There Are Such
Things as Miracles
Halsey and Kurita at Leyte Gulf
Christopher J. Anderson
By the autumn of 1944 even the most dedicated Japanese naval officer could recognize that things were not going well in his country's war with the United States and its allies. Beginning with their seizure of the Marshall Islands in February, the third year of the war had been marked by a string of Allied victories. Everywhere, it seemed the Americans were inexorably advancing in a vast and overwhelming tide that was seizing all of the territory the Japanese had gained during the heady days of 1941 and 1942.
In the summer of 1944 the situation took a further turn for the worse when, in response to efforts to defeat American forces fighting to secure the Marianas Islands—including the critical island of Saipan—Adm. Jisaburo Ozawa's 1st Mobile Fleet had been decisively defeated at the Battle of the Philippine Sea on June 19-20, 1944. Known derisively by the Americans as the “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot,” the disaster cost Ozawa all but forty-seven of his 473 operational aircraft, as well as two of the Emperor's precious aircraft carriers. With the Marianas Islands in American hands, Japanese planners knew that the enemy was now within range of the home islands. Soon, waves of American B-29 bombers would be exacting revenge for the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor by mercilessly bombing Japanese cities. In the wake of Ozawa's defeat, Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, who had done so much to propel his nation into conflict with the United States, was forced to resign. After the fall of Saipan, one prescient Japanese observer was overheard to remark that, “Hell is on us.”
“Act Faithfully and Well”
To forestall this, Japanese planners met in July 1944 to try and determine what to expect next from the enemy and to prepare a course of action that could be followed in response to whatever direction the Americans struck. The resulting “Sho” (Victory) plan, which required that all available resources be carefully husbanded until needed, provided four alternative defensive operations that could be activated as soon as the Americans made their next move. Sho-1 would be activated in response to an attack on the Philippines, Sho-2 for the Kuriles and Ryukyus, Sho-3 for southern Japan, and Sho-4 for northern Japan. Each of these plans was considered an all or nothing operation intended to provide one last opportunity to secure a decisive victory over the Allies and forestall Japan's total collapse. For any of these plans to be successful, however, the Japanese would need to achieve a level of cooperation among their forces that had heretofore been lacking. They would also need time to train pilots who could replace those lost in the Marianas Islands.
Time ran out in October 1944. In preparation for the upcoming American naval offensive, Rear Adm. William F. Halsey began a series of air attacks starting as far to the north as Okinawa and working southward to the Philippines. Intended to confuse the enemy as to the time and place of the next attack and to further weaken their defenses, the Japanese responded by sending out what available aircraft they had to drive off the American planes.
Adm. Soemu Toyoda, the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet, was in Formosa on October 12 when Halsey's aircraft struck that island. Believing the attack heralded the start of the invasion of Formosa, Toyoda ordered a partial activation of Sho-2 and sent every available aircraft to attack the Americans. Unfortunately, the air battles in the first weeks of October were merely a repeat of what had happened four months before. Vice Adm. Shigeru Fukodome commented after the American raid that “our fighters were nothing but so many eggs thrown at the stone wall of the indomitable enemy formation.”1
Although the Japanese achieved limited successes—sinking two Allied cruisers—the air battles of September and October were a serious setback to the possible success of the Sho plan. The poorly trained Japanese pilots were simply no match for the Americans; slightly more than half of the 1,000 aircraft the Japanese had gathered since June fell to Halsey's planes. The battle over Formosa seriously diminished what little airpower the Japanese now had available to implement whichever of the Sho plans finally became necessary.
Meanwhile, as Halsey's aircraft were clearing the skies of Japanese planes, the massive U.S. fleet began to assemble at Hollandia and elsewhere along the coast of New Guinea to begin its journey north. Although there had been a good deal of wrangling between Gen. Douglas MacArthur, who favored an American landing to liberate the Philippines, and Adm. Chester Nimitz, who favored bypassing the Philippines altogether in favor of an attack on Formosa, by September MacArthur's appeals had their desired effect and President Franklin Roosevelt had made the decision to launch the next Allied attack on the Philippines. Scheduled to begin with an invasion of Leyte on December 20, 1944, the date of the invasion was advanced to October after Halsey excitedly reported that the island was poorly defended and could be taken with little effort.
Believing that the moment had arrived to return to the Philippines, the Americans prepared to launch a massive combined overall command of the operation. Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger's 6th Army would land on the island, while Vice Adm. Thomas Kinkaid's massive 700-ship 7th Fleet supported the operation from Leyte Gulf. Meanwhile, in the unlikely event that the Japanese fleet was able to sail south toward the invasion fleet, Halsey, operating under orders not from MacArthur but from Nimitz, was commanded to use his 3rd Fleet to “cover and support forces of [the] Southwest Pacific in order to assist the seizure and occupation objectives in the Central Philippines... and destroy enemy naval and air forces in or threatening the Philippines Area. . . In case opportunity for destruction of major portion of enemy fleet offers or can be created, such destruction becomes the primary task.” 2
Although the two principal fleets were operating under different commanders—Kinkaid under MacArthur and Halsey under Nimitz—it was believed that operations had been going smoothly up to this point, so a split command would not pose any major difficulties.
Despite the most powerful naval force ever known assembled against them, the Japanese remained unaware of exactly where the Americans would strike next—and therefore unable to activate the appropriate Sho plan—until the morning of October 17, when Japanese observers on the tiny Philippine island of Suluan reported that they spotted American ships. The men of the 6th Ranger Battalion had come ashore on Suluan, Dina-gat, and Homophon to secure these islands in preparation for the arrival of Kinkaid's 7th Fleet. Reports of the American advance on the Philippines were received by Admiral Toyoda, who realized that the time had come to initiate Sho-1 and finally check the American advance.3 After further discussion among senior Japanese naval officers, at 1110 on the morning of October 18, 1944, Toyoda gave the order to execute Sho-1.
