As with so many discussions involving the Diadochi everything seems to drag us back to Alexander one way and forward to the era of Rome on the other. We are drawn to the origin and the nemesis. To try and understand the armies the Successors deployed in their many wars, we must first try and understand the army that Alexander brought to Asia, because both were, by and large, Macedonian organizations. Changed certainly by experiences in Anatolia, Mesopotamia, Iran, Bactria, Sogdia and India, but subsequently only in the case of Seleucus’ armies were the changes probably more than skin-deep. Elephants, chariots and light troops seemed to dominate in his armed forces, as they marched west from the borders of India towards the climactic Battle of Ipsus in 301 BC, in a manner that was quite different from his rivals. The military establishments that we have good details for, fighting the great battles of 323 to 312 BC, performed as Macedonians in a manner that would have been all too familiar to Alexander and even Philip, his father. The armies and the Diadochi’s use of them was rooted in the invading host that Alexander led over the Hellespont in 334 BC and how that organization was used and developed in the years of conquest. What changes there were, between 323 and 281 BC, as the Hellenistic kingdoms shook themselves out, had more to do with the military problems the generals faced over those years, rather than any inherently different attitudes or approaches amongst the leaders and soldiers involved.
The core of both Alexander’s armies and those of his Successors was the infantry phalanx, not always the battle winner but always the backbone. We know much of these units, not just from descriptions of their role in the creation of the Macedonian Empire but also because this formation exerted a fascination on generations to come, that stretched even down to Europe of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries AD. If Machiavelli saw the Roman legion as the exemplar of his Florentine militia at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the cousins William Louis and Maurice of Nassau at the end of that century reformed the Dutch army based on ideas from Aelian’s Tactica, a work from the age of Trajan which discussed the place of the phalanx in the Macedonian war machine.
There had been military manuals written before Aelian, some even predate the rise of the Macedonian Empire. Aeneas Tacticus and Xenophon both wrote in the first half of the fourth century BC. Aeneas apparently penned a number of treatises on war but unfortunately only the one, How to Survive under Siege, remains. As for Xenophon, he produced a copious output, most of which is extant; however, his interest in military matters was mainly confined to his beloved horses. The material we do have on Alexander and his Successors’ war machine dates from considerably later. Asclepiodotus in the first century BC wrote an account of the Greek phalanx, though it is more a philosophical treatise than a book of tactics designed for generals. Arrian (like Aelian, from the second century AD), usually regarded as the most reliable source for Alexander, was a Roman provincial governor and military man. He also wrote a Tactica, of which only the part on cavalry survives, though he has much useful military information in his life of Alexander. Both Arrian and Aelian may well have based much of their work on Polybius who, we know, wrote a Tactica in the second century BC, less than 200 years after the Diadochi era. Indeed, Arrian specifically cites the work which, again, is now lost. Polybius himself, though a Greek, knew some of the greatest Roman military figures of his age.
But, even if some of these ancient descriptions of the phalanx were anachronistic, describing a military organization which had long been defunct and was now surpassed by the Roman legion, their content still had strong resonance for its audience. Just as in much the same way Alexander’s career always retained a special place throughout ancient history as the archetype of the conqueror. He retained this kudos even in comparison to other greats like Hannibal, Scipio Africanus and Julius Caesar; even though, it could be argued, he had an easier task than these later generals. They all fought enemies with comparable fighting qualities to themselves whereas those Alexander had to deal with were, by and large, peoples and tribes unused to fighting together and thus easier prey for the Macedonian military machine. But, whatever judgement is (or was) made, the fact remains that the Romans and their emperors, in particular, were ‘suckers’ for his glamour.
Nero, in 66 AD, apparently organized a new (all-Italian) force he styled as the ‘phalanx of Alexander the Great’ in order to conquer Parthia, though in the event it was never used. Caracalla took this hero worship of Alexander one step further and in 214 AD also organized a phalanx, but this time the soldiers were to be all Macedonian and the officers were instructed to adopt the names of Alexander’s generals. And, less than twenty years later, the emperor, Alexander Severus, created a unit called the Silver Shields, named after Alexander’s guardsmen who had such a major influence on the Diadochi era. Many of the original members of the elite unit lived for several generations and their reputation and aura was such that units in Antiochus the Great’s army in the 190s BC were still being called the Silver Shields. As for their Roman equivalents, both Nero’s and Alexander Severus’ units fought in the traditional Roman fashion. However, it is possible that Caracalla really did train his phalanx to fight in the ‘Macedonian style’ and certainly the unit was 16,000 strong as recommended in most military treatises.
This military formation that exerted such an attraction to so many was a real invention that had sprung fully-grown from the head of that extraordinary monarch Philip II of Macedonia. A man whose reputation only suffers eclipse by the inevitable comparison with the son he sired. Macedonia may have been out on the fringes of the Hellenic world when his career began but Philip had known that world from within. He had been exiled in Thebes as a youth of 15 years and stayed with a man called Pammanes, a soldier and a great friend of Epaminondas, and had seen there the cutting edge of Greek military evolution. It must have been here that Philip absorbed the idea of a deeper, weightier phalanx like the ones handled so successfully by Epaminondas at Leuctra in 371 BC and Mantinea in 362 BC, when the Thebans dispelled for ever the threat of Spartan hegemony that had lain like a black cloud over the Greek mainland since the triumph of those reactionaries in the Peloponnesian War.
The longer spears of his phalanx came from somewhere else. Philip, here, may have been influenced by Iphicrates of Athens who in the first half of the fourth century BC toured the ancient world from Thrace to Egypt commanding mercenary armies in the service of a number of employers. Cornelius Nepos even claims Iphicrates as Philip’s protector at one stage: ‘Eurydice the mother of Perdiccas and Philip fled with these two boys, after the death of Amyntas, to Iphicrates and was secure under his power’; and if this is true Philip would have known of his reforms first hand.1 Some such closeness to these tactical reformers is required to explain the radical military thinking that Philip so quickly put into practice in his relatively backward country. Iphicrates armed his hoplites with a smaller shield and longer spear as well as a particularly sturdy boot that took his name.
Philip’s kingdom was not a land of city states which, since time immemorial, had provided citizen spearmen and foot soldiers equipped to fight in the heart of the battle line, whose social status was intrinsically bound up with this function. Macedonia was famous for its aristocratic horsemen, if anything, and if the commonality fought at all it was as javelin-armed light troops. But the reforming king changed all that; he levied the peasantry and mobilized them around a core of infantry guards who had traditionally protected the king when he fought on foot. The social environment helped to grease the wheels of change. There was no dead hand of tradition dictating how infantry should fight as there was in the cities to the south. In Greece, in many places, it was generations before the military establishments changed their formations to Macedonian-style phalanxes, even though these ‘new model’ soldiers had already comprehensively seen off old-style hoplites in their own backyard on key occasions, from Chaeronea in 338 BC to Megalopolis in 331 BC.
The name of the original royal guards or foot companions was pezhetairoi, and, from then on, this was used as the designation for the whole of the new infantry arm. The men were now equipped with a small round shield (pelte) made of a bronze facing over a leather and wood core about 2 feet across, rimless and less concave than the traditional large round shield (aspis) of the classical hoplite. The shield was slung from the soldier’s left shoulder on a baldric, to free up both his hands to wield an 18-foot pike (sarissa) that made the phalanx so formidable. This was in two pieces, weighed about 15 pounds with its front end sheathed with a 20-inch point and its butt similarly covered, so it acted to balance the great bulk of the pike held out in front and also could be used offensively if the weapon broke in combat. In this the phalangite differed from the citizen hoplite who held his aspis by a grip in the middle and used one hand to brandish his 8 to 9-foot spear. Helmets, body armour and greaves were worn by some of the men, probably at least the front-rankers, from the beginning and, with Alexander’s success and with the resources available to his Successors, defensive equipment became more elaborate and complete over the years. If it is likely that some of the peasants that Philip conscripted made do with just helmet and shield, by a generation or two later they would have been very well armoured indeed.
