13

 

SURPRISE

» 31 AUGUST–1 SEPTEMBER 1863 «

 

Monday morning, 31 August 1863, dawned hot and dusty in the Tennessee River valley. Atop Sand Mountain, Hans Heg ordered Lt. Col. James Abernathy of the Eighth Kansas Infantry regiment to lead thirty cavalrymen from the First Tennessee (Union) Cavalry regiment to survey the roads all the way to Trenton, Georgia, in Lookout Valley. Boldly, Abernathy led the Tennesseans forward on the relatively flat top of the mountain. Approaching the descent into Lookout Valley around 9:00 A.M., his small party encountered Confederate pickets, who withdrew hastily down the mountainside. Abernathy followed into the valley and approached Trenton, a village of only a few houses. Several hundred yards from the village his detachment came under fire from Confederates hidden behind fences and buildings. Outnumbered and afraid of being surrounded, Abernathy withdrew up the mountain without loss. He was not pursued and returned the way he had come, reporting to Heg what he had seen. Abernathy saw no sign of Crook’s regiments supposed to be on Sand Mountain but did learn that they had visited Trenton on the previous day. He identified his opponents as elements of the Fourth Alabama Cavalry regiment. In fact, Trenton’s defenders that morning belonged to Lt. Col. Harris Mauldin, commander of the Third Alabama Cavalry regiment. Mauldin had arrived in Trenton around 5:00 A.M. with approximately 300 of the best-mounted and equipped troopers drawn from Hagan’s Brigade of Martin’s Division. He had been ordered on 27 August to march from Alexandria, Alabama, northward to Trenton via Big Wills Valley, which became Lookout Valley a short distance before reaching the Georgia border. He had covered forty-five miles since the previous morning and knew little of either the situation or the terrain around Trenton. Fortunately for him, Abernathy’s party was small and its mission was limited. Each commander reported the encounter to his respective superior, Mauldin to Wheeler and Abernathy to Heg.¹

West of Sand Mountain, other elements of the Twentieth Corps slowly lurched into motion. First to move was the remainder of Davis’s First Division. Leading the way, Carlin’s Second Brigade found it hard to raise its heavily laden wagons over the eroded rock ledges that intersected the path. Detailing soldiers to assist the wagons, Carlin finally reached the top of the mountain. Moving only a short distance beyond the crest, Carlin’s men camped near a small stream in early afternoon. Behind Carlin came Post’s First Brigade. Again, regiments lined the track to assist laboring mules dragging wagons to the crest. Reaching the top by nightfall and disregarding loud complaints by his men, Post kept the brigade moving until he had passed both Carlin and Heg. It was not until 8:00 P.M. that Davis’s division was finally consolidated on the plateau. For Carlin’s and Post’s commands, the tiring day had been relieved only by the spectacular views from the top of Sand Mountain. Cpl. George Morris of the Eighty-First Indiana Infantry regiment spoke for many when he wrote, “Below was the smiling valley, with its fields of waving grain, while like a silver thread the Tennessee River wound between the high mountains, decked with the brightest foliage, and the bosom of the river was dotted with lovely islands robed in green. In the distance the pontoon bridges could be seen, with a steady stream of blue coats marching over them, their bayonets flashing back the sunlight and the Stars and Stripes waving over them.” The troops crossing the bridge belonged to Johnson’s Second Division. Moving from their Crow Creek camps, Willich’s, Dodge’s, and Baldwin’s brigades all managed to cross the undulating span successfully during the day and occupied Davis’s old campsites in the river bottom. Lt. Col. William Robinson in Dodge’s command was not impressed with the scenery. A resident of western Pennsylvania well acquainted with mountains, Robinson confided to his diary, “Hard looking country—air fragrant with miasma—birds look sickly.”²

With the crossing going well at Caperton’s Ferry, Rosecrans saw no need to supervise McCook further and turned his attention to Crittenden’s Twenty-First Corps. Having ordered Crittenden to begin moving his scattered divisions to Shell Mound, Rosecrans became concerned that the Confederates might strike the Twenty-First Corps before it could join the remainder of the army. Increasingly there were signs that Bragg was reinforcing his right, above Chattanooga, where the Army of the Cumberland was the weakest. Of course, Rosecrans’s deception plan had been crafted with just that outcome in mind. Still, as more and more divisions crossed the river and disappeared into the mountains, Crittenden’s vulnerability would increase for a few days. If Bragg chose to cross the river and confront the Twenty-First Corps while the remainder of Rosecrans’s army was straddling the Tennessee, the situation could become dangerous. Similarly, if Bragg crossed in strength after Crittenden moved down to Jasper but before Thomas and McCook could threaten Bragg’s railroad to Atlanta, the Bridgeport-Stevenson logistical complex would be placed at risk. With those considerations in mind, Rosecrans at 9:00 A.M. had Garfield send Crittenden a list of questions: Were the Confederates moving up the Tennessee River? Was Bragg concentrating on Rosecrans’s left flank? Where was Burnside? Where was Forrest’s cavalry? Garfield wanted Hazen and Wagner to collect as much information as possible and rush it to army headquarters. Further, Van Cleve’s division should hasten to join the remainder of the corps. Like the messages sent to Crittenden on the previous night, this one too would take time to deliver, either via a line of signal stations on mountaintops or by telegraph to Tracy City, thence by courier to Dunlap. Longer messages, especially encrypted ones, were most easily transmitted via Tracy City, but the line of flags and torches seems to have been the preferred method by which Rosecrans communicated with Crittenden.³

While Rosecrans pondered Crittenden’s situation, his staff dispatched another flurry of detailed instructions to various elements of the army. Goddard ordered the army’s reserve ammunition train of 800 heavily loaded wagons from Tullahoma to Cowan, where the Sixty-Ninth Ohio Infantry regiment would shepherd it over the Cumberland Plateau. He also sent a herd of beef cattle to Tracy City for use by the Twenty-First Corps. Finally he instructed the army paymaster not to hurry in paying the troops because of the ongoing operations. Meanwhile, Bond coordinated Reserve Corps movements on the army’s flanks. He notified Granger that Rosecrans wanted Morgan to advance to Flint River and Dan McCook to move to Huntsville. He also asked Granger when the loyal Tennessee units would arrive at McMinnville to free Dick’s brigade to rejoin Van Cleve. Bond also telegraphed Chief Quartermaster Hodges in search of fifty sledges Rosecrans wanted sent to the front. Thoms enjoined railroad superintendent Innes to maintain the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad tracks better, so as to avoid wrecks like the one that briefly blocked the track near Murfreesboro that day. He also arranged for a train to travel to Larkinsville to evacuate seriously ill cavalrymen. In early afternoon Rosecrans learned that pontoons were not reaching the Bridgeport construction site as he had directed. A train expected to deliver pontoons to Bridgeport and return to Stevenson for another load had not appeared, wasting valuable time and throwing Rosecrans into a rage. Garfield scorched the telegraph wires to Lytle seeking to know “by whose neglect this criminal delay has occurred,” while Thoms asked Lytle for a progress report on the bridge construction. When Lytle blamed a railroad conductor, Thoms directed assistant railroad superintendent Beggs to locate the miscreant. As the staff scrambled to rectify the problem, Rosecrans suddenly decided that he again needed to go to Bridgeport, so the dummy was readied to take him there in late afternoon.⁴

