With the initial objective of securing a landing on the Cotentin Peninsula achieved, the VII Corps, of which the 4th Infantry Division was part, turned its attention to the next strategic objective—Cherbourg. The campaign to push the Germans out of Normandy and retake France required vast quantities of fuel, ammunition, equipment, and many more troops. The Mulberry artificial harbors that were set up off the invasion beaches and over-the-beach deliveries by landing craft would suffice for only a few weeks. The Allies needed access to a major seaport to support their titanic logistical effort. The nearest port to the invasion beaches was Cherbourg at the northern tip of the Cotentin Peninsula. The capture of this vital harbor became the focus of the Ivy Division’s efforts for the next nineteen days.1
During the night of June 6, General Barton conferred with a staff officer from the 82nd Airborne. He decided to shore up the northern flank and begin the drive to Cherbourg in concert with the paratroopers holding Ste.-Mere-Eglise. At midnight, he issued orders to continue the attack toward Montebourg. The orders trickled down to H Company. After Bill finished preparing his mortar section for the night defense, he began planning for the next day’s attack.2
The 12th Infantry stepped off at 0600 hours on June 7, advancing west-northwest. Without any firm targets, the heavy mortars did not have to fire from their overnight positions and moved with the rest of the battalion. The platoon’s jeeps still had not landed, so the men continued to carry their weapons and ammunition as they followed the rifle companies. Bill had targets planned on points of danger along the attack route and pre-designated firing positions for the guns to cover the battalion’s advance.
The 2nd Battalion moved forward two and a half kilometers before hitting an enemy position at Neuville-au-Plain, just east of the highway running up to Montebourg. Overnight the Germans had organized a counter-attack against the 82nd Airborne Division in Ste.-Mere-Eglise. They had just arrived in Neuville when the 2nd Battalion’s left flank also reached the outskirts of the town. German rifles and machine guns opened fire from nearly every window in the village. Instantly, the rifle companies returned fire.3
At the sound of the erupting battle, the mortar squad leaders cried, “Action.” The crews executed the drill for putting the guns into operation, something they had practiced often in England. The men carrying the base plates dropped them at the points designated by the squad leaders. Gunners and assistant gunners established the initial direction of fire by driving in aiming stakes on the specified compass heading. The crews aligned the base plates with the aiming stakes. The gunners spread and locked the legs of the bipods then opened the clamping collars. The assistant gunners inserted and locked the bottom of the barrels into the base plate sockets. The crews lowered the barrels into the bipod’s cradle then closed the clamping collars. With the guns mounted, the gunners cranked the tubes up to 62 degree elevation and set the deflection scales to zero. The gunners finished by adjusting the tubes for level and alignment. As soon as Bill and his observers called back range and direction to the targets, the section sergeant calculated the correct settings for the mortars. The gunners adjusted the deflection and elevation on the tubes. Squad leaders then shouted, “Fire.” Within minutes, Bill’s crews started dropping 81mm rounds on Neuville to suppress the Germans.4
Before the battalion could seize the town, Colonel Reeder called Colonel Montelbano and ordered him to halt the attack. On the right, the 1st Battalion had become entangled with an enemy strongpoint during the morning’s action. That caused a gap to form between the regiment’s forward battalions. Even more worrisome to Reeder, the 12th Infantry had advanced forward of the rest of the division and now had exposed flanks. At this stage of the war, American tactics demanded an unbroken front when advancing. Later in the war, the Army would learn to exploit any crack in the enemy’s defense to reach an objective—and worry less about flank security. Colonel Reeder filled the gap with the 3rd Battalion and pulled Colonel Montelbano’s men northeast to high ground between the villages of le Bisson and Bandienville to guard the regiment’s rear. The mortar platoon became part of the regiment’s reserve but stayed busy the rest of the afternoon clashing with enemy elements that tried to circle behind the regiment.5 (See Map II)