These warriors were deployed in files usually 16 ranks deep, but this could be cut down to 8 or doubled to 32 as appropriate. The formation was not as deep as the weighty 48-man-deep Theban phalanx, but twice the depth of the typical 8-man file of the Classical era. Individual phalangites usually had 3 feet of frontage in battle formation, though in locked shields defensive formation this space reduced by a half. The smallest tactical unit was the 256-man syntagma comprising 16 files (lochoi) of 16 men. In overall command was the syntagmatarch and each file had an officer at the front, a lochagos, and one at the back, the lochagos’ second in command, the ouragos, whose function was to encourage the men from the rear. The syntagma was also subdivided into two taxeis of 128 men, each under a taxiarch and then a tetrarchia (four files of 16 men) and a dilochia (two files of 16 men). How many syntagmai were in the main regimental infantry formation of Alexander (somewhat confusingly called a taxis) has caused much ink to be spilt by military historians of the ancient world. Some consider them to be 1,500 strong whilst others think 2,000 a more likely number. It will be noted that this is the approximate equivalent of either six syntagmai (1,500) or eight (2,000). But later Diadochi formations are described as either 1,000 or 2,000 men strong.
In the case of a 2,000 man taxis, when deployed 16 deep, there would have been 125 lochoi with a consequent frontage of 125 yards. Thus, at Paraetacene in 317 BC, where we have specific information, we can calculate that for Eumenes, who had 17,000 in his phalanx (and allowing for small gaps between the units), a complete frontage of roughly 1,100 yards. For Antigonus, the equivalent calculation at Paraetacene would give a frontage of about 1,800 yards or more. At Gaza in 312 BC, where the phalanxes were smaller, Demetrius’ 11,000 infantry would have had a frontage of about 800 yards and Ptolemy with 18,000 men would have spread to 1,200 yards or so. Presumably, although we are not told, the general with the smaller phalanx would make it less deep, or have greater intervals between units, to avoid being outflanked by his opponent.
But what is sure is that, as in any army, these theoretical divisions and the numbers in them would not have long survived the attrition of campaigning. The phalanx units, like any other formations, would have gradually decreased in numbers until it was possible to get replacements. How this was achieved under those generals whose power base was far from Macedonia is very unclear. We have details of replacements coming from Macedonia to flesh out Alexander’s depleted phalanxes but, after his death, activity of this sort is less recorded and also was practically much more difficult with no centrally-controlled state to organize and push them on their way. The tendency for those commanders who had no access to the manpower pool of Macedonia must have been to find replacements locally, but our sources for the Diadochi years are pretty specific about the nationality of the make up of the front line phalangites. They are recorded as either Macedonians or of mixed nationality or as mercenaries equipped to fight like Macedonians. This probably means that for some time most of those phalangites described as Macedonians were originally from that country and if they did include replacements from elsewhere, these were few in number.
The warriors that Philip had levied were well-drilled and had, even by Alexander’s time, become far more expert soldiers than the citizen militia of classical Greece. Philip’s thousands of recruits were trained into near professionals, to a high standard of fitness. They could march with very little baggage, only had one servant for every ten men and could even campaign in winter when most citizen hoplites would demand to go home to their farms. By the time of the Successors, the new essence of this soldiery was typified by the Silver Shields, who epitomize the more notorious and unfortunate qualities of the mercenary. These rootless men were dominated by the cash nexus, with all they owned and cared for in the wagons and tents of their camp. Their loyalty to the original Macedonian state, if not to the memory of Alexander, had been eroded by years away from home and, if they could be kept paid and loyal, they showed they might win an empire for their commanders. Yet, if these veteran professionals were necessary to found a dynasty, any ruler, so established, must eventually return at least a proportion of the men back to the land to become the progenitors of another generation of soldiers, something each of the Hellenistic dynasts strove to do once the campaigns that won them their kingdoms had been accomplished. Military colonies had been the martial bedrock of great states since records began and the Macedonian elites who took control, whether in Europe, Asia or Africa, were no exception.
Whether they were the old sweats from Philip’s reign, or the new recruits that had been brought to Asia during the great conquests of Alexander, how many soldiers it amounted to who took the road to Persia is problematic. Diodorus describes 12,000 Macedonian foot crossing to Asia and 3,000 were probably already there, having been sent as an advance guard under Parmenion in 336/335 BC. In the winter of 334/333 BC, some of Alexander’s officers took the married Macedonians back home (no detail of figures is given) with instructions to recruit more men. These were most likely those that are recorded as having arrived at Gordium, 3,000 foot and 300 horse in all. Another 5,000 foot and 800 horse could have arrived before Cilicia was invaded in 333 BC, but the evidence is somewhat confused (taken from Quintus Curtius and Polybius) and how many were actually Macedonians is a very moot point. In Babylonia in 331 BC, Alexander received 6,000 Macedonian foot and 500 Macedonian horse. It has been suggested that altogether between 9,000 and 12,000 Macedonian infantry came as replacements between the years 334 and 331 BC and this seems as credible a ball-park number as it is possible to get.2 Two years later, Antipater sent 8,000 replacements who arrived in Bactria, but they are called Greeks, and in 326 BC Diodorus claims reinforcements of 30,000 foot and 600 horse, but again they are described as allies and Greek mercenaries. It is possible some of these were Macedonians but probably not many. Thus something over 20,000 Macedonians were available in the main army near the end of Alexander’s life just before he dismissed the 10,000 veterans who Craterus was to lead back home to Europe. This suggests that 10,000-odd remained at Babylon when the world changed. However, these figures are far from certain.3 It must also be remembered that some of Craterus’ 10,000 veterans remained in Asia as he took only 6,000 Macedonians back to fight in Greece.
In addition to all these Macedonians over the Hellespont, when their king died there was a further new levy that Antipater and Craterus brought over to fight Perdiccas in the First Macedonian Civil War, following their successful prosecution of the Lamian War. Neither group had sustained many casualties in their particular theatres of the war of 321/320 BC and consequently there may have been, all told, between 30 and 40,000 warriors split between the various generals. With attrition, the understandable desire to go home by some of the forces, and the leakage of some to rebels such as Eumenes, there would have been a comparatively small number of troops to be divided between the legitimist officers. Furthermore, all the Diadochi, except whoever ruled at Pella, faced the same problem of how to get replacements for these troops and, regardless of whatever other troops they might have under arms, nobody was able to play at the high table of regal ambition unless they could deploy a Macedonian-style phalanx of some description.
The result was that soon, as well as the original Macedonian phalangites who conquered the world under Alexander, many ersatz versions were armed and drilled to fill the gap. Other troop types were re-equipped, trained and armed so they could stand in the main phalanx with their Macedonian comrades. Some of these would have been Greek citizen hoplites who had previously carried the old big shield and short spear that remained for many years the standard military equipment in Greece. Others originally would have been armed as peltasts (versatile unarmoured infantry, taking their name from the pelta, a kind of light shield). These, at least, would have had some experience of hand-to-hand combat so could be more easily retrained in contrast to bowmen, javelinmen or slingers who were used to fighting only from afar. What is clear is that the option Alexander considered of fleshing out his Macedonians with young men from the Iranian provinces, equipped as bowmen and javelineers, was not considered by his Successors. The reason almost certainly is that when Alexander had proposed this mixed phalanx he knew that, against the enemies he expected to encounter, it would be useful to have a missile component in the middle of the files between pikemen at the front and back. But when his Successors found themselves confronted by enemy phalanxes, the only answer was to fight fire with fire, to face sarissa-armed phalanx with sarissa-armed phalanx.