At Bridgeport, the delay in the pontoons’ arrival did not affect the thousands of soldiers working on the bridge. During the day most of the Pioneer Brigade joined them. Leaving one company to maintain the Caperton’s Ferry bridge, O’Connell sent part if his command by rail with the remaining pontoons, while the remainder marched from Stevenson. Meanwhile many of the infantry laborers and part of the First Michigan continued preparing the timbers for the trestle bridge across the wide channel from Bridgeport to Long Island. During the day they also began to erect the bents that would hold the roadway out of the water, standing them up on the riverbed and connecting them with balks and ropes. While some soldiers struggled in the water with the massive timbers, others improved the bridge approaches. At the same time, telegraphers extended their line across the river, using an insulated cable. To record the scene for posterity, a Cleveland photographer created at least two images of the construction crews at work that day. Lytle described the effort in a letter to his sister: “From my tent on the hill the camp presents a busy appearance. Railroad trains rolling in & out, locomotives whistling, long wagon trains loaded with timbers for the bridges, ‘engineers and mechanics’ busy as bees, regiments of infantry & cavalry passing and repassing—fatigue parties in every direction.” Suddenly a series of telegrams from Stevenson interrupted Lytle. Garfield wanted to know why the train moving pontoons to Bridgeport had not returned for another load, and Thoms wanted to know how the construction gangs were faring. At 3:30 P.M. Lytle placed the blame for the delay on the nameless railroad conductor and reported that the trestle momentarily stretched one-third of the way to Long Island with flooring laid as fast as the bents were secured. When the next telegram from Stevenson disclosed that Rosecrans was on the way to Bridgeport, Lytle hastily closed his letter and prepared to receive the army commander once again.⁵

Combination trestle/pontoon bridge under construction at Bridgeport, Alabama, 31 August 1863. (Library of Congress)

On both sides of Bridgeport other Federal units were active. Downstream, Crook’s cavalrymen recrossed the river at the Hart’s Bar ford. Upstream at Battle Creek, the traffic ran in the opposite direction. Brannan was finding it a bit more difficult to get his division across the Tennessee than he had earlier predicted, and he sent no more glowing reports to his superiors. Using its improvised flotilla, Van Derveer’s Third Brigade had reached the far shore during the previous day, but its battery and much baggage still remained west of the river. While the Eighty-Seventh Indiana Infantry regiment moved the baggage, the remainder of the brigade bathed, washed their clothes, or foraged across the countryside. When a rumor spread that Bragg had evacuated Chattanooga, Cpl. David Griffin of the Second Minnesota Infantry regiment wrote home: “I do not doubt it much for we were getting them pretty well shut up and they would either have to fight or run away, and as the latter form of warfare was Bragg’s favorite mode, they have again taken to the foot race and gone towards ‘the last ditch’ but where that is I do not know.” In Brannan’s other brigades, there was no time for speculation about the direction of the campaign; there was a wide river to cross, with inadequate means. The Second Brigade was next to test the makeshift fleet. In brigade command for only two weeks, John Croxton moved four of his five regiments over the river, leaving only the Seventy-Fourth Indiana Infantry regiment and his battery on the Federal shore. Also crossing was Connell’s First Brigade. According to Adj. John Inskeep of the Seventeenth Ohio Infantry regiment, the order was, “Get across the river somehow to day.” Less skilled than Van Derveer’s woodsmen, Connell’s soldiers had struggled to build their own watercraft. Nevertheless, they made the crossing without incident, although their battery also remained west of the river. By midnight Brannan’s division had mostly made it across the stream, but its baggage, artillery, ammunition wagons, and some officers had yet to reach the eastern shore.⁶

At Shell Mound, Edward King’s probe toward Chattanooga began well before dawn. King sent Col. Daniel Ray’s cavalrymen through Running Water Canyon into Lookout Valley and toward Chattanooga, while he remained several miles in rear at the village of Whiteside. There a rough road left the valley floor and climbed the mountain wall, providing an alternate route to Trenton. Nearby was the still-smoldering wreckage of the Running Water Creek railroad trestle. Originally a metal-roofed Howe truss 789 feet long and 110 feet high, the bridge had been destroyed by Confederate engineers eight days earlier. Now reduced to an impressive pile of charred timbers and twisted iron surmounted by two large, masonry supports 90 feet high, the bridge impressed King’s infantrymen who occupied defensive positions around it. While they waited, some soldiers amused themselves by sending cars from a small coal mine crashing down the mountainside. Ahead of them, Ray’s troopers debouched from Running Water Canyon and followed the main road to Wauhatchie in Lookout Valley. Encountering Confederate pickets, Ray pushed them back easily. Suddenly in the early morning light, Ray saw what appeared to be a heavy force of infantry and artillery ahead on the lower slope of Lookout Mountain. Concluding that he was outnumbered, he withdrew to Whiteside. There he proudly displayed a captured Confederate purchasing agent with a wagon load of leather and a saddlebag full of Confederate currency. After the war, Ray claimed to have captured twenty-five Confederates at a cost of two of his own men killed and five wounded, but his written report omitted any such claims. Either way, King at 9:00 A.M. ordered the entire command to withdraw to the river. Reaching Shell Mound Station in early afternoon, King camped with his infantrymen on the east bank of the stream, making the occupation of Shell Mound permanent. Meanwhile, Ray ferried the Second Tennessee back to the west side of the river.⁷

While waiting for their baggage to arrive, a number of King’s soldiers explored Nickajack Cave. With an opening 177 feet wide and 48 feet high, the cave extended at least a mile and a half and had been noted in national literature before the war. In 1863, it was a major source of niter, a critical ingredient of gunpowder. Nickajack Cave lay within the territory of District Eight of the Confederate Nitre and Mining Bureau, headquartered in Chattanooga. Originally worked by a private contractor, whose equipment had been wrecked by a brief Federal advance in 1862, the cave had subsequently been operated by the Confederate government. By August 1863 an extensive industrial operation for the production of niter existed inside the cave and just outside its mouth. Miners first dug the niter from the cave floor and placed it in long wooden hoppers or vats. Water was then introduced into the vats, permitting the niter crystals to be leached into kettles. The resulting liquid was boiled outside in furnaces. The concentrated product then was moved to a potash works in Chattanooga, where it was turned into potassium nitrate or saltpeter. The Nickajack Cave apparatus was extensive, and as late as July 1863 at least fifty-three workers toiled there daily. Although the evidence is inconclusive, it appears that the Nickajack Cave works may have been active until late August, when Confederate troops evacuated the Shell Mound vicinity. Federal soldiers exploring the cave could not have known the details of the operation, but they were impressed by its size. Now the works were quiet, but the extensive paths and footbridges throughout the cave proved irresistible to Federal soldiers with time on their hands. One such tourist, Cpl. William Miller of the Seventy-Fifth Indiana Infantry regiment, recorded, “I was back in the cave some distance and it is a rough dismal place and I observed Torches all through it. Some above and some below me. If a man Should Step off of the plank it is no telling where he would land.” Miller’s musings on 31 August would soon prove prophetic.⁸

Abandoned niter works at Nickajack Cave, Tennessee. (Miller, Photographic History)

