6
THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR THREAT AND SOUTH KOREA’S DETERRENCE STRATEGY
ON JANUARY 6, 2016, North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test and claimed that the regime had succeeded in developing hydrogen bombs. On September 9, the North conducted its fifth test, claiming that it was the successful test of a bomb enabling it to produce a variety of smaller, lighter, and diversified nuclear warheads of higher strike power. These tests were followed by a test of a long-range missile engine, which the North claims to be a new, high-powered type for launching a geostationary satellite. Pyongyang has explicitly stated that its purpose is to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that can reach US territory. It is improbable that North Korea will slow down its nuclear buildup and even more improbable that the North will give up its nuclear programs. North Korea argues that the motive in going nuclear is to deter a US nuclear first strike, but this is highly unpersuasive.1 With an enhanced second-strike ability to attack the American mainland, North Korea would like to negotiate with Washington and Seoul to get the most profitable outcome from a perceived position of strength. The regime might also think of using nuclear weapons if Kim Jong-un’s power is under serious challenge.
There is no doubt that deterrence will be the foundation for stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula. However, unlike many ongoing interstate rivalries, a status quo or stability between the two based on the military balance is not a sustainable equilibrium. Korea is a divided country, and two Koreas are officially at war because the Korean War ended by armistice, not a peace treaty, in 1953. Peace between the two Koreas is obviously a desirable condition, but as the two Koreas both hope to reunify the Korean Peninsula on their own terms, stability or negative peace—meaning merely the absence of war—is not the ultimate goal. Although North Korea can be successfully deterred for the time being, North Korea, being aware of its weak position in the competition with South Korea, will continue to rely on military means and especially nuclear weapons. South Korea’s strategy of deterrence is therefore only a part of South Korea’s North Korea policy in a broader sense. Deterrence itself is not a purpose but only a basis from which the two Koreas can start negotiations for denuclearization, reconciliation, and ultimately reunification. South Korea has tried to combine the two pillars of deterrence and sanctions to develop a balance of power upon which they can negotiate future reconciliation and engagement with the North.
This chapter will examine North Korea’s efforts to enhance nuclear capability and South Korea’s deterrence strategy. It will critically review deterrence theory and explore whether it will be applicable in devising deterrence strategy to deal with the totalitarian North.
Growing North Korea’s Nuclear Threats under the Kim Jong-un Regime
Growing threats from North Korea originate in structural factors related to its domestic political structure. Kim Jung-un, having assumed power without any previous policy experience, had to prove himself to be a capable leader. He chose the most effective and visible option. He concentrated resources on developing nuclear weapons, setting an accelerated pace, and justifying his policies with a new doctrine of simultaneously developing the economy.
North Korean Nuclear Capability under the Byeongjin Strategy
After Kim Jong-il’s death in December 2011, North Korea longed for the status of a formal nuclear state. On March, 31, 2013, Kim Jong-un declared the so-called byeongjin strategy, meaning a strategy aiming at both economic development and the building of nuclear weapons simultaneously. At the same time, North Korea declared that it is now a constitutional nuclear power and that it will not pursue the purpose of denuclearization. This strategy is fundamentally different from Kim Jong-un’s, since Kim Jong-il at least did not deny the denuclearization of North Korea as the final outcome of negotiations with neighboring powers.2
After conducting the third nuclear test on February 12, 2013, North Korea has endeavored to enhance its capability for nuclear weapons and also to increase conventional threats to South Korea and its neighbors. On January 6, 2016, it announced it had conducted its first successful test of a hydrogen bomb, the fourth nuclear test since October 9, 2006. For the last ten years, North Korea ceaselessly enhanced its nuclear capability, and many argue that North Korea has become an operational nuclear power. It is still unclear whether the blast detected was large enough to have been a full thermonuclear device, but it may have involved some nuclear fusion. On February 7, North Korea conducted another long-range missile test, and it may have succeeded in miniaturizing the nuclear warhead: A few months later, Kim Jong-un announced that North Korean scientists had been able to make a nuclear warhead small enough to fit on a missile. Intelligence agencies in surrounding countries now believe that North Korea is capable of miniaturizing a nuclear weapon and putting it on its KN-08 mobile ICBM.3
