1. J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992).
1. I do not wish to suggest that mine is the only reasonable interpretation of Descartes. My claim is rather that the interpretation presented here has been the most influential in the history of the subject.
2. G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949).
1. K. Popper and J. C. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain (Berlin: Springer, 1977).
2. J. C. Eccles, How the Self Controls Its Brain (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1994), 5.
3. Eccles, How the Self Controls Its Brain, 69.
4. H. Stapp, The Mindful Universe, forthcoming.
5. The classical statement of idealism is in George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, ed. J. Dancy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
6. H. Feigl, “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’ ” in H. Feigl, M. Scriven and G. Maxwell, eds., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 2 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958).
7. D. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8. Some famous logical behaviorists were G. Ryle, see his The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949), and C. Hempel, “The Logical Analysis of Psychology” in N. Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).
9. I cannot find the exact source of this quote. I think it is an adaptation of Ogden and Richards’ characterization of Watson as “affecting general anesthesia.” C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (1926, London: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1949), 23.
10. Three classic statements of the identity theory are in U. T. Place, “Is consciousness a brain process?” British Journal of Psychology, vol. 47, no. 1 (1956): 44–50; J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes,” in D. Rosenthal, ed., The Nature of Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 169–176; H. Feigl, “The ‘mental’ and the ‘physical,’” in Feigl, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science.
11. This objection and the ones which follow are discussed in Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes,” in Rosenthal, The Nature of Mind.
12. This objection was presented by, among other people, J. T. Stevenson, “Sensations and Brain Processes: A reply to J. J. C. Smart” in C. V. Borst, ed., The Mind-Brain Identity Theory (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1970), 87–92.
13. G. Maxwell, “Unity of Consciousness and Mind-Brain Identity” in J. C. Eccles, ed., Mind and Brain: The Many Faceted Problems (Washington: Paragon House, 1974), 233–237.
14. This objection was discussed in Smart’s original article, and also in J. J. C. Smart, “Further Remarks on Sensations and Brain Processes,” in Borst, The Mind-Brain Identity Theory, 93–94.
15. J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992).
16. N. Block, “Troubles with Functionalism,” in C. Wade Savage, ed., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 9 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978), 261–325.
17. Among the early proponents of functionalism were H. Putnam, D. Lewis, and D. Armstrong. See H. Putnam, “The Nature of Mental States,” in Block, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, 223–231; D. Lewis, “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications,” in Block, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, and D. Lewis, “Mad Pain and Martian Pain,” in Block, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, 207–222; D. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind (London: Routledge, 1993).
18. P. Johnson-Laird, The Computer and the Mind (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), and Mental Models, Toward a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference and Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983).
19. Eliminativism was originally stated by R. Rorty and P. Feyerabend. A recent advocate is Paul Churchland. See P. Feyerabend, “Mental Events and the Brain,” Journal of Philosophy (1963): 295–296; R. Rorty, “Mind-Body Identity, Privacy and Categories” in D. Rosenthal, ed., Materialism, and the Mind-Body Problem (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1971), 174–199; P. M. Churchland, “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes,” in Rosenthal, The Nature of Mind.
20. D. Davidson, “Mental Events,” reprinted in D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 207–227.
21. P. M. Churchland.,“ Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes,” in Rosenthal, The Nature of Mind, 603.
1. T. Nagel “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophical Review, vol. 83 (1974): 435–450, reprinted in David Chalmers, ed., The Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
2. F. Jackson, “What Mary Didn’t Know,” Journal of Philosophy, vol: 83 (1982): 291–295, reprinted in T. O’Connor and D. Robb, eds., Philosophy of Mind (New York: Routledge 2003); F. Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 32 (1986): 127–136, reprinted in Chalmers, The Philosophy of the Mind.
3. N. Block, “Troubles with Functionalism,” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 9 (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1978) 261–325, reprinted in N. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 268–305.
4. S. A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), relevant portion reprinted in Chalmers, The Philosophy of Mind, 329–332.
5. J. R. Searle, “Minds, Brains and Programs,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (1980): 417–424, reprinted in many publications, including O’Connor and Robb, Philosophy of Mind, 332–352.
6. H. Dreyfus, What Computers Can’t Do, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1979).
7. J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992).
8. T. Nagel, “Armstrong on the Mind,” in Block, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, 205.
9. The insufficiency of behavior to discriminate discriminable meanings was shown by W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962). He did not see that the argument was a reductio ad absurdum of behaviorist accounts of meaning. For a criticism of Quine’s views, see, J. R. Searle, “Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person,” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 84, no. 3 (March, 1987): 123–147; reprinted in J. R. Searle, Consciousness and Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
10. C. McGinn, “Anomalous Monism and Kripke’s Cartesian Intuitions,” in Block, Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, 156–158.
11. D. Dennett, “Back from the Drawing Board,” in D. Dahlbom, Dennett and His Critics (Cambridge, MA: Routledge, 1993), 211.
1. D. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Theory of Conscious Experience (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 115–121.
2. T. Huxley, “On the Hypothesis that Animals Are Automata and Its History,” in D. M. Armstrong, The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), 148.
3. J. Kim, Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 44.
4. For an earlier version of this list see H. Feigl, “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’,” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 2, eds. H. Fiegl, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958).
5. J. Kim, The Philosophy of Mind (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 59.
1. See, for example, the chapter on pain and temperature (chapter 5) in C. R. Noback and R. J. Demarest, The Nervous System: Introduction and Review (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977).
2. M. S. Gazzaniga, The Social Brain: Discovering the Networks of the Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1985).
3. W. Penfield, The Mystery of the Mind: A Critical Study of Consciousness and the Human Brain, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 76.
4. D. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown, 1991). Specifically, he says consciousness is a virtual von Neumann machine implemented in a connectionist architecture.
5. T. Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
6. C. McGinn, “Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?” Mind, vol. 98 (1989): 349–356.
7. J. Kim, “Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy vol. 9 (1984): 257–270.
8. D. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
9. C. Koch, The Quest for Consciousness: A Neurobiological Approach (Englewood, CO: Roberts and Co., 2004).
1. D. Dennett, “The Intentional Stance,” in Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology (Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books, 1978).
2. J. R. Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
3. H. Putnam, “Meaning of ‘Meaning,’” in K. Gunderson, ed., Language, Mind, and Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), 131–193, excerpt reprinted in D. Chalmers, ed., The Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
4. In Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind, 587.
5. T. Burge, “Individualism and the Mental,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 4 (1979), excerpt reprinted in Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind.
1. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951).
2. W. Penfield, The Mystery of the Mind (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 76.
3. J. Kim, Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
4. J. Kim, “Causality, Identity and Supervenience in the Mind-Body Problem,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 4 (1979): 47.
1. D. N. Wegner, The Illusion of Conscious Will (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
1. S. Freud, “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria,” in Collected Papers, vol. 3 (New York: Basic Books, 1959), 13–146, esp. 49ff.
2. J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992).
3. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: Macmillan, 1958); cf. S. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).
1. B. Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (London: Allen and Unwin, 1940), 15.
2. For a statement of several different versions of the argument from illusion, cf. A. J. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (London: Macmillan, 1953).
3. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed., L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), 210–211.
4. J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. S. Pringle-Pattison (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 67.
5. M. Bauerlein, Literary Criticism: An Autopsy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997).
6. J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).