11

 

FINAL PREPARATIONS

» 24–27 AUGUST 1863 «

 

On Monday, 24 August, Rosecrans began the final week of campaign preparations with an attempt to resolve a major logistical issue. A shortage of railroad equipment had developed as a result of Rosecrans’s expedited accumulation of supplies at the Stevenson railhead. For some time staff officers had been canvassing the army’s rear and adjacent commands for additional boxcars, but now the need was for additional locomotives. The obvious source of relief was Grant’s Department of the Tennessee, which used river transportation primarily and was not then involved in an active campaign. On 24 August Rosecrans authorized Goddard to query Grant in hopes of securing at least five or six engines. At the same time Goddard wrote to Capt. Charles Parsons, Grant’s St. Louis quartermaster, also asking for locomotives. Grant had both locomotives and cars to spare, writing to Parsons on 10 August that he controlled “about one hundred locomotives and fifteen hundred cars of all classes.” Grant was willing to share his surplus but circumstances conspired to prevent Rosecrans from profiting from Grant’s generosity. Parsons had no spare locomotives at St. Louis, and Rosecrans’s message apparently did not reach Grant’s Vicksburg headquarters until 2 September. By that time Grant had gone to New Orleans, where his horse fell on him, severely injuring his thigh. In Grant’s absence, the request would bounce from desk to desk among staff officers until 10 September, when Grant’s railroad superintendent admitted that he could indeed spare six locomotives if ordered to do so. Grant would not return to Vicksburg until 16 September and even then remained in great pain. Rosecrans’s request thus received no action for more than three weeks, far too late to bring relief to the hard-pressed William Innes. Relations between Grant and Rosecrans had long been cool at best, but in this instance more mundane factors seem to explain Grant’s failure to assist a fellow department commander in a timely manner.¹

Other problems facing Rosecrans on 24 August were equally vexing but more susceptible to solution. Supply of Twenty-First Corps units in the Sequatchie Valley continued to be difficult, causing Rosecrans to write to chief commissary Samuel Simmons about the issue once more. This time the problem was at McMinnville, where Crittenden had reported only partially filled requisitions, even though Simmons claimed warehouses there contained 200,000 rations. Previously, Tracy City had been the problem, but now Wood was instructed to draw his supplies from that source instead of McMinnville. Only the easy availability of forage and the friendliness of the Sequatchie inhabitants was keeping Twenty-First Corps units adequately supplied. Crittenden’s corps also came to Rosecrans’s attention in another context. Rosecrans had finally learned of Minty’s ignominious flight from Smith’s Cross Roads and was displeased not only with Minty but also with Crittenden, Minty’s supervisor. To stiffen Crittenden’s resolve, Rosecrans instructed Captain Drouillard to reiterate to the corps commander that he alone would be held responsible for Minty’s accomplishing his mission. Crittenden should not worry, because Burnside’s small army was approaching and would soon make contact with his troops at Pikeville or Smith’s Cross Roads. He also authorized Crittenden to draw some supplies from Bridgeport, if McMinnville proved inadequate as a depot. In a separate message, Drouillard instructed Crittenden to open communication with Reynolds, whose two brigades lay at the mouth of the Sequatchie Valley near Jasper. With the construction of a good bridge over Battle Creek, an easy supply route from Bridgeport all the way through Jasper to Pikeville would become a reality. The army’s left thus would be tied to its center and its logistical needs met, if necessary, without recourse to either Tracy City or McMinnville.²

Rosecrans next looked to his right and rear, where the key commander was Gordon Granger of the Reserve Corps. On 24 August Rosecrans clarified Granger’s existing orders and issued new ones. Granger already was charged with securing the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad, but, lacking cavalry, he had to use foot soldiers for the task. Rosecrans wanted reconstruction of the railroad from Nashville to Decatur, Alabama, to continue, but not at the expense of the protection of the N&C. Granger had placed James Morgan and two of his brigades on the Decatur line, with Tillson’s First Brigade stationed at Columbia and Daniel McCook’s Second Brigade scattered from Columbia northward rebuilding railroad bridges. Now Rosecrans instructed him to push one of the brigades south to Athens, Alabama, with all possible haste. If a crossing of the Tennessee River was to be effected safely, Granger’s Reserve Corps would have to prevent the Confederates from interfering either with the Stevenson supply base or the crossing itself. For the long term, reconstruction of the line from Nashville to Decatur was highly desirable. That route, when linked with the Memphis & Charleston Railroad from Decatur to Stevenson, and the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad from Stevenson to Nashville, would greatly increase capacity by permitting one-way traffic to the front. Loaded trains could go directly to Stevenson and empty trains could be routed back to Nashville via Decatur. At least, that would be possible when the Decatur line was completed. At the moment, security of the N&C and the army’s far right flank was paramount, and Granger’s corps was spread widely to accomplish his mission. James Steedman, new commander of Granger’s First Division, covered the triangle of territory between Murfreesboro, Shelbyville, and Cowan with his three brigades. Most of Morgan’s Second Division was on the railroad to Decatur, while Robert Granger and his Third Division held the remainder of Middle Tennessee, including the army’s Nashville base.³

Apparently Rosecrans had intended to return to Bridgeport and survey more potential crossing sites that day, but for some reason he did not make the trip. His brief visit to the area earlier had been insufficient to select additional crossing sites upstream from Bridgeport. In preparation for Rosecrans’s return, Frank Bond issued warning orders for commanders to prepare for Rosecrans’s arrival at Bridgeport. Security had been a problem a few days earlier, when Confederate pickets had fired on the general and his party. Therefore several companies of Rosecrans’s escort, the Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry regiment, were sent to Bridgeport. Rosecrans, however, apparently remained at his Stevenson headquarters all day immersed in minutia. He instructed Calvin Goddard to write to the post commander at Cowan: “The General Commanding directs you to assume command of the convalescents at Cowan and see that they are kept under proper discipline. Consult with the surgeon in charge and require the performance of such duty as they are able to perform.” Another message from Goddard had large consequences for one soldier. Pvt. Henry McLean, nineteen, of Battery C, Second Illinois Light Artillery regiment, had been convicted of desertion in the spring, and his execution scheduled for the next day at Fort Donelson. In response to a query from Col. Arthur Smith, temporary post commander, Goddard wrote, “In the absence of Col. Lyon, you will of course carry sentence against Private McLean into execution.” The appeal to Rosecrans was McLean’s last hope, and he was executed by musketry on the following day. Private McLean’s impending fate was not mentioned when Rosecrans made his daily report to Halleck. In it, he announced no changes in the position of his units and stated that nothing had been heard from Burnside. He closed by gratuitously asking, “Would like to know if Grant is to do anything to occupy Johnston’s attention.” Such a brusque query would be bound to elicit a response, whether Rosecrans meant to do so or not.⁴

Along the river 24 August was another day of activity. Wilder’s ammunition shortage precluded another shelling of Chattanooga, although companies continued to scout openly along the river. Pvt. Alva Griest of the Seventy-Second Indiana Mounted Infantry regiment worried that the Confederates would discover just how few Federals were in front of the town: “If they know our numbers we would have to vamous I think.” Lilly’s gunners rejoiced in the arrival of a pack mule laden with sugar, coffee, and whiskey. In a report to army headquarters, Wilder correctly located the Confederate corps facing him, noting the large amount of train traffic, and the presence of many wagons in Chattanooga’s streets. Upriver, Hazen sent the Ninety-Second Illinois Mounted Infantry regiment to the river’s edge opposite Harrison’s Ferry and again bombarded the Confederate positions. After agitating their opponents, the Federals returned to camp, visiting Igou’s Ferry, upstream from Harrison’s, on the way. Still farther upstream, Minty remained at Sale Creek feeling the heat of official displeasure. During the day he tried to deflect criticism by reporting that he had kept scouts at Washington and Blythe’s and Doughty’s Ferries since his arrival in the valley. He wrote, “I was under the impression that I was using a good deal of vigilance,” and he promised to have 150 troopers at Smith’s Cross Roads by nightfall. Far downstream from Chattanooga, men of King’s brigade engaged Confederate cavalry pickets and continued to pound the Shell Mound railroad station into rubble. At Bridgeport, several companies of the Thirty-Sixth Illinois Infantry regiment crossed the channel to Long Island for a brief reconnaissance. When the Confederate pickets contested the move, Lytle’s artillery opened on them, “causing much scatterment,” in the words of Pvt. Edward Tabler of the Fifty-First Illinois Infantry regiment. Finally, from Bridgeport southward as far as the river’s great bend beyond Guntersville, Stanley’s Cavalry Corps guarded the river, interacting daily with Confederate pickets on the far side.⁵

In the Fourteenth Corps, Thomas reported that he had bridged Battle Creek, the Confederates had probably destroyed the Running Water Creek railroad bridge, and artillery ammunition had been dispatched to Wilder. In the First Division, gathered near Anderson Station, Absalom Baird formally assumed command. Soldiers in Negley’s Second Division, camped just outside of Stevenson, noted that 103 pontoons were stockpiled in their area, with others arriving daily. In the Eleventh Michigan Infantry regiment of Stanley’s Second Brigade, officers treated their men to a barrel of beer in honor of the regiment’s second anniversary. Beer also flowed in Sirwell’s Third Brigade, offered by the sutler of the Thirty-Seventh Indiana Infantry regiment. Lt. Robert Dilworth of the Twenty-First Ohio Infantry regiment noted with disgust that his captain, Charles Vantine, was drunk on duty. In Brannan’s Third Division at Battle Creek, Medical Director Moody Tolman began to issue quinine to sick men because no whiskey was available. Pvt. Mungo Murray of the Thirty-First Ohio Infantry regiment of Connell’s First Brigade wrote his sister expressing great confidence in the “ever-victorious” Rosecrans, and declaring that “this army has yet to learn defeat.” Notwithstanding firing heard from both Bridgeport and Shell Mound, Sgt. Axel Reed of the Second Minnesota Infantry regiment of Van Derveer’s Third Brigade swam halfway across the Tennessee River and conversed freely with Confederates on the far bank. At Jasper, in Reynolds’s Fourth Division, the men of the 105th Ohio Infantry regiment of King’s Second Brigade discarded their battered forage caps for much more practical slouch hats. At Tracy City, where he remained nominally part of Turchin’s Third Brigade, Col. Caleb Carlton of the Eighty-Ninth Ohio Infantry regiment unburdened himself in a letter to his wife: “I hope while we are detached to get transferred to some other Brigade and Division for I have but little respect for Reynolds and none for the ‘Gallant German Marauder Turchin.’”⁶