With no fixed frontlines, both the Americans and Germans had trouble anticipating what direction an enemy probe might come from. The Germans liked to send out a single tank in these situations to scout enemy positions. In one instance, Bill had gathered with part of his section along a hedgerow when a German tank approached. With no weapons capable of knocking out a tank, the men felt defenseless and several panicked, running back to H Company’s defensive position. Bill and another man kept their wits about them and crept along a hedgerow to get behind the tank with the idea of disabling it with a grenade. The tank crew saw them but could not target the two infantrymen because of the dense vegetation. Although tanks had advantage in terms of firepower, maneuverability, and armor protection, their crews tended to get very nervous when enemy infantrymen lurked about. The German tank quickly pulled back. The threat having departed, Bill and the other soldier picked up all the loose equipment left behind by the men who had fled and walked back to the company area. When they rejoined their comrades, they dumped all the equipment in a pile in front of them. Point made!6
The situation remained highly fluid throughout June 7. The regiment had no contact with the other two regiments on its flanks, so Colonel Reeder pulled the Command Post (CP) inside a perimeter and faced the Anti-Tank Platoon to the west. Bill planned targets to protect the regiment’s left flank and rear, and his men oriented their guns mostly to the west and south. These precautions paid off. A reinforced company of Germans charged out of Neuville to attack the battalion around 0200 hours. Lieutenant Slaymaker remarked, “There’s a lot of scuffling and grenade throwing.” The battalion’s small arms and mortar fire drove them off without the need to call for artillery.7
The action closed with the Germans unable to organize a cohesive defense and the Americans yet to form a solid front. The 12th Infantry had run into some sharp engagements but that had not stopped it from expanding the beachhead. Bill and his men were growing accustomed to incoming fire but, so far, they had not run into any enemy force they could not handle. That situation was about to change. Bill later recalled, “The first two days weren’t that bad, but that changed on day three.”
During June 7, the Germans brought up two regiments to reinforce the defenders facing the 4th Infantry Division. Drawn from the 91st and 243rd Divisions, these units were well-trained and well-equipped combat formations. The German commander had given up hope of driving the Americans back into the English Channel and now sought to establish a solid defense. He designated a main line of resistance (MLR) along the high ground between Emondeville and Crisbecq. The 1058th Infantry Regiment took up positions directly opposite the 12th Infantry.8
Division HQ ordered the 12th Infantry to continue its attack on June 8 with the high ground northeast of Montebourg as its objective. The axis of advance ran first through the town of Emondeville that sat atop a low hill, then continued onto the village of Joganville. From there, the regiment would skirt the eastern edge of Montebourg. Their route meant that they had to cross several farms to reach the objective. Starting this day, the 4th Infantry Division would learn how easily the Germans could defend the peculiar Norman terrain.
The bocage frustrated the American advance throughout Normandy. The dense, tangled vegetation and earthen walls of the hedgerows channeled the attackers into narrow roads, running between them, which the Germans covered with mines, machine guns, and anti-tank weapons. The Americans quickly learned to avoid these kill zones and advance through the hedgerows and across the fields.9
That did not solve all the problems. The tanks had the power to push through the vegetation but their front ends lifted as they climbed over the barriers, exposing their underbellies to German anti-tank weapons like the Panzerfaust or the powerful 88mm Flak gun. The Germans tended to entrench on the backside of the open fields, sometimes in the middle. Whenever the Americans broke through a hedgerow and entered the field, the Germans had a clear field of fire. The Germans especially liked to defend the sunken roads that ran parallel to the front. They would dig in along the hedgerow facing the Americans while using the protection of the sunken road behind their position to move troops and vehicles from one sector to the next, as the situation required. The terrain and German defensive techniques obstructed rapid maneuver and concentration of firepower, just the type of offensive tactics the Americans liked to use.10
The battle on June 8 kicked off at 0530 hours with naval gunfire pounding Emondeville. The 1st and 3rd Battalions led the attack with the 2nd Battalion in reserve. Despite the Navy’s terrific shelling, the attack bogged down against German artillery and machine gun fire only 600 yards beyond the line of departure (LD). The enemy launched a fierce counterattack against the 1st Battalion using the Seventh Army Sturm Battalion, supported by a heavy artillery barrage. The 1st Battalion responded with a deluge from its mortars (the 81mm mortar platoon dropped four hundred rounds in ten minutes) and division artillery that beat back the Sturm Battalion—barely.11
Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion pushed across the hedgerows toward Emondeville, taking heavy casualties the whole way. Every time the riflemen hopped over a hedgerow, they came under withering enemy fire. By will and sheer determination, L Company forced its way through Emondeville only to have the German defenders emerge from the houses they had bypassed and shoot at them from behind. The company soon found itself isolated on the far (north) side of Emondeville. The rest of 3rd Battalion tried to reach them but German artillery and rocket fire pinned down K Company just short of the village.12
Colonel Reeder then committed the 2nd Battalion to envelop the enemy’s position and take Emondeville from the west. Colonel Montelbano contacted the 3rd Battalion then directed his attack around their left flank. Tactics dictated that the heavy mortar platoon move forward by echelon (one section at a time) so that at least one section remained in place to deliver immediate suppressive fire on targets of opportunity. The advancing mortar sections picked up their tubes, baseplates, and bipods, then followed the battalion’s lead companies as they swung around K Company’s left.13
The 2nd Battalion had just started its flanking maneuver when the Germans unleashed a barrage of rockets. The Germans had developed a launching system, called the “Nebelwerfer” or “smoke thrower,” that fired multiple rocket projectiles a distance of 2,200 meters. Each rocket had a diameter of 280mm and a powerful 110-lb. high explosive warhead. The Nebelwerfers could fire six of these rockets in rapid succession from a towed launcher. When launched, the rockets produced a high-pitched screeching sound. American troops nicknamed them “Screaming Meemies.” The rocket projectiles lacked the accuracy of artillery but a launch of six rockets could saturate an area target with deadly effect.14
The huge warheads thudded into the fields right in the battalion’s path. The ground erupted like a volcano, spitting earth and smoke skyward. Blast waves smacked the riflemen the same moment the deafening roar of the exploding shells boomed in their ears. Colonel Reeder realized how devastating rockets could be to exposed troops. Jumping up and down and waving his arms to the west he shouted, “Everybody go over that way!” Following the orders of their agitated regimental commander, the troops immediately darted to their left. This saved lives but caused confusion. Company commanders, platoon leaders, and squad leaders had no chance to control their formations as the men stampeded out of the impact area. The situation became even more critical when the Germans launched a counterattack out of Emondeville that hit the disorganized 2nd Battalion.15
The regiment’s executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel James Luckett, marveled at the battalion’s reaction. “[T]his counterattack far from routing the 2d Bn seemed to be the thing that straightened them out. The men quickly adjusted themselves into units and went after the Germans.” The Americans “opened up with everything they had”—rifles, machine guns, and 81mm mortars—and sent the Germans reeling back to Emondeville.16
The revitalized battalion turned its attention back to its objective and advanced. The heavy weapons suppressed the enemy while the riflemen climbed over the hedgerows and maneuvered across the open spaces. Despite the suppressive fire, the Germans held their ground and returned fire with deadly effect. The crump…crump of distant American artillery and mortar fire mixed with the boom…boom of German shells impacting close by. The rattle of machine guns and rifles melded into a steady, cacophonous din. Losses mounted quickly.
The mortar platoon had its own problems with the Norman terrain. Army doctrine stated that OPs should be “close enough to the mortar position to permit the observer to see both the target and the mortar position.” In the bocage, the observers could not see past the next hedgerow and could not be seen past the one to their rear. While the platoon had radios, it did not have enough to hand out to the observers. It had telephones and reels of telephone wire but the fast-paced situation made it difficult to lay wire. Enemy artillery and mortars often severed the wires, anyway. Bill’s men had to improvise by sending runners back and forth between the guns and observers. They also adapted by displacing mortar sections frequently to keep the guns close to the observers and the front line. The platoon advanced like an inchworm: extend-contract, extend-contract.17
When the attack ran into stiff resistance coming from a French farmhouse, the company called up the naval Shore Fire Control Party attached to the regiment, and issued a call for fire against the entrenched Germans. The USS Nevada (BB-36) answered the call with its main battery of fourteen-inch guns. Bill had his eyes on the target when he heard the incoming rounds. “The huge shells sounded like a freight train flying overhead.” The exploding rounds sent out a massive shock wave. When the smoke cleared, the farmhouse and its German defenders had been obliterated. “Wow! What destruction!” Bill exclaimed.
