Fig. 13. Hamlet Evaluation System model hierarchy
The 9th Infantry Division was introduced in the Delta for one purpose only, to improve the security. Its mission was clear: it had to defeat the Viet Cong main and local force units and to support the pacification efforts of the GVN, thereby eliminating the Viet Cong’s intimidation of the people. Pacification then was the endgame, and the most discernable pattern in it was that programs depended entirely upon security. Consequently, the division had a dual focus—combat operations and pacification.
In mid-1968, the war in the populated Delta of South Vietnam was a guerrilla war. The tactics of avoiding contact only to surface at high points and then to disappear into the countryside and the absolute necessity of the Viet Cong main and local force units to have the support of the people to operate effectively were hallmarks of guerrilla warfare. In this guerrilla war, the goals of both the Communists and the GVN and its allies was to control the population and resources of South Vietnam. Since the GVN controlled the urban areas, the pacification of the rural areas was the key to success. Although many peasants harbored ill feelings toward the government for past deprivations, it was generally necessary for the Communists to maintain control of the countryside through force and intimidation. Their main and local force battalions provided the muscle, and the local district companies and village and hamlet guerrillas kept the lid on popular discontent. The Viet Cong manipulated the population by imposing its own Infrastructure (VCI). The VC coerced people into providing food, intelligence, and labor and, most importantly, unit recruits. The hamlet guerrillas dug the bunkers, emplaced the booby traps, transported materiel, and provided localized intelligence. Control of the rural population was the Communists’ number-one objective. To wrest control from the Communists and provide security to the countryside, the Allies not only had to defeat the Viet Cong main and local force units, but they had to block the increased infiltration of NVA troops, supplies, and equipment that were bolstering the failing efforts of the Viet Cong, as well as eliminate the important VCI. That required the full cooperation of all Allied Forces and GVN organizations.
Between 1965 and 1971, the Communists were fighting a guerrilla war. However, it is important to note that, over time, they set aside all pretense that the conflict was an indigenous insurrection, abandoning guerrilla warfare and adopting conventional warfare methods. These conventional tactics accelerated as the United States withdrew its 500,000-man force, leaving the 290,000 NVA/VC troops in place. These enemy troops were upgraded with tanks, heavy artillery, and anti-aircraft guns. NVA tactics improved to the point that they were making coordinated divisional-sized combined arms attacks upon the thinly stretched and always outnumbered RVNAF units. Although the NVA changed its tactics, the GVN stubbornly clung to its strategy of pacifying and protecting all twelve thousand far-flung hamlets and villages. Even after the United States drastically reduced its military aid funding in 1974, which forced the RVNAF to conserve ammunition and greatly reduce VNAF flying hours, thereby appreciably limiting the previous RVNAF advantages of firepower and mobility, the GVN did not adjust to the situation. The RVNAF, attempting to protect all the population and territory, was stretched too thin without adequate reserves. A major factor causing the NVA/VC to change their tactics was that the GVN and its allies were very successful in their pacification efforts.1
There was a great tug of war between the Communists and the GVN to control the rural population. Earlier, the GVN did not have sufficient forces to protect the thousands of hamlets and villages. Often, RVNAF units would visit hamlets during the day; however, at night, when they left, the VC would occupy them. It didn’t take much for the VC with guns to intimidate the peace-loving farmers.
However, by mid-1968, the GVN was poised to expand its security out from the urban areas and to reclaim the countryside. The tools for providing security had improved immeasurably. The Ministry of Revolutionary Development had been formed to coordinate the activities of the many military and civilian organizations involved in pacification. The Regular Forces (ARVN) were conducting operations directly in support of pacification. The RF/PF had expanded and were better equipped and led. The People’s Self Defense Force had been formed and was increasing greatly, and was assisting the RF/PF in local security. The Phoenix Program implemented by the National Police had been initiated for the purpose of identifying and rooting out the VCI personnel. The police utilized provincial reconnaissance units, made up of Chieu Hoi personnel as a strike force in eliminating VCI. Working together with the Popular Forces, the National Police maintained law and order in the villages and hamlets. Once secure, the rural development cadres moved in to improve the social and economic well-being of the population. With those building blocks in place and the Viet Cong main forces in their base areas, from 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969, the GVN carried out the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, whose purpose it was to expand the control of the GVN.