For the past two years, North Korea has test-fired submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) several times. On April 23, 2016, North Korea tested an SLBM for probably the fifth time and displayed pictures of such an event for the third time. The design was still in its earliest stages, and much work, including the development of a full-scale motor, appeared to still be required. However, on August 24, 2016, North Korea tested from a submarine another ballistic missile that flew about five hundred kilometers in the longest flight by that type of North Korean weapon. The problem for South Korea is that its Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system is focused on the interception of land-based ballistic missiles. It has become more important to current deter threats from the seas surrounding the Korean Peninsula as North Korea may deploy SLBMs with nuclear warheads much earlier than expected.4
Explaining North Korean Nuclear Motives
North Korean nuclear weapons serve multiple purposes. First, North Korea continuously reproduces the statement that its nuclear weapons are to deter a US nuclear attack, arguing that Washington excluded North Korea from a nuclear no-first-use commitment. Second, Kim Jong-un wants to perpetuate a totalitarian regime and consolidate his power by personalizing control over the country. Given North Korea’s struggling economy, nuclear weapons provide him with political legitimation of his economically ineffective rule by showing his militant resolve to fight the United States. By continuously enhancing nuclear capability, he sends the message to the people that the outside security threat is increasing. This excuse of military expenditure justifies the poor attempt to revive the economy. Third, when political utilization of nuclear weapons for power consolidation is no longer required, Kim can begin to deal with outside powers to elicit economic assistance. This is an old pattern: North Korea nuclearizes, then receives maximum economic assistance for denuclearization. Fourth, Kim may use nuclear weapons purely for offensive purposes. North Korea may start an all-out war using nuclear weapons with the confidence of controlling a crisis and winning if it is sure of US reluctance to retaliate with nuclear weapons. It is also probable that Kim Jong-un relies on the slim chance of continuing his dictatorship even after a disastrous nuclear war.
The North Korean argument that Pyongyang develops nuclear weapons for the purpose of nuclear deterrence is on weak ground for three reasons. First, both South Korea and the United States have no intention of first attacking North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons for any reason unless a North Korean attack is unequivocal and imminent. Second, Washington would not conduct a surgical strike against Pyongyang’s nuclear facilities unless North Korea further develops a nuclear capability with entirely offensive purposes or seriously proliferates nuclear weapons. And third, the current nuclear power of North Korea is further below the level of deterrence by denial and also by punishment because of the enormous capability gap between the nuclear capability of the North and that of the Republic of Korea (ROK)–US alliance. North Korea lacks both the missile defense system to deny the attack and the retaliatory capacity from South Korea and the United States. North Korea, under some situations, may decide to use nuclear weapons for aggressive reasons, but this does not mean that North Korea’s nuclear weapons have any deterrent effects.
Since Kim Jong-un inherited power in 2012, he has repeatedly announced that nuclear weapons are not the object of any deal for denuclearization or for eliciting economic assistance. During the period of Kim Jong-il’s reign, each stage of developing nuclear weapons and conventional provocations tended to be followed by a proposal for negotiations with South Korea, mostly for economic assistance. However, Kim Jong-un never explicitly utilized nuclear power for economic gains. As the task of political consolidation has been more urgent, Kim Jong-un seems to emphasize security threats from the United States, and to a lesser extent from South Korea, and to show the regime’s capability to develop nuclear programs. It is uncertain whether a strong domestic power base would allow him to use nuclear power for economic purposes, but so far the pattern is different from that of his father.
South Korea’s Strategy of Deterring North Korean Offense
What would be the right course of deterrence for South Korea under these conditions? North Korea has declared an intention to develop nuclear weapons to deter nuclear attack from the United States with South Korean support: They would retaliate with nuclear weapons when they are attacked with nuclear weapons. As North Korea is governed by a young, inexperienced, despotic leader and has a faltering economy, there is a possibility that nuclear weapons may be actually used in a confrontation. This poses a serious challenge for both South Korea and the United States and also for Japan in terms of how to deter a North Korean nuclear attack. The ROK-US alliance has focused on deterring North Korea’s frequent provocations and a possible offensive by conventional means, because the US tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn in 1991.