The attack ground forward. F Company assaulted across an open field against a German position, using “marching fire.” The 81mm mortars supported them by dropping rounds in front of the infantrymen until the troops got close to the bursting radius of the shells. Then, the mortar crews added fifty yards to the range and continued to fire. F Company pressed ahead, but lost its commander when he was killed trying to take out a machine gun with only his carbine. One of E Company’s riflemen, Technical Sergeant Daniel Stresow, had better luck. He snuck his way along one side of a hedgerow until he was next to a machine gun on the other side of the bushes. He bounded over the shrubs and killed the two-man crew with his bayonet. At one point in the fight, E Company surrounded a German detachment. Six enemy soldiers raised a white flag but appeared to balk at coming out into the open. 2nd Lt. John Everett and a handful of enlisted men went forward to take the Germans prisoner. The two groups were only twenty yards apart when an unseen German machine gun cut down Everett and one of the enlisted men. After that, E Company overwhelmed the German unit with no thought of quarter.18
By mid-afternoon the 2nd Battalion had advanced all the way to the Ste.-Mere-Eglise-Montebourg highway and held the adjacent village of Basse Emondeville. Colonel Reeder pulled it back to attack Emondeville from the west. In the confusion, one of the mortar sections got separated going through Basse Emondeville. Lieutenant Slaymaker had to send Bill and three men to guide them back into the attack.19
The 2nd Battalion reached the beleaguered L Company late in the afternoon, a few hundred meters northwest of Emondeville. That linkup allowed the regiment to extricate K Company, which had gone to ground under sustained German artillery and mortar fire just south of the village.
While Colonel Montelbano’s men fought house to house through Basse Emondeville and Emondeville, the regimental Command Post (CP) came under attack. German artillery observers had noticed a collection of vehicles in nearby Saussetour and correctly guessed that it was an American headquarters. The enemy pounded Saussetour with 88mm and 150mm shells and directed a local counterattack against the soft target. It took part of 3rd Battalion’s I Company and a heavy dose of counter-battery fire from the 42nd Artillery Battalion to break up the attack and silence the enemy guns.20
The struggle for Emondeville continued into the evening. The German survivors used the cover of darkness to withdraw one kilometer north to Joganville, though nineteen Germans emerged from one house to surrender to the mortars. “We put them to work digging our emplacements.” The 2nd Battalion secured the village and H Company set up the 81mm mortars and heavy machine guns around the hamlet. Primary and secondary targets had to be planned to the front and firing positions prepared. Given the fluid situation, Bill had to plan for counterattacks from the left flank and rear, too. Alternate firing positions were designated and potential targets reconnoitered. Bill positioned OPs and had the section lay wire to them. He stayed busy all night working up fire plans and checking the mortar squads’ range cards to ensure they recorded data for all planned targets.21
The regiment lost nearly three hundred men on June 8; among them was 2nd Lt. Sam Kyle, Bill’s best friend. The 12th Infantry had advanced only one third of the way toward Montebourg. After experiencing German rockets, sustained mortar and artillery fire, inter-locking machine gun fire, and stubborn defenders who fought to the death, the Americans had a better idea of how fierce the fighting would become in Normandy. Undaunted by the stiff resistance and the regiment’s casualties, Colonel Reeder ordered an attack on June 9 to seize Joganville but with some modifications. The grinding fight at Emondeville convinced him that the rifle companies could not assault well-defended positions without help. Small arms and mortars were simply not enough to dislodge determined German defenders without absorbing unsustainable losses. The Americans needed more firepower—that meant using tanks.22
Tallie Crocker, the H Company commander, summoned Bill to the CP in the predawn hours for a briefing about the upcoming attack. The young lieutenant had not slept for days but he dragged his weary body to the CP to receive the attack order. Bill fell asleep on the way there and collapsed into a hedgerow. Waking up as soon as he landed in the bushes, Bill pulled himself out of the shrubbery, none the worse, except for a small cut on his hand. He would wonder about that cut days later. Coming back after the briefing, Bill felt a strange uneasiness take hold like the time he looked at his parents on the tarmac in San Francisco. This time he knew what the odd sensation meant. He pulled his sergeant aside when he got back with his section. “Stay clear of me today,” he said. “I think I’m going to get hit.”
