10

 

BOMBARDMENT

» 21–23 AUGUST 1863 «

 

Well before dawn on 21 August the soldiers of Wilder’s brigade stirred in their camps around Poe’s Tavern. Their task was to appear ostentatiously at the river crossings upstream of Chattanooga and simulate the advance guard of a mighty host. In order to gain the desired effect, Wilder’s command had to be visible but not so overt as to be an obvious deception. Nor was he to provoke a cross-river response by Confederate forces. Wilder was separated from the bulk of Crittenden’s Twenty-First Corps in the Sequatchie Valley by the formidable obstacle of Walden’s Ridge. Only two brigades, Hazen’s above Poe’s Tavern and Wagner’s overlooking Chattanooga, were within extreme supporting distance. An aggressive response to Wilder’s provocations would place his men in considerable danger. Wilder himself was undaunted by either the complexities of the mission or the convoluted command structure controlling it. He nominally belonged to the Fourteenth Corps, yet the entire deception operation belonged to Crittenden’s Twenty-First Corps. Crittenden chose to remain at Dunlap in the Sequatchie Valley, leaving John Palmer to supervise the initial deception. Having received his orders directly from Rosecrans, Wilder considered himself to be an independent actor, a role he had enjoyed since the beginning of the Tullahoma campaign. He divided his brigade to cover a wide swath of territory. First, he assigned Col. John Funkhouser of the Ninety-Eighth Illinois Mounted Infantry regiment to lead his own unit and Col. Smith Atkins’s Ninety-Second Illinois Mounted Infantry regiment to Harrison’s Ferry, supported by two guns from Capt. Eli Lilly’s Eighteenth Indiana Battery. Next, Wilder assigned Capt. Jacob Vail and two companies of the Seventeenth Indiana Mounted Infantry regiment to scout along the river near North Chickamauga Creek. Finally, Wilder himself would lead the Seventy-Second Indiana Mounted Infantry regiment, the 123rd Illinois Mounted Infantry regiment, the remainder of the Seventeenth Indiana, and four of Lilly’s guns to the river opposite Chattanooga. To Wilder’s relief, Palmer decided to accompany Funkhouser’s force to Harrison’s Ferry.¹

Southern portion of Chattanooga, with freight station, train shed, and Crutchfield House in view in the distance. (Chattanooga Public Library)

Leading two companies of the 123rd Illinois, Maj. James Connolly around 6:00 A.M. suddenly reached the river opposite the town. The streets of Chattanooga lay 600 yards away, but much closer were twelve Confederate soldiers leading sixty mules from a ferry. The Confederates were utterly surprised by the sudden appearance of the Federals. Connolly’s men dashed forward, capturing the drovers. The ferry abruptly backed away, leaving its gangplank behind. Although the Federals inflicted several casualties, including the ferryman, the vessel reached the city safely. For a few moments, no one in Chattanooga reacted, so great was the surprise. Indeed, Connolly had time to water his horses in the river before a few scattered shots from the city caused him to retreat to the shelter of nearby trees. Arriving by midmorning, Wilder surveyed the situation with Lilly. A range of hills known as Stringer’s Ridge paralleled the river from Moccasin Bend south of the town to a point well upstream. The ridge stood 350 feet above the plain and was approximately a half mile from the river. Two vessels, the Paint Rock, a sternwheeler of 140 tons, and the smaller Dunbar, a side-wheeler, lay moored at the foot of Market Street, along with a floating bridge of forty-seven pontoons. Atop Cameron Hill, slightly lower than Stringer’s Ridge, was an earthwork with three embrasures. Slightly below it was another work pierced for nine guns, and a water battery below that at river level. Just beyond three large brick warehouses was a small fieldwork commanding the landing. Upstream was another large fortification perched on a sheer rocky bluff, while smaller works crowned hills beyond it. No cannon could be seen. A mile beyond the river stood two railroad stations and the large Crutchfield House hotel. Several church steeples rose above the general clutter of buildings. The streets seemed to be empty of either soldiers or civilians. Taking in everything at a glance from Stringer’s Ridge, Wilder ordered Lilly to open fire. By 10:30 A.M., Lilly had gotten his guns into good firing positions on the ridge and sent the first shells screaming toward Chattanooga.²

Lilly’s first targets were the Paint Rock and the Dunbar, which he engaged with three guns at a range of 1,600 yards. The right gun bombarded the silent earthwork on Cameron Hill. Firing slowly, Lilly’s gunners methodically took the vessels apart. After three shots struck its waterline, the Paint Rock sank in shallow water with its upper works badly damaged. The Dunbar remained afloat, but its superstructure was wrecked. Lilly next turned his attention to the two large fortifications at either end of the waterfront. Confederate gunners briefly replied until they found they could not reach the Federals. Meanwhile, Lilly’s men placed shot after shot through the Confederate embrasures. After an initial flurry of people scrambling in panic from the houses and churches downtown, few citizens were to be seen. As the bombardment continued, only an occasional person dashed from house to house. At one point, a bold civilian drove his carriage back and forth on the riverbank, in apparent defiance of Lilly’s gunners, until he was targeted specifically. When a shell burst nearby, he too disappeared out of range. In late afternoon, having expended over 260 rounds, Lilly was firing only an occasional shot toward the ferry moored near the steamboats when suddenly a rifled thirty-two-pounder spoke from the large fort. Unlike the other Confederate rounds, which had fallen laughably short, the heavy shot struck Lilly’s position squarely. Bouncing off the ground under gun No. 5, it sliced off the leg of Cpl. Abram McCorkle and killed four horses in the gun team before finally coming to rest against a tree behind the gun limber. The lucky shot ended Lilly’s target practice and the Federals departed from Stringer’s Ridge at 4:30 P.M. The artillerymen evacuated Corporal McCorkle to Poe’s Tavern, but the severe wound caused his death four days later. Wilder’s force withdrew several miles to the foot of Walden’s Ridge near the beginning of the Anderson Road. Above them camped Wagner’s command, distant spectators to the artillery duel.³

Fourteen miles upriver, at Harrison’s Ferry, John Palmer followed two of Wilder’s regiments and a section of Lilly’s guns to the riverbank. With Palmer was the Twenty-First Corps chief of staff, Lt. Col. Lyne Starling, and Lt. George Crow, topographical engineer. Col. John Funkhouser first sent four companies of the Ninety-Eighth Illinois under Lt. Col. Edward Kitchell upstream several miles to the village of Dallas. He then led the remainder of his regiment and the eight available companies of Col. Smith Atkins’s Ninety-Second Illinois to the vicinity of the ferry landing. A lone Confederate picket saw the Federals approach and escaped to the far shore in a flatboat. Far more cautious than Wilder at Chattanooga, Palmer began a minute investigation of the Confederate fortifications across the river. There seemed to be several distinct works overlooking the ferry, just below the point where Ooltewah Creek entered the river. A handful of Confederates could be seen observing the Federal column. For some time, each side stared at the other. While Palmer and Starling closely observed the Confederate movements, Lieutenant Crow sketched a map of the area. Also observing the scene was Smith Atkins of the Ninety-Second Illinois, who stood near a large frame house close to the river. Suddenly, a Confederate officer approached the river and knelt on one knee. A puff of smoke made it instantly clear that he was firing on the Federals. His bullet missed Atkins but struck Pvt. William Patterson in the arm. The Federals quickly responded with shots of their own. Armed with Enfield rifles, most of the Ninety-Second Illinois could not reach the Confederates. Only three companies of the Ninety-Second had Spencer rifles, so they and the six companies of the Ninety-Eighth Illinois carried the action until Palmer halted the firing. Having learned that the Confederates were alert and that boats would be required to cross the river, Palmer withdrew Funkhouser’s command several miles from the river. He then returned to Poe’s Tavern and crossed Walden’s Ridge to Dunlap.⁴

Farther upstream, Robert Minty also showed his small command to the Confederates. Minty’s First Brigade was seriously understrength in view of its role in the deception plan and the need to connect with Burnside’s forces. He had been required to leave the battalion of the Third Indiana Cavalry regiment to shield the McMinnville supply depot. He left 200 more troopers at McMinnville because their horses had broken down. By the time he reached Pikeville, Minty could mount only 1,200 men. Nevertheless, he crossed Walden’s Ridge early on 21 August with three regiments and two guns of the Chicago Board of Trade Battery. Reaching the hamlet of Morganton at the eastern foot of Walden’s Ridge around 9:00 A.M., he pushed forward a mile to Smith’s Cross Roads. From there he sent scouts toward the Tennessee River. One group traveled northeast to the village of Washington, while another rode southeast toward Blythe’s Ferry. The scouts to Washington encountered a few Confederates, who easily withdrew beyond the Tennessee. Before leaving Washington, the Federals plundered the Rhea County courthouse, scattering county records. At Blythe’s Ferry, the Federals found Confederate infantry busily entrenching on the far side of the river. Before Minty’s troopers withdrew, the Confederates opened fire, wounding a trooper in the Fourth United States Cavalry. Having shown his command to the Confederates, Minty positioned himself at Smith’s Cross Roads. At the moment, there was no sign of Burnside, Van Cleve’s supporting infantrymen were beyond Walden’s Ridge, and Wilder’s nearest units were at Poe’s Tavern, fifteen miles to the south. With his rations and forage almost exhausted and his road to the rear unsecured, Minty believed himself to be in a dangerous position. Those fears would grow as the hours passed. Still, as he nervously glanced back at the mountain behind him, Minty and his small band of horsemen were where Rosecrans wanted him to be.⁵