There is no doubt now that extended deterrence based on the alliance is the most significant and reliable measure for deterrence for South Korea to adopt. South Korea has tried to combine deterrence by punishment based on extended deterrence and deterrence by denial by developing the Kill-Chain and KAMD systems. However, fear will loom large in South Korea that the United States may be reluctant to run nuclear risks with North Korea, giving rise to the problem of decoupling. Both South Korea and the United States need to convince Pyongyang and the South Koreans that the United States is willing to accept high costs in defense of an ally, even though US vital interests are not necessarily at stake.5
Yet there is no doubt that South Korea needs to maintain a sufficient level of extended deterrence in partnership with the United States to cope with North Korea’s purely offensive strategy.6 Patrick Morgan devised the distinction between “general” and “immediate” deterrence. He argued that today immediate deterrence is relatively rare because it assumes a very severe conflict and the need for imminent action.7 In the case of the Korean Peninsula, the need for immediate deterrence has not yet dissipated. When the two Koreas are sure of the other party’s defensive intentions and focus on lessening the security dilemma, mutual deterrence becomes easier and tends to be based on a strategically compatible understanding about the concept and purpose of deterrence. The inter-Korean relationship with Kim Jong-il’s North Korea could have a very slim basis for mutual understanding. As long as Kim Jong-un’s military strategy is uncertain and his domestic political base seems so fragile, the appropriate level of deterrence is hard to establish.8
South Korea tried to strengthen extended deterrence based on the ROK-US alliance and also started to build the mechanism of deterrence by retaliation. Extended deterrence has come to be the core aspect of Seoul’s deterrence strategy. The joint communiqué of the Forty-Sixth ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting, on October 23, 2014, emphasized the continued US commitment to providing and strengthening extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of military capabilities, including the US nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities. It also aimed to ensure that extended deterrence for the ROK remains credible, capable, and enduring. The US secretary of defense and the ROK minister of national defense decided to periodically review the implementation progress of the bilateral Tailored Deterrence Strategy against North Korean Nuclear and Other WMD Threats. In addition, the secretary and the minister noted that the Tailored Deterrence Strategy Table Top Exercise contributed to enhancing the alliance’s understanding of the Tailored Deterrence Strategy and to preparing political and military response procedures for various situations. The United States and the ROK are committed to maintaining close consultation on deterrence matters to achieve tailored deterrence against key North Korean threats and to maximize its effects.
In addition, the two secretaries reaffirmed their commitment to reinforcing the alliance’s renewed deterrence by denial and response capabilities against North Korean missile threats through the establishment of Concepts and Principles of ROK-US Alliance Comprehensive Counter-Missile Operations to detect, defend, disrupt, and destroy missile threats, including nuclear and biochemical warheads. They also reaffirmed that the ROK will seek to develop, by the mid-2020s, its own Kill-Chain and KAMD systems, which will be critical military capabilities for responding to the North Korean nuclear and missile threat and also interoperable with alliance systems. To this end, the secretary and the minister also decided to enhance information sharing on North Korean missile threats. The United States and the ROK are committed to maintaining close consultation to develop comprehensive alliance capabilities to counter North Korean nuclear, other WMD, and ballistic missile threats.9
When South Korea decides to pursue deterrence by denial, it will not be easy to clarify the sufficient level of deterrence with the unpredictable level of North Korea’s nuclear capacity. South Korea developed the Kill Chain as a practical means of realizing the proactive deterrence strategy. In this strategy, surveillance, reconnaissance, and air-strike systems are key parts of the Kill Chain. But the Kill Chain is not designed to deter all of the North’s missiles before they are launched. South Korea needs to improve the KAMD system to intercept any missiles launched against the South. These days South Korean military specialists and the public are conducting hot debates concerning the need to establish a multilayered missile defense system by focusing on the terminal phase and low-altitude defense, and they plan to develop the KAMD system into a more advanced, medium-altitude defense concept. South Korea is planning to secure systems such as PAC-3, M-SAM, and L-SAM. Also, it decided to allow the US forces to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system on Korean soil. The ongoing discussion revolves around finding an appropriate site for the THAAD system, its future Koreanization, and the means to fend off heated opposition from China and Russia.10
Conventional threats from North Korea are also increasing. As was clearly manifested in the case of the Cheonan incident, it is an impending imperative for South Korea to design more active and tailored deterrence. In 2013, the United States and South Korea agreed to establish active deterrence against North Korea’s military provocations, with the idea that both nations would jointly respond to the North’s local provocations, the South taking the lead and the United States in support. The two countries established the Combined Counter-Provocation Plan, which improved combined readiness and developed a posture to allow the two nations to immediately and decisively respond to any North Korean provocation. Among the low-level incidents the deal is meant to deter are maritime-border incursions, the shelling of border islands, and infiltration of South Korean territory by low-flying fighter jets or by special forces units.