But the changing complexion of the rest of the army had become clear by the time of the conflict between Antigonus and Eumenes. When the satraps who were later to join forces with Eumenes assembled at Susa, Peucestas, the satrap of Persia, had ‘3,000 men of every origin equipped for service in the Macedonian array’.4 In battle at Paraetacene, a few months later, Diodorus describes Eumenes’ infantry line up on the left as 6,000 and more mercenaries, then after them ‘five thousand men who had been equipped in the Macedonian fashion’ but were not Macedonian nationals.5
On the other side in that combat, the Antigonid set up was described as (again starting on the left) 9,000 mercenaries, then 3,000 Lycians and Pamphylians, ‘8,000 mixed troops in Macedonian equipment’ and finally nearly 8,000 Macedonian phalangites.6 Again, the first two groups would have been largely hoplites while the rest were sarissa-wielding pikemen. At Gabene, in the winter, not much seemed to have changed except that Antigonus had lost men in the previous battle. All that is noted is that Antigonus had 22,000 foot in his phalanx, while Eumenes, although fielding essentially the same units, changed his formation and placed his best infantry on the left side, the hypaspists first (literally ‘shield-bearers’, an elite infantry unit), then the Silver Shields and after them the mercenaries and non-Macedonians armed as phalangites.
What is clear from all this is that, on both sides, half or more of the phalangites were now non-Macedonians. Except for the special case of Europe, where Macedonians could be easily recruited by the incumbent powers, the proportion of foreigners was bound to increase. Men described as mixed, of all races or of every origin were almost certainly from the Iranian satrapies. If they had been Balkan or Anatolian their region of origin would in all probability have been given in the sources. Thus, for instance, we have Lycians, Pamphylians, Greeks and Thracians all mentioned by name. The inexactitude in reporting the homelands of these other warriors was essentially a function of ignorance. Diodorus and his sources were just not as familiar with Iranian geography as they were of those regions nearer to home, which had long been well within the Greek ken.
Under Alexander, and, certainly under his Successors, these well-drilled infantry, whether ethnic Macedonians of the old or new levy or new recruits from the non-European world were the very heart of the battle line. They would have been an awesome sight as they approached the enemy with pikes raised, lowering them only at the charge when the paean (battle song) was raised. Macedonians usually cried ‘alalalai’, a cry to their war god, but other nations, no doubt, had their own savage yells. And leading at the cutting edge of that most daunting of phalanxes were the Silver Shields (Argyraspids). These, it is generally agreed, were the same units as the hypaspists of Philip’s and Alexander’s army. The Silver Shields were divided into three chiliarchies of 1,000 soldiers each; men raised nationally, not regionally like the rest of the phalanx, in order to reinforce loyalty to the king. They normally fought on the right of the phalanx, in the place of honour, as befitted their status, but if their existence and history is fairly well attested there has been much debate over their equipment. Because they so frequently fought in rough terrain and were at the forefront in attacking towns and forts, it is claimed they were not pikemen. In these circumstances an 18-foot spear would be a great hindrance, so it is conjectured that they were some sort of hoplite or peltast. Further evidence for this claim is adduced from the Alexander Sarcophagus, where the foot soldiers (generally assumed to be guardsmen) are shown in hoplite panoply with aspis shield and not the pikeman’s smaller pelte. The most probable explanation is that they would have equipped themselves depending on the task in hand; such high-status troops would have had access to whatever size of spear and shield was required. But what is most certainly the case is that when we hear of them in the age of the Diadochi they fought as pikemen in the heart of the phalanx and, in fact, were the very best of them.
These hypaspists had been built around the royal foot agema (guard) who defended the king when he fought on foot as the royal squadron (ile basilike) of the Companions did when he led from horseback. They also provided his guard in camp.7 These units were beautified by Alexander with new silver plating on their shields before they took the road to India in 327 BC, which gave rise to their new name. They also had had an interesting career, post-Alexander, before hooking up with Eumenes. Their leader, Antigenes, had been involved in the murder of Perdiccas during the Egyptian campaign, where these men certainly fought. At the Battle of the Camel Fort, Diodorus mentions shield bearers fighting with the elephants in the attempt to assault Ptolemy’s Nile defences. Then, after the settlement at Triparadeisus they were sent on punishment duty to Susa, perhaps because of their involvement in the near mutiny against Antipater. But it has been contended by at least one scholar that the Silver Shields were a new unit different from the hypaspists and created at Triparadeisus from 3,000 disgruntled veterans.8 Whoever these violent old fellows really were, they brought the Persian treasure from Susa back to Cyinda where they were recruited by Eumenes in 317 BC.
If the question of who the Silver Shields were is open to debate, other information adds further confusion. This is that the Silver Shields were bracketed, in Diodorus’ account of the battles of Paraetacene and Gabene, with another body of 3,000 men who are themselves described as hypaspists. They are not attested before Eumenes got to Persia. When he winters in Mesopotamia, only the Silver Shields are mentioned and this is also the case at Peucestas’ great entertainment at Persepolis. The first mention of these hypaspists is at the Battle of Paraetacene, when they are placed on the extreme right of the phalanx on the right side of the Silver Shields. The 3,000 men were in the position of highest honour. So who were these, the most prestigious infantry in the whole army, who again at Gabene held the position of honour, next to the Silver Shields (this time on the left)? Not only are they not noticed before the two great battles, neither are they mentioned in the course of the fighting or the negotiations that led to Eumenes’ downfall. Again, it is the Silver Shields who receive all the attention of our sources. This is a mystery of great interest as it is difficult to credit any reasonable explanation. It is unlikely to be a mistake or misunderstanding as Diodorus is quite clear about the two units and their position in both battles. It does not seem possible that he would mistake them or double them up. But when he obviously recognizes they are the most prestigious unit, why does he not mention what they did in battle? They are as numerous as the Silver Shields and presumably as effective so why do they not demand the same attention? As they are not mentioned before Eumenes got to Persia, they must have been made up of men who were in the armies of the Iranian governors, perhaps veterans who had remained on garrison duty in the provinces and were recruited by Eumenes as an infantry guard. But the evidence is not there and to compound the mystery further they are never heard of again. It is even possible they were remnants of the well-born Persian warriors, who Alexander, in his later years, ordered to be drilled into sarissa-bearing phalangites. They may have remained in the east with satraps like Peucestas. Indeed, perhaps, they are the ones referred to as in the Persian satrap’s retinue when Eumenes joined him and his allies in Susiane.9 A proposition made more probable by the fact they, too, were reported as 3,000 in number.
The Macedonian phalanx that fascinated so many for so long was early on described by the historian Polybius, a Greek general from Megalopolis, who was exiled for many years in Rome. His description of the Macedonian-style phalanx (in The Histories, not his lost Tactica) has the great advantage that he was contemporary with its use. He may have commanded, would surely have seen, these units drilling and fighting and would have talked to people who had experienced battles both where phalanx fought phalanx and where phalanx fought other sorts of national armies. The other great benefit is that he was, as far as it is possible to be, objective, as he had a foot in both the Greek and Roman camps. He lived from 203 to 120 BC, was a member of the Arcadian ruling class, but from 168 BC spent seventeen years as hostage in Rome where he was closely associated with the great Scipio family who included Aemilius Paullus who triumphed in the Third Macedonian War and Scipio Aemilianus who ploughed Carthage into the sand and finally subdued the brave Celtiberians of Numantia.