It is unlikely that Braxton Bragg was surprised by the sudden appearance of Federal troops across from Chattanooga on 21 August. Bragg was still at Cherokee Springs, but the army staff was in the city. In Bragg’s absence, Leonidas Polk and Frank Cheatham were the senior officers present in the town. Federal activity beyond the Tennessee River had indeed been monitored by the Confederates. The growing Federal presence around Stevenson, Bridgeport, and Jasper had not gone unnoticed by Anderson’s Brigade and the Third Confederate Cavalry regiment. Similarly, multiple small detachments roaming beyond the Tennessee River northwest of Chattanooga also were reporting Federal movement into the Sequatchie Valley. Maj. Charles McDonald’s Battalion of Forrest’s Division, a detachment from Col. Benjamin Hill’s Thirty-Fifth Tennessee Infantry regiment from Cleburne’s Division, and a detail from several more Tennessee infantry regiments under Lt. James McFerrin of the Thirty-Second Tennessee Infantry from Stewart’s Division had all been scouting for some time beyond the river. Unfortunately, only McFerrin’s report is extant. In it he noted that his scouts left the west bank of the river only on the night of 20 August under pressure from Wilder’s advance. Clearly, Wilder’s movements were being reported to the staff of the Army of Tennessee. That information, however, seems not to have been widely disseminated, as Frank Cheatham told a reporter that he was unaware of the Federal approach. As a result, the ferry operator transporting herders across the river at Chattanooga had no inkling that Wilder’s Federals were so near on 21 August. In late morning a signal corps detachment atop Raccoon Mountain saw Wilder’s men approaching the river, but their warning came too late for an immediate response. Events might have taken a different course had Bragg been in Chattanooga instead of the more lackadaisical Polk, but Bragg was absent and the senior leaders in Chattanooga thought it best to be seen in church that morning.⁶

The citizens of Chattanooga were utterly unprepared for the rain of shells that descended upon their town in midmorning. Although it was Friday, the town’s churches were filled with soldiers and civilians attending services in accord with President Davis’s proclamation. Polk and his wife were most likely at St. Paul’s Episcopal Church at Chestnut and Eighth Streets, where Dr. Charles Quintard was preaching. Cheatham and several subordinates were at the First Presbyterian Church at the corner of Seventh and Market Streets. Henry Watterson, principal reporter for the Chattanooga Daily Rebel, was also at the Presbyterian Church, along with correspondents from more distant newspapers. Rev. Benjamin Palmer had just begun a long prayer when Lilly’s first shots exploded on the waterfront. As errant shells landed elsewhere in the city, nervous congregants began to depart in haste. Cheatham attempted to quiet the growing unease, but his words had no effect. Throughout the town, men, women, and children rapidly transformed growing concern into abject panic. Lilly’s guns were at least 2,500 yards from the Presbyterian Church, but shots that flew over the batteries on Cameron Hill reached well into the town, striking private dwellings, churches, and hospitals indiscriminately. Some people, like reporter John Linebaugh of the Memphis Daily Appeal, were restrained by officers as they attempted to reach their quarters near the river. By evening hundreds of citizens had abandoned their homes for rude camps in groves beyond artillery range or found space on departing trains. Not all escaped so easily; according to the Daily Rebel, five or six citizens were killed or wounded before the day’s bombardment ended. Among the mortally wounded were an unidentified woman and Elizabeth “Lizzie” Roach, twelve, a refugee from Nashville struck in the thigh. Chattanooga had been bombarded before, but the lack of meaningful warning contributed greatly to the shock felt by citizens far beyond the reach of Lilly’s guns.⁷

The military reaction to Wilder’s appearance was more measured than that of Chattanooga’s civilians. In Bragg’s absence, Polk orchestrated the army’s response. First he sent Lumsden’s Alabama Battery from the Artillery Reserve, Scott’s Tennessee and Scogin’s Georgia Batteries from Cheatham’s Division, and Fowler’s Alabama Battery from Hindman’s Division to occupy the fortifications on the town’s waterfront. Armed mostly with smoothbores, the Confederate gunners soon found that their field guns were badly outranged. Only the heavy rifled thirty-two-pounder could reach Lilly’s position and it took several hours to mount it and bring it into action. Beyond that direct response, Polk needed information about what might be happening beyond the bulk of Lookout Mountain. By telegraph he queried Anderson about Federal activity in the area of Bridgeport and Shell Mound. Similarly, he telegraphed Hindman, ordering him to keep a strong guard at Kelly’s Ferry and maintain contact with Anderson. While waiting to hear from the left of his line, Polk rearranged the defenses of his center and right as well. Cheatham had been guarding several railroad bridges west of Chattanooga for some time, as well as Brown’s Ferry downstream. Polk ordered Cheatham to relinquish those posts to Hindman, while extending his pickets upstream to the village of Harrison, the western edge of Hill’s sector. Polk instructed Cheatham to utilize his escort, Capt. Thomas Merritt’s Company G, Second Georgia Cavalry regiment, for the task. In another message indicating a lack of confidence in Cheatham, Polk directly charged Col. Alfred Vaughan Jr., temporarily commanding Smith’s Brigade, to maintain a picket line from Chattanooga downstream to the nose of Lookout Mountain, where it would connect with Hindman’s pickets. Finally, Polk ordered Asst. Quartermaster Richard Mason to gather the corps transportation for possible movement. Having taken those actions, Polk waited to hear from Bragg.⁸

Responding quickly to Polk’s call for information and action, Hindman rode first through a mile-long gap in Raccoon Mountain to Kelly’s Ferry, where he found Capt. Granville Sandusky’s Company H, Third Confederate Cavalry, on guard. Sandusky told Hindman that another company of the Third Confederate was at Rankin’s Ferry, twelve miles downriver at the mouth of Running Water Creek. Returning to Wauhatchie, Hindman sent a staff officer to investigate Brown’s Ferry. Brown’s was another well-known crossing site, sixteen miles upstream from Kelly’s Ferry by the meandering Tennessee River but only four miles from the Wauhatchie depot. When the staff officer returned, he reported that a small Federal mounted force had appeared across the river that morning and had probably seized a number of wagons belonging to a foraging detail from Hill’s Corps. This disturbing news came from two teamsters who swam the river to escape capture. In addition, locals reported a Federal force passing over Walden’s Ridge early in the day. Forwarding this information to Polk, Hindman also reported that he was relieving Cheatham’s pickets. Deeming Brown’s Ferry to be the most critical point, he sent the Fiftieth Alabama Infantry regiment of Deas’s Brigade to defend that crossing. He reinforced Captain Sandusky at Kelly’s Ferry with sixty infantrymen and ordered another group of similar size to replace Cheatham’s men at the railroad bridge over Running Water Creek. Finally, he dispatched thirty men to relieve Cheatham’s guards at the Lookout Creek railroad bridge. He asked to be excused from sending anyone to the Chattanooga Creek railroad bridge because the structure was in Cheatham’s area. Hindman reminded Polk that he lacked his artillery batteries and ordnance wagons. He also issued an order banishing all dependents visiting the command. Among those affected was brigade commander Arthur Manigault, who reluctantly parted with his wife, Mary, and son, Arthur, twelve, in midafternoon.⁹

When Capt. James Hall’s Company K, Twenty-Fourth Alabama Infantry regiment of Manigault’s Brigade, arrived at Kelly’s Ferry around 6:00 P.M., they discovered approximately 200 Confederate cavalrymen on the far shore of the Tennessee River. The horsemen proved to be McDonald’s Tennessee Cavalry Battalion. In Maj. Charles McDonald’s absence, Capt. Philip Allin commanded the battalion, which had been monitoring Federal movements west of the Tennessee. Forced from both the Sequatchie Valley and Walden’s Ridge by the approach of Wilder’s brigade, Allin’s men were desperate to cross to the Confederate side of the river. Cut off from Chattanooga, the battalion had reached Kelly’s Ferry on the afternoon of 21 August but found no easy means of crossing the stream. Fearing to ride their horses across the river, the cavalrymen spent several hours trying to force their mounts to swim to the Confederate shore. No horses made the trip willingly, and few made it at all without their riders. By nightfall only a few cavalrymen and their mounts had successfully surmounted the obstacle. Fearing that the Federals would arrive at any time and catch them with their backs to the river, the desperate cavalrymen turned to a final expedient. Finding two small dugout canoes, they began the laborious process of towing single horses across the river. Throughout the night, teams of two men in each dugout worked to rescue Allin’s command. On every trip across the river, one man paddled the canoe, while the other held the reins of a horse. The laborious process would not be completed until 2:00 A.M. on 22 August, but surprisingly only one horse drowned during the crossing. With Allin’s departure from the west bank of the river, Bragg lost his last major source of information about Federal activity beyond his immediate sight. Over the next several days a handful of stragglers would also make the crossing successfully, but they provided little useful news.¹⁰

Even before Wilder’s bombardment galvanized Polk into action, significant portions of Hill’s Corps were in motion. For several weeks, the only infantry guarding the river above the mouth of South Chickamauga Creek had been Wood’s Brigade of Cleburne’s Division. Wood’s four regiments and two battalions were responsible for the thirty miles of riverfront from Sivley’s Ford just upstream from Chattanooga to Blythe’s Ferry. All told, there were at least twelve possible crossing points to be picketed. Wood guarded Blythe’s Ferry with the Thirty-Second/Forty-Fifth Mississippi Infantry regiment and placed the Fifteenth Mississippi Sharpshooter battalion at Doughty’s Ferry next downstream. The Forty-Fifth Alabama Infantry regiment monitored Campbell’s and Thatcher’s Fords, while the Thirty-Third Alabama Infantry regiment covered the crossing sites around Harrison’s Ferry. The remaining crossings were left to the Sixteenth Alabama Infantry regiment and the Eighteenth Alabama Infantry battalion. Wood made his headquarters at the village of Harrison. According to “Army of Tennessee,” a correspondent of the Augusta Daily Constitutionalist and apparently a staff officer at army headquarters, William Mackall received information on 20 August that the river line upstream from Chattanooga was threatened, especially around Blythe’s Ferry. The report could have come from one of the detachments forced from the Sequatchie Valley by Wilder’s and Minty’s advancing troops, or it could have been a reaction to the increasingly nervous dispatches emanating from Buckner in Knoxville. No written orders from army headquarters are extant, but Hill clearly was told to send a brigade to reinforce the Thirty-Second/Forty-Fifth Mississippi at Blythe’s Ferry. Although the Blythe’s Ferry position belonged to Cleburne’s Division, Cleburne momentarily had no troops available to support Wood. Two of his remaining brigades, Polk’s and Deshler’s, had recently moved from Tyner’s Station southward several miles to Graysville and were too distant to be sent quickly. Cleburne’s remaining brigade, Liddell’s, was being detached to form an army reserve and was unavailable as well.¹¹