The Assumption of Rationality in Deterrence Theory and North Korea
Can North Korea be deterred? As indicated above, nuclear weapons have obvious domestic utilities. Kim Jong-un should consolidate his domestic power base and also compete with South Korea regarding the prospect of reunification. When he is successfully deterred by the United States and South Korea, he loses political legitimacy, more so without notable economic achievements. Deterring North Korean nuclear offense should take account of these situations, since we are dealing with a divided political entity controlled by a relatively inexperienced dictator. Kim’s continuous failure to develop nuclear power as a result of the US and South Korean deterrent power may drive him to consider actually using nuclear weapons to protect the regime from the domestic and outside challenge.
Deterrence as a theory is based on the assumption of actor rationality. As deterrence aims at the attacker’s inaction by threatening retaliatory harm, it influences the attacker’s risk calculus. Rational decision makers are supposed to make decisions on the basis of a logical process of information free from biases and distortion.11 Some analysts argue that one flaw of deterrence theory is that its rationality might guide the actor to risk-taking that will provoke its own destruction. The prospect of an unpredictable leader with unknown levels of risk acceptance highly complicates the plausibility of deterring the opponent. The assumption of a rational adversary is subject to general skepticism and specific doubts when dealing with North Korea.
Theoretically, deterrence is premised upon several elements, such as actors’ rationality and self-interests. Deterrence is possible when a defender displays sufficient capability and credibility with a certain level of mutual communication. Inter-Korean relations before Kim Jong-un assumed that power tended to be based upon mutually shared concepts of rationality and evaluations of capacity with frequent communications, even though communication was associated with mutual conflict and antagonism. Yet it is true that deterrence is also possible when the concept of deterrence is shared and socially constructed. Inter-Korean relations from 1994 to 2011 showed these tendencies, because there have been inter-Korean summit meetings and Kim Jong-il had safely personalized North Korean power leading to inner political stability.
Kim Jong-un’s regime has radically changed inter-Korean relations. Most important, North Korea’s and South Korea’s national strategies have fundamentally changed, and the existing common ground for dealing with North Korean nuclear matters has broken down. It is still uncertain that Kim has consolidated his power base. As the basic components defining inter-Korean relations so far have lost ground, the meaning of mutual deterrence has also changed. As deterrence is possible under the broader framework of each strategy to the other, it is necessary to look at Kim’s strategy and his military programs.
Although Kim Jong-un is functionally rational, there may be many psychological and political elements for biases that will increase the likelihood of nonrational or subrational behavior.12 However, as much literature has shown, people are resistant to information that is incoherent to their cognitive framework and belief systems. As Janice Gross Stein argues, cognitive psychology demonstrates the limit of decision makers’ rationality. Especially in times of risk and uncertainty, leaders retain a number of heuristics and biases, which impair the process of judgment. Adherence to heuristics and biases makes decision makers resist dissonant information to preserve personal consistency.13
There are ample bases to think that this tendency will be reinforced in dictatorships. The dictator with absolute decision-making power can make important decisions on the basis of personal judgment. When he or she has already formed a specific frame for evaluating the strategic environment, it is hard for the dictator to be open to new information. If the legitimacy of the dictatorship depends on the performance of the dictator, there will be a high cost to policy change because it may suggest that earlier decisions were poor. In the case of Kim Jong-un’s North Korea, political power is highly concentrated in the dictator. Especially in the initial stage of political consolidation, other political elites are afraid of being purged in the middle of political succession and turmoil. Not guided or helped by fearful bureaucrats, such young and inexperienced leaders should make critical decisions and show infallibility to consolidate power.