Polybius states his intention was to explain to his Greek compatriots why the Roman legion overcame the Macedonian phalanx, as they apparently found this success ‘incredible’. He describes the phalanx as invincible ‘face to face’ when closed, each man occupying a space of three feet square and with every man wielding the sarissa, 18 feet long. He describes the first five ranks as showing a great pincushion to the front while the rest kept their weapons upright to both ensure they did not wound their comrades and also to ward off any missiles that might be rained down on them. This is not the only use of the men at the back; they gave a crucial psychological feeling of depth and support and more practically ensure that, even if they wanted to, the men at the front are pushed forward and cannot turn and flee. A very different formation from the one adopted by the Roman legionary who needed greater space to wield shield and sword and who was not pressed on by those behind him.
The Macedonian phalanx, Polybius contends, was a slow and cumbersome formation that could be easily avoided if it could not be stood against. Despite its irresistibility on flat, even ground, the slightest disruption caused by change in terrain was fatal to the Macedonian system; ‘ditches, gullies, depressions, ridges and water-courses, all of which are sufficient to hinder and dislocate such a formation.’10 If the phalanx had to travel any distance there was an irresistible tendency to bunch up or spread out that was not shared by a looser Roman formation that could adjust more easily. The Battle of Pydna in 168 BC showed a classic example of this defect. As the phalanx pushed forward the ground became more uneven with the result that it lost its cohesion, enabling the Roman legion to exploit the resultant gaps. And, to further compound this fragility, the phalanx had another great disadvantage when facing the Roman system. Though each legionary would be facing at least two phalangites as well as ten spear points, the legion and maniple (subdivision of 120 men) with its separate lines meant there were always men kept in reserve. The Roman military organization had institutionalized a reserve of two lines. The front two lines were respectively the hastati and principes who could reinforce or interchange with each other when necessary. The third line, the triari, was able to reinforce the front two lines and could always, in the end, act as protective rearguard if all had gone wrong in front of it. Thus, when the phalanx became disrupted (either after a successful or unsuccessful attack), the Romans had warriors in hand to get under their spears and into the phalanx’s formation, where their Spanish swords could do their lethal work.
So Polybius’ view was that the phalanx could only stay on clear ground, as if it found itself elsewhere it would become very vulnerable. More than this, it was difficult to split it into small parts, thus only being really of optimum use for great set-piece battles. A Roman legionary, by contrast, was a soldier and fighter either alone or in formation, while the phalangites were only effective in strict mass formation. Furthermore, the legion had the added advantage of a higher proportion of junior officers and NCOs enabling a greater degree of flexibility and use of local initiative.
The phalanx’s fragility, which Polybius described, can be seen in the era of Alexander and his Successors, but it is far from the dominant motif. At the Battle of Megalopolis in 331 BC, fought between Antipater and Agis III, king of Sparta, when the Macedonian phalangites were led onto rough ground by the Spartan hoplites falling back, they were certainly less effective, but this did not stop them winning the battle. Equally at Issus in 333 BC, when the phalanx crossed the river in the face of Darius’ Greek mercenaries, they had real trouble.
The Macedonian centre was much slower off the mark; in a number of places, moreover, the steep banks of the stream prevented them from maintaining a regular and unbroken front, and the result was that Darius’ Greek mercenaries attacked precisely at the point in the line where the gap was widest.11
The phalanx had to suffer the indignity of being rescued by Alexander and his Companions but they then cut the mercenaries to pieces and helped win a famous victory.
By and large, we search in vain for examples of the phalanx losing formation and suffering defeat for it during the Diadochi wars. In the Lamian War, at the battle where Leonnatus died, a green phalanx purposely moved to high, rougher ground where they retained formation to keep the rampant enemy cavalry at bay. More than this, veteran phalangites, at times, showed that they could be very manoeuvrable and extremely able to react to circumstances. At Gabene, when Eumenes’ phalangites were threatened in the rear by Pithon’s cavalry, they swiftly formed a square to a show a bristling wall of spear points all round to their enemies. Yet, the facts of later wars do bear out Polybius’ contention; not just at Pydna, but also at Cynoscephalae in 197 BC and Magnesia in 190 BC where exposed flanks and disruption caused by missile fire allowed the legionaries to get in and tear the phalanx apart. It seems almost as if the Roman infantry had a particular quality that tested the Macedonian steamroller. Indeed, Polybius goes on to suggest Pyrrhus was so struck by the usefulness of the Roman way of war that when he came to Italy he adjusted his tactics and mixed maniples of his Italian allies in with his own Epirote phalangites.
Though certainly receiving the most attention, these pikemen were far from the only men who made a mark in the years of Macedonian world hegemony. Diodorus describes 7,000 Greek allies and 5,000 Greek mercenaries as being in Alexander’s army at the Hellespont and many thousands more of these came east as replacements over the years. Over 38,000 men described as allies and Greeks arrived when the army was away in Bactria and further east. Furthermore, many mercenaries who had fought either for Darius or his satraps would have been incorporated in Alexander’s army as the Persian Empire gradually fell to the newcomers. How these men were equipped and how they fought is open to question. Many of the Greek allies, we know, were hoplites and could have stood shoulder to shoulder with the Macedonian phalanx. That Alexander used them in reserve, as camp guards or on garrison duty was more because of dubious loyalty than equipment.
Some of these mercenaries and allies would have been peltasts. Originally these were Thracian javelineers who got the name because of their characteristic crescent shaped shield the pelte. Peltasts were the defining troops of the Thracian peoples, they were lightly armoured and skirmishing was their forte, but they could also fight it out face-to-face if necessary. Well before the Macedonian world era began, the term peltasts had come to mean something far beyond just a specific type of Thracian warrior. It had become a generic term for warriors who became the favoured type of mercenary, that almost all Greek states came to depend on later in the fifth and in the fourth centuries. The designation ‘peltast’ had come to mean a troop type, something between the frontline hoplite or phalangite, and the specifically light missile infantry using javelins, bows and slings. These soldiers certainly were skirmishers; indeed the Thracians had been brought in as such. They could keep out of the hoplites’ way and wear them down as at Corinth against a Spartan mora (battalion) in 390 BC.
By our period peltasts seemed to have become a kind of medium infantry but unfortunately the sources for Alexander and his Successors virtually never use the term itself. One of the very few occasions the term is used is when Antigonus ‘selected the finest of the peltasts’ with light infantry to guard his long military caravan as it wound through the Cossaean hills in the face of a dangerous local enemy.12 They are clearly seen as an integral part of the war machine. Asclepiodotus describes them, with other light troops, as able to close up in ranks eight deep but they are also described as fighting in open order. Certainly, they are not the men who usually fight at the very front of battle, but are used for crucial but routine duties, like garrisoning towns and other line of communication duties.