Unlike the activity downstream, the riverfront from Chattanooga upstream was quiet on 31 August. In Wilder’s command, men spent the day foraging, improving their camps, or writing letters. In the afternoon Lilly ascended Stringer’s Ridge to survey recent changes in the Confederate batteries guarding Chattanooga. Wilder sent a report to Rosecrans detailing information he had recently gleaned. Three scouts had penetrated far enough beyond the river to observe the Confederate regiment guarding the entrance to Lookout Valley and believed only cavalry detachments roamed beyond that point. More important, William Crutchfield reported that Buckner had retreated to Loudon, part of Hill’s Corps had been sent to support Forrest at Kingston, Wheeler’s command was still at Rome and Gadsden, and at least 10,000 troops from Johnston were arriving to reinforce Bragg. Finally, Wilder noted that he had found a good ford at Friar’s Island, seven miles upstream from Chattanooga. From his position on Walden’s Ridge, Wagner provided additional information. He confirmed the departure of part of Stewart’s Division from the river line and forwarded a prisoner captured near Kelly’s Ferry. The man described the Third Confederate Cavalry regiment’s dispositions and stated that Bragg’s greatest fear was a Federal crossing south of the city. Otherwise, Wagner’s men spent the day celebrating the arrival of tents, blankets, knapsacks, and mail from the Sequatchie Valley. A similar shipment reached Hazen’s brigade around Poe’s Tavern. There the Sixth Kentucky Infantry regiment displayed a large American flag and made itself comfortable for an extended stay. Seeing no indications of a move, officers in the Sixth Ohio Infantry regiment invited the local citizenry to attend a dance Hazen had permitted them to organize. At Smith’s Cross Roads, Minty sent most of the Fourth Michigan Cavalry regiment northward in another effort to contact Burnside.⁹

In the Sequatchie Valley, Crittenden was becoming increasingly nervous at his Dunlap headquarters. For some time he had felt isolated in the narrow valley, totally dependent upon signal stations and courier lines for news of the rest of the army. Around 11:45 A.M. he received Rosecrans’s brief message of the previous night warning him that movement orders were on their way to him. Without knowledge of the larger picture, Crittenden could make little sense of the message. Expecting that the movement order would arrive via Tracy City, he told Wood to send a courier to the mountain village. While he waited, he worried about Van Cleve’s exposed position at Pikeville. At 1:15 P.M. he sent Van Cleve information from Wood forecasting an attack on the Pikeville position and cautioned Van Cleve to “be ready.” Fifteen minutes later he dismissed Van Cleve’s proposal to establish a secondary supply depot at Pikeville in view of the army’s pending advance. With that, Crittenden returned to scanning the road for a courier from Tracy City. At 2:15 P.M., the order finally arrived by signal, and it was encrypted. At last Crittenden had orders he could understand: place the three divisions of the corps in motion toward the Tennessee River at Shell Mound; leave the four-brigade deception force in place; and have Wagner and Hazen occupy Chattanooga if the Confederates evacuated the city. At 4:20 P.M. Crittenden acknowledged the order in a brief note to Garfield, stating that the Twenty-First Corps would begin its march at 6:00 A.M. on the following day. At 7:00 P.M. he informed Garfield that he would locate his headquarters at Jasper five hours after the corps moved. Later still, at 9:30 P.M., he assured Garfield that he would continue beyond Jasper to army headquarters at Stevenson for consultation and further orders. Unsure of himself and uncomfortable in ambiguous situations, Crittenden always performed best when he had specific and precise orders from a superior. Now, he happily prepared to execute just such orders.¹⁰

Blissfully unaware that their idyll would soon be ending, the men of the Twenty-First Corps continued their daily routine. At Therman, Wood’s First Division mustered for pay, as did all other units of the Army of the Cumberland. The periodic mustering determined who was eligible to be paid for the previous two months’ service, but did not signify that paymasters would immediately appear. Otherwise, there was little unusual activity in Wood’s division. In the Third Kentucky Infantry regiment, officers continued their search for a suitable place to leave the seriously injured Capt. John Tuttle when the division moved south. A few miles north at Dunlap, Palmer’s Second Division also mustered for pay. The story was much the same at Pikeville, where Van Cleve’s Third Division continued to dispatch heavy guard details with wagon trains shuttling to and from the McMinnville supply depot. There, too, in Samuel Beatty’s First Brigade, still another regiment was punished for making noise at night by being forced to stand in line for hours. Of course, everything changed as darkness fell and Crittenden issued orders to each division commander to prepare to leave the Sequatchie Valley. Those orders created a flurry of movement in every regimental camp. What had been a pleasant interlude for most soldiers was now seen to be ending. The foraging had been good, especially the ripe peaches, and the inhabitants had mostly been friendly. Those citizens now would be abandoned to their fate. The rumor mill worked overtime as men speculated on their new destination, which many believed to be Knoxville. Palmer was especially concerned about leaving while his Second Brigade remained beyond Walden’s Ridge. Hazen’s baggage had to be left under guard at Dunlap until it could be sent to join him. Palmer closed his note to Hazen wistfully: “I leave you very bare of supplies, but [Lt. Charles C.] Peck [chief of transportation] will be here before you will need supplies. I take all from here not now issued. I hope you may get Chattanooga, and that I may speedily see you again.”¹¹

At Stevenson, stifling clouds of dust covered everything from tents to trees. Thrown up by thousands of marching men, shuffling mules, and churning wagon wheels, the dust was everywhere, choking those who had yet to move to the river. Laibold’s Second Brigade of Sheridan’s division had been scheduled to march to Bridgeport to join its parent formation, but the movement was postponed for a day, probably because the construction camps took all available room. Beatty’s First Brigade of Negley’s Second Division, which had relieved Laibold’s troops on the previous evening, now assumed responsibility for the town, although an order to store knapsacks indicated that it would not remain in Stevenson for long. A few miles to the north, shielded from the town by a spur of the mountain, Stanley’s and Sirwell’s brigades grumpily reestablished the camps they had abandoned on the previous evening. North of Negley’s troops, in Baird’s First Division, King’s Third Brigade assumed responsibility for protecting the railroad all the way north to the tunnel. Relieved from guard duty at Tantalon and Anderson Stations, Baird’s remaining brigades returned to their camps and mustered for pay. Meanwhile, elements of the Cavalry Corps gradually converged on Stevenson. Nearest at hand was Campbell’s First Brigade of McCook’s First Division. Campbell’s Second Michigan Cavalry regiment had been beyond the river at Bridgeport for several days and remained there. Now Campbell moved the Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry regiment from Bolivar to Caperton’s Ferry and across the river to a temporary camp. Southwest of Stevenson, LaGrange’s Second Brigade left Larkinsville for Bellefonte, arriving after dark. West of Larkinsville, Watkins received orders to move the Third Brigade to Caperton’s Ferry, after leaving detachments to guard critical railroad bridges until the Reserve Corps relieved them. Instructed to hurry, Watkins moved quickly, leaving thirty seriously ill troopers at Larkinsville to be rescued by a train early the next day.¹²