In McCook’s and Crittenden’s commands, there was little for the men to do but make themselves as comfortable as possible in the hot, muggy atmosphere. Davis’s First Division of the Twentieth Corps remained in its camps just west of Stevenson, where the temperature reached 94 degrees. Sidney Post, commanding the First Brigade, held a convivial dinner party in honor of the visiting wives of two officers. At Bellefonte, Johnson’s Second Division continued to enjoy the excellent foraging and fishing around that abandoned town. The Thirty-Fourth Illinois Infantry regiment of Dodge’s Second Brigade guarded the remaining records of Jackson County, salvaged from the wrecked courthouse. Men in the Twenty-Ninth Indiana Infantry regiment memorialized Pvt. John Grover, accidentally killed by a friend while the two wrestled with a musket. At Bridgeport, during the evening some officers of the Fifty-First Illinois Infantry regiment serenaded others with a popular new song, “When This Cruel War Is Over.” At Stevenson, the Seventy-Third Illinois Infantry regiment finished storing its knapsacks in preparation for a move. In the Sequatchie Valley, Twenty-First Corps commander Crittenden continued to fret about Minty’s retreat and his vexing supply situation. In Wood’s First Division, the foraging remained profitable around Therman. In Wagner’s Second Brigade, miscreants from the Ninety-Seventh Ohio Infantry regiment absconded with several sheep collected by the brigade’s artillerymen. The two brigades of Palmer’s Second Division at Dunlap were delighted to receive their first mail since leaving Manchester. Hazen’s Second Brigade, meanwhile, lay in its camps around Poe’s Tavern, supporting Wilder’s and Minty’s horsemen. Hazen himself wrote disdainfully to corps headquarters that Minty had run from a Confederate scouting party of only 100 men. At Pikeville, Van Cleve also chided Minty gently: “I trust by this time you have returned to your first position at the crossroads, and that you will be able to watch the movements of the enemy from that point.”⁷

At Chattanooga, the fog obscuring the river valley eventually burned away, leaving few Federals visible on the far bank of the river. At Bragg’s headquarters no new information arrived indicating what the Army of the Cumberland might do. Federals could be seen in varying numbers from Guntersville, downstream from Chattanooga, to Washington, far upstream. Shelling had occurred at Shell Mound, Chattanooga, and as far north as Harrison’s Ferry. Federal soldiers were known to have made at least one brief foray across the river, at Shell Mound. The screen provided by the mountains and river made Rosecrans’s intentions momentarily as opaque as the morning fog. The only significant movement seemed to be northeast of Chattanooga, where Buckner was withdrawing from Knoxville. Thus, Bragg and his staff tended to focus on Buckner’s movements. As Buckner seemed to be moving south along the East Tennessee & Georgia Railroad toward Loudon, Bragg ordered Bushrod Johnson to leave Loudon when Buckner’s troops arrived and move closer to Chattanooga. For Bragg, the major news on 24 August was a telegram from Joseph Johnston in Mississippi. Johnston announced that he was sending an effective force of 9,000 infantry and artillery to Chattanooga. Although Johnston claimed the movement had begun on the previous night, it would take at least four more days to get the last units started from Morton. Johnston was adamant that Bragg not consider the transfer of Breckinridge’s and Walker’s Divisions permanent: “This is a loan to be promptly returned.” Such an attitude seemed churlish on Johnston’s part because Breckinridge’s command had belonged to the Army of Tennessee until loaned to Johnston several months earlier. Nevertheless, reinforcements were coming, with the Eighth Georgia Battalion of Gist’s Brigade and the Thirtieth Georgia Infantry regiment of Wilson’s Brigade departing Morton for Tennessee that evening.⁸

One of the division commanders leaving Mississippi was delighted to be departing. Already a controversial character, Maj. Gen. William Henry Talbot Walker, forty-six, would soon inject even more discord into the senior leadership of Bragg’s command. Born into a prominent Augusta, Georgia, family in 1816, Walker was an 1837 graduate of West Point, forty-sixth in a class of fifty that included Bragg and Mackall. Slight of build, asthmatic, and academically weak, Walker nevertheless by the time of the Civil War had made a strong reputation as a combat officer. Wounded at least three times in the Second Seminole War and again severely at Molino Del Rey, “Shot Pouch” Walker seemingly lived only to fight. He had chafed during long stints on recruiting duty and other peacetime postings that had included commandant of cadets and tactics instructor at West Point. Married into a prominent Albany, New York, family, he nevertheless offered his services to the South in late 1860. Thereafter, he had floated in and out of the general officer ranks in both Confederate and Georgia state service, but each time he had resigned in a fit of pique over some perceived slight. Reinstated as a Confederate brigadier in March 1863 and posted to the District of Georgia, he and his brigade had participated in the Vicksburg campaign under Johnston. Only lightly engaged in the battle of Jackson, he nevertheless had been promoted to major general and divisional command on Johnston’s strong recommendation. Widely known for his bellicosity and exaggerated sense of honor, Walker was a man of the strongest passions. Shortly after his arrival in Chattanooga, he told his eldest child to instruct her siblings, “Tell them I want them to grow up hating the Yankee nation more & more every day & I don’t want any cousining or uncling any Northern kin. That is played out. This revolution has d——the nation for ever in my eyes.” Incapable of cloaking his opinions to play army politics, Walker would bring his particular brand of candor to the army at whatever level he was allowed to occupy.⁹

Walker’s three brigades had only served together since June. The senior brigadier was States Rights Gist, thirty-two, a native of South Carolina. Born at the height of the Nullification Crisis, Gist was a privileged member of upcountry South Carolina society. A graduate of Harvard Law School, he rose to prominence as an attorney and militia officer by the end of the 1850s. State adjutant general in 1861, he was an aide at First Manassas. Named brigadier general in March 1862, he commanded a brigade on the Atlantic coast until May 1863, when it was called to reinforce Johnston in the Vicksburg campaign. Col. Claudius Charles Wilson, Walker’s second brigade commander, was not a professional soldier. Born in Georgia in 1831, Wilson attended Emory College, then read law and quickly became a prominent attorney in Savannah. In September 1861 he was elected colonel of the Twenty-Fifth Georgia Infantry regiment. Thereafter he saw coastal duty until the spring of 1863. Traveling with Walker’s Brigade to Mississippi, he rose to brigade command when Walker was promoted. A sensitive man, Wilson, thirty-one, was well liked by his men, even though, like Gist, his combat experience was minimal. In contrast, the third brigade commander, Matthew Duncan Ector, forty-one, had seen a great deal of fighting by September 1863. Born in central Georgia in 1822, Ector was an attorney and legislator in his native state until 1849. After the death of his first wife, he moved to Texas and resumed his legal and political career until 1861. Enlisting as a private in the Third Texas Cavalry regiment, he fought at Wilson’s Creek and Pea Ridge. Elected colonel of the Fourteenth Texas Cavalry (Dismounted) in the spring of 1862, he led his unit at the battle of Richmond in the Kentucky campaign. Promotion to brigadier general followed in September 1862, as did brigade command in October. The unit was heavily engaged at Stones River in December. Transferred to Mississippi for the Vicksburg campaign, Ector’s Brigade would now be returning to the Army of Tennessee.¹⁰

If Walker brought increased volatility to the army’s officer corps, John Cabell Breckinridge brought malice. Born into a prominent family in Lexington, Kentucky, in 1821, Breckinridge eventually received a law degree from Transylvania University. After a brief sojourn in Iowa, he returned to Lexington and gravitated into Democratic Party politics. Late in volunteering for the Mexican War, he saw no action. Nevertheless, that limited service and a talent for oratory fueled his meteoric rise through the Kentucky state legislature and the U.S. Congress to the vice presidency in the Buchanan administration. Elected to the Senate, he simultaneously became the presidential nominee of the Southern wing of the fractured Democratic Party. In the fall of 1861 fear of arrest drove him into the Confederacy. Commissioned brigadier general, he took command of the First Kentucky Brigade. His first action came at Shiloh, a week after an unexpected command change elevated him to command the division-sized Reserve Corps. There he led his three brigades ineptly, but his conspicuous personal courage rescued his reputation. Promoted to major general, he joined Van Dorn in Mississippi in the summer of 1862. Sent to capture Baton Rouge, he gained the town but relinquished it when naval support failed to materialize. Learning of a proposed thrust by Bragg into Kentucky, Breckinridge sought to join it. Bragg was amenable, but Breckinridge’s unwillingness to go without his troops ensured that he would not arrive before the campaign ended. By now soured on all things Kentuckian, Bragg found Breckinridge’s delays unsatisfactory. Thereafter, the execution of a Kentucky deserter, the anti-Bragg activities of a Breckinridge staff officer, and a questionable performance at Stones River made Breckinridge’s break with Bragg irremediable. Thereafter he made common cause with Bragg’s enemies until his transfer to Mississippi in May 1863 separated the two antagonists. Now Breckinridge, forty-two, would be rejoining his nemesis.¹¹