It has frequently been assumed that the term ‘mercenary’ when it refers to Greek or Anatolian soldiers usually means a peltast. This is often the case but certainly not in all circumstances as we know the mercenaries who fought for Darius were hoplites and they fought as hoplites when they went home to fight against their Macedonian foes in the Lamian War. Whether the troops who are described in the Diadochi battle line as mercenaries were peltasts or hoplites is open to question. The fact that they are mentioned in the main body next to phalangites suggest they are hoplites but this is not absolute as it is possible medium troops like peltasts could have been deployed as a hinge between the cavalry and main phalanx, as was the case in many of the battles Alexander fought. They subsequently occupied the same role at Raphia in 217 BC, when Antiochus III took on Ptolemy IV, and at Magnesia in 190 BC, where the Romans defeated the same Antiochus’ army.
Specialists light troops had been employed by Alexander in his conquering army and many continued to do duty under his Successors. According to Diodorus, ‘Odrysians, Triballians and Illyrians accompanied him to the number of seven thousand; and of archers and the so called Agrianians one thousand’.13 The first two of these were Thracian peoples who would have, by and large, provided light infantry, but also, perhaps, some better armoured aristocrats who doubled as hostages for a people who had recently fought against Alexander. Whether they fought as officers for their own men or on horseback with the Companions is not known. The Agrianians were a Paeonian people supplied by their king, Langarus, and were elite javelin men who, under Alexander, usually worked in tandem with the archers, who seemed to have been either Cretan or Macedonian. These two units were always at the heart of things, whether in battle or in rough country skirmishing, but after Alexander’s death we hear nothing of what became of them.
Certain geographical regions were associated with particular light infantry skills. Rhodians were renowned as slingers, who fought by hurling lead shot and neither wore armour nor carried a shield, having just a knife for use in the last extremity. There was never any intention that they should fight hand-to-hand but their lightness would allow them to stay out of harm’s way and, like snipers, try to pick off enemies. They are seldom mentioned in the battle line, though they might have been part of any group that are mentioned guarding elephants and sometimes skirmishing in front of the phalanx. These warriors were also of particular use in sieges and it is in these circumstances that we find the telltale lead shot left by them, often with curses or quips like ‘take that’ incised on the bullet. Of course, not all Rhodians were slingers and certainly not all slingers were Rhodians. They usually came from hilly regions where poor ill-equipped people might use the weapon to protect themselves and their domestic animals from predators. Achaea, Acarnania and Elis in Greece were also well known for their slingers.
Similarly the island of Crete was renowned for its archers, and, more than this, it was generally famous for its fighters for hire. The petty cities of the island were always at each other’s throats and this ensured skills in warfare were acquired that made them attractive employees for the rulers of the dissolving Macedonian Empire. The economic imperative that made many turn to this trade also meant many others turned to piracy to make a living. These Cretan bowmen were also without any body armour and with only a knife for protection. They used a recurved composite bow with usually bronze-headed, but sometimes iron-capped, arrows. Like slingers, they were at their best in sieges and it is from the detritus of these events we often find the evidence that allows them to be so described.
Javelineers, like slingers, came mainly from poorer mountainous areas, in Greece particularly from Aetolia, Acarnania and Arcadia, and from other Balkan peoples like the Agrianians. But any place could produce this most easily equipped of soldiers from amongst their own poorer classes. Often even servants might be so armed, anybody indeed who could not provide themselves with adequate arms to stand up in the battle line. These javelinmen could carry shields and even a sword but usually a lack of defensive body armour prohibited them from hand to hand fighting in the front line. Yet, nothing was absolute, as certainly Alexander armed javelin men and others with axes to hamstring elephants at the Battle of Hydaspes. As Quintus Curtius observed, ‘The Macedonians began to use axes – they had equipped themselves with such implements in advance – to hack off the elephants’ feet’.14
But what was central to these troop types was the ability on one hand to hit at long range and on the other an inability to fight in the main line of battle. Their light equipment meant they could get out of the way of most enemies, except of course cavalry to whom they were very vulnerable. Only in rough country could they stand against horsemen. Here cover meant they could escape the enemy’s swords and spears and pick them of with arrow, slingshot or javelins.
In the battle lines of the great combats, these light infantry (psiloi) are seldom mentioned except as the guards for the elephants who could be very vulnerable to light nimble soldiers who could get out of the beasts’ way and drive them into panic by a pinprick rain of missiles. This is well exampled at the assault on Megalopolis in 318 BC when Polyperchon’s elephants were halted by planks with nails in them. ‘At the same time some of the mahouts were killed by the missiles of all kinds that poured upon them from the flanks. The elephants, suffering great pain because of the clouds of missiles.’15
Gaza, in 312 BC, is another dramatic example; Ptolemy’s preparations are reported by Diodorus, ‘they also stationed their light armed units, ordering the javelin-men and archers to shoot without ceasing at the elephants and at those who were mounted upon them.’16 Once the attacking beasts had also been stopped by planks studded with nails, these light troops finished the job of routing them back into their own men, thus effectively ending the struggle.
The other occasion upon which missile men had a decisive impact in a major battle was at Ipsus in 301 BC. Here, when Antigonus’ phalanx was exposed as Demetrius galloped away with the cavalry, it was the weapons shot and thrown at the phalangites’ unprotected right side that drained their morale and led to mass desertion. And, indeed, it was missile men who either from horseback or on foot let fly the javelins that cut down the grand old man himself.
These men had, in general, a considerably lower status than their comrades who stood up in the phalanx and due to this they are less noticed in our sources. Because these light armed troops were easily recruited in almost any region, the Diadochi would have recruited them where they found them but their land of birth was seldom of interest to the historians of the time. The only type that tends to be regionally designated with any frequency is Persian bowmen and sometimes slingers. They are mentioned in the army Craterus took back to help Antipater and they are recorded as recruited by Peucestas, to the number of 10,000, to help in the guarding of Eumenes’ Pasitigris line. Later in the same campaign they are mentioned as being recruited when the satrapal army made its way to Persepolis in 317 BC, after Antigonus had moved north through the mountains of the Cossaeans.
Now, to turn to the arm of decision; to consider the horsemen, who behind their warrior king, Alexander, won all the battles in the conquest of Persia and who in the era of the Diadochi often seemed to have the final say. At the apex of both status and effectiveness in the Macedonian royal array were the 2,000-odd Companions who, with neither stirrups nor saddle but with boots and saddle cloth, were amongst the most formidable of cavalry. For protection they mainly wore an open Boeotian helmet, to allow good vision, and usually a cuirass comprised of linen reinforced with metal plates or a muscle cuirass of bronze. Their main offensive weapon was the 12-foot spear (xyston), made of tough cornel wood sheathed in metal at both ends, backed up with a short sword.
The Companions were organized into eight squadrons (ilai) of 200 each in Alexander’s day, with a separate royal agema of 300 or 400 men. They were later reorganized into 500-strong hipparchies, each of two ilai of 250 troopers, which remained the usual formation in the Successor years. When the Successors established themselves they usually went into battle with a guard of 300 of the best cavalry. The Companion cavalry seem to have been originally regionally recruited, just like their compatriots in the phalanx. There are units described as being from Bottiaea, Amphipolis and Apollonia. The horsemen in the battles of the Successors who are described as Companions were undoubtedly the same sort of troops (if not the same men) as those who had ridden over with Alexander. And, in the battles where their presence is mentioned, they are always on the flank, intended to carry out the decisive strike and always led by an officer of the highest status.