Although Toyoda was unhappy with the prospect of launching his fleet in the face of an enemy overwhelmingly superior in air and naval power, later commenting that making the decision, to activate Sho-1 was “ as difficult as swallowing molten iron, ”4 he knew that the loss of the Philippines would sever the home islands from their valuable oil supplies in the East Indies, which would have a catastrophic effect on the Japanese war effort. If Japan were to have any hope of survival, therefore, the Philippines must be retained.
Sho-1 called for the Japanese to order what remained of their widely scattered forces to converge at Brunei, where Adm. Takeo Kurita would lead them to attack the American fleet at Leyte Gulf. If he arrived quickly enough, it was hoped that Kurita could destroy Kinkaid's 7th Fleet before the Americans became strong enough to secure total control of the archipelago. To prevent Halsey's 3rd Fleet from coming to the aid of Kinkaid, the Japanese planned to use an additional force to entice the Americans northward.
Map 14. Sho-: Japan's Last Chance
Toyoda knew that in order to lure Halsey away from the landing area he would have to provide a target that was sufficiently tempting to ensure the Americans' pursuit. Since the air battles in the Philippine Sea and at Formosa had destroyed what little remained of Japanese naval airpower, the decision was made to offer up the Empire's remaining aircraft carriers as bait. This sacrificial force was commanded by Ozawa and consisted of four carriers, two battleships that had been converted to aircraft carriers by the addition of improvised flight decks, and eleven cruisers.5 As carriers had come to dominate naval operations by this point in the war, it was reasoned that the site of what remained of Japan's carrier force would be too lucrative a target for the aggressive Admiral Halsey to pass up.
After arriving in Brunei on October 20, Kurita and his staff briefed the assembled officers aboard his flagship, the cruiser Atago. The plan called for Kurita to split his force into two wings that would travel to Leyte on two separate routes. To the north, the 1st Strike Force under the overall command of Kurita consisted of five battleships, including Yamato and Musashi, the largest and most powerful battleships ever built, seven cruisers, and fifteen destroyers. This force would travel across the Philippine archipelago via the Sibuyan Sea. After passing through the San Bernardino Strait, Kurita would travel around Samar and descend on Kinkaid from the north. Meanwhile, a smaller but still potent force of two battleships, one cruiser, and four destroyers, led by Vice Adm. Shoji Nishimura, would strike Leyte from the south after crossing the Sulu Sea, traveling past Mindanao through the Surigao Strait. As the two forces traversed the narrow passages toward Leyte, what little ground-based aircraft that remained to the Japanese would take to the sky and provide air cover. If everything went well, the two pincers would arrive almost simultaneously at Leyte on October 25 (see Map 14).
Every one of the officers present for Kurita's briefing knew that this was a desperate gamble likely to result in the sinking of many of the Emperor's finest ships. They also knew they had no other option but to proceed. If they succeeded, they could save their embattled country. If they failed, they would at least ensure that the Imperial fleet met an honorable end. Before the briefing was adjourned, Kurita addressed his officers:
I know that many of you are strongly opposed to this assignment. But the war situation is far more critical than any of you can possibly know. Would it not be a shame to have the fleet remain intact while our nation perishes? I believe that Imperial General Headquarters is giving us a glorious opportunity. Because I realize how very serious the war situation actually is, I am willing to accept this ultimate assignment to storm into Leyte Gulf.
You must all remember that there are such things as miracles. What man can say that there is no chance for our fleet to turn the tide of war in a decisive battle? We shall have a chance to meet our enemies. We shall engage his task forces. I hope that you will not carry out your duties lightly. I know you will act faithfully and well.6
On the same day Kurita briefed his officers, General MacArthur returned to the Philippines at the head of one of the most powerful armadas the world had ever seen. American forces were able to take advantage of the confusion among the Japanese defenders to quickly establish a beachhead on Leyte. While troops and supplies of the 6th Army stormed ashore, Kinkaid's 7th Fleet pounded enemy positions with the guns of its battleships and cruisers.
When the meeting aboard Atago adjourned, the Japanese officers returned to their ships and began the preparations necessary to get Kurita's force under way. Japanese sailors, inspired by the sight of the Combined Fleet anchored at Brunei and believing they had an opportunity to reverse the course of the war, worked diligently throughout October 21 to prepare their ships. By evening everything was ready. On the morning of October 22, Kurita's 1st Strike Force sailed from Brunei toward Palawan, with his flagship in the van just behind a screen of destroyers. As they sailed toward their destination, Kurita was cheered to learn that three cruisers and four destroyers, commanded by Vice Adm. Kihohide Shima, were coming from Formosa to reinforce his southern wing. The latest additions to Kurita's strike force were instructed to travel south and join Nishimura, who had left Brunei on October 23, before entering the Surigao Strait. So far, everything had gone as well as could be expected; the forces had joined and were now traveling rapidly toward the Philippines.7
Strike for Leyte
Lying in the path of Kurita's advancing ships were two submarines on patrol near the Palawan Passage, USS Darter, commanded by Cmdr. David McClintock, and USS Dace, commanded by Cmdr. Bladen D. Claggett. Just after midnight on October 23, Darter's radar picked up signals indicating that an enemy convoy was approaching. Immediately, the two submarines submerged and positioned themselves to attack what they assumed was a relief convoy traveling toward the Philippines' Japanese defenders. As their screens lit up with a number of blips, radar operators on the two submarines soon realized that this was no convoy.