To support Cleburne, Hill ordered Alexander Stewart, whose division was camped near Tyner’s Station, to loan Cleburne a brigade. Stewart selected Clayton’s Brigade to reinforce Blythe’s Ferry. Clayton was the junior brigadier in the division, and his brigade, though large, was untested in serious action. Nevertheless, shortly after midnight, Clayton put his command on the road toward Blythe’s Ferry. Clayton was informed he would be attached temporarily to Cleburne’s command. The brigade was well on its way long before Wilder arrived opposite Chattanooga. Clayton’s men were unaccustomed to arduous road marches, so he was far short of Blythe’s Ferry when a courier reported that Federals had appeared opposite Blythe’s Ferry. Clayton accelerated his pace, further discomfiting his men, but soon received another message telling him the emergency had passed. Slackening his speed, he reached the village of Birchwood, four miles from the ferry, around sundown. Leaving his brigade there, Clayton continued forward with a section of guns. Far in his rear, other units from Cleburne’s Division were also moving to support the river defenses. Polk’s and Deshler’s commands moved north at sunrise from their camps around Graysville. In the lead, Polk reached Harrison at noon and halted there. Deshler followed an hour later and advanced a short distance beyond Harrison before stopping for the night. The remainder of Hill’s Corps spent the day cooking rations in preparation for instant movement. Later, in both his official report and his postwar writings, Hill took Bragg to task for being surprised on 21 August. The fact that three of his brigades were in motion by dawn of that day, before a single Federal soldier had appeared across the river, renders his charge invalid. Some of Hill’s foragers were surprised on the far bank of the Tennessee when Wilder arrived at midmorning, but their predicament reflects more on Hill than Bragg. No one knew where the Federals would appear, but their coming seems to have been at least partially anticipated by the army staff.¹²

Bragg reached Chattanooga from Cherokee Springs at the end of the day. One of his first acts was to order Anderson to leave Bridgeport and Shell Mound and fall back toward Chattanooga. Anderson received the order just as he was completing a report to Polk on his dispositions. Although most of his brigade was camped at Taylor’s Store, on the railroad a mile from the ruined bridge, he also guarded Cameron’s Ferry, plus Alley’s Ferry upstream toward Shell Mound. At Shell Mound itself he had stationed the Forty-First Mississippi Infantry regiment, which also protected Gardenhire’s Ferry just beyond Rankin’s Ferry. Caperton’s Ferry, below Bridgeport, he had left to Capt. John Hoge’s Company A, Third Confederate Cavalry regiment. Anticipating movement ever since he had learned of the bombardment of Chattanooga, Anderson in late afternoon readied his regiments to leave their camps at a moment’s notice. While the men packed their meager belongings, several officers struggled to evacuate their visiting wives via the railroad. At least one regiment developed contingency plans to destroy its baggage and cooking utensils if no train was available to carry the impedimenta to Chattanooga. Fortunately, a train arrived in time and the matériel was quickly loaded aboard. Anderson notified Polk that he would move toward Chattanooga via the hamlet of Whiteside, and around 9:00 P.M. the regiments at Taylor’s Store took the road toward Shell Mound. After they passed the Shell Mound depot, the Forty-First Mississippi followed, halting often to guard the rear while the remainder of the brigade stumbled forward in the darkness. Anderson’s men would march all night, most of them continuing through the canyon of Running Water Creek until they debouched into the much larger valley of Lookout Creek. From there it was only a short distance to Wauhatchie and a reunion with the remainder of the division. Left in place along the river were the now isolated companies of the Third Confederate Cavalry.¹³

Anderson’s move was only Bragg’s first response to the Federal bombardment. Next, he recalled Walthall’s Brigade from Atlanta. Walthall was to report to St. John Liddell at Chickamauga Station for assignment to a new divisional formation. Although Liddell had requested a transfer to Louisiana, Bragg had persuaded him to remain with the Army of Tennessee for one more campaign. As a reward, Liddell received command of a small division consisting of his own brigade and Walthall’s. Another circular placed Polk in command of all troops at Chattanooga, including Jackson’s Brigade. Next Bragg reviewed the army’s troop dispositions with his staff. From Roddey’s brigade at Tuscumbia to Forrest’s command at Kingston, Bragg’s army was draped across a 250-mile front. His infantry, however, was concentrated within the forty-mile stretch from Wauhatchie to Blythe’s Ferry, with the sole exception being Johnson’s Brigade at Loudon. Johnson served as a tenuous link to Buckner’s command, which added another seventy miles of frontage from Loudon to Cumberland Gap. It had long been obvious that Bragg could not hold the river line in strength with his limited forces. Nor, with his inadequate transportation and bridging assets, could he cross the Tennessee River to attack the Army of the Cumberland. Instead, Rosecrans would have to come to him. Therefore, Bragg believed he would have to wait for Rosecrans to commit the Army of the Cumberland to an axis of advance before the Army of Tennessee could respond. The response would be offensive in nature, but it could not be implemented until Rosecrans tipped his hand. Bragg would have to be patient for a while longer. The Federals were beginning to stir, but there might be time for reinforcements to arrive before they acted. Thus he sent a late evening telegram to Joseph Johnston in Mississippi: “Rosecrans and Burnside both moving on us in force. Artillery fired on the town to-day across the river; preparing to cross below. If able to assist us do so promptly.”¹⁴

Unaware of what was transpiring at Chattanooga, Simon Buckner was agitated by problems of his own. Certain that Burnside’s army was bearing down upon him, and painfully aware that his strength was inadequate to defend Knoxville and the railroads, he vigorously sought assistance. An earlier request to Mackall for guidance having produced nothing, Buckner asked Adjutant General Cooper if Samuel Jones, commanding in southwestern Virginia, might come to his aid. Knowing that Cooper would not reply immediately, Buckner telegraphed Mackall again. Plaintively, he asked Mackall to tell him which way to withdraw, either northeast toward Abingdon, Virginia, or southwest toward Loudon, Tennessee. With shells falling in the streets of Chattanooga, Mackall was too busy to respond. Verging on insubordination, Buckner again wired Mackall, tartly reminding him that his department had been subsumed into Bragg’s for the sole purpose of “concerted action.” In return, Buckner had received nothing but silence. Boldly, he threatened to go his own way, knowing that it was an empty threat. He closed by begging, “Please answer.” When nothing arrived from Mackall, Buckner resolved to act. Learning from Forrest of the Federal activity in the Sequatchie and Tennessee River valleys below Kingston, Buckner concluded that he had to move closer to Bragg’s army. Loudon, not Abingdon, thus would become Buckner’s base of operations. To that end, he began to assemble a mobile force of 7,000 troops near Knoxville. Gracie’s Brigade arrived during the day from Strawberry Plains. Single regiments were called to Knoxville from Hansonville and Glade Spring in Virginia. Even though he expected Big Creek Gap to be one of Burnside’s routes of advance, Buckner replaced its infantry garrison with cavalry. When the concentration was complete, only Frazer’s garrison at Cumberland Gap and Jackson’s railroad guards would remain in place. Finally, Buckner counseled the presidents of the East Tennessee & Georgia and East Tennessee & Virginia Railroads to remove their rolling stock to places of safety.¹⁵

Unaware of the turmoil he had created among his enemies, Rosecrans on 21 August maintained his usual routine. Rising late, he planned to handle correspondence until the middle of the day and then travel to Bridgeport to investigate potential crossing points. He wrote first to Thomas Crittenden, thanking him for his prompt movements and expressing the hope that Crittenden’s activities would attract Confederate forces posted downstream from Chattanooga. He then sent a brief message to Ambrose Burnside, suggesting that Burnside make contact with Crittenden’s troops in the Sequatchie Valley. Finally, he offered a tardy report of the previous day’s operations to the adjutant general’s office in Washington, predicting, “I think we shall maneuver to cross where they do not expect us.” Meanwhile, the army staff prepared for Rosecrans’s trip to Bridgeport by calling up the steam dummy for a noon departure from Stevenson and directing William Lytle to provide horses for the general’s party. Before departing, Rosecrans ordered George Thomas to investigate the possibility of capturing the Confederate steamer Paint Rock, which allegedly was stranded at a shoal below Chattanooga. Col. Caleb Carlton, commanding the Eighty-Ninth Ohio Infantry regiment at Tracy City, had reported during the night that a large number of crewmen from the Paint Rock had arrived with news that the vessel was stuck at a shoal known as the “Suck.” Vessels attempting to pass upstream usually needed to be warped past the “Suck” by using lines attached to capstans onshore. The crewmen, members of the First Louisiana Infantry regiment, told Carlton that the capstan system was broken, trapping the Paint Rock. Carlton’s news was out of date because the Paint Rock had already reached Chattanooga, only to be sunk later that day by Wilder’s artillery. Unaware of those developments, and anxious to gain a vessel to facilitate his crossing, Rosecrans asked Thomas to capture the vessel. He and his son Adrian then boarded the dummy with McCook and Stanley and headed for Bridgeport.¹⁶

At Bridgeport, six deserters from the Seventh Mississippi Infantry regiment crossed the river into the Federal lines early in the morning. They reported demoralization in their unit and stringent efforts by officers to prevent more desertion. They also stated that Joseph Johnston had arrived in Chattanooga with 10,000 reinforcements for Bragg. Not long thereafter, a flag of truce from Patton Anderson delivered two women to the waiting Federals. The ladies did not impress Lt. Alfred Pirtle, a native of Louisville, Kentucky: “The Mrs. Payne who came over today is some no body from down on Market St bet 9 X 10th. I don’t know anything about her. Miss Caruthers is a Rebel I suppose, but wants to get home even if it is in our lines.” In early afternoon the dummy arrived with Rosecrans and his party. Soldiers from Bradley’s command rushed to greet the generals until their officers, fearing a Confederate reaction, dispersed them. When Lytle and his staff joined the group, the party numbered more than twenty riders. The cavalcade then headed downstream to visit possible crossing sites. Approaching Cameron’s Ferry, Lytle and others heard a shot from across the river. They continued their ride until several more bullets whizzed past them, one almost hitting Adrian Rosecrans. Lytle feared the worst: “It occurred to me that the enemy might have thrown across the river a small cavalry force and the thought flashed across me that if old Rosey & McCook & Stanley should be bagged that I would be censured for not bringing along a stronger escort and catch the d—l generally!” Fortunately, the party soon encountered troopers of the First Tennessee (Union) Cavalry regiment who were picketing the area unbeknownst to Lytle. Rosecrans had seen enough and ordered the party back to Bridgeport. Exhilarated by his brush with danger, he made an impromptu speech to the assembled men, who wildly cheered him. Afterward, Cpl. William Austin of the Twenty-Second Illinois Infantry regiment recorded, “It was the first time I ever heard a cheer for Rosey. The soldiers love him in a different way. They praise him when he is away, and all the time, and there is not a man—a fighting man—in his army who would not rush into the jaws of death and rob it of its terror by their enthusiasm.”¹⁷

