ABSA Annual of the British School at Athens
GRBS Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies
JHS Journal of Hellenic Studies
Introduction
1. For a recent version of this view see R Lane Fox, The Classical World (Allen Lane, 2005).
2. Plutarch, Pyrrhus, translated by I Scott-Kilvert and published in The Age of Alexander (London, 1973), 7.
Chapter 1: Soldiers and Armies
1. Cornelius Nepos, Iphicrates, translated by Rev. J S Watson in Lives of the great Commanders (London, 1886), 3.
2. See A B Bosworth, The Legacy of Alexander (Oxford, 2002), pp 71–2.
3. Ibid, p 72 ff contends that they would really have been less than this. He suggests that 7,000 would have remained based on the numbers and ratio of Asiatic troops Alexander had intended to mix together in new pike and missile armed phalanx, in order to utilize his recently recruited Iranian troops. However, the result may still be 10,000 if we assume the 3,000 hypaspists were not intended to be mixed but kept inviolate as might be expected of the royal guard. But as even Bosworth accepts, the sources and consequent figures for troops are all highly suspect.
4. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, translated by R M Geer (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1947), 19.14.5.
5. Ibid, 19.27.6.
6. Ibid, 19.29.3.
7. One piece of evidence that indicates they on occasions did carry the sarissa is that when killing Cleitus, the Black, Alexander took a sarissa held by his guard, who would surely have been one of the hypaspists.
8. See R A Lock, ‘The Origins of the Argyraspids’, in Historia 26 (1977), pp 373–378. Most other scholars reject this view, see, for instance, E M Anson, ‘Alexander’s Hypaspists and the Argyraspids’, in Historia 30 (1981) pp 117–20 and W M Heckel, The Marshalls of Alexander’s Empire (London, 1992) pp 307–8.
9. For a useful discussion of this conundrum see A B Bosworth, The Legacy of Alexander, in particular pp 83–4.
10. Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, translated by I Scott-Kilvert (London, 1979) 18.31.
11. Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander, translated by A De Selincourt (London, 1958), 2.11.
12. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 19.19.4.
13. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History VIII, translated by C.B. Welles (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963), 17.17.4.
14. Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of Alexander, translated by J Yardley (London, 1984), 8.14.28.
15. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 18.71.5–6.
16. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History X, translated by R. M. Geer (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1954), 19.83.3.
17. The issue of the decline of Macedonian cavalry is discussed at length in P Sidnell, Warhorse (London, 2006) p127 ff.
18. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 18.15.2.
19. Some Thessalian cavalry accompanied Pyrrhus’ army when he went to the aid of Tarentum, against Rome, in the years immediately after the death of the last Diadochi.
20. Asclepiodotus, Tactica, translated by the Illinois Greek Club, (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1923), 7.3.
21. Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander, 5.12.
22. It has been suggested that the elephants were still in the process of being trained for military action when Alexander died. See for example, L Ueda-Sarson, ‘Alexander’s War Elephants’, in Slingshot 227 (2003) pp 19–22.
23. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 18.27.1
24. Plutarch, Eumenes, translated by B Perrin in Parallel Lives VIII (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1919) 14.4.
25. Cited in Pliny, Natural History, 8.5.5. Surus is conjectured to mean the ‘Syrian’ which implies the animal was an Indian elephant rather than the African ones the Carthaginians would normally have used.
26. Livy, Rome and Italy, 9.19 translated by B Radice (London, 1982), 9.19.
27. Ibid, 9.18
28. Sumptuary laws were enacted in Athens by Demetrius of Phalerum with the inevitable resulting condemnation of him for spending large amounts on putting up his own statues all over the city. ‘Austerity for others but not for us’ became a well-known motif in Rome, a little later, when her successes had brought the wealth and art of Greece and the East flooding into her coffers.