As most of Rosecrans’s army neared the river crossing sites, a vacuum developed on the army’s flanks. On the left, Dick’s command could not leave McMinnville until Reserve Corps units arrived to relieve them. Granger selected several loyal Tennessee regiments for the task, placing them under Col. James Shelley. Rosecrans, however, assigned Brig. Gen. James Spears to the command at the same time. A prewar lawyer in Pikeville, Spears had vigorously opposed Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation and was a divisive force in the East Tennessee Unionist community. Aware of Spears’s reputation, Granger had chosen Shelley, but Rosecrans’s assignment of Spears delayed the movement briefly. Van Cleve thus would have to wait a bit longer to regain his absent brigade. On the army’s right flank, the unit charged with filling the space vacated by the Cavalry Corps was Morgan’s Second Division. Morgan had been ordered to move Tillson’s First Brigade to Huntsville, but he was in no hurry to leave Athens. Slowly following Tillson was McCook’s Second Brigade. On the morning of 31 August, while leaving Lynnville, Tennessee, the Fifty-Second Ohio Infantry regiment had two men slightly wounded by bushwhackers. Enraged, McCook sent Col. Oscar Harmon’s 125th Illinois Infantry regiment back to Lynnville with orders to burn five houses. Distressed by the unpleasant task, Harmon selected one home and four businesses: “The people were greatly alarmed. They thought the whole town was going, and the women begged earnestly. Bring such a case home, and their feelings can be easily appreciated.” Three hours later, two companies of the Fifty-Second Ohio were fired upon while serving as brigade rear guard. Again the snipers could not be found, and again a nearby property owner paid the price, losing two barns even though the regiment suffered no loss. Maj. James Holmes had no regrets: “How they got on fire I did not know and when I saw them I didn’t care much.” McCook’s troops then resumed their march, halting for the night five miles south of Pulaski, Tennessee.¹³

Upon returning from Bridgeport, Rosecrans prepared his daily report for Halleck. Although the Bridgeport bridge was behind schedule, everywhere else the crossings were going well. By the end of the day, two Twentieth Corps divisions and a cavalry regiment were on the east bank at Caperton’s Ferry. At Battle Creek, Brannan had crossed virtually all of his infantry, leaving only some baggage and artillery on the west shore. At Shell Mound, Reynolds had crossed a brigade and was preparing to send another over the river. At Bridgeport, the far shore was secure. Cavalry units had penetrated into Lookout Valley without serious opposition. North of Chattanooga, the deception force continued to attract attention. On the army’s flanks, the Twenty-First Corps was preparing to march to the crossing sites, and most of the army’s cavalry was nearing Caperton’s Ferry. The Reserve Corps was slowly filling the void left by advancing units. Even the railroad was finally delivering the supplies needed to sustain an advance beyond the river. Rosecrans believed Wheeler’s cavalry was withdrawing to Rome, leaving him free to enter the mountains south of Chattanooga, and he saw indications that Bragg’s army was moving upstream. If true, his campaign plan was unfolding just as he had intended. Completion of the Bridgeport span on the next day would guarantee that the army could sustain itself beyond the river. Coincidentally, Rosecrans’s report passed in transit a message from Abraham Lincoln. Unaware of the recent successes, Lincoln nevertheless saw enough progress to end the unpleasant dispute between Rosecrans and the government: “I repeat that my appreciation of you has not abated. I can never forget whilst I remember anything, that about the end of last year and beginning of this, you gave us a hard-earned victory, which, had there been a defeat instead, the nation could scarcely have lived over.” For the moment at least, Rosecrans was free to conduct his campaign as he alone saw fit.¹⁴

The Consolidated Tri-monthly Report of the Department of the Cumberland dated 31 August presents a reasonably accurate picture of the army that Rosecrans would lead across the Tennessee River. At army headquarters, there was an aggregate present of twenty-one officers, with fifteen present for duty. The three units in the headquarters guard counted an aggregate present of 1,214 officers and men, with 1,006 present for duty. The Fourteenth Army Corps showed an aggregate present of 26,608 officers and men with seventy-four cannon, 22,616 being present for duty. The Twentieth Army Corps numbered an aggregate present of 16,734 officers and enlisted men with fifty-four artillery pieces, but only 14,222 soldiers present for duty. The Twenty-First Army Corps had an aggregate present of 17,168 officers and men with fifty-eight cannon, and 14,367 present for duty. The Reserve Corps contained an aggregate present of 20,254 officers and men with fifty-two guns. Its present for duty total was 16,931. The Cavalry Corps contained only two divisions and nine guns, with an aggregate present of 12,701 officers and men. Of that number, only 10,699 were present for duty. Separately recorded was the First Michigan Engineers and Mechanics regiment with an attached battery (885 aggregate present and 808 present for duty) and various unattached artillery units, mostly in the Nashville fortifications (320 aggregate present and 303 present for duty). The army’s Pioneer Brigade (605 aggregate present and 425 present for duty), Signal Corps detachment (154 aggregate present and 153 present for duty), and the Convalescent Battalion at Cowan (1,048 aggregate present and 173 present for duty) were subsumed in the totals for their parent units. The grand total for Rosecrans’s department thus came to an aggregate present of 95,905 officers and men, with 80,967 present for duty. Because much of the Reserve Corps manned static garrison positions, Rosecrans’s primary reliance would be on Thomas’s, McCook’s, Crittenden’s, and Stanley’s commands. Together, these corps had an aggregate present of 73,211 officers and men, with 61,904 present for duty.¹⁵

The last day of the month was also strength reporting day for the Army of Tennessee. The army staff numbered 24 officers aggregate present, with all present for duty. Polk’s Corps, which included Cheatham’s and Hindman’s Divisions, listed an aggregate present of 17,985 officers and men, with 15,559 present for duty, and thirty-four cannon. Hill’s Corps, which consisted of Cleburne’s, Stewart’s, and Walker’s Divisions, numbered 20,395 officers and men aggregate present, and 17,445 present for duty, with twenty-eight artillery pieces. Stewart’s transfer to Buckner’s command came too late to be reflected in the 31 August report. Liddell’s Reserve Division claimed an aggregate present of 5,334 officers and men, and 4,506 present for duty, with ten guns. The army’s cavalry, comprised of Wheeler’s Corps, Forrest’s Division, and six escort companies, contained an aggregate present of 14,522 officers and men, and a present for duty strength of 11,672, with twenty cannon. In addition, Bragg’s artillery reserve numbered 467 officers and men aggregate present, with a present for duty total of 423, and sixteen guns. He also had three engineer companies, which added 302 officers and men aggregate present and 256 present for duty. Thus, the Army of Tennessee momentarily consisted of 59,027 soldiers aggregate present and 49,885 present for duty, with 108 artillery pieces. Breckinridge’s Division, still in the process of arriving, did not appear in the army’s totals. According to a report dated 26 August, the division listed 5,775 officers and men aggregate present, and 4,956 present for duty, with 16 artillery pieces. Buckner’s command on 10 August numbered an aggregate present of 17,332 officers and men, with 14,733 present for duty. Counting Breckinridge and Buckner as part of the Army of Tennessee gave Bragg 82,134 officers and men aggregate present and 69,574 present for duty. Two small brigades from Buckner’s command, at Cumberland Gap and on the railroad to Virginia, were unavailable for immediate service with the main army.¹⁶

In the Chattanooga suburbs Bragg and his staff continued to believe that the Federals would cross the Tennessee River north of Chattanooga, although Brent acknowledged that “spies & scouts” forecast that the Federals would cross south of the town. Even so, Buckner’s situation continued to dominate the thinking of army headquarters. If Frazer believed that he could hold Cumberland Gap for forty days, and if Buckner supported him, then by all means the garrison should remain in place. Thus Mackall tersely responded to Buckner’s plea to revisit the issue: “Let Frazier [sic] hold the gap.” The unspoken belief in Chattanooga was that the coming campaign would be decided in less than forty days, and if the Army of Tennessee was victorious, Frazer could be relieved. If not, Frazer’s small command would be inconsequential. Either way, it was essential that Buckner and Forrest manage their withdrawal from East Tennessee safely. With the army’s supply situation approaching a crisis, Brent enjoined Buckner to strip the countryside through which he passed of all usable food. Expecting Forrest’s cavalry to cover Buckner’s withdrawal to Charleston, Brent again ordered Forrest to take position south of the Hiwassee River and connect with Hill’s pickets on his left. As for Hill, Bragg still expected the Federal crossing to occur in his sector and worked during the day to funnel reinforcements to him. Liddell received instructions to collect arriving units from Breckinridge’s Division and make them available for Hill’s use. Unfortunately, Breckinridge’s men had serious armament deficiencies, so Lt. Col. Hypolite Oladowski, chief of ordnance, sought better weapons from Atlanta and Richmond. Toward the end of the day, word arrived from Smith’s Brigade that the feeble Federal probe of the morning had been repulsed easily and the Federals had disappeared. Thus Bragg, Mackall, and Brent remained convinced that Rosecrans would cross the Tennessee River above Chattanooga rather than below.¹⁷