Upon returning to Stevenson, Rosecrans forwarded the latest information on Confederate activity to Washington. Some information came from the Mississippi deserters, but the bulk of Rosecrans’s news came from one of William Truesdail’s “scouts” named M. D. Thompson, who had just reported from Chattanooga. Thompson stated that Joseph Johnston was moving to Knoxville from Mobile with 25,000–50,000 troops. That startling information apparently came from Leonidas Polk, who was present where Thompson dined on the previous night. Polk, he claimed, said that a Confederate invasion of Kentucky would be the best way to counter Rosecrans’s advance. Thompson also seemed quite knowledgeable about Anderson’s Brigade and reported movement toward Bridgeport by units of Cleburne’s Division. Bragg’s order of the previous evening to prepare three days’ rations was also noted. Other tidbits of information included the caliber of the two heavy guns in Chattanooga, roadwork around Harrison, and the alleged location of Forrest’s cavalry at Sparta. Most important of all, Thompson stated that Bragg remained ill at Catoosa Springs. In his report to Washington, Rosecrans emphasized the Johnston and Cleburne movements. In fact, Johnston would only be asked by Bragg for reinforcements that very evening, so the Johnston reference represented only speculation. Similarly, Cleburne’s movement was simply the shifting of two brigades from Tyner’s Station to Graysville. Cleburne’s Division moved on 21 August, the day of Thompson’s report, but toward Harrison, not Bridgeport. As for Thompson himself, he probably was Michael D. Thompson, a young Chattanooga merchant who received permission from Federal occupation authorities in 1865 to open a public bathhouse in Chattanooga. Whoever he was, the fact that he reported events only a day old indicates that his transmission method was rapid. Most likely, the information was carried by train to Shell Mound and sent across the river by unknown means. Such a conduit would explain how Thompson knew so much about the troops guarding Bridgeport and far less about the other end of the Confederate line.¹⁸

While Rosecrans toured the front, his army continued to improve its position. In the Fourteenth Corps sector, Thomas moved his headquarters to the hamlet of Bolivar, between Stevenson and Bridgeport. Division commanders Brannan and Reynolds edged closer to the Tennessee River in accord with orders from army headquarters on the previous day. Brannan ordered Van Derveer’s Third Brigade to leave Sweeden’s Cove and occupy a new position at the mouth of Battle Creek. There Confederate pickets welcomed them with several rifle shots. There, too, Van Derveer’s son Harry saw a live Confederate for the first time. At the same time, Reynolds’s command marched five miles northeast to the village of Jasper. Nestled at the foot of the Cumberland Plateau, Jasper lay at the mouth of the Sequatchie Valley. Reynolds’s instructions were to find suitable sites from which to interdict the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad at Shell Mound. At Dunlap, twenty-five miles to the north, Crittenden nervously awaited information about the execution of the army’s deception plan. Wagner’s Second Brigade of Wood’s First Division withdrew from its vantage point overlooking Chattanooga late in the day and Hazen’s Second Brigade of Palmer’s Second Division descended to Poe’s Tavern on the far side of the ridge, but at Dunlap Crittenden knew virtually nothing of their movements. At Pikeville, twenty miles north of Dunlap, Van Cleve struggled with serious logistical issues facing both his own and Minty’s commands. At the other end of Rosecrans’s line, McCook’s Twentieth Corps still had not completed its concentration. Although Richard Johnson and his Second Brigade finally reached the hamlet of Bellefonte, the Second Division’s two remaining brigades still struggled to surmount the Cumberland Plateau. So did Long’s Second Brigade of Crook’s Second Cavalry Division. Deep in the army’s rear, the first Reserve Corps brigade to be called forward, Daniel McCook’s, left Nashville and halted for the night at Franklin, Tennessee.¹⁹

Although Patton Anderson attempted to keep his evacuation of Taylor’s Store and Shell Mound a secret, his departure was noted almost instantly by Federal units across the Tennessee River. Around midnight, Van Derveer’s sentries at the mouth of Battle Creek reported that the opposing infantry pickets had been replaced by cavalrymen. They also reported hearing heavy railroad activity beyond the river. On the morning of 22 August, Van Derveer promptly sent the report to Fourteenth Corps headquarters, but Thomas decided not to forward the information until he could hear from Reynolds, who was supposed to be in the process of interdicting Shell Mound. At Bridgeport, where heavy fog blanketed the river, several deserters from Anderson’s Brigade appeared early in the day. They announced that their unit had departed around 9:00 P.M. the previous evening, carrying three days’ rations, and was moving to Chattanooga. Lytle, who had been planning to send a flag of truce to protest the previous day’s picket firing, instead sent a detachment of sharpshooters from Bradley’s brigade across the channel to Long Island. Led by Lt. John Turnbull of Lytle’s staff, the Federals exchanged a few shots with members of the Third Confederate Cavalry regiment and later returned to the Federal shore with additional deserting Mississippians. Lytle reported the news of Anderson’s departure to Sheridan at Stevenson, who forwarded it to corps and army headquarters. Rosecrans probably would have returned to Bridgeport in response to the news, but the dummy had broken and momentarily was not available. Still, Anderson’s departure portended good things for the Federals if Rosecrans decided to cross the river in the vicinity of Bridgeport and Shell Mound. Meanwhile, Cpl. Edward Crippin of the Twenty-Seventh Illinois Infantry regiment summed up the attitude of the common soldier at Bridgeport in his diary: “Rebs left us alone in our glory last night. … They never so much as bid us good bye when they started. … Well let them go we will visit them shortly.”²⁰

During Rosecrans’s absence from headquarters on the previous day, private letters from Halleck and Lincoln had arrived at Stevenson. With the dummy broken, Rosecrans had time to respond on 22 August. The extraordinary content of the letters must have inflamed his mercurial temper. Halleck’s letter, dated 9 August, was a blunt attempt to end the wrangling between Rosecrans and the Lincoln administration. He denied that Stanton was hostile to Rosecrans but said that both Lincoln and Stanton remained unsatisfied with Rosecrans’s slow pace. In Halleck’s opinion, Rosecrans himself had largely created the problem: “In your official dispatches, as well as in your private notes, you seem to be laboring under the impression that the authorities here were making war on you. There never was a greater mistake. I know of no one here who has not the kindest and most friendly feelings for you. Nevertheless, many of your dispatches have been exceedingly annoying to the War Department. No doubt such was not your intention, but they certainly have been calculated to convey the impression that you were not disposed to carry out the wishes of the Department, at least in the manner and at the time desired.” Rosecrans’s response was equally blunt. First, he explained that his delays had been caused by the lack of a sufficient mounted force and the difficult terrain in which he was operating. In a passage that must have been especially galling, he compared the terrain Halleck faced during his brief advance on Corinth in 1862 to the far more daunting mountains and rivers encountered by the Army of the Cumberland. Asserting that his actions had the approbation of his senior officers, Rosecrans attacked the War Department for ignoring, with “contemptuous silence,” the recent achievements of his army. He believed he was utterly misunderstood by his superiors, Halleck’s protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. In a final rhetorical flourish, he gratuitously advised those superiors to try to grasp both his difficulties and his proposed solutions.²¹

Lincoln’s letter, dated 10 August, was couched in an entirely different tone from Halleck’s. He denied that he had lost confidence in Rosecrans, then explained how his own views had fluctuated over the summer as Grant’s campaign against Vicksburg waxed and waned. When Lincoln saw Johnston gathering a force to relieve the Vicksburg garrison, he urged Rosecrans to reduce Grant’s risk by attacking Bragg. When Vicksburg capitulated, Lincoln slackened his pressure on Rosecrans to advance. Then, when Rosecrans’s continued delays gave Johnston the opportunity to reinforce Bragg, Lincoln again urged Rosecrans forward. Yet when Rosecrans continued to resist, Lincoln admitted his own uncertainty: “The question occurs, Can the thing be done at all?” In effect, Lincoln begged Rosecrans to reassure him that the “thing” could indeed be done. He closed with some gentle yet fatherly words: “Do not misunderstand. I am not casting blame upon you. I rather think by great exertion you can get to East Tennessee; but a very important question is, Can you stay there? I make no order in the case; that I leave to General Halleck and yourself. And now be assured once more that I think of you in all kindness and confidence, and that I am not watching you with an evil eye.” In his response, Rosecrans ignored the president’s explanation and offered his own opinion of the relationship between Grant’s army and his own. He argued that Grant’s army now should assist Rosecrans by pinning Johnston’s army in place. After repeating the familiar litany of difficulties, Rosecrans once more sought the president’s indulgence: “Thanking you for your kindness, may I ask you, when impulsive men suppose me querulous, to believe I am only straightforward and in earnest, and that you may always rely upon my using my utmost efforts to do what is best for our country and the lives and honor of the soldiers of my command.” Nowhere in the letter did Rosecrans venture an opinion on Lincoln’s specific question; the president would have to be satisfied with his general assertion that he would do his best.²²