The life of a peasant in peacetime was difficult enough. The war, with its added deprivations, made the situation even more difficult. The farmers were tied to the land and could not vote with their feet, as hundreds of thousands of other South Vietnamese had done when they moved to GVN-controlled areas. Although poor, the farmers were wise; they would not willingly commit themselves to either side unless there was a solid sense of security. As a result, many hamlets remained contested as the Communists and the GVN fought for control. The control of the Delta countryside was paramount to the GVN in this period of guerrilla warfare, since it would take away from the Communists their source of sustenance and manpower and deny them the bases from which to attack urban areas.
One may ask, how do you measure or define control? MACV went to great pains to answer that fundamental question.2 It designed the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) specifically as a means of assessing the effects of insurgency upon the people of Vietnam. Essentially, it permitted a set of questions to be asked about the people and their environment and evaluations to be derived from the responses. The system provided information in three fundamental areas encompassing pacification—military, political, and community development—from a set of 165 multiple-choice questions. HES data originated at the hamlet and village level with information gathered monthly from various sources. It was designed to meet several objectives, the most important of which were to monitor the progress of the pacification effort in hamlets and villages throughout South Vietnam and to provide a geopolitical profile of South Vietnam.
The general types of inputs to the system are shown in figure 13. The output was a rating for each hamlet/village in country. There were seven basic alphabetic ratings forming a progressive scale, from worst to best. An “E” rating represented the worst situation; an “A” represented the best; and “D,” “C,” and “B” ratings marked intermediate levels. An “N” was assigned if there was insufficient information to evaluate a hamlet and a “V” was given when the hamlet was considered under VC control.
In 1968–1969, the security ratings were based primarily upon the military situation, but in later years, the security rating was determined by combining the military and political situations. A “V” rating was given if enemy forces physically occupied the hamlet. An “A” rating could be assigned if there was no enemy military activity during the month, or if governmental units occupied the hamlet. A hamlet was considered to be under GVN control if it had a HES rating of “A” or “B” and under Communist control if it had a “V” rating. Control was contested when the ratings were “C,” “D,” and “E,” although a hamlet with a “C” was considered under the influence of the GVN and a hamlet with a “D” or “E” was considered under the influence of the VC.
Actually, the control of the population in the Upper Delta had not changed appreciably during 1967, and the control situation just before the Tet Offensive on 30 January 1968 is as shown below. For comparative purposes, the control situation on 31 May 1968, following the Tet and Mini-Tet Offensives is also indicated. On 31 January 1968 only 92,952 inhabitants out of 1,715,948 were living in an “A” rated hamlet, and there was not a single “A” rated hamlet in either Go Cong or Long An provinces.
Fig. 13. Hamlet Evaluation System model hierarchy
The two phases of the Communist General Offensive and General Uprising were unsuccessful in bringing the population under VC control. There had been no general uprising in this key populated Delta area. In fact, there was a decrease in the population under VC control. Early in 1968 was the apogee of VC control in the Upper Delta (including the period prior to the 1975 collapse of the GVN). In May 1968, only 16.6 percent of the population was under GVN control, whereas 38.7 percent was under Communist control. Over 660,000 inhabitants lived in contested hamlets. The security and pacification operations of the 9th Division and its RVNAF allies were to dramatically improve the situation in the coming months.
About June 1968, the division took a bold step and directed the 1st Brigade to establish a battalion-sized fire support base (FSB) in the heart of VC territory near Base Area 470. Plans were carefully made to insert troops, establish a perimeter, and then quickly fortify the perimeter to withstand expected enemy attacks. Everything went smoothly. The VC were obviously caught by surprise and offered only small resistance. The FSB was expanded and built up, an oasis in the previously sacrosanct VC territory from which the enemy could more easily be attacked and interdicted. Subsequently, other FSBs were constructed in VC areas. In July, when the 2nd Brigade established an FSB in Kien Hoa, the VC responded viciously with mortar fire and ground attacks, however, to no avail. Units operating from these FSBs, utilizing ambushes as well as Bushmaster and jitterbug techniques, took the battle right into the center of VC territory, seriously attriting the VC and disrupting efforts to resupply and refit. The VC hegemony over the Delta countryside was broken. GVN pacification results began to increase at this time, surging in early 1969 during the IV Corps Dry Weather Campaign.
As a matter of interest, 31 May 1968 HES ratings for Kien Hoa, the province where VC control was greatest, are given in table 9. As mentioned, prior to the establishment of a battalion fire support base in Kien Hoa in July 1968, there were ten times as many hamlets controlled by the VC than by the GVN. Kien Hoa, a bastion of VC hegemony, was a prime area for security and pacification operations.