Brig. Gen. Benjamin Hardin Helm, thirty-two, commanded Breckinridge’s beloved Kentucky Brigade. The son of a Kentucky governor, Helm was born in Bardstown, Kentucky, in 1831. Graduating from the United States Military Academy in 1852 and commissioned in the dragoons, he resigned after a year because of poor health. Thereafter he became a practicing attorney in his native state. Spurning a commission offered by his brother-in-law, Abraham Lincoln, Helm organized and commanded the First Kentucky Cavalry regiment in 1861. Promoted to brigadier general after Shiloh, he commanded a brigade at Baton Rouge until badly injured when his horse collapsed. After a long recuperation, he took command of the Kentucky Brigade in February 1863. Breckinridge’s second brigade commander was Brig. Gen. Daniel Weisiger Adams, forty-two. Born in Frankfort, Kentucky, in 1821, he grew to manhood in Mississippi, where he read law and killed a man who slighted his father. Acquitted of murder, Adams built a legal and political career in New Orleans. Joining the First Louisiana Regular Infantry regiment in early 1861, he commanded it by September. Heavily engaged at Shiloh, he assumed brigade command until a head wound cost him his left eye. Promoted to brigadier general in May 1862, he led a brigade at Perryville and again at Stones River, where he was wounded in the left arm. Upon recovery, “Old Pelican” and his Louisiana brigade followed the division to Mississippi. Breckinridge’s third brigade commander was Brig. Gen. Marcellus Augustus Stovall, forty-five. Born at Sparta, Georgia, in 1818, Stovall participated in the Second Seminole War as a militiaman at the age of seventeen. Appointed to West Point in 1836, he withdrew after one year for reasons of health. Thereafter he worked as a merchant in Augusta and Rome, while maintaining strong ties to the Georgia militia. Chosen lieutenant colonel of the Third Georgia Infantry battalion in late 1861, he led that unit for more than a year in East Tennessee. Transferred to Bragg’s command, Stovall’s strong showing at Stones River gained him promotion to brigadier general in April 1863.¹²

The Federal lethargy, which permitted Johnston to reinforce Bragg, led to much speculation about Rosecrans’s plans. Relying upon information received from Chattanooga on 24 August, the Memphis Daily Appeal opined that the Federal activity at Bridgeport represented Rosecrans’s true intentions, while the upstream movements were only a diversion. Pvt. John Magee of Stanford’s Mississippi Battery was certain that either way, Chattanooga would have to be evacuated, a sentiment shared by Bragg. Others disagreed, and indeed there was a lessening of tension in the town on 24 August. Polk ordered Maney’s and Smith’s Brigades of Cheatham’s Division to withdraw from the waterfront to their camps behind the town. Similarly, Cheatham’s pickets downstream were also withdrawn, to be replaced by Hindman’s men. When Hindman asked for clarification of his duties on the river, Polk refused to act without specific approval from Bragg. Meanwhile, Hindman’s three brigades completed their march over the tip of Lookout Mountain, leaving a lone regiment to guard the road into Lookout Valley. In Hill’s Corps, one commander took the initiative without waiting for orders. Henry Clayton at Blythe’s Ferry had already assumed command in the sector, had stopped the steamboat Holston from heading upstream, and was building a bridge over the Hiwassee River at Bunker Hill. Clayton’s strong actions displeased the Holston’s captain, who escaped and resumed his journey upriver. They also displeased Cleburne, who complained to Hill about Clayton’s impertinence. At Chickamauga Station, Liddell absorbed the First Louisiana Infantry regiment into his old brigade, now commanded by Col. Daniel Govan. That night, Franc Paul, publisher of the Chattanooga Daily Rebel, bribed a railroad engineer to move his newspaper out of town. Loading his primary press, stocks of newsprint, and most of his staff on two cars spotted behind his office on Market Street, Paul departed for Marietta. Left behind were three employees and a small press to continue reporting the news from the beleaguered town.¹³

Simon Buckner was momentarily still in Knoxville, although many of his mobile units had already begun to depart. In the faint hope that he might still get assistance from Richmond, Buckner plaintively wired Adjutant General Cooper, “Is it not possible to re-enforce me?” Probably not expecting a positive answer, he continued to abandon his former department. Originally he had planned to concentrate at Kingston, but now the village of Loudon, thirty miles southwest of Knoxville, seemed to be a better place, so he directed his troops toward that point. Loudon was the site of a massive railroad bridge on the East Tennessee & Georgia Railroad. Thus Buckner ordered Archibald Gracie, commanding the infantry gathering at Turkey Creek, to march to Loudon. There Gracie was to confer with Bushrod Johnson, whose brigade had been guarding the Loudon bridge since July. In addition to his own brigade, Gracie’s force included Trigg’s Brigade, which was composed mostly of Floridians. To avoid the heat of the day, Gracie’s and Trigg’s men began their march at dusk. Also in motion were the Fifty-Eighth North Carolina Infantry regiment and the Sixty-Fifth Georgia Infantry regiment, withdrawing from the mountain passes to the west, and the Sixty-Third Virginia Infantry regiment, coming by rail from Saltville. The Sixty-Third Virginia belonged to Samuel Jones’s department, but Buckner had gained its services by promising to give Jones some dismounted cavalry. Writing to Forrest, he again offered to place Pegram’s Brigade under Forrest’s control. Scott’s Brigade was still at Lee’s Ferry on the Clinch River, guarding one of the main roads to Knoxville. Buckner instructed Pegram to cooperate with Forrest and maintain contact with Scott. Telling Pegram that Rosecrans was simply waiting at Smith’s Cross Roads for Burnside to arrive before advancing on Knoxville, he promised to give Pegram divisional command. As Pegram and Scott were sworn enemies, there could only be trouble with such an arrangement, if adopted.¹⁴

Early on 25 August a cold front swept across the Tennessee River valley, producing rain and falling temperatures. The previous day had been hot and muggy, but now men clutched their blankets closer as they stood around smoky fires. Unpleasant weather did not alter Rosecrans’s plans for the day. By late morning, when he took the dummy to Bridgeport, the rain had stopped, but the temperature remained disagreeable. At Bridgeport, Rosecrans met several escort companies and headed upstream to survey potential crossing sites. The cavalcade proceeded first to Brannan’s camps, where Rosecrans visited men of the Eighty-Seventh Indiana Infantry regiment. He then crossed Battle Creek and rode to the Shell Mound ferry, where occasional shots were exchanged every day with Confederate pickets. Stopping at the camp of the Seventy-Fifth Indiana Infantry regiment, Rosecrans and his party cautiously advanced to a position where they could view the river. After concluding that the Shell Mound area would suffice, Rosecrans and his retinue rode to Reynolds’s headquarters at Jasper. While Rosecrans and Reynolds chatted, a message from Secretary of War Stanton arrived, reporting that Fort Sumter was in ruins and that the Federals were beginning to bombard Charleston itself. Elated, Rosecrans ordered Reynolds to assemble nearby regiments for an impromptu speech. According to a witness, Rosecrans declared, “Charleston! where they first fired on the American flag—where this rebellion began—I want to see it reduced to ashes—I want to see the old flag which waved over it in April ’61 and which the Presidt. has carefully preserved, raised again over Fort Sumter by the hands of Gen’l. Anderson.” Before leaving Jasper, Rosecrans told Reynolds to spread the glorious news to all of his units. Reynolds complied, awakening many soldiers who had spent a backbreaking day unloading supply wagons. Rosecrans meanwhile returned to Bridgeport and the waiting dummy. It was well past midnight when he arrived at Stevenson.¹⁵

During Rosecrans’s trip to Shell Mound and Jasper, the flow of orders from army headquarters at the “Little Brick” in Stevenson slowed to a trickle. Garfield was still unwell and sent only one routine message on 25 August. Goddard, who had handled Garfield’s business during his illness, ordered the Cowan commander to send forward the army’s cattle herd escorted by a cavalry company. Otherwise, Goddard sent only two more messages, seeking some mess furniture lost in transit from Nashville. Drouillard wrote to Brannan, offering prefabricated trusses to rebuild the bridge over the Sequatchie River. Thoms denied Crittenden’s request to bring Van Cleve’s Second Brigade forward from McMinnville because loyal Tennessee units forming in the army’s rear were not yet ready. Thoms also instructed Crittenden to gather all the rations he could carry, in preparation for a general advance. On the same day, Chief Quartermaster Henry Hodges answered a query from Quartermaster Gen. Montgomery Meigs. Rousseau’s proposal to recruit a new mounted division had been rejected in Washington, but Stanton had agreed to mount Rousseau’s existing division if the army’s bureau chiefs agreed that it could be done without difficulty. Like Halleck, Meigs opposed the idea, and he had asked on 17 August if the Department of the Cumberland had enough mules to mount Rousseau’s command. In office less than a week and consumed with supporting the army’s impending advance, Hodges answered Meigs’s request only on 25 August. He acknowledged that 5,409 mules were at the Nashville depot but indicated that he had no capacity to provide the number needed to mount a full division. Meigs had quarreled with Rosecrans before, over horses, and was unwilling to support a scheme in which he had no faith. Thus the bureaucratic tug of war continued, even as Rousseau began his return to the army. Horace Porter may have had Meigs in mind when he wrote his mother dismissively about rear echelon officers who were in “the ‘not-another-man-or-another-dollar conspiracy.’”¹⁶

On the long riverfront, the Federals remained quiescent for yet another day. John Wilder continued to await the arrival of artillery ammunition, which finally appeared late in the day. Meanwhile his regiments facing Chattanooga continued to send parties to the river, where they traded shots with the opposing pickets. The Seventy-Second Indiana Mounted Infantry regiment scouted Friar’s Island, a potential crossing site north of Chattanooga. Several deserters from the Sixteenth Tennessee Infantry regiment reported that Bragg would soon retreat from Chattanooga and that they expected a Federal crossing at Harrison’s Ferry. Upstream, two companies of the Ninety-Second Illinois Mounted Infantry patrolled along the river, and a few scouts from the Ninety-Eighth Illinois Mounted Infantry regiment did the same. They all reported nothing to have changed, although there seemed to be suspicious activity among the troops at Harrison’s Ferry. Like the regiments below them, John Funkhouser’s Ninety-Second and Ninety-Eighth Illinois contented themselves with moving short distances to better camps or brought forward critical supplies. Hazen’s infantrymen remained peacefully in camp at Poe’s Tavern but remained ready to support Funkhouser if necessary. Atop Walden’s Ridge, Wagner pushed his brigade back to the rim of the valley, where he monitored Confederate railroad activity in Chattanooga. Impatient to begin the advance, Wagner expressed his frustration at the slow pace of the campaign in a report to army headquarters. North of Poe’s Tavern, Minty’s small brigade sheepishly returned to Smith’s Cross Roads from Sale Creek. That evening Minty cautiously pushed the Fourth Michigan Cavalry regiment toward the village of Washington. Even at the downstream sites of Shell Mound and Bridgeport, nothing of note occurred, with only an occasional rifle shot disturbing the peace. Thus the lull established several days earlier continued along the river dividing the two armies.¹⁷