Of the originals who filled the ranks at Granicus, Issus and Gaugamela, some, like their infantry counterparts, would have gone home after Alexander’s death but possibly not many, as later kings of Macedonia could not field the number of Companions that Alexander could, suggesting the Asian wars really did constitute a permanent drain on the Macedonian pool of skilled cavalrymen.17 The remaining survivors divided between the dynasts as chance and personal ambition dictated. It is probable that in the Successor armies they were organized in similar units and remained, like their progenitors, made up mainly of high-born Macedonians. The extent to which non-Macedonians were recruited to provide replacements for these cavalry is unclear but it must have occurred. At Paraetacene 1,000 are mentioned on one side and 900 on the other and this is, at least, as many as the number Alexander led into Asia. Some replacements came over in his lifetime but since his death we do not know of any major injections of recruits from Macedonia and in Eumenes’ case this would anyway have been practically very difficult. High-born Iranians must have fleshed out the Companions referred to in the confederate army under Eumenes, just as they did in the Seleucid Companions who still retained the name a century later. More than this, these units of Companions were also where the friends and councillors of the new rulers fought. And, besides functioning as a powerful cavalry arm, these regiments acted as a continuing school for the young aristocrats whose families had attached themselves to the various dynasts. Blue-blooded young men who, from whichever polity they hailed, started their education as pages but then continued their schooling as the officers of the future in the Companion cavalry, just as had been the case in the days of Philip and Alexander.
Second only to this cavalry elite were the heavy horsemen from Thessaly; indeed some sources suggest they might be regarded as the equal of the Companions, ‘being Thessalians exceptional for their courage.’18 Northern Greek aristocrats numbering 1,800 initially went to Asia, where they provided much of the muscle for Parmenion (the largest squadron from Pharsalus acted as his bodyguard) when he held down the left wing in the great battles of the Persian conquest. They were equipped just like the Companions, and like them were recruited regionally, based on their home cities. But, unlike them, they were returned to Greece after a few years, when the invasion army had reached Media and Alexander was confident he had overcome all really serious Achaemenid opposition. Their presence as the key cutting edge of Greek forces in the Lamian War shows they were still the best horsemen around, and that they were available in their thousands on the Greek mainland at a time when the Macedonian state in Europe was desperately scraping round for any sort of cavalry. Apart from that significant eruption they played little role in the Diadochi wars.19
The Macedonians generally fought in a wedge formation, which they had probably learned from the Thracians, who had themselves learned it from the Scythians. This was an effective offensive formation where the unit leader could keep good control of the troopers behind him as all of them had a good view of him; ‘since all have their eyes fixed on the single squadron commander as is the case also in the flight of cranes.’20 But all these cavalry might fight in longer lines a few ranks deep or even in squares depending on what the circumstances required, and it was usually at the head of these ancient cavaliers that the army leaders would place themselves when battle was to begin. A regular squadron of 250 horse in a wedge formation would have had a frontage of 45 yards or so, thus 1,000 Companions, that often are described, would have had a frontage of around 180 yards, However, this should be doubled to give a decent interval between squadrons (cavalry would need more room than infantry) so that they are not crunched up against each other. The resultant 360 yards when extrapolated for the 3,700 horse reported on Antigonus’ right at Paraetacene would have resulted in a cavalry line not much under 1 mile in length.
The 600 allied Greek horse that are mentioned by Diodorus going east with Alexander (as hegemon of the league of Corinth) in 334 BC may have been heavy cavalry, equipped like their Thessalian cousins, or lighter troops with little armour and using javelins for combat. An indication that most were heavies is that at Gaugamela in 331 BC they are brigaded on the left under Parmenion with the Thessalian horse. After Darius was finally defeated in 330 BC they, like the Thessalians, were offered demobilization at Ecbatana but many opted to stay on in the ranks of the mercenary horse. How many allied Greek horse there were at this juncture is difficult to determine since we only know of one definite reinforcement of 150 mounts arriving at Gordium in 333 BC, but there must have been others. In any case, they are still recorded under arms during the years of the Successors but following their progress is very difficult. Certainly 500 allied horse are mentioned on Antigonus’ right at the Battle of Paraetacene, but whether this refers to these same men is unclear. Here, as at Gaugamela, they are brigaded with the heavy cavalry, like the Companions and Antigonus’ bodyguard, so it is probable they were heavy horse rather than skirmishers.
The troops that we know definitely were light cavalry in Alexander’s invasion army were the scouts (prodromoi), numbering 900. These were troopers whose only protection was a helmet and their offensive weapon was a very long spear described as a sarissa. This was presumably longer than the 12-foot spear carried by the other heavy horsemen, or it would not be so particularly specified. But practicality would surely mean it was shorter than the phalangite’s pike which as a two-handed weapon would not have been feasible for horsemen, who needed at least one hand to control their steed. Though, of course, later cataphracti (completely armoured cavalry) used a two-handed kontos (barge pole) and this is attested for Parthians, Sassanians and even Romans, these were very heavy horse expected to move forward in steady and irresistible manner, not to perform the kinds of agile manoeuvres expected of light horse. These prodromoi may have come from Macedonia or Thrace but other units definitely came from the ‘barbarian’ marches, like the Paeonians and Odrysians whose rulers had been reduced to subject allies of Greater Macedonia. The role of all these troops was to act as scouts and skirmishers, a sword would have been carried but only as an arm of last resort. The long spear was intended to keep enemies off so they would not need to fight hand-to-hand or require the protection of body armour. What is interesting is that these troops are little mentioned after the Macedonians had got well into Asia. The invaders discovered and co-opted troop types that did these jobs better, most particularly the horse archers they came across on the central Asian steppe.
Mercenary light horse are not mentioned as going over to Asia but are heard of by the siege of Halicarnassus and are frequently noted as active in Alexander’s wars. They are described at Gaugamela as providing a screen in front of part of the right and left wings; acting as the cavalry equivalent of infantry skirmishers. But a good number, up to 800, were killed off in an ambush by Scythians near the Polytimetus River in Sogdia, in 329 BC. Though 500 of this troop type are mentioned in Antigonus’ battle line at Paraetacene, what relationship they had to the mercenary horse utilized by Alexander is unclear and we can really say little specific of the national origin or equipment of these men.
Though the Diadochi war machines were created by the fusion of European and Asiatic power, money and techniques, the Alexandrine core remained the same. But, of all the arms concerned, the cavalry arm saw most change. This should be no surprise as Asia had always been the home of celebrated horsemen. Alexander encountered not only formidable exemplars of the kind of cavalry with which he was familiar in the cavaliers of Persia, Media and Bactria, but also light horse archers typical of the peoples of the steppe. Before reaching inner Asia, he would have had little experience of this sort of warrior but, once encountered, he clearly liked what he saw and lost little time in incorporating many of them into his military caravan. Arrian mentions ‘Scythian cavalry, and the mounted archers of the Daae’ as a main component, 1,000 to 1,500 strong, of Alexander’s task force as he heads off to confront Porus at the Hydaspes and, indeed, these were the first to strike a blow against the Indian monarch’s army.21 Under the Diadochi we look in vain for troops described as Scythian or Daae, though, if these actual men were not kept on in large regiments, some may have remained in the retinues of the satraps who gained control of the regions near their steppe homelands. The horse archers we do know of are recorded usually as Parthians and are often brigaded with Median light horse.
