strong connections to the middling class. The revolutionary overthrow of the London oligarchy by the armed people had been all that stood between the survival of the Commons, and its crushing by the royal court. The Independent radicals were subsequently the most active in establishing and administering the financial apparatus to fund the army. This gave them “a leverage on the course of affairs far out of proportion” to their size over the Commons, or their weight in the City government.38
With the sizable desertion of royalists from both Houses in late May, Parliament passed the Nineteen Propositions on 1 June, 1642, and sent them to the king the next day. This was a concise programmatic list of Parliament’s demands written by Pym. Presented by him as a basis for negotiations, it was an obvious ultimatum. The demands included Parliament’s approval of all leading government and military officials, and official policies; approval of the education and marriage proposals of the king’s children; strict enforcement of recusancy laws against Catholics, and the elimination of Catholic votes in the House of Lords; the king’s approval for “assistance” to “preaching ministers,” and for laws against “innovations and superstition;” his approval of the Militia Ordinance; restoration to office of sitting Members and Lords; an oath for judges and Privy Councilors to support the Petition of Right; that the positions of judges and officers depend only on their good behavior, rather than the king’s pleasure; acceptance of Parliament’s justice against “delinquents” (i.e., royalists who refused to pay taxes authorized by Parliament); the disbandment of the king’s army; foreign alliance with Protestant states; withdrawal of the charges against the Five Members; and that membership in the House of Lords be subject to approval of both Houses. They offered, once again, to take over the royal finances, promising to provide “sufficient to support your Royal Dignity in Honour and Plenty…”39 The king’s lengthy rejection came little more than two weeks later.
Also in June, the House of Commons passed an ordinance, based on a proposal by Pennington, “calling on everyone to make voluntary contributions of money, plate or horse for the country’s service.”40 Four Puritan Aldermen who were members of the Militia Committee (and two of whom were Atlantic merchants) were chosen to administer the collections from the Haberdashers’ Hall. They would become “Parliament’s leading financiers and financial administrators between 1643 and 1645.”41 Thirty Atlantic merchants sat on local ward committees for receiving voluntary contributions.42 This interim measure prepared the way, the following November, for a full-blown tax called a weekly assessment. Until then, however, “…Parliament had no source of regular revenue, nor did it have any administrative machinery for the collection of taxes.”43 And by early 1643 the assessment would prove inadequate by itself; events would force Parliament to raise more taxes for its defense. Thus in the long run, this was only a major first step in establishing an income to prosecute the war against the king.44 Parliament also had recourse to loans from its wealthy bourgeois supporters in the City.
Along with money, the rank-and-file of Parliament’s army under the command of the Earl of Essex was also largely supplied by Londoners. “It was claimed that 8,000 apprentices of London joined the Army in the summer of 1642.”45 “The tradesmen of London gave mass support to Parliament…and the first to enlist were 71 dyers, 88 butchers, 186 weavers, 157 tailors, 124 shoemakers, 88 brokers and 49 sadlers.”46 Apprenticeships could cost £100-£200 or even more; they were generally filled by younger sons of gentlemen, or sons of yeoman, husbandmen, or clergy, in addition to those of the urban bourgeois class.47
The middling people and rural yeomen Parliament depended on largely saw the conflict as one for godly reformation, a cause they were most militant about.48
…parliament was pledged to the reform of the church and to the reformation of men’s lives; it was supported by the leading reforming preachers; and so those who looked for reform of the church in a more protestant direction and for vigorous efforts to suppress vice and promote godliness, inevitably gravitated towards the parliamentary side.49
For many Puritans, Parliament was a means to an end.50 Even those less religiously passionate were often driven into Parliament’s arms (and army) by the hostility and low ways of Cavalier mercenary or impressed troops. “…Clarendon criticized ‘the license, disorder, and impiety’ of the king’s soldiers.”51 Despite some lackluster admonitions from Charles,52 “in mid-October 1642 [he] authoris[ed] Yorkshire royalists to ‘plunder the estates, to kill and destroy all those that are well affected to the parliament.’”53
By the early autumn of 1642, 12,000 infantry volunteers, along with a large number of horsemen, were enrolled specifically to fight outside of London under the Earl of Essex. This was in addition to the militia, which by now had nine regiments for a total of about 10,000 men to defend the City. The commanding officers were mostly Militia Committee members, and the 40 captains were overwhelmingly livery company men or merchants.54 In October, the Trained Bands took a significant step, resolving to join Essex’s forces in the field, where they played a leading role in the battle at Edgehill.55 A contemporary witness wrote:
“The Trained Bands of the City of London endured the chief heat of the day, and had the honour to win it, for being now upon the brow of the hill, they lay not only open to the horse, but the canon of the enemy, yet they stood undaunted.” 56
Traditionally, militias were for defense, and not expected to go beyond the boundaries of their counties, which contemporaries often referred to as their “countries.” Peasants and artisans fought bravely in defense of their homes. However they would not fight very far from their localities, and returned to them as soon as the danger was past to pursue their livelihoods.57 The difficulties with the king’s armies during the Bishops’ Wars at the Scottish border were in part due to the resentment of men recruited or impressed in London or elsewhere being sent so far away. This same issue would affect both armies during the Civil War,58 but especially the king’s; chronically short of men the Cavaliers resorted to impromptu impressment to a great extent. The London Trained Bands would again join the army in August of 1643 to relieve the siege of Gloucester in the west, a Parliamentary garrison town. Once again they distinguished themselves a few weeks later in the First Battle of Newbury.