Trained to attack regardless of the odds, the two U.S. submarine commanders positioned themselves immediately in front of the Japanese force and prepared to launch all of their torpedoes at the advancing ships. Both commanders hurriedly plotted targets at several of the larger blips on their radar operators' screens. Soon, a volley of torpedoes shot out from the two submarines, quickly followed by another volley. Shortly after the second volley left their tubes, the crews of the two submarines could hear a series of explosions. Quickly raising their periscopes, the skippers saw two destroyers and a cruiser breaking up under the damage caused by multiple torpedo hits. McClintock later remembered that the cruiser was:
a mass of billowing smoke from the number one turret to the stem. No superstructure could be seen. Bright orange flames shot from the side along the main deck from the bow to the after turret. Cruiser was already down by the bow, which was dipping under. Number one turret was at water level. She was definitely finished. Five hits had her sinking and in flames. It is estimated that there were few if any survivors.8
With his thoughts focused on the difficulties of bringing his force through the Sibuyan Sea without fighter cover, Kurita was startled by the explosions that erupted to his front and right as two of his destroyers and the heavy cruiser Myoko burst into flames and staggered under the blows of enemy torpedoes. The stunned admiral quickly regained his senses, however, and over the objections of some of his officers who wanted to look for survivors, ordered that the fleet continue toward the Philippines without delay. Aware of the long odds against success, Kurita accepted that his force would suffer casualties; what was most important was that he bring as much of his strength as possible to the north side of Leyte Gulf by October 25.
Soon after ordering his fleet to continue, Kurita contacted the commander of the 1st Air Fleet on Luzon, Vice Adm. Takajiro Onishi, and alerted him to the fact that his force had been attacked and that early the next day he could expect to be visited by aircraft of the now alerted American fleet. Onishi agreed and responded with a request to attack Halsey's forces immediately. Even though they had been able to husband a fair number of aircraft throughout the Philippine Islands, Kurita knew that the numbers were insufficient, and the pilots too ill trained to launch an air attack on the massive American fleet with any hope of causing serious damage. Thus, Kurita denied Onishi's request and instead ordered him to gather as many aircraft as possible to provide what air cover he could to Kurita's force. As if to ensure that his orders would be carried out, Kurita concluded his last message to Onishi with a reminder that “the future of the nation rests with the fleet.”9
As the Japanese ships sailed on, hurriedly dropping a number of depth charges as they passed the crews of the two U.S. submarines congratulated themselves on what, by almost any reckoning, had been a tremendously successful evening. What was more important than the sinking of the heavy cruiser Myoko,however, was the information that the Combined Fleet had come out to do battle. While the crew of Darter began to celebrate, McClintock alerted Admiral Halsey that there was a large Japanese fleet headed toward Leyte Gulf.
Halsey Hits Back
Halsey, eager to come to grips with the Japanese, alerted Kinkaid of the approaching enemy force and spent the remainder of October 23 preparing for their arrival. As soon as it was light enough to launch aircraft, Halsey sent up pairs of Hellcats and Helldivers to search for Kurita's fleet along the most likely approaches to Leyte. One of these search parties consisted of three planes launched from USS Intrepid at 0600 on the morning of October 24. At 0812, while flying over the Sibuyan Sea, one of these aircraft spotted Kurita's fleet steaming along the western side of the Tablas Strait, headed for the San Bernardino Strait. Within ten minutes this information had been radioed back to Halsey on board USS New Jersey. Following quickly on the heels of the sighting of Kurita's force was news that aircraft from USS Enterprise had located and attacked Nishi-mura's force of two battleships, a cruiser, and several destroyers. Although he had yet to find the Japanese carriers, Halsey now knew where the bulk of the Japanese forces were located and he quickly devised his plan of attack.10 His available force was divided into three task groups: Task Group 38.4, commanded by Rear Adm. Ralph E. Davidson (off Leyte Gulf); 38.2, commanded by Rear Adm. Gerald F. Bogan (east of the San Bernardino Strait); and 38.3, commanded by Frederick C. Sherman (east of Luzon). A fourth, Task Force 38.1, commanded by Adm. John McCain, had been detached and sent to Ulithi for rest and resupply.
Seeking to come to blows with the enemy, while at the same time mindful of his order to support Kinkaid's now alerted 7th Fleet and nervous that the report of Kurita's sighting made no mention of aircraft carriers, Halsey ordered his three remaining task forces to concentrate. While Admiral Sherman was charged with patrolling the northern approaches to Leyte, Admirals Davidson and Bogan were immediately ordered to launch their aircraft against Kurita's advancing forces. Aware of Nishimura's approach, Kinkaid detached all of his larger ships to defend the Surigao Strait and to prepare for the Japanese southern strike force's arrival. Although he cursed himself for the overconfidence that had permitted him to send McCain to Ulithi, Halsey believed, quite rightly, that he still possessed a force potent enough to cause serious damage to Kurita's ships.
After quickly formulating a plan of attack, Halsey contacted his task force commanders, relayed the necessary information on the approaching Japanese formation, and ordered, “Strike! Repeat. Strike!”11 Hellcat and Helldiver pilots aboard the carriers of the 3rd Fleet quickly scrambled and were soon ready to launch attacks on Kurita's fast approaching ships.
Since his radio messages with Kurita the night before, Onishi had been busy preparing to rush his aircraft to the support of the approaching Japanese ships. As soon as it was light, the first of Onishi's planes were in the sky and headed to Kurita's aid. Very early on the morning of October 24, the skies above the Sibuyan Sea was full of hundreds of Japanese and American aircraft all racing toward Kurita.
Fortunately for Kurita, Onishi's planes won the race. A force of fifty planes had taken position above the Japanese fleet by 0958 and was waiting when the first of the American air attacks reached their target. At 1026 a force of twenty-one fighters, twelve dive-bombers, and twelve torpedo bombers from the aircraft carriers Intrepid and Cabot reached the Japanese fleet and were staggered by what they saw.12 Although the size of the enemy force had been reported earlier, actually seeing an armada of such power was truly awe-inspiring. The Americans did not have long to gawk before Japanese aircraft waiting overhead pounced.