The attack by the 2nd Battalion kicked off at 0700 hours, helped by a fog lying atop the bocage. The weather was a mixed blessing. The infantrymen could use the extra concealment but the fog also prevented them from getting any air support. The 81mm mortars could hit Joganville from their positions in Emondeville, so the guns remained in place for the initial move as Bill and the observers moved forward with the rifle platoons to locate targets and select forward firing positions.23
The observers worked their way through the hedgerows and crawled into spots that gave them observation of Joganville and some cover against enemy fire. With no chance to set up alidades, the observation posts (OPs) could not align with the gun-target (G-T) line. The platoon laid the guns on an initial compass heading toward Joganville (6400 mils). Peeking through brush, the observers estimated their O-T line (5400 mils) and distance from the target (e.g. 400 meters). The observers had to correct their fire orders for the deviation in their line of sight to the target versus the G-T line, using the compass-mil method.
After calculating the correct distance and direction of fire to the targets, the observers called in initial fire orders using telephones wired back to the gun squads. “HE [type of round], 0 [deflection], stake [aiming point], 1200 [range], one round.” The observers fixed their binoculars on the targets and spotted the impact of the initial rounds. They called back adjustments for the range and deflection to shift subsequent rounds onto the enemy. Once the rounds landed on target, the observers called “fire for effect.” Each gun squad dropped rounds on the enemy every four seconds, saturating the German positions. By comparison, the artillery could only sustain a rate of fire of one round a minute.
Both sides came to appreciate the value of mortars during the close fighting in the hedgerows. The wider dispersion of standard artillery rounds and their greater bursting radius meant that targets any closer than 400–600 meters to friendly troops had to be treated as “danger close” missions. In Normandy hedgerows, an enemy was usually 100 to 300 away. Only mortars could safely fire on an enemy that close. The Germans used mortars extensively, too. Their preferred tactic was to pin down American infantry with small arms and machine-gun fire, then clobber them with mortars. Some estimates showed that German mortars accounted for 75 percent of American infantry losses in Normandy. The Germans also appreciated the threat posed by American mortars and, with increasing frequency, targeted H Company’s mortars with their artillery.24
E Company riflemen forced their way into Joganville, fighting house-to-house. The Germans fought back with small arms fire and a 75mm howitzer. After a brief, fierce battle, the company seized the town and the howitzer. Over to the right, F Company moved through several fields before they ran into a German combat outpost. The lieutenant commanding the company took a bullet between the eyes while the Battalion S-2 and a platoon leader suffered severe burns from a white phosphorus (WP) round. The enemy held them up until a platoon of tanks from B Company, 746th Tank Battalion joined the fight. The infantry and armor worked together against the enemy. The tanks blasted the dug-in German infantry, forcing their heads down. F Company’s riflemen followed with a direct assault. The Americans rooted out the defenders at bayonet point, killing twenty-five of them. The 1st Battalion, on the battalion’s right flank, also used tanks from the 746th to advance beyond Joganville. The 12th Infantry had much to learn about combined-arms tactics but its first experience with tanks worked very well.25
Just north of the village and across a creek, stood the Chateau Daudinville, a massive Norman building with four-foot thick stone walls. More a fortress than a residence, the chateau was defended by a company from the Sturm Battalion. The enemy made effective use of the chateau’s grounds and its wide-open fields of fire to bar the regiment’s advance. The motorcycle troops even mined and booby-trapped the outer walls. Colonel Reeder knew an infantry assault would be suicidal but the chateau had to be taken. Now that tanks had joined the regiment, Reeder organized a deliberate attack by Combat Team 12 (CT 12), using all the assets he had available. He brought up six tanks from the 746th to bolster the infantry. As soon as the mortar platoon’s observers fed firing data to the crews, they started dropping rounds at a furious rate. The short-barreled 105mm howitzers of the regiment’s Cannon Company and the regular 105mm howitzers of the 42nd Artillery Battalion joined in. American supporting fire plastered the chateau as the tanks and infantry attacked. The tanks hit the chateau with their 75mm main guns and machine guns but the enemy still cut down the infantry as they crossed the creek. It took time, but American firepower turned the tide of battle. Indirect fire whittled down the outlying German positions. Tank fire drove the enemy away from the chateau’s windows. Small arms fire picked off more of the defenders who tried to fire back. Under the umbrella of fire, the riflemen worked their way across the creek until they got close enough to launch a final rush to wipe out the defenders. “It was our turn to kill a few,” Lieutenant Slaymaker said. “There were no prisoners. They were killed before they could surrender. The men [were] mad…There [was] no mercy in anyone’s heart. We [had] seen too many of our buddies killed and wounded this day.”26