Aristocrats were contemptuous of the new “citizen army” in London, but when the king’s nephew, Prince Rupert, was about to invade in November 1642, it was the Trained Bands and the Auxiliary volunteers recruited under Warwick who were crucial in blocking his attempt at a quick victory.59 Recruitment was encouraged through an October appeal by John Goodwin, Puritan minister of St. Stephen’s, Coleman Street, in support of Parliament and “a war for religion.”60
In some towns, such as Gloucester, Nottingham and Manchester, parliamentarians were sizable minorities, but in these and many others, such as Portsmouth, Bristol, Worcester, and Chichester it was the middling class who were strongest for Parliament.61 Birmingham and nearby Coventry were staunchly Parliamentarian: when the king tried to enter the latter in August 1642, he was refused entrance by between one and two thousand armed citizens from the city and vicinity, organized under John Barker, “a prosperous draper, alderman and MP for the city.” Not just the towns, but areas around them took Parliament’s side. The four to five thousand people of Birmingham and surrounding villages, who manufactured metal goods, sent 15,000 swords to the Parliamentary army. They not only refused to supply the royalists, but they arrested anyone suspected of buying arms for the king. Prior to the inconclusive October 1642 battle of Edgehill in the Midlands, the local people around Birmingham hid their provisions from the Cavaliers, “‘and the very smiths hid themselves, that they might not be compelled to shoe the horses’” of the pro-feudal army. By contrast the Earl of Essex’s army had no trouble obtaining provisions.62 Again at Birmingham, in April 1643, it was the “‘middle and inferior sort of people’” who opposed Prince Rupert, over the heads of the “‘better sort.’”63 Rupert took his revenge: “The royalists plundered the town, and took some £1,000 in money and goods… They fired the town, destroying 87 houses and leaving 340 people homeless.”64
In the West Riding of Yorkshire, a cloth-making area, the parliamentarian Lord Fairfax and his son Sir Thomas were highly popular with the people. Nonetheless the Fairfaxes signed a treaty with local royalist gentry to keep the Riding neutral. The peace collapsed within a month, not least because Parliament rejected it in no uncertain language.65 Sir Thomas raised an army from the clothing towns which drove back royalist assaults at Leeds and Bradford.66 With Fairfax’s army away in December 1642, Bradford was again saved by a remnant of determined men with reinforcements from Halifax. Less than a hundred men with no organization or officers drove off a royalist force of 1,000, to the latter’s great surprise.67 But by the early spring of 1643 the Fairfaxes were in desperate straits; repeated appeals to Parliament for money and men had brought neither. All the more striking then was Sir Thomas’ victory at Wakefield against a force twice the size of his own in May.68
The year 1642 saw substantial gains in the consolidation of the Revolution in London and Parliament, the two closely connected and interdependent. The Common Council, composed of bourgeois merchants and business men from the livery companies, led by its Militia Committee, took over the municipal power in London, just as Parliament, led by improving gentry and noble investors, emerged as a fully independent central state power committed to the new capitalist order. Enthusiasm for the cause of Parliament in London solidified the revolutionary militia, and recruited a volunteer army against the king. But the hold of the revolution in London remained incomplete. The reasons why and the consequences will be examined in Chapter 15.
First we must look at the spontaneous support for Parliament that existed among much of the peasantry and rural artisans in the countryside.
1 “Mr. Baldwin and ‘Gradualness,’” in Leon Trotsky on Britain, 51
2 “The Militia Ordinance, 1642,” BCW Project, http://bcw-project.org/church-and-state/first-civil-war/militia-ordinance Accessed June 20, 2016; “Declaration concerning the Militia,” House of Commons Journal Volume 2: 15 March 1642, British History Online, https://www.british-history.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol2/pp478-479#h3-0010 Accessed November 7, 2019; “That the People are bound by the Ordinance for the Militia, though it has not received the Royal Assent,” House of Lords Journal Volume 4: 15 March 1642, British History Online, https://www.british-history.ac.uk/lords-jrnl/vol4/pp645-646#p39 Accessed February 18, 2020
3 Schwoerer, “the Militia Controversy,” 75
4 Pennington, “The Making of the War, 1640-1642,” 184
5 “Magna Carta 1215,” http://avalon.law.yale.edu/medieval/magframe.asp Accessed June 1, 2017
6 Taft, “The Good Old Cause,” 450
7 Palmer, “Oliver St. John,” 21
8 Hexter, King Pym, 201-202
9 Zaller, “The Concept of Opposition,” 232
10 Russell, “The First Army Plot of 1641,” 104-105
11 Hexter, King Pym, 19-22, 31-35, 59-61, 135; Lotte Glow, “Pym and Parliament: The Methods of Moderation,” Journal of Modern History 36, no. 4 (December 1964): 373, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1875246 Accessed November 28, 2016
12 See Chapter 16 below.
13 Green, History of the English People Vol. 5, 164
14 Hill, “Parliament and People in 17th-Century England” [revised], in The Collected Essays of Christopher Hill Vol. 3, 52, quoting Conrad Russell.