As Rosecrans surveyed potential crossing sites, his soldiers waited in their camps for the order to advance. Near Stevenson, Pioneer Brigade engineers continued building the quartermaster platform at the depot and drilled on their pontoons. During the day planking was loaded aboard wagons for transport to the river, and additional men were detailed to the pontoon companies. Far in the rear, at Estill Springs, soldiers from the First Michigan Engineers and Mechanics cut and shaped heavy timbers for bridging until a rainstorm temporarily halted their work. In the Fourteenth Corps there was little activity during the day, but signs of an impending move continued to appear. In the First Division, Lt. Howard Burnham assumed command of Battery H, Fifth United States Artillery regiment, while in the Twenty-First Wisconsin Infantry regiment an officer left for home, absconding with his company’s morale fund. The 104th Illinois Infantry regiment in the Second Division was detailed to cut wood to fuel the voracious engines endlessly passing their camp. Lt. Eben Sturges Jr. of Battery M, First Ohio Light Artillery regiment, spent the day studying the German language and reading newspapers. In the Twenty-First Ohio Infantry regiment, Capt. Charles Vantine was drunk for a second day, and the regiment received orders to surrender its tents, a sign of imminent movement. Increased daily roll calls in the Seventy-Eighth Pennsylvania Infantry regiment also portended a change in the unit’s location. At Battle Creek, the Third Division reduced baggage, issued extra shoes, and loaded rations into wagons. Meanwhile, three men of the Second Minnesota Infantry regiment swam across the river and visited the Confederate pickets. A trickle of Confederate deserters made the crossing in the opposite direction. In the Fourth Division, although much of his day was taken up with unloading wagons, Cpl. Alanson Ryman of the Sixty-Eighth Indiana Infantry regiment still found time to send his wife some apricot seeds and his daughter a handmade ring. Everywhere, the apparent good news from Charleston boosted morale.¹⁸

Elsewhere in the army, men filled the time in a variety of ways as they awaited the opening of the campaign. In the Twentieth Corps, soldiers in the First Division foraged unsuccessfully for peaches, played cards, and completed paperwork, while regimental bands serenaded division commander Davis and his wife. At Bellefonte, many of the Second Division’s regiments drew rations. A disturbing trend, however, was the growing sick list. Sickness was also spreading in the Third Division, especially in the two brigades at Bridgeport. Stanley’s cavalrymen did not seem to suffer the same maladies as their infantry counterparts and thus were able to concentrate on preparing themselves for action. Men in the First Wisconsin Cavalry regiment at Larkinsville received a shipment of revolvers, while the Third Ohio Cavalry regiment acquired new supplies of beans, soap, and candles. In the narrow Sequatchie Valley, where nothing but mountains could be seen on all sides, the Twenty-First Corps also impatiently awaited the order to move. Except for Wagner’s and Hazen’s men, Crittenden’s soldiers received no news of what was transpiring elsewhere in the army. Thus, First Division regiments busied themselves with mundane tasks like rigorous drills. In the Second Division, men in the First Kentucky Infantry regiment received a welcome ration of potatoes, while a detail from the Ninetieth Ohio grumbled about being assigned to road repair. With so much time on their hands, grumbling became especially rampant in the Eighty-Fourth Illinois Infantry regiment, where the men strongly disliked their brigade commander, whom they considered a petty tyrant. Division commander Palmer wrote his wife in Illinois about the old-fashioned clothes worn by the local civilians. Even deeper in the mountains, Van Cleve’s two brigades had little time to comment on their surroundings, as the men were engaged in either heavy foraging or escorting supply trains crawling over the Cumberland Plateau to McMinnville.¹⁹

The cold front that made 25 August so disagreeable for the Federals also cast its pall over Chattanooga. Braxton Bragg was up early, summoning Hill to his headquarters for a conference. Hill received the message at 5:30 A.M. and left his own headquarters at the Chickamauga Creek bridge to ride to Bragg’s office at the Bruce house on the edge of Chattanooga. While unknown, the subject of their discussion most likely involved the situation on Hill’s right flank. With Buckner sounding the alarm daily about Burnside’s approach and the presence of Minty’s horsemen around Smith’s Cross Roads, a major collaboration between the two Federal forces was certainly possible. If such proved to be the case, Hill’s command would represent Bragg’s first line of defense. Because Cleburne was absent inspecting the Hiwassee River sector, Hill left Stewart in charge of the corps while he was at Bragg’s. There is no indication that Polk attended the Bragg-Hill conference. At any rate, Polk was unworried about recent events. In his first letter to his wife after her departure, Polk downplayed Federal activity, writing, “It is yet doubtful what Rosecrans purposes are. I think he will do nothing hastily. For your satisfaction I may inform you that we are to be reinforced from Johnston’s army. These reinforcements are now on the way, and I think will be in time for our operations without doubt. The force promised will aid us greatly and put things easy.” If George Brent’s diary entry for 25 August is a true indication of Bragg’s thinking on that day, the army commander’s focus was primarily on Buckner’s situation. When a telegram arrived from Buckner describing Burnside’s progress toward the gaps in the Cumberland Plateau, Bragg’s concern for his right flank grew. Buckner’s sources were adamant: “All speak of it as a move concerted with Rosecrans.” According to Brent, Bragg surmised that a small group of Federals had already crossed the Tennessee River far upstream from Chattanooga, and he advised Buckner to concentrate his forces and cross the river into the Federal rear.²⁰

Another matter of substance crossed Bragg’s desk on 25 August. The Army of Tennessee’s chief of subsistence, Maj. Giles Hillyer, offered a gloomy report on his department’s inventory and a dire prediction for the immediate future. According to Hillyer, he had three depots of his own and could also draw upon depots at Loudon and Atlanta in times of extreme need. His projection for September was startling: “After supplying the army to August 31, inclusive, I shall have on hand in bacon, salt beef, and lard, 900,000 rations; fresh beef none; breadstuffs, 1,100,000 rations; rice and pease, 3,000,000 rations; sugar, 150,000 pounds; vinegar, 1,200,000 rations; soap, 3,000,000 rations, salt, 4,500,000 rations; molasses, 300,000 rations.” Hillyer believed he had sufficient quantities of bread, rice, peas, soap, salt, and vinegar to sustain the army indefinitely. Unfortunately, Hillyer’s depots had only enough bacon and beef to last until 15 September. Maj. Robert Wilson at Loudon could only provide an additional five days’ supply of meat each month, while Maj. James Cummings at Atlanta reported that the needs of the Army of Northern Virginia had first priority on his limited stocks. Hillyer stated that he was trying to procure cattle in northern Alabama but expected to acquire no more than 700 head, only three days’ supply. Some bacon could be found in the same area, but the Mobile commissary officer would probably reserve the bacon for the Mobile garrison. Hillyer based his projections on the army’s current strength (without the augmentation from Johnston’s command) and the allocation of only one-third pound of bacon per daily ration. The latter amount already was causing discontent within the army; to reduce it further would risk massive demoralization. Hillyer concluded, “Upon the whole, general, I can see no reasonable expectation to feed the army with meats beyond the last of September.” In response, Bragg authorized Hillyer to seize all beef cattle in the vicinity of the army. He also forwarded Hillyer’s report to Commissary Gen. Lucius Northrop, who suggested only that Bragg assume the offensive.²¹

The gloomy weather, troubling supply situation, and virtual evacuation of the town made Chattanooga an unhappy place on 25 August. All connections to the outside world, such as the post and telegraph offices, had moved to the distant suburbs days earlier. The Tennessee state records that had followed Governor Isham Harris to Chattanooga had also been removed. Yet life still flickered in the town’s newspaper, the Daily Rebel. Although the publisher, the main press, and most of the staff had departed, the remaining employees managed to publish an abbreviated edition on 25 August. Writers Henry Watterson and Albert Roberts and printer Henry Sparks published a one-page War Bulletin of the Rebel on that day and remained defiant. Indeed, the Rebel, even its truncated form, was essentially the only remaining public institution in what the paper labeled a “war camp.” In florid prose, Watterson described how the bustle of commerce had disappeared from the streets, replaced by the dash of cavalry and the rumble of artillery batteries. Still, in Watterson’s view, Chattanooga could withstand the worst that Federal guns could inflict upon it: “Rack on and do your worst, Rosecranz and gang, mongrel, puppy; whelp and hound. The mountains are on fire! There are freemen in the crags. There are rifles among the pines.” As for news, the Rebel reported that three Confederate cavalrymen watering their horses on the riverfront that morning had been killed by Federal sharpshooters. It also described how the body of a Federal officer allegedly killed on the previous day was finally removed, although Wilder’s command listed no such casualty. Speculating about the future, the paper cited current rumors that Rosecrans had no intention of crossing in force at Bridgeport but intended to move northward to join Burnside advancing upon Knoxville. Perhaps reflecting the opinion of Confederate headquarters personnel, Watterson stated, “At all events, the impression prevails that if a general engagement takes place at all, it will occur in upper East Tennessee, between this point and Knoxville.”²²

Still, some Confederate units were in motion. Hindman’s Division marched across Chattanooga Valley to McFarland’s Spring at the western foot of Missionary Ridge. On Hill’s front, men in the Thirty-Third Alabama Infantry regiment at Harrison’s Ferry improved their works, while Federal sharpshooters harassed them ineffectively. Nearby, soldiers in the Seventeenth Texas Cavalry regiment went fishing after their opponents disappeared upstream. Eighty-five miles to the northeast, Gracie’s and Trigg’s Brigades entered Loudon after a grueling night march. There they met division commander William Preston, who arrived from Knoxville by train. Buckner remained momentarily at Knoxville, although the bulk of his staff departed for Loudon. With the departure of all other units, only the Sixty-Third Virginia Infantry regiment remained with Buckner. Hoping to coordinate cavalry movements, Forrest rode from Kingston to Loudon but was disappointed to find Buckner still in Knoxville. The arrival of most of Buckner’s units at Loudon freed Johnson’s Brigade to march six miles down the railroad toward Charleston. Several hundred miles to the southwest, Morton, Mississippi, saw even greater activity as more units of Walker’s Division entrained on the first leg of their journey to Chattanooga. Also departing Morton were the first elements of Breckinridge’s Division. With Breckinridge absent on leave, Helm supervised the division’s departure. Like Walker’s men, Breckinridge’s Division was forbidden to bring any of its wagons. To conserve scarce railroad cars, the division’s artillery horses were to be driven overland via Rome. With even regiments departing Morton piecemeal, the chaotic movement would severely test the capabilities of several railroad companies. The original plan to send everyone via Mobile would soon prove unworkable, to be supplemented by a rail-water route through Selma. The longer the Federals delayed their advance, however, the more of Johnston’s men would be able to join Bragg before the great battle occurred that everyone was expecting.²³