Cognitive psychology also demonstrates that political leaders are subject to attribution error and loss aversion. As people tend to exaggerate dispositional factors over situational things, putting heavier emphasis on personality attributes than external contraints, they criticize others’ decisions rather than contemplate the overall strategic environment. Frequent purges in North Korea exemplify this trend. Also, leaders are risk averse when things go well but become more risk acceptant when things go badly.14 Kim Jong-un, after several years of consolidating power after Kim Jong-il’s death in December 2011, has coherently criticized the United States and South Korea for these countries’ alleged efforts at regime elimination and military antagonism. North Korea’s inner and external situation has posed a serious threat to regime survivability, but it is doubtful if Kim reached a rational evaluation of his own country’s survivability. Under a deteriorating status quo, the possibility of more risk-acceptant behavior, such as more frequent provocations, nuclear tests, or even military attack, becomes stronger.
Conditions for Deterrence of a Dictator in a Divided Country
Deterring North Korea under these conditions will be harder than the literature regarding deterrence usually assumes. Arguments about deterring rogue states deal with this difficulty. Rogue states “brutalize their own people, display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, sponsor terrorism around the globe, and reject basic human values,”15 risking their lives and the general welfare of their countries. Dictators in these states attempt to preserve their own political power, with the minimum winning coalition that will perpetuate their political rule. Dictators do not care about people’s level of life, focusing only on the maintenance of political support from the minimum range of political elites.16 In this case, threatening massive harm to the people of the challenger will not deter aggressive action. As far as the dictator may survive and reserve political power in spite of considerable loss, he or she may attempt to change the status quo with the expectation that the attack may be rewarded.
What is worse for North Korea is that the ultimate situation of political failure would be reunification by absorption with the leadership of South Korea. If reunified in favor of South Korea and the alliance with the United States, the position of Kim Jong-un as a totalitarian leader would be in serious danger. There have been diverse criticisms of North Korea’s human rights situation, and the international society under the leadership of the United Nations may put Kim Jong-un on international trial for his wrongdoings.
This complicates the possibility of deterring Kim Jong-un when he decides to use military means, including nuclear weapons, when his regime and power is at stake. Under hypothetical situations such as public revolt in the North against Kim’s rule, all-out war possibly started from border clashes with South Korea, or surgical strikes to nuclear facilities by the ROK-US alliance, Kim might rationally believe that he has much to gain, or at least little to lose, from using nuclear weapons.17 This situation resembles the difficult case of deterring terrorists who are willing to die for some other values and causes. Under the most desperate situation, Kim might risk his own political regime to destroy South Korea for his own cause or honor. This is the case of what Ivan Arreguín-Toft called “unconventional deterrence.” When an adversary is motivated by some sort of nationalism or religious inspiration and is willing to sacrifice his own life, it is hard to effectively threaten and deter him. When Kim resorts to nuclear weapons to preserve his own power or to leave a legacy, the usual threats will not bring about the desired outcome.18
Deterrence applies not just to theory but to strategy as well. As Morgan argues, the rationality assumption is essential in developing deterrence theory, but deterrence strategy does not necessarily require this rationality assumption. What is needed in deterrence strategy in practice is “sufficient fear of the consequences of the threatened retaliation to not do what has been indicated. The underlying perceptions and judgments that constitute and are shaped by this fear and that lead to abandoning plans to attack may be irrational, rational, or some combination of the two.”19 The most crucial factor will be the clear and uncompromising determination to attack the adversary. Deterrence succeeds when the strength of the will to retaliate is fully dictated and communicated. In the case of North Korea, Kim Jong-un may attempt to use nuclear weapons hoping that South Korea and the United States will not retaliate with nuclear weapons to save the peninsula from nuclear disaster and that he would begin to dictate the terms of his preservation.
From the above, one thing is clear: Deterrence is context-specific. When the defender tries to deter the challenger, he needs to understand the latter’s history, culture, language, religion, and worldviews.20 The equilibrium between the deterred and the deterrer cannot be sought a priori but only through an evaluation of a specific strategic context. What is unacceptable damage and what is the desired benefit will be decided by particular contexts in which the deterrence game is being played. In the case of inter-Korean relations, the Korean people are divided but largely wish for reunification regardless of where they live. But reunification means the radical transformation of the current political system, and two Koreas will resist being absorbed by the other, deterring not only military attack but also any political attempt to take the initiative for reunification. As the power gap between two Koreas becomes wider and Kim Jong-un feels more threatened by the possibility of the South absorbing the North, he may attempt to resist reunification with different forms of all-out war, including nuclear war. Because the cost-benefit calculus for Kim’s nuclear attack will be influenced by changing inter-Korean relations, how Seoul should and likely would deter North Korean attacks will also change.