For the men in the ranks, the process of waiting for the enemy to reveal his intentions was beginning to wear on their nerves. Soldiers in the Twelfth Tennessee Infantry regiment, on picket beyond Lookout Mountain, were concerned about the skirmishing in their front until at 8:00 A.M. Preston Smith declared that the enemy force had withdrawn. The remainder of the day was quiet, although speculation about Federal intentions was rampant. Rumors spread through Strahl’s Brigade of Knoxville’s evacuation and Cumberland Gap’s fall. In Stanford’s Mississippi Battery, Pvt. John Magee, twenty-two, was depressed by the interminable waiting: “Hope brighter times may come. Oh how I wish for a battle, a move or anything to divert my thoughts.” In Hindman’s Division, lying in temporary camps on Chickamauga Creek, the talk was all about an altercation between Hindman and Polk’s staff a week earlier that had prompted several challenges but no duels. Pvt. Thomas Hall of the Twenty-Fourth Alabama Infantry regiment said of the division commander: “Hindman has proven himself to be a regular low-life rowdy. … But with all this he may be a good officer, and I for one will do none the less good fighting on account of him. If he will just lead us into it that is all I want, to encourage me to fight. Or if he keeps out of the way I don’t care.” On the river line, Cleburne’s soldiers occupying the fortifications also worried about the future. In the Tenth Texas Infantry regiment, Pvt. Benjamin Seaton, thirty-two, wrote, “Alas how sad the gloom of hope seams at the present time to look around and see the sad condition we are now placed in is almost anuff to give up all hop of our independence.” At Chickamauga Station, Lt. John Bostick of Liddell’s staff did not share the downcast mood so prevalent among the enlisted men, advising his sister, “Joe says that Mother has about $200 in Tenn. Bank money and that it can now be sold for near a thousand dollars. Sell it at once before we whip the Yankees and Confederate money goes up.”¹⁸

Unlike Polk’s and Hill’s troops, Buckner’s command was in rapid motion southward from Loudon to Charleston. With prodigious effort, the East Tennessee & Georgia Railroad transported Bate’s and Clayton’s Brigades forty-two miles to Charleston on 31 August. That evening the trains returned to Loudon for Brown’s Brigade. Led by Johnson’s Brigade, most of Buckner’s Corps moved south by foot. At the end of the day Johnson’s weary soldiers finally halted at Athens, twenty-seven miles south of Loudon. Behind Johnson, Preston’s Division was scattered along the road for miles, suffering severely from the heat and billowing dust clouds. Preston’s men passed through Philadelphia, seven miles south of Loudon, and encamped for the night on both sides of Sweetwater, ten miles beyond Philadelphia. Trigg’s and Gracie’s Brigades were in front with the two artillery battalions, while McMahon Brigade brought up the rear. Behind the infantry came Pegram’s Cavalry Brigade, while Scott’s Cavalry Brigade halted at Lenoir Station, seven miles north of Loudon. Forrest’s Cavalry Division also crossed to the south bank of the Tennessee. Before leaving Loudon, Buckner notified Samuel Jones, whose Department of Western Virginia adjoined Buckner’s now-defunct department, that Jackson’s small brigade of railroad guards was withdrawing into his area. Buckner wistfully closed, “Take charge of Southwestern Virginia for me.” Ignorant of the larger strategic picture, many of Buckner’s men did not understand their seemingly random movements. Lt. William Cole of the Thirty-Eighth Alabama Infantry regiment found the situation utterly inexplicable and decidedly gloomy. As he wrote to his wife after arriving at Charleston, “I think also that we will get badly whiped. … I see no chance for any thing else—for the men here in this army are low spirited and a large portion of them think that there is no use of fighting. … They think that we are whiped and no chance for anything else—it does appear to me that we are at the end of our row.”¹⁹

South of Chattanooga, other Confederate units were also active on 31 August. Walker’s Division spent the day walking from Chickamauga Station four miles to the vicinity of Tyner’s Station. That evening, Walker’s last brigade commander, Wilson, reached Chickamauga Station. Just beginning to arrive were the leading elements of Breckinridge’s Division. In the lead was Adams’s Brigade, followed by Stovall’s Brigade. Bringing up the rear was Helm’s so-called Kentucky “Orphan Brigade.” Elements of both the Sixth and Ninth Kentucky Infantry regiments spent the day in transit on the railroad between Montgomery and West Point. After changing cars at the latter, the Kentuckians reached LaGrange around midnight and were fed by the ladies of the town. Breckinridge remained absent on leave, so Helm directed the movement. Moving much more slowly was Wheeler’s Cavalry Corps, which headed northward in haphazard fashion to join the main army. Both brigades of Wharton’s Division left Calhoun and Rome and slowly marched westward toward the extension of Chattanooga Valley called Broomtown Valley. By evening at least one regiment, the Fourth Tennessee Cavalry regiment of Harrison’s Brigade, had arrived at a hamlet known as Dirt Town. The ultimate destination of both brigades was LaFayette, Georgia, approximately twenty-five miles south of Chattanooga. At the same time, Martin’s Division was slowly making its way northward from camps near Alexandria, Alabama, toward Broomtown Valley as well. One of Martin’s units, the Fifty-First Alabama Cavalry regiment of Hagan’s Brigade, made it only to Round Mountain by the end of the day. Approximately forty-five miles to the north, Harris Mauldin’s detachment from Hagan’s command held Trenton against Federal probes. With Federal cavalry active at Wauhatchie and on Sand Mountain, Mauldin at 11:00 P.M. told Wheeler, “If a large force attacks me I can see no chance to save my train, as there is no gap here where I can go up Lookout Mountain. I shall do the [best I] can under the circumstances, and await your orders.”²⁰

Unaware of Mauldin’s predicament, Confederate officials nevertheless were concerned about Bragg’s situation. Tennessee’s governor, Isham Harris, on the previous day had appealed to Jefferson Davis for aid for Bragg’s command. Harris’s message found Davis in the midst of discussions with Gen. Robert E. Lee on a wide range of strategic options. For some time a proposal had existed to send part of Lee’s army to assist Bragg temporarily. James Longstreet, the chief military proponent, had congressional allies, but Lee was adamantly opposed to weakening his own command. Believing that he had convinced Davis to keep his army united, Lee on 31 August instructed Longstreet to prepare the command for an offensive movement. Davis, however, had not made a final decision. Until he did, Davis could do little to reinforce Bragg beyond asking Johnston to send aid. Still, Davis could not ignore Governor Harris’s candid assessment. Thus, he wrote to Vice President Alexander Stephens in Crawfordville, Georgia, hoping that Stephens could persuade Governor Brown to mobilize the Georgia militia and send it to Chattanooga. He also directed his aide Col. James Chesnut to visit both Brown and Governor John Shorter of Alabama and request assistance from their state forces. Secretary of War Seddon wrote Brown independently: “We are advised that a formidable force of the enemy is advancing on East Tennessee. Cannot the local troops organized by you be thrown to aid?” With the two regiments of the Georgia State Line already deployed along the railroad at critical points from Atlanta to Graysville, the grandly named but woefully inadequate militia known as the Georgia State Guard was all that remained for Brown to provide. In sum, there was little more that could be done by anyone in a timely fashion to assist Bragg and his army. Therefore, while Harris Mauldin spent an anxious night at Trenton fearing the worst, the discussions about strategy continued at Richmond.²¹