After his unpleasant correspondence with Washington, Rosecrans turned to what he considered more practical concerns. In a note to Burnside, he offered insight into his thinking about his future axis of advance: “Wish to cross below if not hindered. May try it above if enemy move to suit. You will be in good time.” The army staff meanwhile labored to improve the logistical infrastructure that would sustain the army’s leap across the Tennessee River. In increasingly brusque tones, Calvin Goddard queried Samuel Simmons, the army’s chief commissary, about his apparent inability to stockpile rations at Tracy City, where Twenty-First Corps wagon trains impatiently awaited them. Simmons was also pointedly asked when he was going to move his office from Nashville to Stevenson. Calls went out for more laborers to work at the expanding Stevenson logistical base, most notably to Col. Charles Thompson, who continued to organize his Twelfth United States Colored Troops at Estill Springs. William Innes and his deputy Kinsman Hunton received instructions to expedite boat construction by assembling millwrights and sawmill workers at Bridgeport and Stevenson. In one important area, a major personnel change occurred. St. Clair Morton, the army’s chief engineer, had been absent on sick leave for a month with “pustular opthalmia” and sought a permanent transfer from the Department of the Cumberland. Rosecrans disliked the eccentric Morton and recommended approval. As Morton’s paperwork began its journey to the War Department, Rosecrans appointed Capt. William Merrill of the Topographical Engineers to replace him and assigned Capt. Patrick O’Connell to command the Pioneer Brigade. Merrill immediately ordered O’Connell to detail a battalion to build a platform for quartermaster supplies at Stevenson. With as many as twenty trains per day unloading army supplies at Stevenson, Rosecrans ordered Gordon Granger to transfer two more assistant quartermasters to that post.²³

Action flared on the Tennessee River during the afternoon and evening of 22 August. Although Wilder’s men expected an early return to Stringer’s Ridge, he held them back while he visited George Wagner atop Walden’s Ridge. In midafternoon he finally sent the Seventeenth and Seventy-Second Indiana Mounted Infantry regiments and a section of Lilly’s Eighteenth Indiana Battery to show themselves along the riverfront. Around 5:30 P.M., Lilly again opened fire from Stringer’s Ridge, focusing his attention on the “heavy battery” on the terrace below the crest of Cameron Hill. That was the location of the thirty-two-pounder that had mortally wounded one of his men on the previous afternoon. The Confederate gunners replied, again with accuracy, but did no damage. In response, Lilly ordered his gunners to entrench their guns. After firing forty rounds, Lilly withdrew his guns at dusk to their secluded camp behind Stringer’s Ridge. Upstream at Harrison’s Ferry, more of Wilder’s units were also active. Palmer had returned to Dunlap, leaving Hazen in charge of the force at Poe’s Tavern. Unlike Palmer, who saw no value in random bombardments, Hazen instructed John Funkhouser to have the attached section of the Eighteenth Indiana Battery open on the Confederates. The gunners sent fifteen shots winging toward the distant earthworks with no discernible effect. Sharpshooters also traded shots with Confederate riflemen, claiming but unable to prove better results. Rather than waste more ammunition, Funkhouser withdrew from the river around 4:00 P.M. and returned to Poe’s. Palmer’s departure made Hazen the senior officer in the valley, and he acted accordingly. While most of his brigade foraged for beef or operated a small flour mill, he gathered a few volunteers for a daring attempt to cross the river and reach the distant railroad. Unlike Hazen, at Smith’s Cross Roads Minty did not again threaten the Confederates holding Blythe’s Ferry. In fact, he continued to fantasize about masses of Confederates sweeping down upon him from all directions. Minty dared only to send six scouts toward the river after dark.²⁴

Behind the deception units, there was activity as well. On Walden’s Ridge, Wagner pushed the remainder of his brigade forward to the rim of the valley. From that vantage point he not only could see Wilder’s camps far below but also had a panoramic view of Chattanooga and its environs. Watching the frenetic activity in town, Wagner tried to make sense of what the Confederates were doing. During the day, Wilder ascended the mountain to confer with the infantryman. Unaware that Garfield remained sick, both officers sent him messages agitating for more aggressive action. Wilder focused upon possible signs of the evacuation of Chattanooga, while Wagner proposed a quick strike across the river upstream to develop Confederate intentions. Wilder soon returned to his brigade and prepared to resume the bombardment of Chattanooga. Meanwhile, Wood arrived from his headquarters at Therman. Wood counted six distant plumes of smoke representing what appeared to be brigade camps, stretching from Kelly’s Ferry downstream to Harrison upstream. His locations were more or less correct, but his estimate of Confederate strength was too small by half. Still, any sizable Confederate movements in the Chattanooga area could be easily observed from Wagner’s perch. Such was not the case in the river canyon downstream, where Wood had sent a detachment to capture the Paint Rock allegedly trapped below the “Suck.” The Paint Rock, of course, was lying within view at the Chattanooga landing, sunk. Wood’s men were still on the way when cannon fire and a great light drew attention far downstream toward Shell Mound. There, Reynolds had sent two regiments and a section of guns from King’s Second Brigade to interdict the railroad. Just before midnight, four daring soldiers from the Seventy-Fifth Indiana crossed the river to burn a covered railroad bridge near the depot. Encountering Confederates on a similar errand, they succeeded in firing the bridge before escaping. The resulting noise and light were seen as far as Bridgeport, causing much speculation.²⁵

On Saturday night Rosecrans finally had some positive news to share with his tormentors in Washington. He described Wilder’s bombardment of Chattanooga on the previous day and confirmed that Anderson’s Brigade had left his front. He forecast success for Reynolds’s expedition to Shell Mound. Finally, he announced the arrival of the Pioneer Brigade at Stevenson with half of the pontoon train. Otherwise, there was no change in the army’s posture. In the Fourteenth Corps, the First Division around Anderson Station improved its camps and guarded the pontoons arriving by rail. In Negley’s Second Division, camped just outside Stevenson, several regiments spent the day chopping wood to fuel passing trains. John Beatty and his examining board meanwhile continued to examine soldiers seeking commissions in the United States Colored Troops. The First and Second Brigades of Brannan’s Third Division joined the Third Brigade at the mouth of Battle Creek. There, they found the pickets from the Third Confederate Cavalry regiment more amiable than Anderson’s Mississippians had been. Brannan’s men quickly took advantage of the truce to bathe in the river and exchange newspapers with the opposing sentries. In McCook’s Twentieth Corps, Davis’s First Division relaxed in its camps, writing letters home and swimming in Crow Creek. With the arrival of his First and Third Brigades, Johnson finally consolidated his Second Division at Bellefonte. In decline before the war, Bellefonte had been abandoned by most of its citizens before the Federals’ arrival. Absent property owners soon suffered serious depredations, and many of Jackson County’s irreplaceable documents were destroyed before the Thirty-Fourth Illinois Infantry regiment restored order as a provost guard. Far to the north, in the Sequatchie Valley, those units of Crittenden’s Twenty-First Corps not engaged in the deception operation entertained Unionist visitors at Dunlap and Pikeville or foraged to supplement their dwindling rations. Unable to get supplies from Tracy City, their leaders reluctantly began to send supply trains to McMinnville instead.²⁶

In Chattanooga, Wilder’s delay in resuming his bombardment permitted Bragg to take stock of his situation. His first thought was to seek reinforcements. Thus he wired Samuel Cooper, “Rosecrans has advanced in heavy force to this side of the mountains. Buckner reports Burnsides moving on him in force. Our line is too long for our present means. Is it possible to send us assistance? The town was raked yesterday by the enemys artillery from commanding heights across the river. This we cannot prevent. Very slight damage.” Before Cooper could reply, he received a message from Johnston in Morton, Mississippi, forwarding Bragg’s earlier request. Mired in a controversy over the loss of Vicksburg, Johnston was unwilling to assist Bragg without specific authorization from Richmond, asking, “Shall I help him?” A similar message soon followed: “General Bragg telegraphs that he will probably need help, as the enemy is threatening him. Should this be the case, am I authorized in sending it from this department?” Cooper’s reply was succinct: “By all means help General Bragg as far as you are able to do so.” Believing that Johnston had relinquished command temporarily, Jefferson Davis telegraphed Hardee, asking if he could assist Bragg. Hardee was in Demopolis, Alabama, organizing part of the paroled Vicksburg garrison. He immediately forwarded Davis’s query to Johnston for decision. Davis also telegraphed Bragg, “Have you batteries on the commanding heights? Can you attack one of the enemy’s columns by a combination of the main body of both yours so as to fight him in detail?” The president’s comments offered no solution to Bragg’s problems, but better news soon arrived from Johnston, who wired Bragg that he would be sending two divisions by rail. The divisions would move without wagons, which expedited the transfer but would further exacerbate Bragg’s transportation difficulties. Nevertheless, the two divisions, which represented half of Johnston’s infantry strength, would be a significant addition to Bragg’s army, if they could arrive before the Federal army advanced.²⁷

The only information reaching Bragg that morning was a report from Blythe’s Ferry that Federal cavalry had appeared upstream at Washington and Smith’s Cross Roads on the previous day. Thus Rosecrans’s forces were widely scattered across his front. In an effort to begin a dialogue with his newest corps commander, Bragg had Chief of Staff Mackall write to Harvey Hill. According to Mackall’s note, Bragg proposed “to await developments of the enemy and when his point of attack is ascertained, to neglect all smaller affairs and fall on him with our whole force.” Hill must have responded, in a message no longer extant, because later in the day Bragg wrote, “You and Gen. Cleburne both agree with my views and intentions. We must strike with our whole power as soon as the opportunity offers.” Without further indication of Federal intentions, Bragg was content to await developments. In the meantime, he acted to preserve the army’s assets. Because the hospital complex on Academy Hill had been struck, medical personnel began to evacuate patients to locations farther south on the Western & Atlantic Railroad. Similarly, the removal of military supplies from riverfront warehouses also commenced. After nightfall, engineers began to remove the army’s pontoons from the river before Federal gunners could destroy them. The previous day’s panic among the citizenry had not dissipated, and a growing procession of refugees left town for safer locales. Some even rented freight cars to haul away their possessions. Among those leaving were Leonidas Polk’s wife, Frances, and her two daughters. The remaining citizens rushed to gather extra stocks of food and other necessary items as more and more businesses closed their doors. Chattanooga’s own newspaper, the Daily Rebel, remained defiantly in place at its Market Street office, although publisher Franc Paul nervously sought a way to evacuate his printing plant from the town. The resumption of the Federal bombardment late in the day accelerated the exodus from Chattanooga by those who had no duty to remain.²⁸