1. Diodorus Siculus Universal History IX, 18.12 notes that the Macedonians were short of soldiers because of the numbers sent out to Alexander in Asia. However, in that case, 13,000 Macedonian infantry seems an unlikely figure. A B Bosworth, The Legacy of Alexander, pp 77, suggests that the figure of 13,000 Macedonian infantry is defective and should actually read 13,000 mercenaries and 3,000 Macedonians. For a full discussion of the problem of Macedonian troop figures at the death of Alexander, see Bosworth Legacy of Alexander, chapter 3, p 64 ff.
2. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 18.12.4.
3. Ibid, 18.13.4. What this national business was is not explained. Quite possibly they invaded Acarnania with whom they were in almost constant conflict over the next few years.
4. A B Bosworth, Conquest and Empire-The Reign of Alexander the Great (Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp 293–4, denies that Leosthenes was elected Athenian general in 324, arguing that it was a different Leosthenes. This argument seems somewhat tenuous.
5. Jason of Pherae and Onomarchus of Phocis were the most notable examples of this, both raising large mercenary armies. Jason, a Thessalian, recruited a massive army but was assassinated in 370 BC before his plans could come to fruition. Onomarchus gained notoriety by plundering the temple at Delphi. His mercenary army conquered Locris, seized Thermopylae and invaded Boeotia. He defeated Philip twice in 353 BC before losing to him in the following year and being killed in the battle.
6. Hypereides, Funeral Oration 10, translated by J.O. Burtt in Minor Attic Orators, II, Lycurgus, Dinarchus, Demades, Hypereides (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1954).
7. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 18.15.2.
8. Ibid, 18.15.4.
9. See Naval Warfare Chapter.
10. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 18.15.7.
11. Antipater’s original army had only 600 cavalry while Leonnatus and Craterus brought over 1,500 each. Taking into account the losses sustained in two defeats and a winter’s siege this would probably leave around 3,000 horse. There remains the strong possibility that Diodorus has garbled his figures.
12. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 18.17.2.
13. Ibid, 18.17.4.
14. There is a marked similarity in the brief description of Crannon with the preceding battle involving Leonnatus. The suspicion lingers that Diodorus has muddled them up.
15. Plutarch, Phocion, 26, attributes the defeat at Crannon to inexperienced leadership and Antipater bribing certain partners of the allied cause. The latter charge may have some substance but the former cannot be substantiated and seems to have been used by Plutarch in order to point up the qualities of Phocion.
1. Why he needed this reinforcement is not made clear, but presumably the regiments he had raised to take to the war in Armenia had been demobilized in the meantime.
2. Plutarch, Eumenes, 6.3.
3. P. Green, Alexander to Actium (London 1991), p.14.
4. Cornelius Nepos, Eumenes, 3.
5. Plutarch, Eumenes, 11.1–2.
6. PSI XII 1284: This quote comes from a papyrus fragment discovered at Oxyrhyncus in the early part of the twentieth century. Identified as a fragment of Arrian, it has been put in proper historical context by A B Bosworth, ‘Eumenes, Neoptolemus and PSI XII, 1284, in GRBS 19 (1978), pp 227–37.
7. One of Antipater’s recent envoys to Leonnatus in Asia had been Hecataeus, the tyrant of Cardia, a close friend and confidant of the regent. One of his earlier tasks had been the arrest and subsequent execution of Attalus after Alexander’s accession. Well-grounded in the lively and dangerous intrigues of his home city, he was a consummate political operator. Eumenes had long hated Hecataeus and had importuned Alexander, unsuccessfully, to have him replaced.
8. For this story see Plutarch, Eumenes, 2.
9. While there is every reason to believe that Craterus was popular with the rank and file Macedonians, our sources tend to overstate it. Ultimately dependent on the eye witness accounts of Eumenes’ fellow Cardian, Hieronymus, this alleged popularity was used to point up Eumenes’ cleverness. Uncritical acceptance of Hieronymus is all too often the case. He had his biases, too, as pointed out by J Hornblower, Hieronymus of Cardia (Oxford, 1981).