Pacification was a complex process requiring the coordination and cooperation of Allied military forces and GVN civilian ministries. In accordance with the HES model, it entailed three distinct stages:
The first two steps in the pacification process could just as well apply to Communist efforts to gain control by driving off Allied military units and stabilizing the situation with local forces and guerrillas, allowing the VCI to establish a political apparatus. Control was not an irreversible process—the contest could go either way. That’s what tug of war was all about.
The 9th Infantry Division utilized the HES extensively to integrate our combat operations with our pacification efforts to ensure the optimum support for the pacification program. When the Accelerated Pacification Campaign was initiated in late 1968, it had clear-cut objectives; the most fundamental one was to choose key hamlets and villages that were in a contested status with the Viet Cong and, through security and civic efforts, to raise these hamlets to a more secure GVN status. We had little faith in the HES initially, since it appeared to us that it could be a pencil exercise with little validity. Therefore, we undertook a detailed Hamlet Evaluation Survey for all the hamlets in one district of Dinh Tuong Province. We told our G-2 to be hardnosed in his evaluations. At the conclusion of our survey, we compared it with the MACV, Advisory Team Survey. We were literally amazed to find that there was less than a 10% difference in evaluations. This gave us new and substantial confidence in the HES. Consequently, the Division integrated combat and pacification efforts in support of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. We utilized the monthly HES classifications to assess the progress of pacification in our area, increasing our efforts in the vicinity of the contested and VC-controlled hamlets. The Division continually coordinated combat operations with Civic Action, and these integrated efforts materially assisted the GVN pacification program.
The 9th Division pacification program had five major Civic Action themes: 1) psychological operations to win the hearts and minds of the people, 2) assistance to victims of the war, 3) assistance in health matters, 4) educational assistance, and 5) the repair and construction of facilities. The individual American soldier has always generously helped to alleviate the suffering and anguish caused by wars, and Vietnam was no exception.3
All units of the division participated diligently and generously in civic action and psychological activities to advance the course of pacification. In the January through May 1969 period, there were 5,357 medical team visits; more than half were to contested hamlets, which treated 344,336 patients. Over 3,800 hours of loudspeaker PSYOP missions were conducted, and 87,714,000 leaflets were distributed, mostly by airdrop. Food and clothing were distributed, thirty schools were repaired or constructed, and 9,302 school kits given out. To improve local transportation, 164 kilometers of roads and 124 bridges were repaired or constructed. Vigorous efforts by the soldiers, often from their own means, were made to improve the health, education, and well-being of the inhabitants.4
We brought one of our finest combat soldiers, Maj. Bernard Loeffke, in to Division Headquarters to be the G5 supervising civic actions in both friendly and enemy psychological operations. With respect to enemy-oriented PSYOPS, the G5 orchestrated well-planned actions to induce enemy troops to rally to the GVN cause. Millions of leaflets were air dropped with varying messages. Whenever there was a major contact, loudspeakers were employed to lower the enemy’s morale and to induce NVA/VC to surrender. Such actions were highly successful in the division area; 8,949 Viet Cong cadres surrendered. It was axiomatic that the greater our military pressure on the enemy, the greater the number of ralliers. Often the enemy would rally to the RNVAF units in our area because of language compatibility.
Little has been mentioned concerning the VC propaganda efforts directed toward U.S. forces. Notwithstanding, they continuously distributed leaflets to American troops, and they often displayed large propaganda banners in the smaller hamlets. Their most popular themes were directed towards family separations, particularly at holidays, and the fear of becoming a casualty. Initial VC propaganda efforts were quite clumsy but they became more sophisticated over time. Figure 14 shows the front and back of a typical VC leaflet, which plays upon both holiday anxieties and the fear of being wounded. Interestingly, the most effective U.S. enemy psychological action was a record which was broadcast from a helicopter flying over an enemy area at night which had as its theme a baby crying to see its NVA/VC absent father.