Although the Japanese pilots were not as experienced as their American counterparts, they had the advantage of numbers, surprise, and the overwhelming number of antiaircraft guns of the ships below. A quick pass by Japanese aircraft downed two of the American fighters and three of the dive-bombers before they even had time to react. Soon, American fighter aircraft had engaged the Japanese, while the remaining dive-bombers regrouped and dove on the fleet, focusing on the huge battleships that lay in the center of Kurita's force.
Despite their bravery, the American dive-bombers never had an opportunity to launch an effective attack. Six of the bombers were blown apart before they even had a chance to launch their weapons. A seventh, badly damaged by enemy fire, crashed into one of the Japanese destroyers in a final act of defiance. Of the remaining eleven aircraft that managed to escape the intense enemy flak, three were destroyed after releasing their torpedoes and the remainder managed to escape intact.
Everything had not gone in favor of the Japanese, however. Of the three torpedoes the Americans had been able to launch, two found their mark. One struck the battleship Nagato. In addition, seven Japanese aircraft had been destroyed. Damage reports from Nagato indicated that it could continue, but its speed would be reduced. Kurita knew that although he had driven off the first American force, others would quickly follow. Slowing the speed of his fleet to that of his slowest ship, Kurita awaited the next attack.
Meanwhile, the stunned survivors of the first American air strike warned their oncoming comrades of what they were about to face. Undaunted Halsey ordered additional air strikes. At 1245 a second strike force from Lexington and Essex reached Kurita. Unlike the first failed attack, additional Japanese aircraft sent by Onishi to relieve the initial flight did not surprise the Americans in this second wave. Nevertheless, after twenty minutes of intense aerial combat, Kurita drove off the attack, but at far greater cost. Faced by far more experienced pilots who were ready for them, twenty-three of Onishi's airplanes were shot from the sky, at a cost of only three enemy fighters. American bombers had braved the intense antiaircraft fire and managed to successfully hit the giant Musashi with several torpedoes. Although their attack did not sink her, she was sufficiently damaged that she would be unable to keep up with the fleet. While some of the American pilots focused their attention on Musashi, others renewed their attacks on the already damaged Nagato. Unable to maneuver quickly because of damage suffered during the first strike, Nagato could not avoid a string of torpedoes that struck her port side. At 1259, just moments after she was hit, Nagato listed to port and sank.
As the second wave of American aircraft slipped back to their carriers in the east, Kurita surveyed the damage. He had already suffered the loss of two battleships, a cruiser, and two destroyers, losses that under normal circumstances would have sent most naval officers reeling. Several of his staff urged him to retire and save what remained of his fleet before additional American strikes came. Remembering the desperate nature of his mission, however, Kurita decided to continue.
No Matter the Cost
Despite the losses he had suffered, Kurita reasoned that he still possessed a powerful force that might inflict a crippling blow on the Americans if it could reach the transports at Leyte. Unwilling to delay any longer, he silenced critics on his staff, and his own fears, and forged on. For the next several hours the air attacks continued and Kurita's force suffered additional damage. After a 1330 attack, the mighty Musashi was so severely damaged that her commander informed Kurita that the battleship was sinking and would have to be abandoned. The news of Musashi's fate staggered Kurita, who wondered if perhaps they were hoping for too much.
Jubilant American aircrews reported back to Halsey that they had inflicted punishing blows on the Japanese. The commander of the 3rd Fleet was convinced that his airplanes had eliminated Kurita's force as an effective threat. Now all he had to do was to find the enemy's carrier forces and he could complete the destruction of the Japanese fleet. Unaware of exactly where Ozawa was, Halsey urged Sherman to step up his reconnaissance missions while he prepared to take the three task groups of the 3rd Fleet wherever was necessary. Aware that Kurita's battered force remained afloat, he also decided to make arrangements to form another force from his larger ships that would be tasked with protecting the San Bernardino Strait. The new force, dubbed Task Force 34, would consist of four battleships, five cruisers, and nineteen destroyers, and, when organized would be commanded by Vice Adm. Willis A. Lee. In order to ensure that his ships were aware of his plans, at 1512 Halsey radioed all of the ships of the 3rd Fleet as well as Admirals Nimitz and King, describing the contingency force, which would be activated upon his command.Radio monitors from the 7th Fleet also picked up this message and relayed the information to Admiral Kinkaid.13
As Halsey formulated his plans, Kurita contemplated his future. Overcome by the loss of so many men, the admiral ordered three of his destroyers to turn about and pick up any survivors while the crews of his remaining ships repaired some of the damage they had suffered. On board Atago, Kurita considered his next move. Having been badly battered by American aircraft throughout the day, and having heard little or nothing about the progress of the other Sho forces, at 1600 he wired Tokyo that despite the support of a limited number of Japanese aircraft:
the enemy made more than 250 sorties against us between 0830 and 1530, the number of planes involved and their fierceness mounting with every wave. Our air forces, on the other hand, were not able to obtain even expected results, causing our losses to mount steadily. Under these circumstances it was deemed that were we to force our way through, we would merely make ourselves meat for the enemy, with very little chance of success. It was therefore concluded that the best course open to us was temporarily to retire beyond the reach of enemy planes.14
Surveying the remnants of his once powerful force, it was easy for Kurita to assume that the Sho plan had been a disaster. The intensity of the air strikes launched against him throughout the day indicated that Ozawa had failed to draw off the might of the 3rd Fleet. Having heard nothing further from Nishimura, he could only assume the worst there as well. Kurita's fortunes, however, were soon to change.