Rosecrans returned from his reconnaissance to Shell Mound and Jasper at 2:00 A.M. on Wednesday, 26 August. There he found Halleck’s response to his poorly phrased question regarding potential assistance from Grant’s Department of the Tennessee. While acknowledging that Burnside had been instructed to cooperate with the Army of the Cumberland, Halleck made it clear that Rosecrans would get no help from the west: “Grant’s movements at present have no connection with yours.” Although not explicitly acknowledged, the impact of that decision by Halleck was to free Johnston in Mississippi to send troops to reinforce Bragg if the Richmond authorities so desired. When he resumed business much later in the day, Rosecrans made no further reference to Grant’s lack of movement. Given the unfriendly relationship between the two department commanders, perhaps Rosecrans had not expected much aid and was hardly disappointed. Supremely confident in his own abilities and those of his army, he had long been prepared to conduct the coming campaign on his own. Rosecrans did request Halleck to provide a replacement for St. Clair Morton, who remained absent on sick leave. With major engineering tasks ahead, Rosecrans believed Capt. William Merrill of the Topographical Engineers was too busy with his mapmaking, Lt. George Burroughs was too junior in rank and experience, and Capt. Patrick O’Connell had his hands full managing the unruly Pioneer Brigade. With the river crossing imminent, there would not be time to get a replacement for Morton to supervise that operation, so Rosecrans would have to assume that responsibility himself. As a commander with strong tendencies toward micromanagement of the smallest details, Rosecrans was certainly comfortable with that situation. Nevertheless, appointment of a chief engineer with appropriate rank and experience would materially assist an army commander engaged in active operations in the enemy’s country.²⁴

A welcome augmentation to the staff occurred on 26 August with Garfield’s return to duty. During the day he ordered the arrest of a citizen named Samuel Love, a mail carrier and ferryman in the Shell Mound neighborhood who had been denounced by his pro-Union neighbors. Removal of Love made a crossing at Shell Mound more secure, if Rosecrans needed it as one of his crossing sites. Garfield also telegraphed the U.S. marshal at Nashville, explaining that the army would be taking possession of the machinery at Brannon’s Foundry for railroad purposes and that Colonel Innes would provide the proper receipts. Finally, Garfield queried Lytle at Bridgeport about artillery firing, which proved to be Reynolds at Shell Mound covering the removal of flatboats from the far side of the river. Goddard wrote to Grant’s St. Louis quartermaster, seeking all the flatcars, boxcars, and passenger cars he could spare. In an effort to resolve Crittenden’s supply difficulties, Goddard decreed that Wood’s and Palmer’s divisions should draw their rations from Tracy City, while Van Cleve should continue to draw from McMinnville. Goddard directed Thomas to have Brannan detail two regiments to report to Bridgeport with axes for the purpose of cutting bridge timbers. Finally Goddard telegraphed Innes in Nashville regarding three passenger cars Rosecrans had ordered modified for transporting sick and wounded soldiers. Other staff officers were also busy. Bond asked Brannan about improving the Battle Creek bridge. Thoms told Sheridan to have Lytle renovate a derelict sawmill to produce lumber for bridge decking. Thoms also telegraphed Granger to be prepared to move forward to cover the army’s rear very soon. Granger was especially instructed to prepare Tennessee cavalry units forming at Carthage for movement to McMinnville, where they would relieve Van Cleve’s Second Brigade. Finally, 1st Lt. Henry Cist, a recent addition to the army staff, notified both Steedman and the Murfreesboro quartermaster that Rosecrans desired all wagons, tools, and spare parts to be moved forward to Stevenson.²⁵

Along the Tennessee River, the skirmishing continued on 26 August. Wilder had been resupplied with ammunition, but he chose not to resume the bombardment of Chattanooga. Instead, Lilly’s gunners spent the day digging pits on Stringer’s Ridge to protect them when they did resume firing. In front of the artillerymen, elements of the Seventeenth Indiana pushed forward to the river. North of the Seventeenth, two companies of the Seventy-Second Indiana patrolled from the mouth of Chickamauga Creek to a point opposite the Chattanooga waterfront. They saw no Confederates on their side of the river and few on the far side. The Seventy-Second Indiana sent its pack train over Walden’s Ridge for rations, while Wagner’s brigade maintained its perch overlooking Wilder’s camps. Upstream, Hazen sent a forage train to Thatcher’s Ferry and had a section of artillery send a few shells across the river. At Harrison’s Ferry, Funkhouser’s detachment of Wilder’s brigade was also in action. On the previous day several Confederate scouts had briefly crossed the river. Resolved to end the practice, Funkhouser before dawn sent Company E of the Ninety-Second Illinois and Company A of the Ninety-Eighth Illinois to the ferry landing and hid them along the road leading from the river. There they watched at sunrise as a woman in a house signaled to Confederates on the opposite shore. Soon a flatboat crossed the river and unloaded a number of horsemen. As the Confederates advanced inland, the hidden Federals revealed themselves. In the ensuing fight, three Confederates were killed and two captured. The Federals then raced to capture the flatboat and its crew. By crouching and paddling with their hands the Confederates managed to get the boat safely downstream. The firing brought more Federals to the scene and Pvt. John King of the Ninety-Second Illinois recorded the result: “The woman’s house at the landing caught fire in less than half an hour afterwards and was burned to the ground with all its contents. We never knew of her being in the ‘signal service’ afterwards.”²⁶

Although Wilder’s brigade was the most visible, other Federal forces also drew attention to themselves. To the north, Minty pushed the Fourth Michigan Cavalry to Washington and the adjacent Lock’s Ferry. After being fired upon ineffectively by Confederates on the opposite bank, they eventually returned to Smith’s Cross Roads. At the same time Minty’s scouts appeared at Blythe’s and Doughty’s Ferries downstream. Minty sent Van Cleve a variety of information, some of which was contradictory and most of which was out of date, but his greatest contribution was his presence near Burnside’s advancing columns. A plausible case could be made that Burnside’s and Rosecrans’s forces were about to join hands, a case Buckner made daily to Bragg. Actions at the other end of the long river line were also compelling, however. The activity there was the product of aggressive action by Reynolds, who began another bombardment of the ruined railroad station at Shell Mound. The shelling was intended to cover a daylight raid by a company of the Seventy-Fifth Indiana Infantry regiment to acquire some flatboats. When queried by Thomas, Reynolds proudly announced that he had captured six flatboats, had prospects of gaining two more, and was building still another. Unaware of the purpose of Reynolds’s noisy probe, Lytle at Bridgeport sent several companies of the Thirty-Sixth Illinois Infantry regiment again to scout Long Island. Presumably, both Reynolds’s and Lytle’s forays were seen and reported by men of the Third Confederate Cavalry regiment, but no such report has come to light. That night, however, Federals at widely scattered points in the river valley noticed numerous lights on Sand Mountain, which overlooked the scene. The lights remain unexplained but may have been the work of Confederate signal corps personnel. If reports of the Federal activity at Shell Mound and Bridgeport did reach Bragg’s headquarters, they would have exacerbated an already confusing picture of possible Federal intentions.²⁷

In the camps of the Army of the Cumberland, the cold, disagreeable weather continued on 26 August. The day was dry, but a brisk wind made it seem like fall. In the Fourteenth Corps, all could plainly see that another movement was rapidly approaching. In the First Division, Capt. William Mitchell of the First Wisconsin Infantry regiment told his father, “Deserters come into our lines daily. They report Bragg’s force very much demoralized. My opinion is that the rebels will not make a desperate stand at Chattanooga.” Capt. Alfred Hough, a member of Negley’s staff, wrote his wife in similar vein: “It does really seem now as if the war was, beginning to draw toward the end. The rebellion is certainly growing weaker. I cannot see how we can fail in our movements here.” Elsewhere within the division, Captain Vantine of the Twenty-First Ohio Infantry regiment remained intoxicated for a third day, while the Seventy-Eighth Pennsylvania Infantry regiment instituted roll call four times daily to ensure its men would be present for the coming advance. At Battle Creek, soldiers of the Second Minnesota Infantry regiment were disappointed when their newfound Confederate friends shouted across the river that they could no longer accept visitors. Capt. John Beatty, thirty-two, of the same regiment, had another concern, as he told his fiancée, Laura Maxfield, twenty-two: “I am growing old. Libbie I am afraid that you will not like me (love me I mean). I am really. It seems to me that all the freshness of my early youth is gone.” In Reynolds’s Fourth Division, the Federal successes at Charleston led many soldiers to believe that the war would be over by the end of the year. Lt. Piatt Andrew of the Twenty-First Indiana Battery was not so sure, as he wrote a friend: “It may be that I am mistaken, but I think two years will pass before we are mustered out of the service.” First Sgt. Newton Parker of the 105th Ohio Infantry regiment was more focused, recording in his diary, “It is supposed we will have a pretty hot time crossing the river. Guess we will do it if we try, however.”²⁸