Fig. 15. MEDCAP—medical personnel treating local civilians
Our most effective civic action was the Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP). Almost every day teams composed of medical personnel accompanied by infantrymen for protection traveled throughout the friendly areas of the provinces visiting hamlets to provide medical treatment to Vietnamese civilians. In a one-year span, over 500,000 patients were treated. Our MEDCAPs were so well appreciated by the populace that we decided to send the teams into contested hamlets to integrate civic action and PSYOP efforts with intelligence gathering activities. We always cleared our visits with the local District Chiefs and usually our teams were accompanied by Regional or Popular Forces. We called this innovation our Integrated Civic Action Program (ICAP), whose purpose was to collect information on the enemy while providing humanitarian assistance and attempting to improve GVN acceptance in local hamlets/villages. ICAPs were our most successful source of human intelligence. And we prepared a pamphlet for distribution detailing the conduct of an ICAP.5
During the day, the hamlets were normally almost devoid of men folk since they were either in the military or working in the fields. ICAPs, obviously, were generally conducted by male personnel; and the Vietnamese women, even if there was no language barrier, would not talk to the soldiers. So at first it was difficult to obtain intelligence information, although the villagers on hand were medically treated. We hit upon the idea of hiring women Hoi Chanhs who had rallied as female Tiger Scouts. They then conversed with the women villagers and often obtained a wealth of information concerning VC activities.
As stated, contested hamlets were often controlled by the GVN during the day but when government personnel withdrew in the evening, they were subject to Viet Cong pressure and occupation at night. Therefore, our ICAPs on many occasions would spend the evening in the hamlets to ensure security, and we called these actions NITECAPs. In the period January through April 1969, the Division conducted 2,042 MEDCAPs, 2,754 ICAPs, and 561 NITECAPs, 45 per day, which treated 344,336 Vietnamese.
The Division fully supported the GVN’s pacification program. It was obvious that for pacification to succeed in our area, it had to be accomplished with the full cooperation of the RVNAF and also GVN entities.
The 9th Division benefitted greatly in our operations and in our pacification efforts from the spirit of cooperation that existed between it and the RVNAF, which included the 7th ARVN Division in Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, and Go Cong Provinces and the 25th ARVN Division in Long An Province, as well as many RF companies and PF platoons. Operations were planned and conducted, and tactical information and intelligence were continuously exchanged at all levels of command to ensure timely and coordinated efforts.
In September 1968, while in command of the 1st Brigade, I was asked to make an evaluation of the ARVN and RF units located in Long An Province, which at the time were six ARVN battalions, three each from the 46th and 50th Infantry Regiments of the 25th ARVN Division, and twenty-five RF companies.6 An additional three RF companies were in training and another three had been authorized but not yet organized. There was a large disparity in the geographical distribution of units: for example, ARVN battalions were located in only two of the seven districts, and the Thu Thua District, with a population of forty-three thousand, had only two RF companies, whereas the smaller Rach Kien District, with eighteen thousand inhabitants, had three RF companies. Any major improvement in spoiling and preemptive offensive operations as well as security would require restationing ARVN units and redistributing RF companies, particularly with the six authorized but not assigned units. Neither of the ARVN regiments was highly aggressive. Both were terrain-oriented, and their operations were characterized by sweeps that picked at the enemy. Their use of air assets was marginal in that they did not strike with them but utilized them for transportation to a location where a stilted operation had been planned. It was noted, however, that when on a joint operation, the ARVN did move out well, indicating a pride of unit and perhaps increased confidence. The 1st Brigade had conducted three joint operations recently. The RF companies in Long An fighting at home were highly motivated and very familiar with the terrain and, as a result, often performed comparably to the ARVN. In the most recent U.S. Advisors Territorial Evaluation of Forces in Long An Province—in which they rated for responsiveness to orders, weapons proficiency, leadership and unit esprit, and plans for supportive fire—thirteen of the RF companies were rated as “good” and twelve as “satisfactory.” In summary, I believed at the time that the ARVN and RF/PF picture was good. There was room for improvement, and there was a general willingness on their part to improve. The best vehicle to obtain a general upgrading was by increased U.S.-VN joint participation in operations. This evaluation of RVNAF units probably applied as well to those in IV Corps. The RF/PF units were those that were constantly in the countryside providing the safety of “secure” hamlets and assisting in rooting out the enemy in “contested” hamlets, particularly the Viet Cong Infrastructure.
Later in December 1968, General Ewell established an evaluation program for RVNAF units in the division’s area. We began keeping statistical data on the Vietnamese units, which was provided by their U.S. advisors with the goal of having them increase their combat operations and, through analysis, their operational effectiveness. Through our war experiences, we knew that small increases in the number and effectiveness of operations could lead to large increases in the number of enemy eliminated. To further joint efforts, the 9th Infantry Division commander sponsored a weekly conference of key U.S. and Vietnamese personnel from each province, at which the statistical data was reviewed and ideas exchanged. In that manner, lessons learned and effective combat techniques were systematically exchanged.