10. Plutarch, Eumenes, 6.5.
11. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 18.29.4.
12. For a full discussion of the vexed issue of how many Macedonian soldiers there were at the time of Alexander’s death and where they were see A B Bosworth, The Legacy of Alexander, pp 64–97. As for the 4,000 veterans left by Craterus in Cilicia when he went over to aid Antipater in the Lamian War it is perfectly possible, as we suggest, that they fought for Neoptolemus and then transferred their allegiance to Eumenes.
13. Plutarch, Eumenes, 7.1–2. Pharnabazus had a very interesting past. Son of Artabazus, one of Darius’ nobles, he was the brother of Barsine, Alexander’s mistress. After the death of Memnon, he took command of the naval war in the Aegean, until captured in 332 BC. He later escaped but seems to have been forgiven and welcomed (like his father) by the Macedonians. Phoenix is hitherto unknown.
14. Plutarch, Eumenes, 6.3–4.
15. For this story see Plutarch, Eumenes, 13, and for its context see B Bennett and M Roberts, The Wars of Alexander’s Successors Vol. 1 (Barnsley, 2008), p 62.
16. See Plutarch, Demetrius, 46.
17. Plutarch, Eumenes, 7.4–6.
18. Plutarch, Eumenes, 7.3.
19. As related in Plutarch, Eumenes, 7.4. He may well be the Gorgias who Olympias tried unsuccessfully to help evade the Macedonian draft and who arrived as a page at Alexander’s court in 331 BC. Though there is another, possibly different, Gorgias who was a taxiarch in 328 BC, and according to the ever-unreliable Justin, was sent home with Craterus in 324 BC. Perhaps he remained in Cilicia and enrolled in Eumenes’ army. For further details, see W Heckel, The Marshals of Alexander’s Empire, especially p 327.
20. According to Plutarch, Eumenes, 7.8, Eumenes found Craterus still alive and mourned over him as he lay dying. This seems a highly-romanticized account.
Chapter 4: Gabene and Paraetacene
1. For details see J Hornblower, Hieronymus of Cardia.
2. There is, however, an anecdote in Polynaeus, Stratagems, 5.35, which tells of Nearchus capturing Telmessus, on the Lycian coast, from an old acquaintance, Antipatrides. If true, the incident most probably relates to the Antigonid campaign against Alcetas in Pisidia.
3. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 19.19.6.
4. Ibid, 19.22.2–3.
5. Ibid, 19.24.3.
6. A B Bosworth, Legacy of Alexander, p 126 suggests Eumenes may have been poisoned, drawing a parallel to similar rumours re Alexander’s death.
7. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 19.29.1.
8. Ibid, 19.29.2.
9. Ibid, 19.29.4.
10. According to the very fragmentary Arrian, Events after Alexander, F.135, Amphimachus was the ‘king’s brother’. Philip Arrhidaeus’ mother was a woman called Philinna from Larissa. As A B Bosworth, Legacy of Alexander, p 113, points out, it is by no means impossible that she had been married before and was the mother of Amphimachus as well.
11. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 19.27.6.