Events elsewhere in the army mirrored the circumstances of the Fourteenth Corps. In their camps near Stevenson, the Pioneer Brigade continued to build platforms to accommodate the hundreds of tons of rations arriving daily at the depot, or drilled with the cumbersome pontoons stockpiled several miles from the river. Except for Sheridan’s soldiers at Bridgeport, the unseasonably cold day passed quietly in the Twentieth Corps. Regimental bands continued their nightly serenades for Davis and his wife. At Bellefonte, the Forty-Ninth Ohio Infantry regiment unloaded supplies from railroad cars, while other men improved their camps. In Baldwin’s command, the entire brigade drilled as a unit. At Stevenson, Laibold’s men heard a rumor that Chattanooga had been occupied by Federal forces. Downstream, the army’s horsemen maintained their vigil along the river, fraternizing freely with Confederate pickets and receiving a steady stream of deserters. Sequestered in the Sequatchie Valley, Twenty-First Corps troops also reveled in the good news coming from Charleston. In Wood’s First Division, Capt. John Tuttle of the Third Kentucky Infantry regiment was essentially crippled for life when his horse fell on him. At Poe’s Tavern, Hazen proudly reported that a mill he had repaired was producing a ton of flour per day. From Pikeville, Van Cleve announced that his supply situation was improving and that he had sent a courier in search of Burnside’s troops. In the army’s rear, soldiers of the First Michigan Engineers and Mechanics regiment continued to shape logs into large square beams. Unaware of Rosecrans’s plans, Pvt. Isaac Roseberry wondered about the utility of their labor: “The co is still getting out timber not knowing wheather it will ever be used or not. This seems to be some thing done to keep the boys out off mischeaf.” In Nashville, Granger informed Garfield that he would send additional troops to Athens, Alabama, but that McCook’s brigade would not move for three more days. Like Private Roseberry, Granger seemed to understand neither the larger operational picture nor the accelerating tempo at the Tennessee River.²⁹

With only minor Federal activity reported from Bridgeport to Blythe’s Ferry, Bragg had no more clues about Rosecrans’s intentions on 26 August than on the previous day. Knowing he was unable to prevent a Federal crossing, Bragg could only wait for Rosecrans to make his move. He could theorize how he might respond if the Federals crossed downstream of Chattanooga, and could do the same if the Federals crossed above, but such an exercise would amount to idle speculation. Thus Bragg needed reliable news of a major Federal crossing before he could put his own troops into countervailing motion. Unable to place small scouting parties across the river successfully, as proven at Harrison’s Ferry, he was totally dependent upon what observers could see from the left bank of the river or from Sand and Raccoon Mountains. In addition, he could draw information from Buckner at Knoxville. Buckner had a robust network of scouts and spies in eastern Kentucky and Tennessee, and they accurately reported the progress of Burnside’s columns toward Kingston and Knoxville, information passed to Bragg and Mackall. What the spies could not divine was the exact relationship between Burnside’s small army and Rosecrans’s much larger one. Even so, Buckner believed that when Burnside was in place, Rosecrans would join him and the united force would cross the Tennessee River between Chattanooga and Knoxville. That analysis remained plausible and, indeed, Buckner was already moving the bulk of his forces to Loudon from Knoxville. By 26 August, Buckner’s assessment was becoming ascendant in Bragg’s headquarters as well, as recorded in George Brent’s diary: “Enemy quiet in our front. He must be waiting until Burnside’s movement is unmasked, & then possibly moving by his left effect a junction with Burnside & cross above us here. We can not hold both Knoxville & this place.” Bragg’s relationship with Brent was strong and of long standing. For Brent to write as he did on 26 August, it is clear that he accurately reflected Bragg’s views as well as his own.³⁰

Even without new information, the army’s senior leaders continued to make prudent small adjustments. Given the general shortage of wagons, and the promise of two more divisions arriving without transportation, Bragg published General Orders, No. 171, which reduced the army’s baggage wagons to an absolute minimum. At the same time, he promulgated Special Orders, No. 229, which made several temporary adjustments of significance. One provision ordered the removal of the last hospital in Chattanooga, Camp Direction, to Dalton. Another provision directed the transfer of the army’s ordnance stores from Chickamauga Station to Graysville. This measure prudently removed Bragg’s reserve ammunition stocks farther from the river. To alleviate the army’s shortage of meat, Bragg ordered Wheeler to assist commissary personnel driving cattle from northern Alabama to the vicinity of Chattanooga. Meanwhile, Medical Director Edward Flewellen and the medical director of hospitals, Samuel Stout, disagreed over where to locate the hospitals evacuated from Chattanooga. Flewellen recommended placing them between Kingston and Big Shanty, but Stout believed that course would limit him to Cassville. Flewellen also agreed to place Stout’s request to seize church buildings before the army’s chief of staff, but he was in no hurry to do so. Oddly, while the army staff was acting with some urgency, Polk seemed to be relaxing the state of readiness of his corps. Division commanders Cheatham and Hindman were told to suspend the requirement to keep three days’ cooked rations on hand. They also were instructed to return their artillery batteries to their respective infantry brigades. Otherwise, it was business as usual in Polk’s sector, with normal details assigned to load railroad cars and work on the Chattanooga fortifications. The Daily Rebel reflected the army’s ambivalence as well, reporting conflicting information about events around Bridgeport and devoting much of its diminished space to a whimsical article titled “Shelled Out.”³¹

Like their Federal counterparts, Bragg’s men had difficulty adjusting to the severe temperature drop that had begun the previous day. In Polk’s Corps, the men of the Twelfth Tennessee Infantry regiment did not let the chill dampen their religious fervor, as large crowds attended their nightly revival meeting. Around McFarland’s Spring, Hindman’s three brigades settled into their camps in the shadow of Missionary Ridge. They could hear the distant sounds of cannon fire coming from Harrison’s Ferry and digested the latest rumors—the enemy was advancing on Knoxville and Harrison’s, but Johnston would soon arrive with his entire army. In Hill’s Corps, details continued to rotate between their camps and the entrenchments along the river. Hill himself remained at his Chickamauga Bridge headquarters, where a rumor circulated that Knoxville had fallen. Foraging Federals at Thatcher’s Ferry threw twenty shells at the pickets of Lucius Polk’s Brigade but without doing any damage. Nearby, men of the Seventeenth Texas Cavalry (Dismounted) used the Federal shelling to explain the disturbed earth in a citizen’s sweet potato patch they had pillaged. In Stewart’s Division, Pvt. Abram Glazener, thirty-eight, of the Eighteenth Alabama Infantry regiment, wrote to his wife, Lavenia, and his seven children: “Always hope for the best whether I get home or not. My ernest prairs is that I may live to see all one time moore.” At Chickamauga Station, new brigade commander Daniel Govan drilled his command then released them to attend revival services. In Walthall’s Brigade, Capt. Joseph Ward of the Twenty-Fourth Mississippi Infantry regiment continued to regret the cancelation of the ball his unit had been planning in Atlanta. He spoke for many in a letter to his sister: “Our holidays are over and we are once more with the army, cut off from evry source of pleasure and nearly everything to eat. We get nothing but blue beef and musty meal to eat. Yesterday by way of variety they gave us some hard corn for roasting ears.”³²

Away from Chattanooga, reinforcements destined for Bragg’s army inched closer. Relieved at Loudon by Buckner’s troops, Johnson’s Brigade made a rapid march to the southwest, finishing the day just short of Athens. At Loudon, the final elements of Gracie’s and Trigg’s Brigades arrived, as did McCants’s Battery. One artilleryman was not dismayed by the withdrawal, as Lt. Andrew Neal told his mother: “We expect hot work soon and I do not care how soon. I have felt more life the last five days than since we came out of Kentucky.” On the same day Buckner arrived at Loudon by train, the Fifty-Eighth North Carolina Infantry regiment reached Lenoir Station, and the Sixty-Third Virginia Infantry regiment departed Knoxville, leaving the town protected only by scattered cavalrymen of Scott’s Brigade. At Loudon, Preston formally organized his division, numbering 5,951 officers and men present for duty. Gracie’s Brigade with 2,206 soldiers, and Trigg’s Brigade, with 1,940, were Preston’s largest units, soon to be augmented by a provisional brigade of regiments yet to arrive. In distant Morton, Mississippi, virtually all of Walker’s Division had departed for Meridian. Momentarily left behind was Lt. Col. Ellison Capers of the Twenty-Fourth South Carolina Infantry regiment, who had just learned of the death of his infant daughter. Detailed to arrange the burial of Maj. Thomas Ogier Jr., Walker’s division surgeon, Capers caught an eastbound passenger train at 9:30 P.M. By that time, elements of Breckinridge’s Division were also beginning to leave Morton. First to go were portions of the Second and Fourth Kentucky Infantry regiments of Helm’s Brigade. Helm departed Morton on the same train as Capers, along with fellow brigade commander Marcellus Stovall. As the rickety train lurched through the darkness, the remainder of Helm’s and Stovall’s Brigades reached the Morton depot and camped for the night.³³

The four days of relative quiet along the Chattanooga waterfront ended with a thundering crash at 9:30 A.M. on 27 August. A signal station atop Raccoon Mountain provided early warning, but nothing could be done to prevent what was coming. Lilly’s four guns entered the pits built on Stringer’s Ridge, while the Seventeenth Indiana and 123rd Illinois Mounted Infantry regiments occupied the plain below. When Lilly opened on the town, he elevated his pieces to thirty-five degrees in an effort to reach the railroad depot, train shed, and Crutchfield House, two miles distant. Eventually, the gunners found the range and struck the buildings several times. Still, the effects were so uncertain that Lilly occasionally shifted his aim to the Confederate works downtown, especially the fortification on the lower shoulder of Cameron Hill, location of the only long-range Confederate cannon. That gun fired in response only twice and did no damage. Satisfied that he had disrupted activity at the railroad depot, Lilly around 3:00 P.M. withdrew his guns behind Stringer’s Ridge. Upstream, Funkhouser sent four companies to sweep the riverbank southward to the mouth of North Chickamauga Creek, while he took the bulk of the Ninety-Second and Ninety-Eighth Illinois Mounted Infantry regiments to Harrison’s Ferry. Using Lilly’s First section, he opened fire on the far bank around 9:00 A.M., driving the small number of Confederates to cover. From his vantage point, Funkhouser could see dust clouds moving in the distance and wagons loading or unloading in Harrison itself. After several hours of desultory fire, he moved upstream a short distance to the village of Dallas and fired a few more shots from that position. Tiring of the effort, he then led his two regiments back to camp. The next crossing point upstream was Igou’s Ferry. There, Hazen sent the Sixth Kentucky Infantry regiment and two guns of Lt. Giles Cockerill’s Battery F, First Ohio Light Artillery regiment, to make additional mischief. Cockerill scattered several Confederates bathing in the river, but again little damage was done. At sunset, Hazen withdrew to Poe’s Tavern and relative quiet returned to the Tennessee River valley.³⁴