After repeated efforts to locate Ozawa's force, at 1640, bombers from Sherman's task force spotted the carriers as they steamed south toward Luzon. Locating the Japanese carrier force was just what Halsey—and Ozawa—had been waiting for. Halsey immediately alerted his task group commanders to concentrate and soon had all three of them moving. He radioed McCain to cut short his leave from the 3rd Fleet and rejoin it as it headed north to destroy the Japanese carriers. With Halsey's force now headed north, the danger of further aerial attack on Kurita's ships had ended. Given a respite from the constant air attacks, Kurita began to recover some of his nerve. Remembering the “all or nothing” nature of the Sho plan, the admiral decided to continue his advance. Perhaps as confirmation of the correctness of this decision, at 1815 Admiral Toyoda responded to Kurita's earlier message, informing him, “All forces will dash to the attack, trusting in divine guidance.”15 His orders now clear and his forces protected by darkness, Kurita proceeded toward San Bernardino Strait. If he experienced no further delays, he planned to pass through the strait at 0100 on October 25.
While Kurita had been battling for his life in the Sulu Sea, Nishimura's force had proceeded with little interruption from the Americans. Although he endured one attack early on the morning of October 24, after he drove off the American planes he proceeded without difficulty. He also received word that the 2nd Force, commanded by Vice Adm. Kiyohide Shima, was approaching his fleet from the north and would soon be available to reinforce him as he passed through the strait. Although he had an intense dislike for Shima, Nishimura recognized that the seriousness of the situation demanded that every member of the fleet work together. There would be time enough for personal vendettas after the Americans had been destroyed.
Remember Pearl Harbor
But Nishimura had been spotted, and although no further attacks were launched against him for the remainder of the day, the Americans were not idle. Given ample warning of the Japanese approach, and confident that Halsey had seen to the defense of the San Bernardino Strait, Admiral Kinkaid took his time to prepare for his opponent's arrival at the eastern side of the Surigao Strait. To counter such a move, Kinkaid ordered Rear Adm. Jesse B. Oldendorf to plug the twelve-mile-wide northern exit of the strait with a force of six battleships—five of which had been at Pearl Harbor in 1941—eight cruisers, and twenty-eight destroyers. Oldendorf decided to place his largest ships directly across the mouth of the strait with the destroyers divided and placed along each side. To add depth to the defense, he also placed thirty-nine of the diminutive patrol torpedo (PT) boats farther down the strait. Unlikely to be able to halt Nishimura's advancing battleships, the PTs would serve as a trip wire to provide Oldendorf with important up-to-the-minute information about the opponent he was about to face. They would also be able to harass Nishimura as he advanced perhaps causing some confusion among the enemy.
The evening of October 24, the men of both navies were preparing for the next stage of the battle. While Kurita and Nishimura's crews made final arrangements before their entrance into the Philippine Sea, Halsey's sailors readied their planes for air strikes against Ozawa's carriers, and Oldendorf's crews made sure their guns were well sighted on the northern exit of Surigao Strait.
While aircrews scrambled around the decks of his carriers, Halsey thought it prudent to inform Kinkaid of his plans. At 2024, Halsey radioed Kinkaid that “strike reports indicate enemy heavily damaged. Am proceeding north with three groups to attack enemy carrier force at dawn.”16 Kinkaid was pleased with the news. He was ready for Nishimura's force as it headed through Surigao Strait, and it appeared that Halsey was ready to knock out Ozawa's force coming from the north with his three task forces. And although it was not a huge force, Kinkaid believed that Task Force 34 should be more than sufficient to halt Kurita's badly damaged ships from emerging through the San Bernardino Strait. Everything seemed in place to deliver the Japanese a telling blow.
Just ten minutes after Halsey had radioed Kinkaid word was received that one of Oldendorf's PT boats had spotted Nishimura's advancing fleet. The tiny American boats charged ahead in a series of brave but disappointing attacks. Despite launching a number of torpedoes, little was accomplished other than disrupting the Japanese advance. Gunners aboard Nishimura's destroyers were able to destroy a number of the PT boats. At 2136, Nishimura radioed Shima, who was following just behind him, that he was “advancing as scheduled while destroying enemy torpedo boats.”17
Opposition to Nishimura's advance, however, was soon to become more intense. Alerted to the advancing Japanese ships just after 0200 on the morning of October 25, Oldendorf's destroyers steamed down Surigao Strait and prepared to deliver a series of torpedo attacks. An hour later the first American torpedoes were sent against the enemy ships. By the time these attacks were over, two destroyers had been sunk and a third badly damaged. Torpedoes had also damaged the battleships Fuso and Yamashiro. Perhaps most important, the PT and destroyer attacks had eliminated all semblance of order among the Japanese ships as they prepared to encounter Oldendorf's waiting cruisers and battleships.
As the badly disorganized enemy force approached within range of his battleships and cruisers, Oldendorf could not believe his luck. The Japanese were approaching in a column dead ahead. For some reason, perhaps the disruptive effects of the earlier PT boat and destroyer attacks, or Nishimura's obstinacy, the Japanese had neglected to maneuver and were now presenting a broad front to the enemy. This meant that Oldendorf was about to enjoy the advantage, dreamed of by all naval commanders but seldom experienced, of being able to bring all of his guns to bear at the lead Japanese ship.
At 0351, Oldendorf ordered his ships to open fire. Soon, shells from some of the largest guns in the navy were raining down on the unfortunate Japanese. For the next fifteen minutes salvos quickly shattered what remained of Nishimura's ships. The flagship Yamashiro had gone down, Mogami and Fuso were badly battered and left for dead, and although Shigure turned around and began to retreat, she was soon dead in the water as well.
Just as the final salvos of the American battleships began to find their targets, Shima, on board the cruiser Nachi, arrived at the scene. He had hoped to join Nishimura earlier, but American PT boat attacks slowed his advance. Viewing the wreckage of Fuso as he sailed northward, Shima soon realized there was nothing left of Nishimura's force to join. A little after 0400, in a gesture of false bravado, Shima launched a series of ineffectual torpedo attacks at what he believed were American ships, and then turned and headed south. As he sailed away from the scene of Nishimura's demise, he came upon the wreckage of Mogami, which he believed was lying dead in the water. Unfortunately he was wrong; Mogami was moving slowly, and at 0430 Nachi collided with the wounded vessel, causing further damage.