15 Manning, English People, 249
16 Manning, English People, 250-251
17 Hill, “Parliament and People in 17th-Century England” [revised], 52
18 Not to be confused with the jointly-appointed Committee of Safety in Parliament, composed of MPs and Lords, which was far less important and is not discussed here. For the Parliamentary committee, see Lotte Glow, “The Committee of Safety,” English Historical Review 80, no. 315 (April 1965), http://www.jstor.org/stable/560134 Accessed November 28, 2016.
19 Pearl, London and the Outbreak, 146-147; Nagel, “The Militia of London,” 43
20 Nagel, “The Militia of London,” 45
21 Pearl, London and the Outbreak, 148
22 Pearl, London and the Outbreak, 137, 148 fn. 163, 164
23 Pearl, London and the Outbreak, 145
24 Pearl, London and the Outbreak, 149-151; Lindley, Civil War London, 201-202, 204-205; Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, 371-372. Pearl lists him as Benion.
25 Pearl, London and the Outbreak, 151-154
26 Joyce L. Malcolm, “A King in Search of Soldiers: Charles I in 1642,” The Historical Journal 21, no. 2 (June 1978): 256, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638260 Accessed June 15, 2019
27 Pearl, London and the Outbreak, 155-157
28 Pearl, London and the Outbreak, 157-158; Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, 373
29 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, 388, Table 7.1
30 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, 398-399
31 Pearl, London and the Outbreak, 114
32 Pearl, London and the Outbreak, 94, 207-208
33 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, 402
34 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, 403-407, 409
35 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, 409-410
36 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, 169-170, 174-175
37 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, 410-411
38 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, 397, 429
39 “The Nineteen Propositions,” Rushworth Historical Collections: June 1642, British History Online, https://www.british-history.ac.uk/rushworth-papers/vol4/pp722-751#h3-0002 Accessed February 19, 2020
40 Pearl, London and the Outbreak, 209; “Ordinance of both Houses, for bringing in Plate, Money, and Horses,” House of Lords Journal Volume 5: 9 June 1642, British History Online, https://www.british-history.ac.uk/lords-jrnl/vol5/pp120-123#h3-0031 Accessed October 23, 2020
41 Pearl, London and the Outbreak, 210
42 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, 429-430
43 Hexter, King Pym, 15
44 Pearl, London and the Outbreak, 210; Johnson, “Disintegration of the Parliamentarian War Effort,” 87-89
45 Manning, English People, 216
46 Manning, English People, 262-263
47 Grassby, “Social Mobility and Business Enterprise,” 356-357, 364-365
48 Manning, English People, 264-265
49 Manning, English People, 265-266
50 Manning, “The Godly People,” 87
51 Manning, “The Godly People,” 91; Fletcher, Outbreak, 327, 328
52 Fletcher, Outbreak, 328, 333
53 Johnson, “Disintegration of the Parliamentarian War Effort,” 49
54 Nagel, “The Militia of London,” 57
55 Pearl, London and the Outbreak, 251; Gardiner, Great Civil War Vol. I, 44; Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, 428
56 Johnson, “Disintegration of the Parliamentarian War Effort,” 196
57 Manning, English People, 246-247; Fletcher, Outbreak, 327
58 Johnson, “Disintegration of the Parliamentarian War Effort,” 183; Underdown, Pride’s Purge, 26-27; Brailsford, The Levellers, 13, 147
59 Manning, English People, 216; Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, 428
60 Manning, “The Godly People,” 88
61 Manning, English People, 262
62 Manning, English People, 218-220
63 Manning, English People, 262
64 Manning, Aristocrats, Plebeians, 61
65 Johnson, “Disintegration of the Parliamentarian War Effort,” 49; Gardiner, Great Civil War Vol. I, 38-39; Keith Lindley, “The Part Played by the Catholics,” in Politics, Religion and the English Civil War, ed. Brian Manning (London: Edward Arnold, 1973), 165. Johnson suggests that this may have been a delaying tactic to forestall an invasion of Yorkshire by royalist forces, though he admits that Lord Fairfax’s initial concerns “were for peace, order and security.” 49-50
66 Manning, English People, 231-232
67 Manning, English People, 232-233
68 Johnson, “Disintegration of the Parliamentarian War Effort,” 55