An object lesson in the price of disobedience occurred during the afternoon when garrison commander John Jackson conducted a military execution. The condemned man was 1st Lt. William White, twenty-three, of the Fourth (ultimately Twelfth) Georgia Cavalry regiment. During the months of May and June 1863, he had encouraged several soldiers to desert, and on 14 June he deserted his post while on picket. He had then gone to Nashville and met with Federal officers, including Robert Granger of the Reserve Corps. He had then agreed to serve as a recruiting officer for the Federals in the territory just north of the Tennessee River near Jasper. During a sweep of the locality in mid-July by a raiding party from the Forty-First Mississippi Infantry regiment, White was captured. He eventually admitted all to his captors after being identified by local citizens and fully expected to be treated harshly. White was taken to Chattanooga, arraigned, and tried by military court. The charges were advising desertion, persuading soldiers to desert, quitting his guard, disobedience of a lawful order, and holding correspondence with the enemy. White pleaded not guilty, but the court convicted him on all charges and specifications, sentencing him to death by hanging. Bragg approved the sentence, to be applied between 10:00 A.M. and 2:00 P.M. on 22 August. A newspaper correspondent from the Augusta Chronicle witnessed the execution and admired White’s exceptional composure during the ordeal. Unfortunately, the hangman did not do his work well. As the correspondent reported, “The Rope failed to break his neck, and he died very hard—struggling for three or four minutes. It was a horrid sight.” White was not the first Army of Tennessee soldier to be executed in Chattanooga, nor would he be the last.²⁹

As Lieutenant White was meeting his end, thousands of soldiers in the Army of Tennessee prepared for action. In Polk’s Corps, Cheatham assumed responsibility for guarding the Chattanooga Creek railroad bridge, relieving Hindman’s troops. In exchange, detachments from Hindman’s Division relieved Cheatham’s men guarding railroad bridges west of Lookout Mountain. When the rearguard Forty-First Mississippi Infantry regiment rejoined Anderson’s Brigade at Wauhatchie, Hindman’s Division was at last complete. At Atlanta, Walthall’s Brigade, now assigned to Liddell’s new reserve formation, prepared to return to Chattanooga. Unwilling to go, at least fifty men deserted. In the brigade’s Twenty-Fourth Mississippi Infantry regiment, men planning a grand military ball in Atlanta saw their hopes dashed as trains arrived to transport them to the front. In Harvey Hill’s sector Federal activity was minimal. At Blythe’s Ferry, the Thirty-Second/Forty-Fifth Mississippi Infantry regiment saw only a few of Minty’s horsemen. Downstream at Harrison’s Ferry, the Thirty-Third Alabama Infantry regiment withstood a brief desultory bombardment but nothing more. Weary from their rapid march to Harrison on the previous day, Deshler’s and Polk’s commands remained in camp. Henry Clayton spent most of the day inspecting the defenses at Blythe’s and Doughty’s Ferries. He also seized a small steamboat and diverted it into the Hiwassee River. Concerned about what might be lurking upstream from Blythe’s Ferry, Clayton attempted to establish contact with Forrest’s cavalry by sending an infantry company beyond the unbridged Hiwassee River. Nowhere in his reports to Stewart and Hill did Clayton mention Sterling Wood, whose troops were already manning the river defenses from Blythe’s Ferry southward. Wood outranked Clayton by fifteen months, but Hill had placed Clayton in charge along the river, under the general supervision of Cleburne. For some reason, Wood was momentarily not in the chain of command.³⁰

As darkness fell in the Tennessee River valley, disturbing information reached the troops at each end of Bragg’s attenuated line. On the right, a message addressed to Wood from Col. Samuel Adams at Harrison’s Ferry reached Cleburne’s headquarters at Harrison. Cleburne was scouting along the river, and Wood was nowhere to be found, so Capt. Irving Buck of Cleburne’s staff forwarded the message to Hill. Adams reported that during a flag of truce exchange an officer had learned that the Federals were planning to cross the river in force that night. In response, Hill ordered Stewart to send Brown’s Brigade to Sivley’s Ford, the site mentioned by Colonel Adams. Stewart at 8:00 P.M. instructed Brown to move to the river, at the same time warning Bate to prepare to join Brown. While Brown’s men stumbled in the darkness toward Sivley’s Ford, Bate’s soldiers continued their camp meeting, with Rev. Benjamin Palmer as the featured speaker. Hill also wrote to Clayton at Birchwood, implying that Clayton’s main focus should be the countryside beyond the Hiwassee, an implication new to Clayton. Clearly, Hill’s command of the river line defenses showed some serious deficiencies on 22 August. The absence of Wood and Cleburne forced Hill to feed elements of Stewart’s Division into the defensive mix piecemeal. Clayton’s role and his authority were especially ambiguous. Fortunately, no Federal crossing materialized. The same could not be said at the other end of Bragg’s line. There, at Shell Mound, a very small number of Federal troops had indeed crossed the river and were burning a railroad bridge. Elements of the Third Confederate Cavalry regiment reported the incursion to guards at the Running Water Creek railroad bridge. From there, the telegraph carried the news to Hindman at Wauhatchie, who sent the report to Polk in Chattanooga around midnight. With so few troops immediately available, so many mountains intervening, and no clear picture of the extent of the Federal incursion, there was nothing for Bragg’s headquarters to do before dawn.³¹

In Knoxville, Simon Buckner continued the gradual evacuation of his department on 22 August. He had been abandoned by senior officers at Fort Donelson and had no desire to find himself in that position again. Therefore, even though no Federal soldier had yet penetrated the mountains in his front, Buckner was ready to abandon both Knoxville and its vital railroad connections. Having decided to concentrate his mobile forces nearer the Army of Tennessee, he needed only to establish the point of concentration. When Forrest informed him of Federal movements downstream near Washington, Buckner decided that Kingston should be his destination. Notifying Mackall, he explained that he was gathering Preston’s command at Knoxville and removing all infantry from Big Creek Gap. Like Bragg’s, Buckner’s field transportation was inadequate, and he begged Mackall for any spare wagons. During the afternoon, he informed Forrest that he had ordered Pegram’s Brigade from Winters Gap to join Forrest at Kingston. He further reported that his infantry was moving to Kingston and would travel at least ten miles in that direction by nightfall. In support of Buckner’s decision, Gracie’s Brigade changed its destination from Clinton to Kingston while on the march, halting for the night at Campbell’s Station. At least one battery of the Ninth Georgia Artillery battalion also joined the exodus from Knoxville. Elsewhere, the Fifty-Eighth North Carolina Infantry regiment withdrew from Big Creek Gap and the Fifth Kentucky Infantry regiment took a train from Abingdon for Knoxville. Buckner told Alfred Jackson, whose small command guarded the railroad link to Virginia, to hold his positions as long as possible, and then either withdraw toward Abingdon, Virginia, or into the North Carolina mountains. Realizing that Jackson’s instructions might sound defeatist, Buckner described them as only temporary expedients: “That you may understand fully, I will say there is no purpose of evacuating East Tennessee, but on the contrary it is proposed to defend it to the last.”³²

On Sunday, 23 August, the portion of Wilder’s command facing Chattanooga remained out of sight and the Eighteenth Indiana Battery did not return to Stringer’s Ridge. Wilder’s inaction was purely a function of his growing logistical problems. His brigade had left Cowan with only six days of rations and, even though foraging had been productive, items like sugar and coffee were now in short supply. Further, the expectation that he could draw supplies from Tracy City was proving problematic. Adding to the difficulty was the length of his supply line. Wilder had left his wagons at Therman when he had crossed Walden’s Ridge. Beyond Therman he relied on a train of pack mules with limited carrying capacity. Thus his supply line ran, in the best of circumstances, from Tracy City across the Cumberland Plateau on a narrow wagon road that descended steeply into the Sequatchie Valley at Therman. There the supplies had to be transferred to pack mules, taken up the western slope of Walden’s Ridge on the old Anderson Road, then brought down the eastern face of the ridge to Wilder’s camp at its foot. If there were no supplies at Tracy City, Wilder’s quartermaster and commissary officers had to descend the mountain to Cowan and draw their food and forage there. According to Wilder, commissary officers at Cowan previously had been unwilling to provide more than minimal rations for his brigade. The lack of a fully stocked depot at Tracy City was clearly beginning to affect operations. Compounding the problem was the fact that Lilly had expended over 300 rounds in two days of firing, a quarter of his basic load. To acquire rations, Wilder returned his pack train to Therman; to solve the ammunition shortage, he requisitioned 200 rounds of percussion shell, 200 rounds of fuse shell, and 1,000 friction primers for his guns. If the ordnance department could get the ammunition to Tracy City, Wilder stated that his men would move it the remainder of the way to the front. Pending resolution of his supply problems, he postponed further offensive action.³³

At Smith’s Cross Roads, Minty’s scouts returned at 3:00 A.M. on 23 August with the disturbing news that Confederates were crossing the river at Blythe’s Ferry and downstream at the mouth of Sale Creek. If true, the Sale Creek force would interpose between Minty and Hazen at Poe’s Tavern, seventeen miles to the south. If Minty did not act immediately, the Sale Creek force, the Blythe’s Ferry force, and Dibrell’s men would pin his small command against Walden’s Ridge and destroy it. In a brief note to Van Cleve, Minty explained that he was leaving for Poe’s Tavern at once. As Minty galloped southward, his courier reached Pikeville a little after 8:00 A.M. Alarmed that Minty was uncovering his front, Van Cleve dispatched Minty’s note to Twenty-First Corps headquarters at Dunlap. Crittenden, who had worried about the security of his corps for several days, demanded to know if Van Cleve had authorized Minty’s precipitous withdrawal. He stated unequivocally that Minty had acted “imprudently” and that he must either return to his old position or withdraw to Pikeville. Crittenden did not want Van Cleve’s two brigades at Pikeville to lack a cavalry screen, and Minty’s handful of horsemen represented all the mounted troops available. Denying that he had ordered Minty’s retreat, Van Cleve forwarded the corps commander’s instructions to the cavalryman. Minty meanwhile was hastening to get his brigade south of Sale Creek. Reaching that point, he found no Confederates at all, and must have realized that he had panicked unnecessarily. Soon he encountered Funkhouser’s Ninety-Second and Ninety-Eighth Illinois Mounted Infantry regiments. They had been sent upstream by Hazen, who was responding to deserters’ reports of rapid Confederate troop movements beyond the river. After calming the rattled Minty, Funkhouser returned to Poe’s Tavern. The entire incident was troubling, especially to Crittenden, who told Rosecrans, “I am much annoyed at this movement of Minty’s, as I deem it of the utmost importance that he should be with Van Cleve.”³⁴