In Chattanooga, George Brent was rudely awakened just before 2:00 A.M. on 1 September by the sudden appearance of a citizen with a disturbing story to tell. The man was Israel Russell, thirty-eight, a prominent farmer from Stevenson. Russell explained that he and his family, along with two Stevenson ministers, had left the town when the Federals arrived. While the Russells continued east beyond Lookout Mountain, the clergymen camped on Sand Mountain. After settling his family safely, Russell decided to return to Stevenson on business. Upon reaching the crest of Sand Mountain, he encountered the two ministers watching the Federal army crossing the Tennessee River at Caperton’s Ferry. In an effort to report what he had seen, Russell headed for Chattanooga. According to an account published in 1910 by Rev. Robert Shook, Russell went to LaFayette seeking army headquarters. Russell may indeed have gone to LaFayette, but if so he quickly discovered that Bragg remained in Chattanooga. Upon Russell’s arrival in Chattanooga, he first sought friends who could substantiate his character, then went to Polk’s headquarters. According to Shook, after hearing Russell’s report, Polk sent him to Bragg: “General Bragg listened with great interest, knitting his brows and stroking his knee hard with his fist and said with very great earnestness: ‘I am going to strike Rosecrans, and I am going to beat him.’” Shook’s account is generally confirmed by an article penned by “Historicus” in the Richmond Whig of 30 October 1863, and also by Hill in his undated battle report written after the campaign. Russell’s observations at Caperton’s Ferry most likely occurred on 30 August, when Post’s and Carlin’s brigades were crossing the pontoon bridge laid the previous day. If Russell departed Sand Mountain that day and traveled by way of LaFayette, he would not have encountered the Federal units probing Lookout Valley on the last two days of August. No matter how he got to Chattanooga, Russell’s arrival created great consternation at Bragg’s headquarters.²²

Bragg’s first response to Israel Russell’s troubling news was to seek confirmation from other sources. He thought first of Capt. Patrick Rice’s Company G, Third Confederate Cavalry, which had covered Bridgeport until driven away by Federal cavalry on 29 August. Brent told Rice that the Federals were reported to be in Lookout (Wills) Valley in strength and ordered him to move down Lookout Mountain until he could observe Trenton. Brent sent the message to Polk for transmission by his signalmen. No one at army headquarters knew that Mauldin’s detachment of the Third Alabama Cavalry regiment had held Trenton for nearly a day, because Mauldin’s reports had been addressed to Wheeler, who was nowhere near Chattanooga. Bragg next ordered Maj. Charles McDonald’s Eighteenth Tennessee Cavalry battalion, picketing upstream from Chattanooga, to move at once to McLemore’s Cove, a V-shaped valley east of Lookout Mountain. If the Federals were already in Lookout Valley, Bragg believed there was nothing to prevent the Federals from continuing their eastward movement toward the railroad. McDonald’s small command could move quickly and was better than nothing if Rosecrans’s army was indeed on the march. While Brent wrote to McDonald, Mackall requested Polk to provide ten men from his escort, Capt. Leeds Greenleaf’s Orleans Light Horse, to protect engineer officers reconnoitering the threatened area. The need to assemble mounted units in the middle of the night to form a screen on and behind Lookout Mountain highlighted the inadequacy of Wheeler’s original dispositions. Widely dispersed, the Third Confederate Cavalry regiment had been sufficient while the Federals remained beyond the river, but when Rosecrans advanced, its picket line was quickly shattered. Rice had done his best, but he could neither halt nor delay the Federal advance guard. Still, Bragg and Brent counted on Rice, and they were chagrinned to learn that Polk’s signalmen could not contact Rice until daylight because they lacked turpentine to light their signal torches.²³

Having dispatched horsemen into the night, Bragg next alerted his infantry. Brent informed Hill that the Federal army seemed to have appeared in force in Lookout (Wills) Valley. A second message instructed Hill to cook three days’ rations at once so as to be “prepared to move in any direction.” With Walker and Breckinridge now part of Hill’s Corps, Brent enjoined him to ensure that their ammunition trains were ready for movement. Indicative of the chaos at army headquarters, a third message instantly followed to Hill and Liddell with the same instructions. Later in the day, when no further information was forthcoming, the crisis atmosphere subsided, and Bragg began to adopt a more measured response. Smith’s Brigade was nearest the point of concern, but only the Twelfth Tennessee Infantry regiment was posted beyond the tip of Lookout Mountain. Bragg instructed Polk to place an entire brigade west of the mountain and an additional brigade east of it facing the road to Rossville. In addition, he told Polk to return Hindman’s Division to its old camps at McFarland’s Spring. There it could counter any Federal threat emanating from McLemore’s Cove. Finally, Brent told Polk that McDonald had been stripped from the river line because of the emergency. Although he had issued instructions at 3:00 A.M. to cook three days’ rations, Polk acted with his usual lack of urgency to reposition his troops. Not until 10:30 A.M. did he order Hindman to return to McFarland’s Spring, and the division did not arrive there until twelve hours later. Similarly, Polk ordered Cheatham to send Strahl’s Brigade to relieve the Twelfth Tennessee beyond Lookout Mountain and detail Preston Smith’s troops to guard the Rossville Road. That move, too, was not completed until late in the day. Exhibiting much more urgency than Polk, inspector general Beard sent an ambulance and wagon to evacuate Mrs. Patton Anderson, her children, and their baggage from Chattanooga. Etta Anderson had been visiting her husband, but Beard knew from the headquarters activity that it was time for her to go.²⁴

Unlike his infantry, Bragg’s largest cavalry force seemed impervious to army control. The only reports received by Bragg during the previous week seem to have come from Captain Rice at Bridgeport, and possibly from Capt. T. P. Edmondson’s Company F, Third Confederate Cavalry regiment, at Shell Mound. Regimental commander William Estes had reported at least once about the Federal incursions across the river to Wheeler, not to Bragg. Similarly, Harris Mauldin also reported only to Wheeler. Mauldin’s detachment had moved north on 27 August, but the remainder of Martin’s Division did not break camp until two days later. Bypassing Wheeler, Bragg had ordered Wharton’s Division to support Hill north of Chattanooga on 29 August but diverted it on the next day to LaFayette. On 31 August, Bragg ordered Wheeler to move his headquarters to Chattanooga, but there was no response. While Brent built a cavalry screen and alerted the army’s infantry, Kinloch Falconer attempted to reach Wheeler. At 2:30 A.M., Falconer telegraphed Capt. Thaddeus Foster Jr., quartermaster at Kingston, Georgia, to forward a message to Wheeler: “The Enemy are reported to have crossed into Wills Valley in force at Trenton. The General wishes a report immediately from you, as to the truth of this report, and any facts in regard to the numbers &c of the enemy.” Thirty minutes later, Falconer wired “Commanding Officer, Troops Wheeler’s Corps, Calhoun, Georgia,” that “General Bragg requests that you move rapidly forward to Lafayette and watch the movements of the enemy from Lafayette to McLemore’s Cove and resist to the last every effort to enter McLemore’s Cove. Report frequently to these Head Quarters.” Later in the morning Falconer drafted a telegram to Col. Alexander Caldwell, post commander at Rome, introducing his clerk Alfred Carothers, who was bearing “important dispatches to Generals Wheeler and Wharton.” For some reason, the telegram was not sent; whether or not Carothers took the train to Rome is unknown.²⁵