The horsemen who had initially ridden out of Europe were fairly few in number, perhaps 5,000 all told, though by Gaugamela they had increased to 7,000. But, with Persia fallen, Scythia visited and India part-traversed, the invaders recruited non-European horsemen, who remained formidable and sometimes decisive throughout the Diadochi wars. The Median, Persian, Bactrian and Sogdian aristocrats who had initially fought Alexander, now joined him and stayed on with his Successors in some numbers over the years to come. The best of them were well-armoured in scale corselets, helmets and even with armour covering their legs. Their horses were big and strong and we know, in the era of Xenophon, that some of them were protected by armoured bards of cloth faced by scale armour. It is unlikely that this was discarded when the Macedonian kings took over, as 100 years later the Seleucids were fielding cataphracti wearing full body and horse protection, making such a breach in continuity unlikely. The most useful of these troops would have stayed on and travelled west, with their conquering commander, before, on his death, joining the entourages of the satraps who took over their homelands. They were recruited and fought again in the great battles, particularly those of 317/316 BC, and after these combats some would have been demobilized or gone back home with their satrapal commanders, but enough would have stayed in the main army. Others would undoubtedly have fought for and against Seleucus, as he first established himself and then went on to fight wars in east Iran, India and Anatolia.
The heavy cavalry battle winners were the apple of the Successors’ eyes, just as they had been for Alexander. They personally led these troops, riding with their greatest subjects, councillors and friends, even when the main strength of their army might lie in their heavy infantry phalangites. This was the place of honour, traditionally on the right of the battle line and though the serried ranks of horsemen might be more exotic, drawn from a greater range of peoples, their role, like the Companions of Alexander, was that of Homeric heroes. It was a dangerous post; Leonnatus, Craterus, Neoptolemus and possibly Lysimachus perished leading these troops into battle, but it was at the heart of things. However, if from Cannae in 216 BC to Rocroi in 1643 AD, a successful attack by the cavalry wings to finish off an army (effectively occupied in front by the infantry) is a military truism, what the story of the Diadochi also illustrates is some of the more problematic qualities of these blue-blooded cavaliers. History equally has many examples, from Raphia in 217 BC to Naseby in 1645 AD, of such cavalry defeating the men in front of them and then heading off in pursuit, never to be seen again and leaving their comrades to suffer for it.
If the heavy cavalry remained the queen of the battlefield, the usefulness of light horse was also well appreciated by Alexander’s Successors. It was fully understood by these commanders that these troops could hold an enemy in play at one part of the line while the killer blow was struck elsewhere. Eumenes and Antigonus both employed this tactic in their great battles, using many of the sorts of light cavalry that had been hoovered up along the way by Alexander’s army. Indeed, it is clear that in most combats for which we have information, one wing was intended to hold back and skirmish rather than get fully involved in deciding the battle, while the other wing was anticipated to win the day.
Elephants were the big new thing in Hellenistic warfare, the one particular feature that would have stood out as different from a Greek battlefield thirty years before. They first seem to have been encountered at Gaugamela, when Darius fielded fifteen. These had no impact and the first time they were recruited was in India when a friendly prince gave Alexander some. These were not used by Alexander in battle and the first belligerent experience of these beasts for the Macedonians was at the Battle of Hydaspes in 326 BC, when they found themselves very uncomfortably on the receiving end. In that encounter they caused numerous casualties and engendered great terror but the side they fought for still lost.
It is often thought that Alexander, himself, did not seem to have a great deal of time for the beasts, thinking them very unreliable. Yet, he still kept several hundred in one part of the army or another in the last years of his life; perhaps it was a matter of prestige, the connection of elephants with royalty that mattered. They are depicted as an integral part of his army on one side of his death cart (the other three sides show cavalry, infantry and warships) and reluctance to put them in the front line certainly did not extend to his successors.22 What information we have suggests, whether it was Polyperchon, Cassander, Olympias, Eumenes, Antigonus or Demetrius, they were prepared to spend much to keep up their herds and, as often as not, used them as the spearhead in battle.
How they were equipped and armed is made clear by Diodorus when he describes the death cart. ‘They carried Indian mahouts in front with Macedonians fully armed in their regular equipment behind them.’23 With an Indian driver sitting on its neck and fully armed phalangites sitting on its back, they towered above all the other warriors in any battle array. Even so, it is likely that the animals on occasions went into attack with just a driver, as fighting from the back of an elephant must have been very difficult for those unused to it. And anyway, the essence of the elephant as a weapon was the beast itself. It is also unclear whether elephants, at this period, carried missile troops. One occurrence suggests not, as before the Battle of Gabene, Eumenes’ elephants were ambushed by Antigonus and they could not reply to the missiles of the men who attacked them. Though, of course, it is always possible that, as they were unprepared for battle, they did not have their fighting crews on board. Certainly the Indians had mounted bowmen and javelineers on them and it is more than possible that their Macedonian pupils would have followed them in this too. Plutarch suggests elephant towers were used at Paraetacene ‘and on the backs of the elephants the towers and purple trappings were seen’, but the first hard evidence for their use is from Pyrrhus’ campaigns in Italy.24 They were certainly worn by the Seleucids’ animals in 273 BC when Antiochus I defeated the Gauls of Asia Minor in the ‘Elephant Victory’.
Their tactical organization is described by Asclepiodotus as being like the phalanx, with a division of sixteen animals being called an elephantarchy. But some idealized arrangements see them acting in great squares of animals. However, in all the battle descriptions we have, they seem to have fought in a single rank. The whole corps was commanded by an elephantarch who, probably, was not just an ad hoc posting for a battle but was retained for a period. Certainly, Eudamus seemed to have had some such role under Eumenes, while Antiochus the Great seems to have had the same officer called Philip fulfilling the post both at Raphia in 217 BC and at Magnesia, twenty-seven years later. The creation of such a rank seems eminently sensible given that if any part of Hellenistic warfare was a real specialism it was the use of elephants. How actual command during the battle might have been arranged is another matter, as the beasts seem usually to have been strung out all along the battle front. The elephants were accompanied into battle by a light infantry guard of fifty men interspersed between each animal.
Their usefulness in battle in the Diadochi era is somewhat inconclusive and only at Ipsus was their use decisive. But the elephants’ ability to frighten horses by their smell and noise made them particularly attractive as a weapon. That and their initial impact on troops who had never seen them before made them well worth having. No doubt, several of the Diadochi who became kings remembered the day Alexander’s army had refused to carry on in India and the straw that had broken the camel’s back for them was the thought of facing an army of 4,000 elephants. To own a weapon that had brought terror to the hearts of even Alexander’s conquering veterans must have appealed to the king’s old officers, whatever the risks and costs of pinning their fortunes to these behemoths.
Some of these formidable beasts became famous and their names well known to the troops, in the same way huge cannons were given names like Big Bertha in a much later age. Pliny the Elder, in his Natural History, mentions one named Surus, possibly Hannibal’s own elephant, who had fought valiantly in the Punic War and had lost one of his tusks.25 Pliny also tells of two elephants in Antiochus’ army (which Antiochus is not specified) named Ajax and Patroclus after the Trojan War heroes. It was certainly understood they might vary in fighting quality as it is specified that when Eumenes deployed sixty beasts about his left wing at Gabene, these were the very pick of the bunch. Equally, being herd animals, the fate of their leader could be as important to the elephants as was the fate of a beloved general to soldiers. Eumenes was one who suffered from this in his last battle, when he was holding on against an enemy, who much outnumbered him, until his lead elephant was downed and his whole line fell apart.
What is also very noticeable in our period is that elephants are mainly valued as a deterrent against enemy horsemen. These are the troops that they are seen as particularly useful against, most emphatically shown at Ipsus, when the failure of cavalry to go near a line of elephants decided the outcome of the battle. This is in marked contrast to subsequent periods when elephants were used. In the battles fought against Rome by Hellenistic armies or Carthaginians it is often the heavy infantry of the legions that the great animals are directed at and often with impressive effects. Perhaps the change of tactic can be explained by the fact that infantry of the Diadochi had become used to the animals over a period of years under Alexander so were never afraid of them in the way the Romans were when they first encountered them. However, the Romans eventually got used to handling them and, understanding their characteristics, used tactics that nullified them. For example, at Zama in 202 BC, Scipio organized lanes so the beasts were harmlessly corralled down them.