12. Ibid, 19.28.1.
13. Ibid, 19.28.3
14. Ibid, 19.28.4
15. Where these elephants were really deployed is discussed at length by A M Devine in his article ‘Diodorus’ Account of the Battle of Paraitacene’, in Ancient World 12 (1985), pp 75–86. He contends that that the word used by Diodorus could be interpreted to mean that the elephants were used as just a flank guard and were not in front of Eudamus’ wing at all. Devine believes that, if the elephants were curved round acting as defence both in front and round the side, this would have made their formation unworkable. Whatever the linguistics, he appears to make assumptions that are not warranted. Firstly, it seems that Eudamus’ wing was already anchored on high ground and so would not need all the elephants as well to make it safe and thus deprive the rest of the wing of the support of these beasts. Equally, his contention that a bent line would not be practical does not seem to hold water; single beasts with their infantry guards could manoeuvre in a curved line, without necessarily exposing a flank, especially as the enemy troops that might threaten them were the very horsemen whose steeds were afraid of coming near elephants at all. However, one point in favour of his argument could be that it explains why Antigonus could so easily get at the space between Eudamus’ wing and the infantry because there would have been no elephants in his way as they were all on the far left acting as a flank guard. And this would also apply at Gabene where Devine in his subsequent article: ‘Diodorus’ Account of the Battle of Gabiene’ in Ancient World 12 (1985), pp 87–96, again contends the animals act just as a flank guard and so, therefore, would not have impeded Antigonus getting at Peucestas and forcing him and so many of his followers to flee. But none of this explains why Eumenes, at Paraetacene, with more elephants would forgo having a guard of elephants in front of his weak left wing when this was exactly the work the beasts were intended for.
16. As with the arithmetic of Antigonus’ army there is also a problem with Eumenes’ host. When we add together each detachment it totals 11 more elephants and 200 more cavalry than Diodorus claims as his total. But, this is not a huge discrepancy and perhaps needs little explanation above the normal muddle due to attrition or troop accounting.
17. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 19.30.2.
18. Ibid, 19.30.10.
19. Ibid, 19.31.2 suggests as much; ‘they were moving from column into line.’
20. Ibid, 19.31.4.
21. According to Polynaeus, Stratagems, 4.6.10, Antigonus detained the heralds to try and conceal the number of casualties he had sustained.
22. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 19.33.1.
23. A B Bosworth, Legacy of Alexander, p 144.
24. Plutarch, Eumenes, 15.7.
25. However, most historians reject this characteristic of Parmenion considering that it is merely a literary device to spotlight Alexander’s superior judgement.
26. Alexander had created a corps of Iranian Companions (including Medes) shortly before his death.
27. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 19.42.1–2.
28. Ibid, 19.42.5.
29. Ibid, 19.42.5.
30. Ibid, 19.42.6.
31. Ibid, 19.40.3.
32. Plutarch, Eumenes, 16.4.
33. See Chapter 1: Soldiers and Armies.
34. Philip, himself, had had a chequered career, receiving Sogdia and Bactria at Babylon. In 323 BC at Triparadeisus he was apparently transferred to command in Parthia. However, Philotas is named as satrap of Parthia, when Pithon aimed at taking the province over, before Antigonus ever arrived east of the Tigris. Philip, perhaps, never had any great local support and had only been restored to some office after the arrival of Eumenes. He later served Antigonus. But, it should be noted that there were at least five officers named Philip under Alexander, so our identification is tentative. For an alternative view see R A Billows, Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State (Berkeley, 1990), p 422, who considers the above mentioned Philotas to be an error, by Diodorus, for Philip.
35. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 19.43.3.
36. Ibid, 19.43.5.
37. J Hornblower, Hieronymus of Cardia, points out how Peucestas’ behaviour during these campaigns is at odds with his faultless and brave demeanour under Alexander. It is more than possible that Hieronymus decided to blacken his character in order to glorify Eumenes.
Chapter 5: Battle of Gaza
1. See Chapter 4: Gabene and Paraetacene, note 34, – if it is the same Philip!
2. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History X 19.85.2.
3. Ibid, 19.80.2.
4. Ibid, 19.80.5.
5. Of course, it could be that Diodorus (or more correctly his source, Hieronymus, who was in the pay of the Antigonids) is building up Ptolemy and his reputation for rhetorical effect.
6. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History X, 19.81.2–3.
7. See Chapter 1: Soldiers and Armies.
8. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History X, 19.82.3.
9. Ibid, 19.83.5.
10. Ibid, 19.84.2–3.
11. Ibid, 19.85.3.
12. Plutarch (Demetrius 5), who has the briefest of descriptions of the battle, states that 5,000 men were killed and 8,000 more taken prisoner.