Deterrence as a Social Construction and North Korea
The classical approach to deterrence posits deterrence from aggression as the main objective.21 However, as deterrence is inherently psychological, we have to take into account the process by which the involved parties share common or conflictual understanding of the meaning of deterrence. Much of this involves the process of learning. As the concept of deterrence among concerned parties is not exogenously given, we have to pay attention to the processes whereby parties depend on perception and learning and sharing meanings.22 South Korea and Kim Jong-un’s North Korea are at the very initial stage of this learning process. The future of Kim’s strategic concept depends on future political dynamics in North Korea that are subject to unpredictability.
If both Koreas, divided but aiming at reunification, want to share the regime of deterrence, there should be efforts to form discourse that shape both actors’ knowledge, type of communication, and understanding of reality. Here the question is how and in what way the North Korea of Kim Jong-un is rational and whether it is deterrable in a traditional sense. Scholars studying deterrence address the question of whether rogue states are deterrable. They argue that imbalances of interests and commitments among opponents, psychological barriers, and the rationality of irrationality are so challenging that deterrence is highly limited.
The sustainability of Kim Jong-un’s regime depends upon the success of the byeongjin strategy. If North Korea’s nuclear weapons cannot be used as a means for eliciting more economic assistance from outside, the very legitimacy of Kim’s rule will be subject to his people’s doubt. The problem here is that Kim, in the face of losing power, may consider carrying out an actual WMD attack or threaten one in a very plausible way. He may think of starting an all-out war against South Korea, a situation in which escalation would be inevitable and lead to his consideration of nuclear weapons for victory or for at least a favorable cease-fire.
To move from an immediate deterrence position, it is imperative to go for more general deterrence. Morgan writes that “general deterrence has to do with anticipating possible or potential threats, often hypothetical and from an unspecified attacker, and adopting a posture designed to deter other actors from ever beginning to think about launching an attack and becoming the ‘potential’ or ‘would-be’ challengers so prominent in deterrence theory.”23 In the case of North Korea, we know who the challenger is but need to prepare for North Korea’s attack with a wide range of aggression evolving from the war-like situation to sparse provocations.
Establishing the platform to share the understanding of deterrence under the overall framework of engaging with North Korea is necessary. Lawrence Freedman argues that
deterrence works best when the targets are able to act rationally, and when the deterrer and the deterred are working within a sufficiently shared normative framework so that it is possible to inculcate a sense of appropriate behavior in defined situations that can be reinforced by a combination of social pressures and a sense of fair and effective punishment. Norms, therefore, do not develop and exist independently of assertions of power and interest.24
He also notes:
Norms play an important role in systems maintenance following the establishment of a deterrence relationship, in that stability depends not only on the fear of the consequences of an attempt to break out of the relationship but an understanding of what might be done to reassure the other that no attempt was being made and also to set the terms for being able to move beyond deterrence.25
The core of the North Korean problem is how to define its future strategic status with a credible assurance from outside powers. North Korea is a country in constant insecurity of being absorbed by the South, betrayed by China, and allegedly threatened by the United States. North Korea will not give up nuclear weapons unless it feels assured of its survivability. Kim Jong-un will seriously consider giving up nuclear weapons only if the option of abandonment of nuclear weapons turns out to be the only way to preserve his regime. North Korean nuclear weapons are not just to be deterred but also to be dismantled and negotiated for inter-Korean dialogue and/or concessions, which makes the task of deterrence quite complicated. Both South Korea and the United States have constantly declared their intention to assure North Korea of its survivability. However, incoherent policy coming from domestic considerations, and an intransient negotiation strategy have prevented both parties from building trust.
North Korea will not be persuaded by verbal guarantees or economic assistance short of full political support.26 At this stage, strategic interaction should be complemented by more communicative interaction. Communicative interaction is about understanding the preferences of the other party and delivering one’s own preferences in a more credible form. It aims at “coming to understanding over the conditions of interaction rather than an orientation towards achieving immediate self-interest.”27
Strategy of Engagement and the Game of Reassurance toward North Korea
Successful engagement with North Korea will weaken Kim Jong-un’s excuse of developing nuclear weapons and military provocation against South Korea. North Korea has consistently insisted that the reason for nuclear development is to deter a nuclear first-strike by the United States against its territory. For the North Korean leadership, the US goal is ultimately the elimination of the North Korean regime and reunification in favor of South Korea. If engaging with the North turns out to be successful, North Korea may feel sure of US and South Korean intentions for peaceful coexistence and gradual reunification.