While the 1st and 2nd Battalions reduced Chateau Daudinville, Colonel Reeder directed the 3rd Battalion to bypass the action and bound around the eastern flank. The 3rd Battalion succeeded in reaching the regimental objective, the high ground northeast of Montebourg. Reeder wanted to consolidate CT 12 on the objective, so he ordered 1st and 2nd Battalions to resume their attack at 1930 hours from their position northwest of Joganville and come abreast of the 3rd Battalion. Reeder designated a couple of roads that generally ran east-west about one kilometer past the chateau as the LD for the attack by the two battalions.27
The 2nd Battalion re-organized after the vicious fight at the chateau. Bill’s section had already had a busy day. Lieutenant Slaymaker brought all of H Company’s mortars forward to the assembly area northwest of Joganville and prepared to bound the sections to support the attack. Colonel Montelbano started the weary battalion moving around 1915 hours, using the Joganville–Montebourg road as a guide for their right flank. Just as the leading rifle platoons reached the LD, they ran headlong into a German force counterattacking out of Montebourg. Up and down the line, riflemen from both sides hit the dirt and opened fire.
German military doctrine emphasized the necessity of launching an immediate counterattack once an enemy force penetrated a defensive line. “It was a point of honor with them,” a G Company soldier once remarked. The fall of Chateau Daudinville and the American push beyond Joganville provoked the Germans into organizing a local assault using their reserves in Montebourg. The two lines of opposing infantry collided along the road that marked the American LD. The mortar platoon had already broken down a section of mortar tubes to carry forward on the evening attack. The sudden counterattack forced them to reset the section. Working quickly, the mortar squads began dropping their remaining rounds just forward of the rifle squads.28
The enemy platoons pressed ahead using fire and maneuver but the 12th Infantry held firm. The Germans tried to press their assault but ran into a solid wall of fire. The Germans then sent a small force to envelop the American left. They found a good firing position for their machine guns behind a hedgerow west of the 2nd Battalion. One of the machine gunners spotted a group of Americans across the field and took aim at the officer leading them.
Bill moved forward with some of his observers along a hedgerow, hurrying forward to spot rounds and adjust mortar fire against the enemy. A sudden burst of machine gun fire coming from the left bracketed Bill’s head. He felt the heat of the first round as it snapped just in front of his nose, then the warm crackle of the second round as it passed behind his neck. A heartbeat later the Americans heard tat-tat-tat-tat-tat-tat! They hit the ground before the machine gunner had a chance to get off a second burst. Bill and his men hugged the ground as more enemy rounds ripped through the shrubs above their heads then low crawled through the growth to get out of the field of fire. By the time they wriggled to the other side, the Germans were pouring fire into the battalion’s left flank.29
The German machine gun position put the American infantry in a difficult spot. They could not sit still with fire pouring into their flank but they had to cross a thick hedgerow and an open field to get at the Germans.30
The commander of the 746th Tank Battalion, Lt. Col. Clarence Hupfer, helped retrieve the situation. He first came forward to make a personal reconnaissance. The hedgerow prevented a direct approach by the tanks against the Germans but Hupfer discovered a gate in the southern extension of the hedgerow. He directed one platoon of his tanks to skirt around the American infantry’s left flank and enter the field through the gate. Once the tanks burst into the open field, they fired on the German machine gunners. With tanks bearing down on them, the German machine gunners withdrew, and the enemy counterattack petered out. The tanks’ success allowed the 1st and 2nd Battalions to push forward just beyond their designated LD, but that’s where they stopped.31