13. According to Diodorus, Universal History X, 19.86.2, even though Andronicus insulted Ptolemy, when he was captured by the Lagid he was treated kindly and ‘advanced in honour’ as ‘one of his friends’.
Chapter 6: Battle of Ipsus
1. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History X, 20.109.1.
2. Ibid, 20.112.1.
3. Ibid, 20.112.3.
4. Polynaeus, Stratagems, 4.12.7, suggests that Lysimachus massacred 5,000 Autariatae immediately after the loss of the baggage train, which raises the problem of how the 2,000 who deserted survived. For discussion of the historicity of this incident see R A Billows, Antigonos the One-Eyed, p 180, and H S Lund, Lysimachus (London & New York, 1992), p 76ff.
5. Plutarch, Demetrius, 28.
6. Ibid, 29.
7. In 1987 a British army officer, Tony Clunn, whilst metal detecting, found 162 silver Roman coins, none younger than the reign of Augustus. He also found three sling shots of lead; these finds enabled him, with archaeologists, to pinpoint the exact site of battle.
8. See Chapter 1: Soldiers and Armies.
9. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History XI, translated by F R Walton (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1954), 21.1.2.
10. W W Tarn, Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments (Cambridge, 1930) p 69ff.
11. B Bar-Kochva, The Seleucid Army (Cambridge, 1976) pp 105–110.
Chapter 7: Siege Warfare
1. Plutarch, Demetrius, 21.
2. Polynaeus, Stratagems, 4.14.1, translated for the authors by B Polack.
3. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 18.71.2–3.
4. Ibid, 18.71.3–4.
5. See Chapter 8: Naval Warfare.
6. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History X, 20.83.1.
7. Ibid, 20.85.4.
8. Ibid, 20.48.2–4.
9. Xenophon, Cyropaedia, translated by H G Dakyns (London, 1911), VI. 1. 52–53.
10. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History X, 20.91.5.
11. For details of this machine and its conjectural mechanism see DB Campbell, Greek and Roman Artillery 399BC–AD363 (Oxford, 2003), pp 45. See also his other excellent books Greek and Roman Siege Machinery 399BC–AD363 (Oxford, 2003) and Besieged: Siege Warfare in the Ancient World ( Oxford, 2006) for other details on siege machinery and warfare which we are indebted to.
12. Vitruvius, De Architectura, translated by M H Morgan (Harvard University Press, 1914), 10.16.4.
13. Vitruvius, De Architectura, 10.14.1.
14. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History X, 20.95.1.
15. R A Billows, Antigonos the One-Eyed, pp 388–9, explicitly mentions Hegetor as designing tortoises for the siege of Rhodes, but the evidence for this is not clear.
16. See for instance, Diodorus Siculus, Universal History X, translated by R M Geer (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1954), note 1, p 395.
17. Vitruvius, De Architectura, 10.16.7.
18. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History X, 20 92 2.
19. An idea first mooted in F E Adcock, The Greek and Macedonian Art of War (Berkeley, 1967).
20. Plutarch, Demetrius, 34.
Chapter 8: Naval Warfare
1. Plato, Phaedo, 109b.
2. He is usually called Cleitus the White to differentiate him from Cleitus the Black (who Alexander killed in a drunken brawl). He commanded an infantry battalion in India but later became a cavalry hipparch, serving as such at Sangala and Malli. He was sent home with Craterus and Polyperchon but was probably instructed to help in the construction of the fleet in Cilicia. There is no evidence that he was ever an admiral of Perdiccas (and subsequent defector) as is often suggested.