At Stevenson, Rosecrans apparently had reached a decision about crossing sites by 27 August, his personal visits to the river having given him enough information to formulate a plan. The army would cross at four sites, from south to north: Caperton’s Ferry, Bridgeport, Battle Creek, and Shell Mound. Caperton’s Ferry, most distant from the Confederates, would be the first site to be used. During the day Rosecrans rode with engineer George Burroughs to determine a covered approach to the river. Beginning at the pontoon staging area northwest of Stevenson, Rosecrans and Burroughs traveled to the headquarters of the First Division of the Twentieth Corps. Davis’s command occupied a position on the Memphis & Charleston Railroad just west of Stevenson. Satisfied that up to that point the pontoons were safe from prying Confederate eyes, Rosecrans instructed Davis to build a military road to the river. He then returned to his headquarters to resolve issues that he would have little time to address when the campaign got under way. Most pressing was a long-term solution to a vexing problem with his supply lines. Because the Cumberland River was often unusable because of low water and the Louisville & Nashville Railroad lacked capacity, Rosecrans needed a railroad to the deeper Tennessee River. If the Nashville & Northwestern Railroad could be completed, supplies could arrive without interruption. Because Governor Johnson also held military rank, Rosecrans baldly assigned him to direct the project. In turn, Granger’s Reserve Corps would protect the road, the army staff would support Johnson’s efforts, and the black regiments forming at Estill Springs and Nashville could be used as labor troops. Nowhere did Rosecrans address the political issues raised by such an order, but his supreme self-confidence, expressed in imperious tones, was much on display. He exhibited a similar tone in a message to Quartermaster General Meigs seeking additional funds for his quartermaster account before the army crossed the Tennessee.³⁵

The army staff spent 27 August tending to housekeeping details. Garfield supported Rosecrans’s orders to Governor Johnson by gathering information on the number of black laborers available. He also instructed Col. Charles Thompson to employ the second black regiment forming to cut locomotive fuel on the Nashville & Chattanooga line to Stevenson. Thompson, a former Rosecrans aide favored with a colonel’s commission, was the lead agent to recruit more former slaves and utilize their labor in the army’s rear. Goddard gave Sheridan specific instructions on the preparation of bridge timbers at Bridgeport. The message also specified that two of Brannan’s regiments wielding axes would report to Sheridan on the next day to shape the timbers. Goddard also established a courier line between Stevenson and Bridgeport. He forwarded to Granger Rosecrans’s desires that prisons in the department be inspected and that the inmates work on the fortifications. Edward McCook, commanding the cavalry force at Larkinsville, received permission to employ loyal citizens in the vicinity as auxiliaries. Finally, Goddard informed chief commissary Samuel Simmons that the headquarters mess had exhausted its supply of hams, a situation that should be rectified as soon as possible. Thoms gently chided Granger in Rosecrans’s name for not forwarding daily reports of Reserve Corps unit locations. When Granger responded that he had telegraphed an updated accounting daily, Thoms was quick to offer Rosecrans’s thanks. The accounting showed that Granger’s units were scattered widely over Middle Tennessee, garrisoning Nashville and smaller towns, protecting the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad, and positioning units to secure Rosecrans’s flanks. Finally, Cist, Goddard’s most junior assistant, instructed Reynolds to draw supplies from Stevenson, as Bridgeport was not yet a functioning depot. Ironically, Thomas reported on the same day that the supply line to Tracy City was finally working properly, with 60,000 rations accumulated there.³⁶

Rosecrans’s nightly report to Halleck on 27 August noted simply, “Bridge preparations going forward.” Indeed that was the case. Most Pioneer Brigade soldiers spent the day drilling with their cumbersome equipment, then loaded the boats, chesses, and balks on running gear for movement to the river’s edge. Other members of the brigade continued work on a long platform near the Stevenson depot to store commissary items. Sheridan that morning offered to build a trestle bridge at Bridgeport very quickly if Rosecrans would give him control of the First Michigan Engineers and Mechanics regiment. In support of that proposal, some members of the Forty-Second Illinois Infantry regiment began building canoes to facilitate the bridge-building. At Battle Creek, Brannan turned to Van Derveer’s brigade for the construction skills he needed. The Second Minnesota Infantry regiment contained woodsmen handy with axes and saws who knew how to construct rafts. During the day teams dragged timbers to the bank of Battle Creek, where the process of shaping the timbers into large rafts began. Brannan also assigned soldiers to construct a semipermanent bridge over Battle Creek to facilitate lateral movement within the Fourteenth Corps sector. Upstream at Shell Mound, Reynolds had already secured several flatboats from the far side of the river. Needing more, he assigned soldiers from the 101st Indiana Infantry regiment to gather lumber for additional rafts. Even units on the army’s flanks participated in the planning for the river crossing. Capt. James Hawley, Cavalry Corps inspector, tested a ford at Hart’s Bar, between Caperton’s Ferry and Bridgeport, and found it suitable for both cavalry and infantry. Far to the north, Wagner reported that a crossing at Chattanooga itself did not look promising. Wood apologized for Wagner’s gloomy report but promised that “whatever is necessary to be done, if men can do it, shall be done.” Even Crittenden, deep in the Sequatchie Valley, sent Garfield a report from Hazen on the possibility of crossing the river north of Chattanooga.³⁷

While some elements of Rosecrans’s command worked at the river, the remainder of the army marked time. At Bridgeport, Cpl. Edward Crippin of the Twenty-Seventh Illinois Infantry regiment spoke for many when he confided to his diary, “Revalee and roll call at the usual hour. … Breakfast over camp to police. … Nothing to do time drags heavaly on my hands. … No news.” After the morning fog burned away, the day proved to be clear and cool, more like September than August. Only a few unusual events broke the monotony. In Negley’s Second Division, Stanley’s Second Brigade was called into formation at 9:00 A.M. for a photographer to record the scene. There had been an attempt to take the photo on the previous afternoon, but by the time the photographer was ready, the light had failed. Thus the Eleventh Michigan, Eighteenth Ohio, and Nineteenth Illinois Infantry regiments, and Battery M, First Ohio Light Artillery regiment, stood for a long hour while their image was recorded for posterity. Nearby, in the Twenty-First Ohio Infantry regiment of Sirwell’s Third Brigade, Col. James Neibling departed for Ohio on recruiting duty. He left behind a large but undisciplined regiment, one of whose captains, Charles Vantine, remained intoxicated for a fourth day. At Bridgeport, chilled soldiers of the Forty-Second and Fifty-First Illinois Infantry regiments sent for their blankets that had been stored at Stevenson. Everywhere signs of a move were visible. The 104th Illinois Infantry regiment welcomed several convalescents to its ranks, an indication that hospitals were being purged of those able to fight. In the Twentieth Corps, the Fifty-Ninth Illinois Infantry regiment received orders to put new shoes on its animals, another sign of things to come. In the Sequatchie Valley, Capt. Daniel Howe of the Seventy-Ninth Indiana Infantry regiment was anxious to move: “This is a horribly lonesome place. The valley is not over three miles wide here and the mountain sides look like prison walls.” At Therman, Capt. John Tuttle had no time to be lonely, as doctors attempted to stretch his broken leg an inch and a half.³⁸

Troops of Timothy Stanley’s brigade near Stevenson, Alabama, 27 August 1863. (Behringer-Crawford Museum, Covington, Kentucky)

Rosecrans’s horsemen were more active than his infantry on 27 August. In Edward McCook’s First Division of Stanley’s Cavalry Corps, Campbell’s First Brigade picketed the river from the village of Bolivar past Cox’s and Caperton’s Ferries to Bellefonte. It also guarded the railroads in its rear and operated courier lines to connect various headquarters. McCook’s Second Brigade, led by Oscar La Grange, continued the picket line southward to Larkinsville. Watkins’s Third Brigade protected the Memphis & Charleston Railroad from a base at Maysville, with occasional patrols to Huntsville. Only in Watkins’s sector was there much activity, and that involved combatting strong guerrilla activity. Madison County, where Maysville was located, was the home of Capt. Frank Gurley of the Fourth Alabama Cavalry. In August 1862, Brig. Gen. Robert McCook had been passing through the county from Athens, Alabama, to Winchester, Tennessee. Ill with dysentery, McCook was traveling in a makeshift ambulance with only a small escort near the village of New Market when he inadvertently became separated from his brigade. Suddenly encountering Confederate cavalry, the Federals fled but were halted by a fusillade of shots, one of which mortally wounded McCook. Frank Gurley was among the Confederates who captured McCook and was blamed for his death. The prominence of the McCook family and the controversial circumstances had led to reprisals in 1862, and a year later the McCook clan still sought vengeance for what they considered a murder. Thus on 27 August 1863, Edward McCook, Robert’s first cousin, informed Rosecrans that Watkins had captured some of Gurley’s associates. In a private message to Alex McCook, Robert’s brother, he reported, “Watkins last night caught Ragsdale, one of the party with Gurley when Robert was murdered.” McCook personally congratulated Watkins and encouraged him to treat such people harshly. Even as McCook wrote, Watkins reported the burning of three bridges on the Memphis & Charleston Railroad. Madison County clearly was not yet pacified.³⁹