The southern arm of the Japanese advance toward Leyte Gulf had been a disaster. As the sun came up on October 25, Shima's sailors anxiously awaited the inevitable attacks by pursuing American ships as they began to limp back to Brunei. While Shima was contemplating how to get his battered ships away from the enemy, Kinkaid was meeting with his staff. The Americans were discussing the recently concluded action and no doubt congratulating themselves on their stunning victory. Just before adjourning the meeting, Kinkaid turned to his chief of staff, Capt. Richard H. Cruzen, and asked, “Now, Dick, is there anything we haven't done?” Cruzen responded that he could think of just “one thing. We have never directly asked Halsey if TF 34 is guarding San Bernardino Strait.” Just to be doubly sure, Kinkaid authorized Cruzen to send Halsey a message to confirm that TF 34 was indeed covering the strait. 18
Although much of the action on the evening of October 24 was in the south, Kurita had not been idle. At 0035, October 25, his fleet passed unmolested through the San Bernardino Strait and into the Philippine Sea. Kurita, still licking his wounds from the air battles the previous day, could not believe his good fortune. How could the Americans have left such a critical passage uncovered? Had Ozawa's flotilla finally drawn off Halsey's forces? If his luck continued to hold, in just over six hours he would be in a position to attack the American transports in Leyte Gulf. After convincing himself that, indeed, there were no Americans guarding the passage, Kurita radioed Onishi and requested that he have whatever air cover was available rendezvous with him as he rounded the eastern side of Samar. Onishi, who had suffered severe losses defending Kurita's force, responded that he would provide what few aircraft remained.
“Where Is Task Force 34?”
Kurita's passage had been unopposed because of a tragic miscommunication on the part of the Americans. Contrary to what Kinkaid, Nimitz, and King believed, there was no Task Force 34. Halsey's earlier message had simply indicated that the task force would be formed if necessary. Believing that he had so damaged Kurita that he no longer posed a threat, Halsey elected to take all of his available strength with him, including the ships that would have composed TF 34. The misunderstanding was exacerbated by Halsey's message the previous evening that declared that he was heading north with “three groups.” This second message seemed to confirm that Halsey had left San Bernardino protected.
The miscommunication between Halsey and Kinkaid might have been avoided had they been serving under a unified command, but that was not the case. Now, this string of errors meant that as Admiral Kurita sailed around the coast of Samar, all that was guarding the vital American landing beaches at Leyte were sixteen tiny escort carriers and a screen of destroyers divided into three groups—Taffy-1, commanded by Rear Adm. T. L. Sprague; Taffy-2, commanded by Rear Adm. F. B. Stump; and Taffy-3, commanded by Rear Adm. C. A. F. Sprague. The escort carriers, nicknamed “jeep” carriers, were intended to provide air support to forces operating ashore and to conduct antisubmarine patrols. They were armed with only one 5-inch gun and a few antiaircraft weapons. To make matters worse, most of the aircraft on board had been armed with ordnance more suitable to support operations against Japanese troop formations on Leyte than against enemy warships.
On the bridge of Atago, Kurita was still trying to figure out how, despite the battering he had taken the previous day and the silence from the other wings of the Sho force, he had been so fortunate. His thoughts were interrupted just before 0600 as he looked up to see thirty-five of Onishi's aircraft overhead. Although he would have enjoyed greater air support, at this point in the operation he was happy with anything he could get. Soon afterward, he received a radio report from Yamato announcing that radar had spotted American aircraft. Cautious after the previous day's beating, Kurita ordered his fleet to prepare for an aerial attack. Soon, however, reports were received that Onishi's aircraft had downed an American reconnaissance plane. Sailors aboard Kurita's ships were alert and at their positions when, just visible over the horizon, they saw the radar masts of Rear Adm. Clifton Sprague's six escort carriers. The news electrified the Japanese crews, and Kurita's chief of staff, Adm. Timiji Koyanagi, recalled that soon after sighting the masts “we could see planes being launched. This was indeed a miracle. Think of a surface fleet coming up on an enemy carrier group? Nothing is more vulnerable than an aircraft carrier in a surface engagement.”19
Kurita was astonished. Although his force had suffered a good deal of damage it was still incredibly potent, especially against enemy carriers caught unprepared. He alerted all of the ships of the force to prepare for action and form a battle line. He then steamed toward the U.S. carriers, and at 0658 the massive 18-inch guns of the battleship Yamato fired on them. As they approached additional ships added their salvos to those of Yamato.
On board Fanshaw Bay, C. A. F. Sprague was horrified to see a huge red geyser of water rise up just off his port bow. The admiral knew that the Japanese often used dye to mark the fall of their incoming rounds. What were the Japanese doing there? he wondered. TF 34 was supposed to be guarding the San Bernardino Strait. He had little time to consider what had happened however, as the waters around Taffy-3 were soon alive with color as Japanese shells came closer and closer. Aware that time was of the essence, he immediately ordered his ships to generate smoke launching their aircraft and to retreat toward Taffy-2. He then radioed T. L. Sprague and Kinkaid the desperate message, “Where is Task Force 34?” Kinkaid was alarmed by the message. He was sure the strait had been covered. Then he remembered that he had never received a confirmation from Halsey that TF 34 was, in fact, off the San Bernardino Strait.