3. Ironically, perhaps the most famous of Alexander’s admirals, Nearchus, never seems to have ventured on the seas after his master’s death. Nearchus had been in charge of the fleet which went down the Indus in 324 BC and was then deputed by Alexander to remain in command of the fleet for the voyage to the Persian Gulf. Nearchus recorded the details of this harrowing journey (extant in Arrian’s Indica) eventually reuniting with Alexander in Susa shortly before the king’s death. But, after Babylon, Nearchus never returned to the sea, remaining as an officer of Antigonus and Demetrius (he allegedly tried to intercede to save Eumenes’ life). Yet perhaps this is no real mystery as in the Indica there are clear signs of tension between Nearchus and an Onescritus, who may well have had real naval responsibility for the voyage. Nearchus’ responsibilities may have been more financial than naval.
4. This number of ships was set out to be built in an Athenian decree in an attempt to regain their thalassocracy. In the original Diodorus manuscript it actually states 200 fours and 40 triremes, but one of his translators (P Wesseling in 1746) regarded this as unlikely given that Athens only had 50 fours in 325/324 BC and accordingly transposed the text! The emendation has been followed by all subsequent translators. For discussion of this see J S Morrison, ‘Athenian Seapower in 323/2 BC: Dream and Reality’ in JHS, 107 (1987), pp 89–90; and N G Ashton, ‘The Naumachia near Amorgos in 322 B.C.’, in ABSA, 72 (1977), p 5.
5. The course of the naval battles so vital to the ultimate Macedonian success is unfortunately little understood. Diodorus’ account is brief and confused and it is unsure whether there were two, three or even four battles which took place. See, Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 18.15.8–9 and note, N G Ashton, ibid, pp 1–11 and also his ‘How Many Penteris?’, in GRBS, 20 (1979), pp 327–42. And, for widely different interpretations, see J S Morrison, ibid, pp 88–97, N G L Hammond and F W Wallbank, History of Macedonia, vol. 3 (Oxford, 1988) pp 113–22 and W Heckel, The Marshals of Alexander’s Empire (Routledge, 1992), pp 373–77.
6. According to Polynaeus, Stratagems, 4.6.8.
7. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 18.72.2.
8. Polynaeus, Stratagems, 4.6.8.
9. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 18.72.8.
10. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History X, 19.75 8.
11. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 18 72 7.
12. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History X, 20.47.1.
13. Mentioned in Diodorus Siculus, Universal History X, 20.50.5.
14. Plutarch, Demetrius, 16; Polynaeus, Stratagems, 4.7.7; and Diodorus Siculus, Universal History X, 20.50.2, respectively. It is also the case that Diodorus, himself, says earlier that Demetrius had arrived on the island with more than 110 triremes (see above) but now says that he has only 108 and then goes on to enumerate various sevens and fours within this 108! Clearly these are not reconcilable but the discrepancy can be explained by assuming that the transports and freighters mentioned in Diodorus, 20.47.1, were not transports as such, but in fact warships. If this is accepted, the amended Diodorus figure of 180 can be accepted. For a full discussion of the fleet strengths at Salamis see M Cary, A History of the Greek World From 323 to 146 BC (London, 1951), Appendix 4, pp 385–6; and H Hauben, ‘Fleet Strength at the Battle of Salamis (306 B.C.)’ in Chiron, 6 (1976), pp 1–5.
15. This is from Diodorus Siculus, Universal History X, 20.49.2. Once more Plutarch, Demetrius, 16, gives a different figure of 150.
16. According to Diodorus Siculus, Universal History X, 20.49.2, Ptolemy had over 200 transports carrying over 10,000 infantry.
17. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History X, 20.51.5.
18. For different views see H Hauben, ‘Fleet Strength at the Battle of Salamis (306 B.C.)’, p 5 and especially K Williams, Alexandria and the Sea: Maritime Origins and Underwater Exploration (Sharp Books, 2004) pp 34–40.
19. The mistress, an Athenian called Lamia, was renowned as a flute player and had apparently already been not only the mistress of Ptolemy, but of Demetrius of Phalerum before him. The other Demetrius, despite being many years her junior, apparently also became besotted with her and she subsequently bore him a daughter, Phila. Plutarch recounts this affair in great detail in Demetrius, 27.