Like Madison County, Chattanooga felt the hard hand of war on 27 August, as Federal shells pummeled the town for four hours. The fact that Confederate signalmen on Raccoon Mountain reported Wilder’s approach before the bombardment had little effect on the outcome. There were still useful supplies remaining in warehouses on the river and commissary wagons were being loaded when the first shells landed around 9:30 A.M. The Federals first targeted the batteries on the river and managed to kill three soldiers and wound three more by the time the bombardment ended at 1:00 P.M. According to a soldier in the Twenty-Fifth Alabama Infantry regiment on picket just downstream, the three were asleep at the time of their deaths and killed by a single shot. The Chattanooga Daily Rebel reported that a total of 280 shots were fired into the town during the day’s shelling. The Rebel reporter also reported much “artful dodging” by the few citizens remaining in Chattanooga and admitted taking refuge in the vault of an abandoned bank next door. Eventually the Federals shifted their attention to the railroad depot, which they hit several times. One of the shells penetrated the army’s transportation office near the depot, where Maj. John Bransford and young assistants toiled on paperwork. A clerk named Thomas received a serious wound in the arm, while a second clerk was injured less severely. Another shell struck the kitchen of the Spencer House, one of the few Chattanooga hotels remaining open, and still others lightly damaged the large Crutchfield House hotel across from the depot. Instructed not to reply to the Federal barrage until noon, Confederate gunners fired only two ineffectual shots before Wilder and Lilly decided to end the shooting for the day. In a show of bravado, a young man flew a kite over the waterfront throughout the action, according to Henry Watterson of the Rebel.⁴⁰

The bombardment of Chattanooga on 27 August seemed not to affect the growing consensus that the Federal crossing would occur far upstream of the city. At some point during the day, Bragg summoned his officers to a conference. Although no list of attendees has been found, the gathering served as a vehicle for Bragg to explain his vision for the coming campaign. Speaking with more emotion than usual, the army commander stated his opinion that the Federals probably would cross the Tennessee River north of Chattanooga. Rosecrans’s particular crossing point, however, was largely irrelevant because Bragg intended to engage the Federals vigorously, either north or south of the city. In forceful terms he instructed the generals to tell their soldiers that the army would fight, not run. Chattanooga would be defended, although not necessarily at the gates of the city itself. He cautioned that hard marching would be involved but that no one should interpret the coming movements as a retreat. Instead, the marches would simply be the means to facilitate a great victory. Referencing the inadequate meat supply, Bragg argued that a victory would alleviate that and other supply difficulties. In sum, by sharing his thinking publicly with his senior generals and instructing them to inform their soldiers, Bragg attempted to forestall the grumbling and defeatism sure to be expressed when the campaign began. For some time Bragg had known that he would have to leave Chattanooga, if only briefly, in order to win a victory—he would not mimic John Pemberton’s tactics at Vicksburg. Bragg wanted all to understand what was about to happen and be prepared to do their part to achieve success. The degree to which this message of hope was disseminated throughout the army is unknown, but Bragg’s words reached the junior officers of at least two brigades in Hindman’s Division. In each case, in letters home, the officers repeated the gist of Bragg’s message and expressed confidence that a victory was in the offing.⁴¹

Two of Bragg’s senior commanders echoed his assessment of Federal intentions on 27 August. Polk, who would certainly have attended the meeting, agreed with Bragg that Rosecrans would most likely attack north of Chattanooga. On that day he wrote to his wife, “We think Rosecrans is moving up the river to make his attempt to cross above Chattanooga; but his plans are as yet not well developed. He has not crossed at Bridgeport and I think will not, nor at any other place below Chattanooga.” In Polk’s opinion, Rosecrans would not cross downstream because of the mountain barriers he would confront east of Bridgeport. At Loudon, Buckner also expected Rosecrans to cross north of Chattanooga and merge with Burnside’s army. Buckner had several spies in Kentucky, one even traveling with one of Burnside’s columns, and their information was definite and timely. The network was managed by Maj. Stoddard Johnston, one of Buckner’s staff officers. Johnston sent the latest spy report on 27 August to Mackall, who believed the report credible. Knowing that Buckner’s command, essentially Preston’s Division and several cavalry brigades, would be little hindrance to Burnside’s force, Bragg decided to act. Aware that the two divisions coming from Mississippi would soon arrive, Bragg believed he could spare a division to reinforce Buckner. Stewart’s Division of Hill’s Corps was less tied to the river than Cleburne’s Division, so Bragg selected Stewart to move to Buckner’s aid at Loudon. He also directed that Forrest’s and Pegram’s commands be combined under Forrest, with orders to “develop the designs of the enemy.” Given what Bragg knew at the time, the move seemed to be a prudent response to a real threat. Even after Stewart’s departure, Bragg’s army would grow by one division with the arrival of Walker and Breckinridge. His plan to wait until Rosecrans committed himself remained intact. The decision seemed justified when the leading elements of Walker’s Division arrived at Chickamauga Station at 7:00 P.M.⁴²

For most of the Army of Tennessee, 27 August passed without incident. In Cheatham’s Division, fatigue details continued improving the fortifications and loading supply wagons. In the Twelfth Tennessee Infantry regiment, the men formed for dress parade as usual in the evening, then attended the nightly prayer meeting. Soldiers in Stanford’s Mississippi Battery of Strahl’s Brigade serenaded Polk. Word spread rapidly about the three men killed while sleeping and the young clerk severely injured in Major Bransford’s transportation office. In the Fiftieth Alabama Infantry regiment, 2nd Lt. James Fraser, twenty-two, closed the current volume of his diary: “Many changes have taken place, some for good, some for ill. Life is uncertain and death is sure. How soon it may overtake us, none can tell.” Upstream, Fraser’s words were prophetic as shells fell in several places, killing a sharpshooter at Harrison’s Ferry and wounding several artillerymen in Calvert’s Arkansas Battery. In the Thirty-Third Alabama Infantry regiment, Pvt. Hezekiah Rabb, twenty-four, was downcast that his wife had been unable to visit him. Disappointment was evident when he wrote, “My Hopes are almost Thread beare I am badly out of hart of our ever Whiping them. … I see nothing in our favor at all they are gaining ground every day on us & believe they will soon carry us up the Spout. … Perhaps I may bee too badly disheartened I Quit the subject for the Present.” In Stewart’s Division, the soldiers of Brown’s Brigade strengthened their fortifications at Sivley’s Ford. At Chickamauga Station, in Liddell’s Division, Pvt. Robert Jarman and his friends in the Twenty-Seventh Mississippi Infantry regiment congratulated themselves on their good fortune in becoming part of the Reserve Division, an indication they would see less action than their peers. As if to prove Jarman’s point, Sgt. John Freeman of the Thirty-Fourth Mississippi regiment confided to his diary, “Nothing new having fine time going in washing evry day.” On the East Tennessee & Georgia Railroad, the soldiers of Johnson’s Brigade completed their tiring march from Loudon to Charleston.⁴³

While most of the army remained in place, some mounted units were in motion on 27 August. The weakness of the cavalry screen on the army’s left had finally been noted in Chattanooga. Wheeler had long been out of favor at army headquarters because of his laxity in administering his command, with Mackall being especially critical of the young cavalryman. Unfortunately, now that there was a pressing need to improve the army’s flank protection, Wheeler’s unit nearest that point, Martin’s Division, remained in exceedingly poor condition. Since July, Martin’s command had been recuperating from the rigors of the previous campaign in camps around Alexandria, Alabama. In order to reinforce the Third Confederate Cavalry regiment scattered along the Tennessee River, the most expedient solution appeared to be the creation of an ad hoc formation. Therefore Lt. Col. Harris Mauldin, commanding the Third Alabama Cavalry regiment of Hagan’s Brigade, received orders to form a temporary unit from the best-mounted and equipped men in the brigade and march it north. Mauldin selected 300 troopers and on 27 August led them northward toward Bridgeport, nearly 100 miles away. At the other end of Bragg’s line, the departure of Buckner’s infantry from the Knoxville area caused the scattered detachments of Scott’s Brigade to begin withdrawing from the Knoxville area as they prepared to join the retreat to Loudon. Before they could get away, the men of Col. Charles Goode’s Tenth Confederate Cavalry regiment were surprised and routed at Jacksboro, losing nearly fifty troopers to the First East Tennessee Mounted Infantry. At Bell’s Bridge, just north of Knoxville, Lt. Winslow Robinson’s Louisiana Battery from Scott’s command was ordered to remove fifty sacks of corn to safety. Robinson seized a civilian wagon to remove part of the corn, left a small detail to safeguard the remainder, and headed south to Campbell’s Station. That night, panic broke out in Knoxville as the railroad east of town was severed by Federal partisans.⁴⁴

On 27 August the first contingent from Johnston’s army reached Georgia. Wilson’s Brigade of Walker’s Division led the movement, which began with a ride on the Southern Railroad of Mississippi from Morton to Meridian, 61 miles. From Meridian, the troops rode the Mobile & Ohio Railroad to Mobile, 134 miles. After a boat trip across Mobile Bay, the soldiers took the Mobile & Great Northern Railroad 50 miles to Pollard. From there, the route ran northeast on the Alabama & Florida Railroad 114 miles to Montgomery. The troops there transferred to the Montgomery & West Point Railroad for an 88-mile journey to West Point, Georgia. The next leg was an 87-mile trip on the Atlanta & West Point Railroad to Atlanta. The Western & Atlantic Railroad’s 128-mile line from Atlanta to Chickamauga Station ended the trip. A few of Wilson’s men arrived during the evening of 27 August, but most of the brigade was still below Atlanta. Behind them came Ector’s and Gist’s Brigades, near Montgomery. Following Walker was Breckinridge’s command. In the lead was Adams’s Brigade, in the vicinity of Mobile. Behind Adams was part of Stovall’s Brigade, on trains between Meridian and Mobile. Finally, regiments of Helm’s Brigade left Morton for Meridian during the day. Because the Mobile route had reached capacity, two of Stovall’s regiments and at least two of Helm’s took an alternate path via Selma, Alabama. Their route would be the Southern Railroad of Mississippi from Morton to Meridian, 61 miles; Meridian to McDowell’s Bluff, Alabama via the Alabama & Mississippi Rivers Railroad, 53 miles; a short boat ride on the Tombigbee River from McDowell’s Bluff to Demopolis; Demopolis to Selma, using more of the Alabama & Mississippi Rivers Railroad, 50 miles; and, finally, a much longer steamboat ride on the Alabama River to Montgomery, 75 miles, where it merged with the Mobile route. While some troops rode in passenger cars, most traveled in or on top of freight cars. Generally unaware of the reason for their movement, Walker’s and Breckinridge’s soldiers saw the trip simply as a pleasant interlude in an otherwise dull summer.⁴⁵