At Stevenson, Rosecrans spent the morning pushing his staff to resolve several issues impeding the army’s preparations. Garfield was still too weak to sit up for more than three hours at a time, so the remainder of the staff bore the brunt of Rosecrans’s manic style of management. A prime concern was the slow arrival of pontoons. On the previous day Innes had complained that he could ship no more pontoons by rail until cars were unloaded and returned. Unwilling to accept blame, both Goddard and Bond alleged that Innes had not told anyone that the pontoons had reached the front. In addition, Innes was instructed to provide more locomotives for the line to Tracy City. Indeed, the Tracy City supply bottleneck caused others to receive chiding messages from the staff as well. Chief commissary Samuel Simmons was queried about the inadequate stocks at the Tracy City depot. Crittenden’s wagons waiting at Tracy City for food and forage found none there, yet Simmons had assured Rosecrans that 20,000 rations had been moved to the village. Thus Bond wanted to know the truth of the matter. The staff also continued to urge Simmons to move his office from Nashville to Stevenson, where he could more closely supervise the commissary officers at the front. In order to soften the peremptory tone of the messages, Drouillard asked Simmons to bring a supply of whiskey because “we are short and dry.” Another series of instructions assigned responsibility for defense of the line to McMinnville, which remained a critical supply node because of the Tracy City failure. When the Decherd quartermaster excitedly reported a recent raid on his post that cost him three men, Goddard dismissed the seriousness of the threat. Nevertheless, he instructed Stanley to rush a battalion of the Third Ohio Cavalry regiment from Cowan to Decherd. Upon receipt of Wilder’s request for artillery ammunition, Goddard told Thomas that he would send some projectiles to Tracy City as requested but suggested that they could sooner be procured from Reynolds at Jasper.³⁵

While his staff worked on logistical issues, Rosecrans concentrated on selecting the army’s specific crossing points. He had already visited the sites near Stevenson and had been told by Lt. George Burroughs, one of the army’s engineers, that Caperton’s Ferry was the best of the lot. He had also surveyed sites downstream from Bridgeport, and had briefly been under fire for his pains. The only site that met his approval in that sector was Bridgeport itself. Seizure of the vicinity would both provide a crossing site and protection for the railroad construction crews. Two infantry brigades of Sheridan’s division were at Bridgeport, supported by Daniel Ray’s Second Tennessee (Union) Cavalry regiment. The bulk of Rosecrans’s cavalry guarded the army’s right flank below Stevenson, but the Second Brigade of Crook’s Second Cavalry Division had just reached Stevenson and was available for assignment. Rosecrans sent it to guard the river from Bridgeport downstream to Cedar Bluff Ford (Cox’s Ferry), near Stevenson. He sent Ray’s Tennesseans to assist Reynolds’s troops covering the river upriver to Shell Mound. With Caperton’s Ferry and Bridgeport tentatively selected as crossing points, Rosecrans needed additional locations to expedite the army’s passage over the river. Therefore, he called again for the dummy to take him to Bridgeport. With McCook and Stanley as traveling companions, Rosecrans toured the country northward along the river. He rode as far north as the camp of the Seventy-Fifth Indiana Infantry regiment, which had raided Shell Mound on the previous night. As usual, Rosecrans paused and chatted amiably with the soldiers, who offered to share their evening meal with him. Declining their offer, Rosecrans returned to Bridgeport and the waiting dummy. He had not finished his examination of the area but had begun to form some idea of its suitability for additional crossing sites. Upon his return to Stevenson, Rosecrans instructed Thomas to improve the fords on Battle Creek, build a floating bridge across the same stream, and begin building flatboats at Jasper.³⁶

Around the army 23 August was a quiet Sunday. In the Fourteenth Corps, the First Division welcomed Absalom Baird, who replaced acting commander John Starkweather. In the Second Division, many soldiers attended religious services and endured the usual dress parade and inspection in the 90 degree heat. At Battle Creek, Third Division soldiers built arbors for shade or climbed the nearby mountain for a panoramic view of the river valley. At Jasper, Reynolds informed Thomas that he had destroyed the Shell Mound railroad bridge, unaware that even then Thomas was sending him instructions not to do so. His soldiers settled into camp around Jasper, described by Surgeon Josiah Cotton of the Ninety-Second Ohio Infantry regiment as “the most dilapidated town I ever saw.” In McCook’s Twentieth Corps, First Division soldiers passed the time swatting bugs and trying to keep cool in their sweltering camps along Crow and Mud Creeks. The Second Division continued to dismantle buildings and appropriate unclaimed items at the deserted village of Bellefonte. Meanwhile, Col. Hiram Strong of the Ninety-Third Ohio Infantry regiment successfully tested the unofficial truce that prevailed with the Third Confederate Cavalry’s pickets. At Stevenson, some Pioneer Brigade men unloaded pontoons while others stood inspection, attended preaching, or visited the sutler for twenty-five cent pints of beer. In the Twenty-First Corps sector, the Paint Rock expedition straggled back to camp without success, while the remainder of the First Division attended religious services or listlessly whiled away the day in its tents. At Dunlap, Second Division soldiers spent their time relaxing in camp and writing letters home. Crittenden attended the service conducted by the chaplain of the Thirty-First Indiana Infantry regiment. At Pikeville, the men of the Third Division, short of rations, were rescued by citizens offering to trade fruit for coffee, sugar, and salt. On the army’s right flank, the First Cavalry Division stood guard on the weed-choked Memphis & Charleston Railroad all the way to Huntsville. In the rear, Daniel McCook’s Reserve Corps brigade reached Spring Hill on its march to the front.³⁷

When Rosecrans returned to Stevenson, he found a message from Crittenden, as well as reports from Wagner and Palmer of their operations on Walden’s Ridge. Coupled with messages from Wilder, the reports gave Rosecrans a good understanding of the recent activities of the deception force. Believing that Innes and Simmons had solved the difficulties of getting supplies to Tracy City, he instructed Crittenden to use that depot for his sustenance. Rosecrans agreed that Minty’s behavior that morning was puzzling, but he was unwilling to censure Minty and did not worry about a Confederate attack in that quarter. Indeed, Rosecrans believed that Burnside’s advance would adequately cover his left flank in just a few days. He projected that Burnside would reach Jamestown, Tennessee, in forty-eight hours, and Jamestown was only sixty-five miles from Pikeville. Crittenden should have Van Cleve try to connect with Burnside, although Minty’s small command could hardly do that and simultaneously demonstrate on the river. Having assured Crittenden that all would be well, Rosecrans composed his daily report to the War Department. This time he addressed the report to Henry Halleck himself. In his summary Rosecrans placed great emphasis on the workings of the deception plan. He noted the occupation of Poe’s Tavern and again highlighted Wilder’s bombardment of Chattanooga. Rosecrans’s operations had forced the Confederates to spread their defenses from Washington in the north to Shell Mound in the south. The pontoons for crossing the river were being gathered, assembled, and otherwise prepared for the coming advance. In other words, Rosecrans was making legitimate progress and the next phase of the campaign would soon begin. He closed by repeating Wilder’s statement that a large number of locomotives were being towed out of Chattanooga. To Rosecrans, that fact alone bespoke the disarray in the enemy camp: “I think they are a little confused.”³⁸

In Chattanooga, Bragg did not consider himself confused. The bombardment of the previous two days and the inability of his artillery to respond proved to Bragg that Chattanooga itself was too vulnerable to serve as a base. Responding Davis’s telegram suggesting artillery locations, Bragg replied, “We have our batteries in all suitable positions but cannot save this town.” Thus, it was time to remove everything valuable, a process that had already begun. In midmorning, Bragg abandoned his offices at the Brabson residence on Fifth Street and moved to the home of Ely Bruce on Montgomery Avenue (now Main Street), a mile from downtown. It was also moving day for the army’s four hospitals: the Academy, Gilmer, Foard, and Camp Direction. After consultation with Medical Director Edward Flewellen, and the Chattanooga garrison commander, Surgeon Dudley Saunders, in charge of the Chattanooga hospitals, decided to evacuate them to Marietta, Georgia. Patients at the Foard Hospital left during the morning, but the convalescents at the Academy and Gilmer Hospitals remained a while longer to dismantle the hospital furniture and prepare it for shipment south. Initially, Camp Direction was to be part of the evacuation, but after everything was packed, Bragg ordered Saunders to reestablish it at Chickamauga Station with items from those hospitals leaving town. Camp Direction thus would remain open for a while longer, with a capacity of only 300 patients. The controlled chaos in the hospital department was replicated elsewhere in Chattanooga, as quartermasters and commissaries hastened to move their matériel to safer locations. Likewise, the post office and the telegraph office moved into temporary quarters in the suburbs beyond the range of the Federal guns. Finally, the outflow of private citizens continued as well, leaving the town to its military garrison. The Chattanooga Daily Rebel remained in its office on Market Street, although owner Franc Paul continued to seek a way to save his newspaper by removing it from town.³⁹