The strategy of engagement is composed of several things. First, the party should reassure the target country that one is not threatening or antagonistic. Second, it should start the policy of reconciliation and peaceful exchange to invite the other to the cooperation game. In this process, it is important for the engager to hedge against the possibility of the other’s betrayal. Third, by gradually building trust, there would be structural bases to foster the change of the other’s system and behavior.28
These processes are not easy. Especially the first stage of reassuring the other of peaceful intention would affect the target country’s risk calculus to develop and use military means, including nuclear weapons. Then, as a part of the engagement policy, the initial strategy of reassurance would work to send signals regarding one’s benign intentions. In this process, it is also possible for the sender to seek the receiver’s intentions and purposes. Uncertainty about the other’s cost-benefit calculus and strategic intention is a precondition to start the game of reassurance. Trust results only gradually after a series of both successful and failing processes of mutual reassurance.29 One way of reinforcing the credibility is to use publicity in communicative interaction. South Korea has endeavored to reassure North Korea of peaceful intention and lower the level of North Korea’s nuclear development by eliminating the North’s excuses for nuclear armament. South Korea tried to raise audience costs—the political punishment political leaders face when reneging on promises—and verifiability so that the signaling can be appreciated as just more than cheap talk. For the future, this effort should go with military deterrence. In this process, South Korea’s dynamic democratic political process would help send signals to and influence preferences of the North Korean regime.
To convince North Korea of the genuine intentions of South Korea and neighboring countries, more public debate and discourses about the future of North Korea needs to be augmented. South Korea should persuade North Korea to give up nuclear weapons and go for economic recovery with security guarantees, which both South Korea and the international community are willing to provide.
If North Korea witnesses an increased public discussion of its role and status in Northeast Asia, it may seek to conform to the expectations of international society, not because of its own good intentions but because of its will to survive.30 In this case, even a slight indication of any Seoul government’s intention to absorb North Korea would further incite North Korea’s worry, leading to increased mistrust of outside powers.
Conclusion
US secretary of defense William Perry once noted that rogue regimes “may not buy into our deterrence theory. Indeed, they may be madder than MAD.”31 We have North Korea with a young and unpredictable dictator at his formative period. North Korea has declared itself a nuclear state and has rejected any negotiation for denuclearization. There are ample grounds for saying that Kim Jong-un is not rational in a traditional sense and that North Korea will become more and more undeterrable. It is crucial at this moment to reinforce the posture of immediate deterrence. As North Korea develops much more destructive and diversified nuclear warheads, ICBMs with a longer range, and the technology for SLBMs, coping with these challenges with a corresponding posture is essential.
However, in the game of deterrence and balance of terror, perception and subjective judgment loom large. For the deterrence to work, credibility and communication is as important as capability. It is very hard to predict the context-specific rationality of Kim Jong-un and North Korea’s cost-benefit calculus. Changes in North Korea’s domestic political, economic, and ideational situation; inter-Korean relations; and a changing power shift in Northeast Asia would affect North Korea’s calculation. To produce a mutually stable concept of deterrence, there should be a gradual process of forging a socially constructed regime of deterrence based on the fear of consequences or otherwise based on assurance between the two Koreas and among major powers in the region. As North Korea is both the threat to be deterred and the partner for reunification, the combination of deterrence and engagement is indispensable. There will be a long and painful road to reassure North Korea of South Korea’s peaceful intentions and to transform a highly offensive game into a defensive one.
Notes
1. For the debate regarding defensive versus offensive versions of security strategy, see Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time (New York; Palgrave, 2010). See also John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001).
2. North Korea defined itself as a nuclear weapons state in its constitution in 2012. Also, North Korea declared that it is “a full-fledged nuclear weapons state” after a plenary meeting of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee on March 31, 2013, and then issued the document of the Law of Nuclear Weapons State at the Supreme People’s Assembly on April 1.