During the day Bragg learned more about the location of Wheeler’s divisions, although nothing was heard from Wheeler himself. In some fashion, army headquarters learned that Wharton was approaching LaFayette and that Martin had reached Trenton, although most of Martin’s command remained far to the south. By that time Falconer had stopped trying to reach Wheeler, and Brent assumed the task of coordinating the movements of Wheeler’s Corps. First, Brent ordered Martin to locate the Federals and report immediately to Chattanooga. Next, he wrote to Wharton, assumed to be near LaFayette. Explaining Martin’s instructions, he ordered Wharton to support Martin’s efforts: “You must closely watch the passes of the mountains, and guard vigilantly against any raids upon our connections. They must be repelled.” Finally, Brent enclosed a dispatch for Philip Roddey, commanding a small brigade in northern Alabama. The message ordered Roddey to leave one regiment in Alabama and join Wheeler with his command as rapidly as possible. Under the best of circumstances it would be some time before Roddey could join the main army. Wharton’s and Martin’s commands, however, were at last becoming available to investigate Federal movements south of Chattanooga. Still, there was no word from Wheeler himself, and Bragg urgently needed better control of the cavalry on the army’s left flank. Thus he sent Maj. Pollok Lee, an assistant inspector general, to join Wharton’s Division and report periodically. Lee’s instructions were apparently verbal, but clearly he could serve as a trusted liaison between army headquarters and Wheeler’s Cavalry Corps. Bragg told Wharton to assist Lee and facilitate his communications with army headquarters. Normally such a liaison officer would have been sent to Wheeler, but in Wheeler’s absence, Wharton was the senior officer in the command. Wharton’s response to the presence of a “headquarters spy” is unrecorded but can hardly have been positive.²⁶

The crisis on the army’s left flank sent ripples throughout Bragg’s command. For all his differences with Forrest, Bragg recognized the Tennessean’s skills in the aggressive collection of intelligence. Thus Brent sent two messages to Forrest on 1 September via Buckner’s headquarters, still believed to be at Loudon. In no uncertain terms Brent ordered Forrest to cross the Hiwassee River and bring his entire command to Chattanooga as soon as possible. Forgetting that Forrest earlier had been given control of Buckner’s cavalry, Brent told Forrest that Buckner’s horsemen would serve as his rear guard and protect the massive Loudon bridge. As for Buckner himself, Brent ordered him to continue his withdrawal to the line of the Hiwassee River. Buckner was to be sure to salvage all the railroad rolling stock he could move within Confederate lines. Formally ratifying a tentative decision made earlier, Brent issued Special Orders, No. 14, which assigned Stewart’s Division to Buckner’s Corps as of 1 September. Aware that Stewart’s command had left its wagons behind when it moved to Loudon by rail, Brent wrote to Hill about the matter. Aware of the developing tension between army headquarters and Hill, Brent was polite in the extreme: “The General desires that you will as far as the public service will admit, let Genl. Stewart have his transportation.” Until Hill relinquished the wagons, their absence remained a sore subject in Stewart’s command. Brent next looked to the army’s rear. Fearing another raid toward Atlanta, he warned Col. Moses Wright, commanding the Atlanta Arsenal, of a potential Federal approach from either Rome or the Western & Atlantic Railroad. Finally, Brent informed Carter Stevenson in Demopolis, Alabama, that the Vicksburg parolees would be gathered near Atlanta under strict control until they could be reactivated in the Army of Tennessee. With the larger issues momentarily addressed, both Brent and Falconer turned to more mundane matters, such as locating 2,000 pairs of shoes for Walker’s and Breckinridge’s men.²⁷

South of Chattanooga, the news of a potential Federal incursion into the army’s rear created concern in several quarters. Security for the railroad to Atlanta had been vested in the Georgia State Line since July. Controlled by Governor Brown and his adjutant general, Maj. Gen. Henry Wayne, Col. Edward Galt’s First Regiment and Col. James Wilson’s Second Regiment were scattered along the railroad. Headquartered at Resaca, Galt covered the sector south to Atlanta, with detachments at Chattahoochee Bridge, Etowah Bridge, Pettis Creek Bridge, and Resaca. Wilson’s regiment guarded the railroad from Resaca to just north of Graysville, which included Dalton, Tunnel Hill, and several bridges around Catoosa Platform and Graysville. At least six cannon supported the infantry, and fortifications covered the major river crossings. Wayne established his own headquarters at Cartersville. During the crisis of 1 September, Bragg notified Wayne to “look out for trouble along the line of the road.” Wayne’s command was not under Bragg’s control, but Brown did not prevent cooperation between the State Line and the Army of Tennessee. Such was not the case with Confederate medical personnel, attempting to relocate hospitals evacuated from Chattanooga. On 1 September Surgeon Dudley Saunders was in the midst of securing equivalent space on the railroad south of Dalton. He found several suitable buildings in Marietta but was blocked at every turn by Brown’s representatives. Saunders estimated that a battle would create at least 6,000 seriously wounded, and he already was accommodating 4,000 sick. Brown’s refusal to permit use of the Georgia Military Institute buildings at Marietta for hospital purposes was especially galling to Saunders. He begged Stout to intervene with Brown, saying, “Privately I do not like the spirit shown by Gov Brown, there is too much of the demagogue.” With battle increasingly imminent and only 6,000 available beds, Saunders feared an impending medical disaster.²⁸

Throughout the army perceptive soldiers saw that something was stirring on 1 September. Rumors of the Federal probe toward Lookout Mountain gradually spread through the camps. On the river, fraternization with the enemy now was sternly prohibited. Orders to cook three days’ rations also meant possible movement. Many units were already in motion. Hindman’s Division spent the day returning to its old camps at McFarland’s Spring. More units from Breckinridge’s Division arrived at Chickamauga Station. Martin’s Cavalry Division continued to straggle northward from Alabama, while Wharton’s troopers reached LaFayette in late afternoon. At Charleston, Stewart’s soldiers reveled in their transfer to Buckner’s Corps. According to Maj. Harry Thornton, “All the men and officers are delighted with the new arrangement—and the transfer to Buckner. He has a kind of popularity, rather based upon his showy military deportment than upon any solid services—while D. H. Hill after his career in Virginia in command of Alabamians is not cordially respected by them.” In the Thirty-Eighth Alabama Infantry regiment, Sgt. Talbert Holt commemorated his fourth wedding anniversary in a letter to his wife, Carrie, and stated, “Big battle to be fought soon, hope I wont be in it.” During the day, Johnson’s Brigade reached Charleston. Yet to arrive was Preston’s Division, which stopped for the night at Riceville. With Forrest’s Cavalry Division and Pegram’s Brigade heading for the Hiwassee also, the only unit remaining at Loudon was Scott’s Cavalry Brigade. Scott’s troopers manned the entrenchments north of the river with two mountain howitzers, sending their horses and the remainder of Robinson’s Battery to the south bank. In Chattanooga, Pvt. William Whitehead of Company H, Second Kentucky Infantry regiment, was executed by musketry for desertion. Cpl. John James of the Thirty-Ninth Alabama Infantry regiment told his wife of his role: “I had to unlock the handcuffs from a captive to be shot. He was shot in a few moments after I took the handcuffs off of him.”²⁹