Throughout the day, all attempts to learn more of the Federal intentions were futile. While the disappearance of Lilly’s guns measurably facilitated the removal of military items from town, the absence of the enemy did not mean that Bragg’s army remained supine. Given the Federal activity around Shell Mound, Bragg decided to destroy the 780-foot covered railroad bridge spanning Running Water Creek near Whiteside. The task fell to Company B, Third Confederate Engineer regiment, covered by part of Anderson’s Brigade. The engineers destroyed the bridge, set the wreckage ablaze at 10 A.M., and returned to Wauhatchie. There they found Hindman’s Division under orders to return to the east side of Lookout Mountain. The division moved at 5:00 P.M. and continued during the night, leaving the Twenty-Eighth Alabama Infantry regiment of Manigault’s Brigade to block the narrow road over the lower slopes of the mountain. In Hill’s Corps troops were also active. Lucius Polk’s Brigade of Cleburne’s Division left its temporary bivouac at Harrison and marched upriver several miles to the vicinity of Thatcher’s and Campbell’s (Gardenhire’s) Ferries, where it occupied a new position on the river. In Stewart’s Division, Brown’s Brigade reached Sivley’s Ford well before daylight. While his men slept, Brown explored his surroundings. Finding no fortifications in place, he requested an engineer to lay out some works but was told that the only available engineer had gone to Blythe’s Ferry, at the other end of the corps line. Meanwhile, Bate’s Brigade continued its revival services at Tyner’s Station, with Reverend Palmer again the featured speaker. Scheduled to last all day, the afternoon services were canceled when orders arrived for the brigade to break camp. In late afternoon Bate’s Brigade marched five miles to Boyce Station, on the Western & Atlantic Railroad near a bridge over South Chickamauga Creek. There, Bate would be within supporting distance of Brown’s position at Sivley’s Ford. Finally, Walthall’s Brigade arrived at Chickamauga Station from Atlanta to become part of Liddell’s Division.⁴⁰

Bragg’s actions materially changed the Army of Tennessee’s center of gravity. The destruction of the Running Water Creek bridge signaled that he was conceding the mountainous terrain west of Chattanooga to the Federals. The withdrawal of Hindman’s Division east of Lookout Mountain centered Polk’s Corps more compactly on Chattanooga. Most of Cheatham’s five brigades were either in town or nearby. At least two brigade commanders, Smith and Maney, were absent. Hindman’s three brigades were immediately on Cheatham’s left, at the eastern foot of Lookout Mountain. Hill’s Corps, which had previously occupied camps around Tyner’s Station, Chickamauga Station, and Graysville, now had moved to the Tennessee River to increase troop density there. In Cleburne’s Division, Wood’s and Polk’s Brigade manned the river defenses as far north as Blythe’s Ferry, while Deshler’s Brigade remained in reserve at the village of Harrison. Several of Cleburne’s brigade commanders were also absent or indisposed, notably Lucius Polk and Sterling Wood. Stewart’s Division had Clayton’s Brigade at Birchwood and Brown’s Brigade at Sivley’s Ford, with Bate’s Brigade nearby at Boyce Station. Stewart’s fourth brigade, Johnson’s, had long been absent at Loudon, guarding the railroad to Knoxville. Forced out of Chattanooga, the army’s supply depot was reconstituted at Chickamauga Station on the Western & Atlantic Railroad. There it was guarded by Liddell’s newly formed Reserve Division of two brigades. In sum, Rosecrans’s deception activities had caused Bragg to contract his line downstream of Chattanooga and significantly strengthen it upstream. The Federal gambit also exposed fractures within Hill’s Corps, with Hill scrambling command relationships by introducing Clayton’s Brigade into Cleburne’s sector with an ambiguous charter. Hill’s initial response to the crisis clearly indicated that he had not yet mastered the intricacies of corps command in a new and different theater of war.⁴¹

Running Water Creek trestle after 1864 reconstruction. (National Archives)

In Knoxville, Buckner’s evacuation of his department continued on 23 August. That day Adjutant General Cooper notified Buckner that there would be no assistance forthcoming from Samuel Jones’s adjacent department. Jones, whose primary mission was to safeguard the salt-making facilities at Saltville, Virginia, thought it imprudent to reduce his garrison to assist Buckner, and Cooper chose not to overrule him. Buckner therefore once more telegraphed Mackall in Chattanooga. He reported that Burnside would probably advance via Jamestown, Tennessee, in cooperation with Rosecrans’s army. Without revealing the source of his information, Buckner boldly stated that Rosecrans would cross the Tennessee River north of the Hiwassee. Burnside was too strong for Buckner to oppose alone, but if Buckner and Bragg united before Burnside and Rosecrans did, a Confederate victory might be gained over Rosecrans. In fact, if events developed as Buckner expected, his command would represent the right of the Army of Tennessee. He noted in closing that the gathering of his mobile force was almost complete. Indeed, such was the case. On that day, Gracie’s Brigade advanced a few more miles on the road to Kingston, while most of Trigg’s Brigade marched from Knoxville to occupy Gracie’s old camps near Campbell’s Station. Scattered regiments, like the Fifty-Eighth North Carolina Infantry at Jacksboro and the Fifty-Fourth Virginia Infantry at Bell’s Bridge, also converged on Knoxville to join the units momentarily pausing around Campbell’s Station. Additional batteries of the Ninth Georgia Artillery battalion departed Knoxville and took the road to Kingston as well. Behind them, in circumstances that mirrored events at Chattanooga, quartermasters struggled to evacuate military supplies from the city. Still in Knoxville, Buckner met with William Preston and offered him command of the mobile force at Campbell’s Station. Preston previously had only led a brigade, but Buckner expected the mobile force to number 8,000 troops, and that would require a division commander.⁴²

Buckner had many reasons to nominate Preston to division command. A product of the Kentucky gentry, Preston, forty-six, not only shared Buckner’s Kentucky heritage and worldview, but he was extraordinarily well connected. Obtaining a law degree from Harvard College in 1838, he built a prosperous practice in Louisville until the outbreak of the Mexican-American War. Although unexceptional, his war service smoothed Preston’s entry into politics. Elected first to the Kentucky legislature, then to the U.S. Congress, in 1858 he was selected by James Buchanan to be the American ambassador to Spain. Like many other Kentuckians of his class, Preston chose to serve the Confederacy in 1861. His eldest sister had been Albert Sidney Johnston’s first wife, facilitating his appointment as Johnston’s aide with the rank of colonel. Promotion to brigadier general followed, dating from 14 April 1862. A few days later Sidney Johnston’s son, William Preston Johnston, a frequent visitor in the Preston home, joined Jefferson Davis’s military staff as an aide. Preston commanded a brigade during the Army of Tennessee’s retreat from Corinth, and there began his criticism of Bragg. Thereafter, he served briefly in the division of John Breckinridge, a distant cousin. Detached with Kirby Smith during the Kentucky campaign, Preston once more commanded a brigade in Breckinridge’s Division at Stones River. He performed gallantly during Breckinridge’s disastrous attack on 2 January but thereafter became heavily embroiled in the controversies wracking Bragg’s army. Even William Preston Johnston, his nephew in Richmond, noted that “Uncle William” was a ringleader in the opposition to Bragg. His high profile in the anti-Bragg camp contributed to his transfer to southwestern Virginia in late April. Not long afterward, his old brigade departed for Mississippi. Banished to one of the war’s backwaters, Preston saw Buckner’s offer of division command as the rescue of a declining career.⁴³

Not only was Preston rejoining Bragg’s army but so was Breckinridge. True to his promise to both Davis and Bragg, Joseph Johnston on 23 August began to transfer two of his four divisions in Mississippi to Chattanooga. Johnston selected Breckinridge’s Division, consisting of the brigades of Daniel Adams, Benjamin Helm, and Marcellus Stovall, and three brigades of Walker’s Division, commanded by Matthew Ector, States Gist, and Claudius Wilson. For the moment, John Gregg’s Brigade of Walker’s Division would remain in Mississippi. As of 20 August, Breckinridge’s Division had an aggregate present strength of 5,797 officers and men. The aggregate present strength of Walker’s four brigades was 8,812 officers and men, so the contingent going to Tennessee could not have been less than 6,000 troops and was probably somewhat larger. Johnston was giving Bragg six of his eleven infantry brigades, although Breckinridge’s Division had been part of the Army of Tennessee until loaned to Johnston in May. Given that Bragg’s aggregate present infantry and artillery strength on 20 August was only 39,486 officers and men, the nearly 12,000 troops sent by Johnston represented a large reinforcement. The preferred route of travel, however, was long, approximately 700 miles via Mobile. It involved seven railroad companies, two gauge changes, and a ferry trip across Mobile Bay. Johnston had promised that troops would begin to leave Morton, Mississippi, on the afternoon of 23 August, but the first detachment, from Walker’s Division, did not depart for Chattanooga until well after dark. He expected the transfer to take at least five days. On the same day, Claudius Wilson, one of Walker’s brigadiers, agreed with Johnston’s estimate, writing to his wife, Kate, “But I must bring this letter to a close and go to packing up. I did not start with the intention of writing a letter but only a note to inform you of our change of base. I expect to be in Atlanta about the 28th and expect to meet a letter from you there.”⁴⁴

Although they had no idea how events would unfold, the soldiers of both armies could clearly see that a major campaign was about to open. On Sunday, 23 August, many men took the opportunity to express their emotions in letters home. Cheered by successes in other theaters, the men of Rosecrans’s army were confident of ultimate victory. Thus Lt. Augustus Carpenter of the Nineteenth United States Infantry regiment told his parents, “A month hence if I mistake not will tell a tale. Whether it be for weal or woe time will show. I think by that time no armed force of rebels will prowl around this department and perhaps many of us will fall in fierce engagements which must inevitably follow.” Still, the sacrifice would be worth the price. Another junior officer, Lt. Montraville Reeves of the Seventy-Ninth Illinois Infantry regiment, made his resolve clear when he wrote to his brother, “I think I would be willing to serve and if nessesary sacrifise my life on the soil of the Southern States to shield the soil of Illinois from the dreded tramp of an army.” Bragg’s men wrote in similar vein. From the camp of the Eighth Texas Cavalry in Rome, Georgia, Lt. Frank Batchelor told his wife that his unit did not fear the coming battle: “The Confidence of our Army is still unshaken in Genl Bragg—and with equal chances we are not afraid to see him measure length with Genl Rosecrans or any one else from Yankeedom.” Far less sanguine was Cpl. Ezekiah Rorie of the Thirty-Second Mississippi Infantry regiment. Rorie only recently had seen a “wild Yank” for the first time, but he expected to see many more soon and wanted to prepare his family for what might happen: “Dear Mother if it is the Lord’s will that I should fall in this battle I beg of you to bear it without misgivings reclicking [recollecting] that many a neighboring mother have borne the same and that your lot is not harder than others. … You dear mother will console and sympathize with my wife and little ones and my brothers and sisters will do the same reminding them that they once had a father that loved them dearer than his life.”⁴⁵