3. With the development of North Korean nuclear weapons, the game of nuclear deterrence and balance of terror began. For the difference between balance of power and balance of terror, see Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory (New York: Routledge, 1996), 177–78. He writes that “with the balance of terror . . . the calculations are quite different. Here, deterrence is everything and is achieved through the threat of unendurable punishment. If the threat ever has to be implemented, the result is an all-out nuclear war, with catastrophic consequences for both sides. Both sides have a powerful incentive to avoid action that requires the deterrent threats ever to be implemented. If nuclear weapons are ever used, then deterrence will have failed. Whereas war in the balance of power system was a legitimate and appropriate part of the balancing process, in nuclear deterrence it signifies the catastrophic failure of that process.”
4. John Schilling, “A New Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile for North Korea,” 38 North, April 25, 2016. And see also Sang-min Lee, “South Korea’s ‘Proactive Deterrence’ Strategy and Policy Suggestions to Develop the KAMD,” Military Official Center for Security & Strategy, KIDA, October 24, 2014.
5. For the question of decoupling, see Shane Smith, “Implications for US Extended Deterrence and Assurance in East Asia,” US-Korea Institute at SAIS, November 2015.
6. For an extensive argument regarding extended deterrence in Asia, see Andrew O’Neil, Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Atomic Umbrellas in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Routledge, 2013).
7. Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), xvi.
8. There are other dilemmas for South Korea, such as a credibility gap, a targeting dilemma, and a stability-instability paradox. See Geun Wook Lee, “Unholy Trinity in Nuclear Deterrence: Three Dilemmas of Nuclear Weapons,” Korean Journal of Security Affairs 12 (2007): 5–18.
9. See the full text of joint communiqué of the Forty-Sixth S. Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting, October 23, 2014. See also Kyudok Hong, “Option 1: Enhancing Military Deterrence,” Asian Forum 4, no. 3 (special forum, June, 11, 2015).
10. See Kyung-young Chung, “Debate on THAAD Deployment and ROK National Security,” East Asia Institute, working paper, October 2015.
11. Morgan, Deterrence Now, 8.
12. Derek D. Smith, Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); James H. Lebovic, Deterring International Terrorism: US National Security Policy after 9/11 (London: Routledge, 2007).
13. Janice Gross Stein, “Rational Deterrence against ‘Irrational’ Adversaries? No Common Knowledge,” in Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age, ed. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 62–63.
14. Stein, “Rational Deterrence against ‘Irrational’ Adversaries?,” 66.
15. Smith, Deterring America, 14.
16. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2012).
17. North Korea’s formal position on using nuclear weapons was indicated during the Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea in April 2013, at which it was declared that “the nuclear weapons of the DPRK can be used only by a final order of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army to repel invasion or attack from a hostile nuclear weapons state and make retaliatory strikes; the DPRK shall neither use nukes against the nonnuclear states nor threaten them with those weapons unless they join a hostile nuclear weapons state in its invasion and attack on the DPRK.”
18. Ivan Arreguín-Toft, “Unconventional Deterrence: How the Weak Deter the Strong,” in Paul, Morgan, and Wirtz, Complex Deterrence, 209.
19. Patrick Morgan, “North Korea and Nuclear Deterrence,” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 13 (2004), 10.
20. Stein, “Rational Deterrence against ‘Irrational’ Adversaries?,” 77.
21. See various arguments in Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1997); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Thérèse Delpech, Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012); and David G. Coleman and Joseph M. Siracusa, Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006).
22. For a constructivist approach to nuclear use, see Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
23. Morgan, Deterrence Now, xvi.
24. Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press 2004), 5.
25. Lawrence Freedman, “Deterrence: A Reply,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28 (2005): 794.
26. Other than verbal means, a state can deploy other types of reassurance attempts: nonmilitary and military deeds. Tang, Theory of Security Strategy, 148.
27. Marc Lynch, “Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement,” European Journal of International Relations 8 (2002): 192.
28. Tang, Theory of Security Strategy, 102
29. Ibid., 130–36. Also Tang argues that “if extensive trust has to come before any reassurance signal, no reassurance is possible. This is simply because reassurance actually is driven by the desire to build trust and reduce mistrust, and building trust via reassurance fundamentally depends on taking some risk in the possibility that the other side is untrustworthy” (p. 140).
30. James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review 88 (1994): 577–92; James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (1997): 68–90.
31. Smith, Deterring America, 36.