The 9th Division took steps to improve RVNAF operations by conducting a six-week program of basic unit training for the 25th ARVN Division and training in air cavalry and airmobile techniques for the 7th ARVN Division. Sniper training was given to cadres from the Central Training Command, seven ARVN divisions, the airborne division, and the Ranger command. To evaluate the effectiveness of training, our instructors accompanied units of the 25th ARVN Division on combat operations, on which several of our troops were wounded.
General Ewell gave considerable thought to upgrading ARVN and RF/PF forces in our TAOI. A formula was developed that we thought would work; it stated that the operational effectiveness of a unit, defined as the enemy eliminated per company day of troops available, was equal to the utilization of these troops times the efficiency of these troops. It defined utilization as the company days spent in the field divided by the company days available and efficiency as the number of enemy eliminated per company day in the field. Thus, utilization and efficiency are entirely different matters, both of which contributed to operational effectiveness.7
The approach was first to get the RVNAF forces out of their compounds and into the field, that is, to improve their utilization. In this, we were quite successful. Before we started, RVNAF forces in our TAOI went to the field an average of once every three days. They then began operating every other day, which was the standard we set. The U.S. standard was that our troops should be operational three days out of four, but because of the prolonged combat the RVNAF faced and because they generally had their families with them, we considered a 50 percent utilization as most satisfactory.
The second step in our attempt to increase the operational effectiveness was to improve RVNAF efficiency, that is, once operating in the field to show them how to eliminate more VC. In that respect, we had some, but not great, success. ARVN forces still continued to sweep in battalion-sized operations, and they seldom operated at night. The RF/PF, although they operated about 50 percent of the time in company-sized units as well as at night, did not have adequate training in such areas as basic marksmanship, nor did they have the leadership as yet to operate efficiently during the period of RF/PF expansion when leadership skills were stretched.
The ARVN units did begin to operate a little more at night and attempted to learn airmobile and jitterbug tactics when they had aviation assets so that there was a gradual but steady improvement. The recommended goals established for operational effectiveness in the 9th Division TAOI, if successfully attained, would result in thirty-six hundred enemy eliminated per month (see table 10). The timely exchange of information and intelligence and the coordinated and cooperative efforts between the RVNAF and the 9th Infantry Division contributed greatly to mutual success and the advancement of the pacification program.
Fig. 16. ARVN soldiers
An example of the exchange of intelligence by Regional Forces and the rapid exploitation of the information occurred in Long An on 23 April 1969; this involved a platoon of B/2-47 Mechanized Infantry:
Late in the evening of 23 April the platoon received information from a Regional Forces outpost that an unknown number of Viet Cong were concealed in a woodline northwest of their outpost (XS 480685). The mechanized platoon deployed and moved into the area where ten to fifteen Viet Cong were observed and engaged with organic weapons. Artillery fires were called in to fix the enemy in position and gunships from B/3-17 Cavalry interdicted possible avenues of escape. “Spooky,” an Air Force flareship armed with miniguns, provided illumination and more firepower. The enemy’s fire was silenced shortly after midnight, but illumination and friendly fire continued throughout the night. A sweep of the area established that twenty enemy had been killed by the infantry, artillery, and miniguns. Several weapons were captured and destroyed. Two U.S. soldiers were wounded.
Prior to 1968, the Viet Cong had had little difficulty in recruiting the intimidated and often disenchanted rural population to fill their units. The North Vietnamese had carefully insisted that COSVN units be composed of only South Vietnamese, so they could report that the insurrection in SVN was strictly a South Vietnamese affair. However, after the huge VC personnel losses in phases 1 and 2 of the General Offensive and General Uprising, the North Vietnamese gave up on this subterfuge and began to infiltrate NVA troops into the Delta to supplant VC losses and units.
The military materiel required to support the Viet Cong insurgency in the Delta had always been brought from sources in North Vietnam. At this time, supplies for the Delta region were generally offloaded at the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville and stored at NVA storage sites near the Cambodian border. As the result of large equipment losses, to resupply the depleted Viet Cong units there was a steady flow of weapons and ammunition into the Upper Delta. Since movement was easily observed in the open Delta areas, NVA troops and materiel were normally infiltrated at night by sampan on the myriad of waterways in the region. Therefore, to prevent the Viet Cong from reconstituting his forces, it was important to interdict enemy personnel and supplies. The Night Search was a valuable tactic, enabling the division to range far and wide interdicting the waterways at night. But so were the ambush and jitterbug operations. The division focused on the enemy, attacking as he attempted to transport materiel, and, once it located Viet Cong storage sites, the division would revisit the area to ambush the enemy as they attempted to resupply. The incidents related here are a few examples of the successful interdiction of troops, weapons, and supplies.