Meanwhile, in a desperate bid to buy time, the aircraft from Taffy-3 were throwing themselves at Kurita's force. Untrained and unequipped for an aerial attack on Japanese ships bristling with antiaircraft guns and supported by circling land-based fighters, Taffy-3's brave pilots were either shot from the sky or driven away before they could do much damage. Later, waves of fighters launched from Taffy-2 and Taffy-1 proved only slightly more successful, launching a torpedo attack that destroyed one of Kurita's destroyers. The beleaguered American carriers of Taffy-3 received a brief respite when they were able to enter the protection offered by a nearby rainstorm. However, even that relief proved to be short-lived. Unable to keep pace with the fast-moving storm, the carriers were soon bracketed by renewed enemy shell fire. Aware that he was sending them to their deaths, but having little choice, C. A. F. Sprague ordered his destroyers to attack the Japanese. Given the circumstances, the Americans were incredibly successful, severely damaging the cruiser Kumano as well as two additional Japanese destroyers.
Even this effort, however, was futile. The overwhelming might of Kurita's battleships and cruisers had soon dispatched the destroyers Johnston and Hoel and left Hermann dead in the water. With his destroyers now gone, Sprague waited for the inevitable, and at 0720, 18-inch shells from Yamato ripped into his flagship, USS Fanshaw Bay, and she quickly went down. White Plains and Gambler Bay soon followed Taffy-3's flagship to the bottom. Kurita then dispatched a cruiser to deal with the remaining ships of Taffy-3 while the rest of his force continued on toward Leyte Gulf.
Before his ship went down, Sprague was able to alert Kinkaid that unless Taffy-1 and Taffy-2 could do something quickly, it seemed certain that Kurita would reach Leyte Gulf. In perhaps one of the bitterest ironies of the day, because of the inefficient radio link between the two fleets, at 0720 Kinkaid finally received a response to his message to Halsey of the previous evening. Halsey informed him that TF 34 was part of his attack on Ozawa.
Kinkaid now had some difficult decisions to make. He was painfully aware that Taffy-1 and Taffy-2 could do little against Kurita's fleet, but he had to sacrifice them in order to buy time. The American battleships and cruisers that had been so successful at Surigao Strait were at least three hours away from Leyte, and though Halsey was reluctantly headed south after a good deal of haranguing and pleading from Kinkaid and an alerted Nimitz, it would still be several hours before the now formed TF 34 could reach the area. As expected, the desperate attacks of Taffy-1 and Taffy-2 did little more than cause Kurita to slow temporarily. Attacks by the aircraft and destroyers of the two groups managed to sink the cruiser Chikuma and damage Tone, but at the cost of five more of the tiny “jeep” carriers and most of the destroyer escorts.
The Price of Imprudence
Kurita now ordered another cruiser and a destroyer to join his trailing cruiser in finishing off any remnants of Sprague's three carrier groups. Just as Yamato's guns were finishing off the last of Taffy-1, Kurita was informed by an excited Koyanagi that his guns were now within range of the enemy anchorage at Leyte Gulf. Kurita could scarcely contain himself. He immediately ordered that word of this stunning accomplishment be flashed to Tokyo, the troops fighting for their lives around Leyte, and to every ship remaining in the fleet. Elated by what they had accomplished, the Japanese sailors worked relentlessly as the guns of the mighty Yamato and the surviving cruisers raked Kinkaid's transports trapped within the confines of Leyte Gulf. What few aircraft remained to Kinkaid could do little against the massive barrage of heavy caliber naval shells that came hurtling into the gulf. The slaughter was on a scale that exceeded what had occurred at the 1905 Battle of Tsushima Strait, Japan's greatest naval victory. So tightly packed were the transports inside the gulf that Kurita's gunners barely had to aim their weapons.
Nimitz was startled when he received Kinkaid's desperate message for help. He, too, believed that Halsey had left TF 34 guarding San Bernardino Strait. Aware of the magnitude of what this could mean, Nimitz immediately radioed Halsey with the question, “Where is Task Force 34? The world wonders.”20 Although the second sentence of the message was meant merely to confuse the enemy, Halsey, perhaps now aware of the tragic mistake he had made, was enraged. In response, he ignored the pleadings of Kinkaid and the questions of Nimitz for another hour before reluctantly making the decision to form TF 34 and head it south ahead of the rest of his force. He was far too late to rescue the situation in the south and his momentary confusion meant that Ozawa was able to quickly turn about and escape as well.
Aware that the remaining U.S. ships would soon be rushing to the relief of Leyte Gulf, after little more than an hour of blasting away at the American anchorage Kurita headed back toward San Bernardino Strait. He knew his battle-scarred ships and exhausted men would have an all but impossible time avoiding Halsey's force, but as had just been demonstrated, there were such things as miracles.
As a final bitter end to the rapidly unfolding American disaster, Halsey's delay in forming Task Force 34 meant that Kurita was able to escape from the gulf and limp back to Brunei. On the beaches of Leyte, Krueger's 6th Army was driven back to the water's edge before the guns of the now combined 3rd and 7th fleets provided sufficient firepower to halt the Japanese attacks. Although the 6th Army was able to hold on, the men endured privation exceeding what the Marines had experienced on Guadalcanal in 1942. Soon, the fighting on Leyte reached a stalemate, with the Americans unable to advance farther inland and the Japanese unable to push the Americans into the gulf. Kurita's stunning victory had set back the timetable for Allied victory in the Pacific by years.
When word of the disaster at Leyte Gulf reached Washington on October 27, President Franklin Roosevelt and his principal military advisors could scarcely believe it. The impetuous Halsey was immediately, and publicly, sacked and replaced by the victor of Midway, the somewhat more prudent Raymond A. Spruance. And although he escaped the fate of his subordinate, Nimitz's strategic plans, much to MacArthur's immense satisfaction, were no longer given much consideration by either King or Roosevelt. After Halsey's removal, there was simply no way to conceal such a disaster from the American public. Mindful of the fact that the election for his unprecedented fourth term as president was just weeks away, aware that many pundits were calling for his removal, and unwilling to see if the public was prepared to continue to pay the price in blood and treasure necessary to subdue Imperial Japan, Roosevelt made plans for peace.