20. There is a charming, if somewhat unlikely, story in Plutarch, Demetrius, 20.4, about Lysimachus and Demetrius. Whilst trying to raise Demetrius’ siege of Soli in Cilicia, Lysimachus apparently sent a note to Demetrius to ask whether he could see his siege train and fleet. After Demetrius agreed, Lysimachus saw them (no doubt with much envy), allegedly expressed his admiration, and went away again!
21. However, there was one ship that we know Lysimachus did have. That was his flag ship the Leontophorus attested to in a fragment of Memnon. Apparently built at Heraclea, it was an eight and famous for its sheer size and splendour. Leontophorus means lion slayer and thus is in keeping with Lysimachus’ constant use of the lion motif. It required, or so we are told, no less than 1,200 oarsmen to row it and could hold up to 1,200 marines. Such a monster almost puts the gigantism of Demetrius to shame. The ship is still attested as in service when Ptolemy Ceraunus took over Lysimachus’ fleet.
22. Pyrrhus had a huge flagship which saw service and which apparently saved his life in 280 BC during his invasion of Italy, with a tempest sinking all his other ships. The flagship ended up in the hands of the Carthaginian Hannibal and she was used against the Romans at Mylae in 260 BC. It has been plausibly argued by R S Rice, ‘The Peregrinations of the Queen: Technology Transfer in the Hellenistic World (http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/rrice/queen.html’ 1996) in a fascinating article that this ship must have been one of Demetrius’ original fleet.
Chapter 9: Border Wars
1. For details of the campaigns involving Seleucus and, in particular, Lysimachus see B Bennett and M Roberts The Wars of Alexander’s Successors 323–281 BC Volume 1: Commanders and Campaigns and the chapters on Seleucus and Lysimachus.
2. See P Harding, From the end of the Peloponnesian War to the battle of Ipsus, Translated Documents of Greece and Rome, No 2 (Cambridge, 1985), pp 159–61 (No.125).
3. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History X, 19.67.7.
4. This period in Epirus is very confusing. Lyciscus was sent by Cassander as ‘regent and general’ of the Epirote alliance. He seems to have been regent for Neoptolemus II. This king’s identity is much disputed but he was probably the son of Alexander of Epirus and Cleopatra (sister of Alexander the Great). Olympias had formerly been his guardian while she ruled jointly with Aeacides. Neoptolemus survived the vicissitudes of Epirote politics (possibly ruling as joint king with Alcetas) until he was murdered by Pyrrhus circa 297 BC. See P Garoufalias, Pyrrhus King of Epirus (London, 1979), pp 187–92; and N G L Hammond and F W Walbank, History of Macedonia, Vol. 3, pp 154–6.
5. Polynaeus, Stratagems, 4.11.4, describes Cassander capturing Epidamnus by an unlikely ruse. He allegedly set on fire villages nearby and hid the rest of his forces. The people of Epidamnus, thinking he had left, came out and resumed their farming, enabling Cassander to seize the town.
6. See W L Adams ‘The Dynamics of Internal Macedonian Politics in the time of Cassander’, in Ancient Macedonia, 3, (1983), pp 2–30.
7. Briefly mentioned by both Pliny and Seneca, the context and date of the incident are both unclear.
8. There is no actual evidence that Antigonus intended to invade Egypt but it is difficult to see the campaign against the Nabataeans in any other context.
9. So presumably 10,000 was too low an estimate of their total population (both figures are from Diodorus Siculus) or otherwise they had allies posted nearby.
1. J Keegan, The Mask of Command (London, 1987), p 13.
2. According to Plutarch, Demetrius, 25, Demetrius was scornful of all the Diadochi (apart from his father, of course). However, he reserved particular bile for Lysimachus whom he termed a treasurer. Apart from the obvious accusation of meanness, it had the added implication and insult that Lysimachus was a eunuch, as eunuchs traditionally filled the post of treasurer.