There is no question the army used and honed under Alexander and his Successors remained a military exemplar for generations and indeed millennia to come. Even Livy could not resist the lure of this force as the great acid test of quality for his ancestors from the beginning of the third century BC. The state and army that had come to dominate the central and south Italian peoples was still required in his imagination to be tested against the institutions, arms and personalities that had developed across the Adriatic and then conquered the whole world to the east.
The issue Livy addressed in his History of Rome was: could those Romans who were contemporaries of Alexander and his Successors have faced their war machine with any chance of success? First, he concentrates on personality and claims a parity of skill between Alexander and many of the Roman military leaders of that era. Marcus Valerius Corvus and Titus Manlius Torquatus, both memorable duellists who later became generals, are portrayed as the equal of the Macedonian leader when it came to bravery and skill in battle. While this does not hold up when he matches them to Alexander himself, it might be nearer the mark with at least some of the Diadochi. Livy also makes the good point that as kings, both Alexander and his Successors had the advantage of providing unified command, but the great drawback was that if they were killed or debilitated everything fell down. Thus, if one of these kings had invaded Italy, to exterminate them would have been at the forefront of the thoughts and actions of all the brave young men of Rome. Pyrrhus encountered this phenomenon in his first encounter with the Roman army, when he had to change armour with a friend because of the vicious attacks on his person that the royal regalia attracted.
This is interesting but does not really test Roman valour, talent, techniques and organization against a Macedonian model. Yet it would be possible, in a virtual way, to explore a situation where the conquering Macedonians turned from Babylon at the end of the 320s BC with plans to immediately invade the Italian peninsula. This was at a time when they still had available all the power of their original army, but were expanded and increased by the wealth and manpower of Asia. This is perhaps not a probable scenario, but nor should it be completely dismissed out of hand. After all Alexander of Epirus (Alexander the Great’s uncle) had not long since died fighting on campaign in Italy. Also, if this supposition is allowed much of interest is raised. If, almost 100 years later, Hannibal Barca could get most of Rome’s subject people to rebel, what greater success would these extraordinary Macedonian warlords have had if they had arrived in the plains of Apulia or the hills of Campania? Could Rome have triumphed when so many of the lands she had just conquered would have risen up to regain the freedoms so recently lost? Livy claims they could but it is very possible to argue the other case.
Equally, what he says about the comparative military puissance of the two sets of armed forces is debatable. Livy claims a Roman population of 250,000 was capable of fielding armies of 50,000 just based on the city itself, never mind colonies and allies. Furthermore, that often four and five armies were kept ‘on active service in Etruria, Umbria (where the Gauls frequently joined their enemies) Samnium and Lucania.’26 In contrast to these mighty numbers he suggests that that the invaders would have been largely dependent on the Macedonian component of their army. Only that part would be formidable, that the levies of Asia would be of no moment and indeed even that the Macedonian core might have been badly debased. As Livy says, Alexander ‘would have been more like Darius…by the time he reached Italy, leading an army which had already forgotten its Macedonian origins and was adopting degenerate Persian habits.’27
While this was not the whole truth, and indicates common prejudice against Asiatic soldiery, it is true that the main heavy infantry they could field would either be Macedonian or troops trained in a similar fashion. Against his Romans, Livy considered the Macedonians would only be able to field 30,000 heavy infantry and 4,000 cavalry, if the Thessalians were included. But the whole assumption that the Macedonian military machine could only dispose of 30,000 pikemen is debatable. Just twenty-two years after Alexander’s death, well over double that number of drilled and trained phalangites came together in combat at Ipsus. If these numbers had been united under Macedonian leadership, with skilled auxiliaries and a range of eager local allies who hated Rome, Livy may not have had such cause for confidence.
As well as claiming a numerical advantage, Livy contends superiority in the value of fighting men; asserting an edge for the Roman soldier, with javelin and scutum against the round shield and pike of the Macedonian, because of their personal hardiness and the variety of weapon systems that allowed the legion a decisive flexibility. But he forgets the qualities that had seen Alexander’s troops overcome every type of people and terrain from the Danube to the Indus and also that any Macedonian force would have included an array of its own specialists: bowmen, slingers and numerous peltasts; a force of all the arms that would allow for a considerable amount of tactical agility.
For Livy to have compared the GDP of these Roman and Macedonian virtual contenders would, of course, have been valuable, if not decisive, in understanding this potential conflict, but the financial and economic dimension are seldom dealt with in any period of ancient history. Most sources are pretty reticent about giving us a sniff of information on the matter of money. Only occasionally, when somebody heads for the hills with the loot, like Harpalus, do we get an inkling of how crucial filthy lucre could be. But his outcome showed that just plundering was dangerous and that it was necessary to have armed might to give the security to enjoy gains ill- or well-gotten. In the end, Harpalus’ bullion led to his death and ended up funding the Athenian contribution to the Lamian War. Still, always money was key but we are seldom given details of how it was garnered. Finance is rarely mentioned by Diodorus; one of the few times is when Antigonus takes centre stage. Having taken control of the 10,000 talents from the treasury at Cyinda, he is then reported as receiving 11,000 talents from the annual revenue. Philip II, in contrast, only got 1,000 talents from the gold mines that were such a major component of his revenue from Greater Macedonia. We also hear of the great windfall of 8,000 talents that Ptolemy got when he disposed of Cleomenes and how crucial this was in stitching together a military establishment in double-quick time that allowed him to see off the threat from Perdiccas. But, if little is known of the actual finances, what is clear is that the world divided by Alexander’s Successors was a rich one which allowed ambitious projects to be essayed that their forebears, a hundred years back, could not have dreamed of. Alexander himself crossed over the Hellespont with a war chest of only seventy talents. There is no polyphony of voices when it comes to describing Diadochi finances at this time, but the general picture is clear. These people had riches, released from Asian treasuries not known before; gold and silver ran through their fingers, luxuries filled their lives in a way just not known in the Classical period. Considerable inflation was probably one result and another was a world where conspicuous consumption became a curse and a worry that seems very modern.28
All this is fascinating speculation that tells us something of what an early imperial Roman knew of the war machine deployed by Alexander and inherited by his Successors. But Livy, even if some of his assumptions can be queried, would always have had the last laugh, as indeed he himself points out in this discourse. That is that his people in the test of real history came out on top. Less than a generation later against Pyrrhus, a second cousin of Alexander the Great, who was blessed with many of his warrior qualities and much of his glamour, they survived. Then less than a century after that the Romans began the overthrow of the armies of Philip V of Macedonia, then Antiochus the Great of the Seleucid kingdom and then trounced King Perseus to such an extent at Pydna in 168 BC that the greater Macedonia created by Philip actually ceased to exist.
All this unhistorical construction may have entertained the Roman historian but the reality was that it was a different foe who first challenged the armies of Macedonia immediately after Alexander’ breath had finally left his body. It was an old enemy from their own backyard who took up cudgels against them. And, despite the fact that most of what comes in the story of the Diadochi concerns officers who were hardly past their young manhood when the story kicked off at Babylon, the first chapter of this epic would not centre on these comparatively young Turks. Next to take the strain of maintaining Macedonian hegemony was an old man who could reasonably have felt that he had already done his fair share of national work in a very long life.