The battered American infantry dug in for the night along the front they had just defended. Unfortunately, their positions were within sight of a German OP nestled in the tower of Montebourg’s church. Besides spotting artillery fire, the OP could also call for rocket strikes. Later that evening, Bill attended a meeting in the H Company CP. The company leaders had just gathered when they heard a Nebelwerfer launch its rockets. The shrill sound of the incoming projectiles alerted them that the rounds were coming their way. Bill and a sergeant dove into a nearby slit trench. The first rocket landed just yards away. Damn! That was close. The second round landed even closer. Uh oh! The third rocket struck beside Bill’s slit trench and everything went black.32
The next thing Bill knew he was floating in a mist. For some reason, his arms and legs moved but there was no ground beneath him. He remained suspended in mist, waving his limbs. Is this what it’s like to be dead? Gradually his senses returned, and he realized that he was neither dead nor suspended in air—he was lying on his back and squirming. The rocket had riddled his torso with shrapnel and cracked his ribs, making it difficult to breathe. The sergeant next to him fared worse—the blast had cut him in two. Bill tried to get to his feet but keeled over. He heard his commander, Tallie Crocker, yelling, “Somebody look after Lieutenant Chapman.” Hands came to help. Bill saw his sergeant and noticed that he had tears in his eyes while he helped lift Bill onto a litter. A short time later, he lost consciousness.33
The battalion evacuated Bill to a clearing station that stabilized him despite his near-mortal wounds. The medics then transported him to Utah Beach. He came to on the beach but struggled to inhale. The shrapnel embedded in his chest and abdomen made every breath painful. The only way he could cope was to take shallow breaths that did not aggravate the puncture wounds. A medic walked over to check on him. The pained expression on Bill’s face and his labored breathing let the medic know that Bill had been badly hurt and suffered severe pain. The medic pulled out a syringe and a vial of morphine. “Here Lieutenant, I’ve got some morphine that will help ease your pain.”
“No doc…Don’t…I’m having…enough trouble…breathing as it is.”
The medic suddenly realized that he had been on the verge of giving the lieutenant an injection that could have shut down the wounded officer’s ability to breathe altogether. His act of kindness might have been fatal. “Oh right!” he said. “Damn! It’s a good thing you said something.”
The regiment continued losing officers and enlisted men after Bill was evacuated. He was one of the 952 casualties the 12th Infantry suffered during its first week of combat. On June 11 Colonel Reeder was severely wounded by artillery fire, eventually losing a leg. That same day, German artillery killed Lt. Col. Dominick Montelbano, commander of the 2nd Battalion. H Company commander, 1st Lt. Tallie Crocker, went down on June 12. A German 88 knocked the mortar platoon leader, 1st Lt. William Slaymaker, out of the war the next day. The troops in Bill’s section had lost all the officers in their chain of command from lieutenant to colonel in seven days. Among the battalion’s three rifle companies, only one officer remained.34
The Normandy battles chewed up the Germans, too. The 919th Infantry Regiment had dissolved under the American assault, and the 1058th Regiment had been reduced to less than half strength. The Americans had killed the commanding general of the 91st Division on the first day of contact, and an Allied air strike killed the commander of the LXXXIV Corps, Lt. Gen. Erich Marcks, on June 12.35
Prior to the invasion the German general staff assumed that the American, British, and Canadian armies could be driven back into the sea by a few well-placed and determined counterattacks. German counterattacks, however, failed to produce any significant results. The Americans stood their ground, then punished the attackers with massive firepower, everything from small arms, machine guns, and mortars to artillery, naval gunfire, and aerial bombardment.
The Germans made another huge miscalculation when they underestimated the Allies’ ability to reinforce and supply the initial invasion force in the Cotentin Peninsula. They anticipated that the Americans could support two, perhaps three, divisions in the Cotentin in the first week after the landing. The LXXXIV Corps had three divisions on hand and could be reinforced with three more in a few days, enough force, they thought, to contain the landing then overwhelm it with strong counterattacks. Instead, the Americans landed with one infantry and two airborne divisions on D-Day then followed up with two more infantry divisions by D+6. The Allies proved that they could surge combat forces onto the battlefield faster than the Germans.36
At midnight on June 9, Hitler sent orders to Field Marshal von Rundstedt, commander of Oberbefehlshaber West (OB West), to hold the Fifteenth Army reserves near Calais and assume a strategic defensive posture in Normandy, rather than launch an all-out attack against the Allied beachhead. The Fuhrer had decided to hedge his bets in the West to save Germany’s dwindling resources for the looming summer battles in the East. By the time Bill was evacuated to England, the Allies had a permanent foothold on the continent.37