On 8 April, southeast of the town of Ben Luc in Long An Province, a company from 2-47 Infantry established night ambush positions near the location of a substantial weapons cache which had been discovered in late March. An enemy force, estimated to consist of seventy-five men, returned to the area, apparently to resupply, and in a two-hour period beginning at 2050 hrs, A/2-47 Infantry killed 42 and captured one. The enemy force was identified as part of the North Vietnamese Army K4 Battalion. A platoon sergeant, whose ambush patrol was within 200 meters of the cache site, described the detection of the NVA force: “They moved right by our position, some as close as five meters. We let them pass before opening up. They had begun to poke around where the cache had been hidden.” Another sergeant commented that the enemy force had been well-disciplined and maintained, but the surprise and ferocity of the ambush had routed the force completely. An element from 4-50 ARVN Regiment reinforced the U.S. company and added five enemy bodies to the toll. No Americans were killed in the action.
In “Jitterbug” operations, the companies of the 2/60 Infantry on 18 March 1969 made nine insertions, no more than usual, and killed nineteen of the enemy while the air cavalry supporting the operation added sixteen. The contacts all occurred in the vicinity of the Bo Bo Canal in the Plain of Reeds, a major Viet Cong and NVA infiltration route. At one location seven enemy were killed and several detainees apprehended. Altogether, several weapons and a large quantity of ammunition were captured: 137 B-40 rockets, four AK-47 rifles, ten 107mm rocket rounds, five 57mm recoilless rifle rounds, and ninety-two chicom grenades.
During the 2/60 Infantry actions on 18 March, an estimated forty sampans had been spotted from the air. The sampans, some containing 55-gallon drums, had been sunk in the Bo Bo Canal to prevent detection. A thorough search of the surrounding area was made on the 19th and one of the largest caches ever found in the area was uncovered. Distributed in clusters over 400 meters, the cache contained: 400 Chicom grenades, 24,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, forty-seven 107mm rockets, twenty-five 57mm recoilless rifle rounds, ten 75mm RR rounds, 600 82mm mortar rounds, and forty B-40 rocket fuses.
In numerous actions like these, the division aggressively interdicted the enemy and slowly dried up his supplies. We also defeated infiltration groups of enemy troops. The Viet Cong’s loss of supplies was noticeable in a salutary way: his attacks by fire against U.S. installations were reduced.
As stated, the mission of the 9th Infantry Division was to destroy the Communist main and local force units and to directly support the GVN pacification program. The destruction of enemy units entailed not only the attrition of Communist forces but also the interdiction of the enemy infiltration of troops and materiel.
To attrit the enemy, we had to find him, and, in such a large area of responsibility, that required the daily commitment of many small-unit operations. On a quarterly basis, there were thousands of operations and hundreds of enemy contacts. Once a contact was made, there were several measures of military success. One was the total number of enemy eliminated, which included both those killed and captured. The division preferred to capture as many enemy as possible, not only for the intelligence obtained, but because it was more humane. Another measure was the exchange ratio, the number of enemy eliminated as compared to the number of U.S. soldiers killed by hostile action or the friendly efficiency. These two measures of military operations are shown on a quarterly basis in table 11; the large upsurge in both measures in 1969 is the subject of the table.
Since it was a guerrilla war, there were no boundaries; the enemy was everywhere, particularly in his so-called base areas. There were no front lines against which to measure progress, as in the World and Korean wars. However, since the goal of pacification was to establish GVN presence in the thousands of hamlets and villages, it was important to provide security to those through military and civic actions. Therefore, the number of contested hamlets upgraded to secure status was a second measure of success. For that reason, the 9th Division always integrated combat operations with pacification efforts, attempting to upgrade hamlets to GVN control. In that respect, the course of pacification in 1968 and 1969 was substantially advanced in the division area by the upgrading of 217 out of 243 GVN targeted hamlets, 89 percent, a superb record. But more important, over 420,000 Vietnamese were freed from Viet Cong control.
Fig. 17. Captured Viet Cong weapons