The U.S. president offered the Japanese a means of escaping from the rain of American B-29 bombers that would soon be unleashed. Roosevelt would agree to a conditional surrender that called for a withdrawal from all those possessions the Japanese had taken after December 7, 1941.
Since Tojo's removal after the Saipan disaster, Japanese peace advocates within Emperor Hirohito's government had sought a means of saving the country and the Emperor's dynasty while preserving their country's honor. Kurita's victory had provided them with that opportunity. Not only was the Emperor allowed to retain his throne, but Japan was able to retain control of its possessions in Indochina, Manchuria, and most of China.
On November 2, 1944, Roosevelt announced to a jubilant American public that the Japanese had agreed to surrender all of the territory conquered after the attack on Pearl Harbor. After giving his unprecedented fourth inaugural speech on Saturday, January 20, 1945, Roosevelt returned to the Oval Office to celebrate. Piled upon his desk was a stack of the customary congratulatory telegrams from governments across the globe. He thought it particularly ironic that at the bottom of the stack was a letter of congratulations from Emperor Hirohito.
The Reality
Soon after departing Brunei, the Japanese plans began to come apart. On October 23, Admiral Kurita's flagship was sunk as it was steaming past the Palawan passage, and throughout October 24 his ships, lacking any air cover, were battered by Halsey's airplanes. Meanwhile, as described previously, Kinkaid destroyed Nishimura's force on the evening of October 24—25.
Believing that he had sufficiently damaged Kurita's force on October 24, Halsey steamed northward against Ozawa, leaving the San Bernardino Strait unprotected. Despite the battering the Japanese received on their way to the strait, the absence of Task Force 34 meant that only Sprague's escort carriers remained between Kurita and Leyte Gulf. In one of the finest displays of courage in the history of the U.S. Navy, the sailors and airmen of Taffy-3 put up a desperate defense against Kurita. Despite the odds against them, Taffy-3's planes—joined later by the pilots of Taffy-1 and Taffy-2—were able to launch a series of desperate attacks against Kurita. Lacking torpedoes, some planes made dummy bombing runs while others dropped bombs meant for Japanese army units on Leyte. Meanwhile, the destroyer escorts of Taffy-3 launched determined torpedo attacks against Kurita, sank Chokai and Chikuma, and drove off Yamato. So determined were the American attacks that at 0915 Kurita called off his own attack and, at 1236, on the verge of scoring a great victory, turned his ships around and headed back through the San Bernardino Strait. Despite all the damage he had suffered, if Kurita had kept his nerve for just a little while longer, there is every reason to believe he could have sailed into Leyte Gulf and inflicted the damage described previously.
As Taffy-3 fought for its life, Halsey began a series of attacks against Ozawa. By the end of the day the 3rd Fleet had sunk all of the Japanese carriers. By every estimate, the Battle of Leyte Gulf had been a total disaster for the Japanese. While the Americans escaped with the loss of only three light carriers and three destroyer escorts, the Japanese lost three battleships, four carriers, ten cruisers, and nine destroyers. They also lost any chance of stopping the relentless Allied advance on the home islands.
Bibliography
Cannon, M. Hamlin, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines (Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1993).
Cutler, Thomas X, The Battle of Leyte Gulf: 23-26 October 1944 (Harper, New York, 1994).
Humble, Richard, Japanese High Seas Fleet (Ballantine, New York, 1973).
Morgan, Ted FDR: A Biography (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1985).
Morison, Samuel Eliot, Leyte, June 1944-January 1945 (Little, Brown, Boston, 1971).
Nalty, Bernard (ed.), War in the Pacific: Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay (University of Oklahoma Press, Oklahoma, 1991).
Spector, Ronald H., Eagle Against the Sun: The American War Against Japan (Free Press, New York, 1985).
Steinberg, Rafael, Return to the Philippines (Time Life, Alexandria, 1980).
Notes
1. Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War Against Japan (Free Press, New York, 1985), 424.
2. Thomas J. Cutler, The Battle of Leyte Gulf: 23–26 October 1944 (Harper, New York, 1994), 60.
3. Spector, op.cit., 427.
4. Rafael Steinberg, Return to the Philippines (Time Life, Alexandria, 1980), 66.
5. Bernard Nalty (ed.), War in the Pacific: Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay (University of Oklahoma Press, Oklahoma, 1991), 199.
6. Richard Humble, Japanese High Seas Fleet (Ballantine, New York, 1973), 38.
7. Cutler, op.cit., 94.
*8. Ibid., 100. In reality, the cruiser that Darter and Dace dispatched was Kurita's flagship Atago. Although Kurita survived the sinking of his cruiser, he had to be fished from the water. In addition to being understandably shaken by the sinking, he lost much of his staff.
*9. In reality, Onishi did not, as was hoped for, provide air cover to Kurita's hard-pressed forces. Instead, believing that greater honor would be attached to an attack on the American fleet, Onishi sent what remained of his planes against Halsey's 3rd Fleet. Although able to cause so much damage to the carrier USS Princeton that she later had to be sunk by friendly torpedoes, Onishi's inexperienced pilots were shot from the sky in such numbers that they had almost no impact on the battle.
10. Samuel Eliot Morison, Leyte, June 1944–January 1945 (Little, Brown, Boston, 1971), 174.
*11. Cutler, op.cit., 121.
12. Morison, op.cit., 184.
13. Cutler, op.cit., 161.
14. Ibid, 151.
15. Morison, op.cit., 189.
*16. Cutler, op.cit., 170.
17. Ibid., 186.
18. Spector, op.cit., 434.
19. Steinberg, op.cit., 60.
20. Spector, op.cit., 438.