Unaware that the Confederates had discovered the Caperton’s Ferry crossing, Rosecrans believed that Bragg remained focused upstream. In fact, there was concern that the Confederates might cross the river and strike the Twenty-First Corps. At 10:00 A.M. Garfield telegraphed Thomas: “Have you any news touching the reported movement of the enemy into East Tennessee?” Thomas replied that he had none. When no other sources indicated such a movement, Garfield relaxed. Writing to his wife, Lucretia, he calmly announced, “We must delay our movement till we can ascertain the truth of this rumor. If it be true we will turn back and fight him on this side. If not we will try to find him beyond the mountains.” His health having returned, Garfield boasted, “No man in this army can fill my place during this moment. It would take him several months to learn the character and condition of affairs as I know them and to hold that influence with the commanding General that I do.” Garfield’s placid demeanor seemingly had an effect. At 2:00 P.M. Rosecrans asked Sheridan for a progress report on the Bridgeport bridge. When told that the work would not be completed until the next day, he seemed content to let the matter rest. Thus the staff spent the day resolving smaller issues. Garfield ordered Thomas to improve the roads between the Battle Creek and Bridgeport enclaves and rebuked Steedman at Murfreesboro for delaying telegraphic communication from the rear. Goddard ordered Steedman to relieve the Sixty-Ninth Ohio Infantry regiment at Cowan. Bond instructed Morgan to bring his infantry to the Flint River bridge, leaving his cavalry at Huntsville. Thoms also tried to secure the relief of the Sixty-Ninth Ohio, as well as the Eighty-Ninth Ohio Infantry regiment at Tracy City. Thoms offered the 60,000 rations and 700 sacks of grain at Tracy City to any Twenty-First Corps units that might want them. Finally, Thoms instructed Chief Quartermaster Hodges to negotiate with civilian bridge companies for the reconstruction of the Tennessee River and Running Water Creek railroad bridges.³⁰

In the Twentieth Corps sector, there was no movement on 1 September. On Sand Mountain, Davis’s men spent the day winnowing their baggage in accord with General Orders, No. 28, which limited regiments, batteries, and brigade headquarters to only three wagons apiece. The three regimental wagons could carry a wall tent, regimental and company desks, cooking utensils, 500 pounds of medical supplies, camp tools, officers’ baggage (limited to 80 pounds each), and three days’ forage for the regimental animals. Division headquarters were limited to ten wagons each: four for camp equipage, baggage, desks, and three days’ forage; four for shoes (800 pairs), some clothing, and blacksmith tools; and two for officers’ commissary supplies. Division ammunition trains were to carry 110 rounds of small arms ammunition per man and 250 artillery rounds per gun. A few wagons in the ammunition train were loaded with axes, spades, and picks for road repair and entrenching. All other wagons were to be grouped into a divisional supply train, divided into four sections carrying six days’ rations each. Every wagon was required to carry three days’ short forage for its team. McCook on 1 September permitted an additional wagon per division to carry medical supplies. As Sheridan had already reduced his wagons below the number required by corps headquarters, he was allowed to go his own way. The order reduced the transportation of the Twentieth Corps to approximately 750 wagons and more than 100 ambulances, pulled by 4,500 mules and just over 200 horses. In order to meet the requirement, hard choices had to be made. Regiments accustomed to nine wagons had to be content with three. Most tents were forbidden, leaving the men only their shelter halves. Officers had to reduce their personal baggage to subsistence levels, which some took in stride, while others grumbled. Everything not taken had to be sent to Stevenson and stored, possibly never to be seen again.³¹

Everywhere in the corps area, the winnowing process continued all day. On Sand Mountain, Hans Heg had no difficulty, as he told his wife, Gunild: “I can take along all I have got.” In Johnson’s division, Col. Hiram Strong of the Ninety-Third Ohio Infantry regiment found the reduction more painful: “I took an old valise of Col. Martin’s put in it such articles of indispensable necessity as the journey required and sent my trunk back.” Sgt. Maj. Lyman Widney of the Thirty-Fourth Illinois Infantry regiment was philosophical: “So anxious are we to lighten our loads that very few have retained any clothing but what they are wearing and one blanket preferring a scanty wardrobe to carrying a heavy pack over the mountains and at the same time filling the position of ‘assistant mule’ by helping to drag baggage wagons and artillery over steep and rocky mountain roads.” Less accepting was Surgeon Luther Waterman of the First Division. Given the reduction of medical supplies to only 500 pounds per regiment, Waterman foresaw a situation in which those supplies would probably be unavailable just when most needed. Had he known that Marietta Davis, twenty-five, the division commander’s wife, was traveling with two large trunks, he would have been even more peeved. Still, General Orders, No. 28, was generally obeyed in the two Twentieth Corps divisions beyond the river. For those men who finished their sorting and packing early, the remainder of the day was theirs. In Davis’s division, the soldiers lazed about their camps or surveyed their surroundings. Johnson’s men washed clothes, bathed, swam, and frolicked in the river. Late in the day, corps chief of staff Gates Thruston issued orders for the next move. Davis was to advance to the far side of Sand Mountain, descend into Wills Valley, and halt at William Winston’s plantation. At the same time, Johnson was to ascend Sand Mountain and occupy Davis’s old camps. Both men were told that McCook and his staff would join Johnson on the mountain during the day. That night Davis and his wife dined again with Colonel Post at his headquarters on the mountain.³²

At Bridgeport, the frenzy of activity continued on 1 September. With more than 1,000 men on the job, work on the trestle bridge continued from both the western bank of the river and Long Island. In the middle of the channel the water was at least eleven feet deep, requiring pontoons to span the gap. While some men extended the trestle, others constructed a bridge of twenty-six pontoons from Long Island to the east bank. Meanwhile, a handful of Confederate prisoners toiled on the approaches and the road across the island. Around 3:30 P.M., Lt. George Burroughs declared the pontoon bridge ready for use. That left only the combination trestle-pontoon structure to be completed, a much more complex task. During the day, Laibold’s Third Brigade of Sheridan’s division moved from Stevenson to Bridgeport. With his command now united, Sheridan moved his headquarters to Bridgeport as well, relieving Lytle at the construction site. Freed of larger responsibilities, Lytle attempted to have a group photograph made of himself and his staff, but the effort was unsuccessful. During the afternoon, wagons from Brannan’s division began to accumulate near the bridge. While waiting to cross, teamsters and guards washed away the ubiquitous dust by bathing in the river. Two such soldiers, privates Harvey Cotterman, twenty, and David C. Moler, twenty-one, both of Company G, Thirty-First Indiana Infantry regiment, unfortunately got into deeper water than they could handle. When one struggled, the other went to his aid, and both drowned in full view of hundreds of men working on the bridge. As darkness fell, Lt. Col. Kinsman Hunton of the First Michigan Engineers and Mechanics estimated that the bridge would be available for use before noon on the next day. At 9:30 P.M., Sheridan promised Rosecrans that the bridge would be completed even earlier, by 9:00 A.M. Anxious to leave the river behind, Sheridan asked permission to cross his division as soon as the bridge was ready, permission readily granted by Rosecrans.³³

Upstream, Brannan and Reynolds expanded their toeholds east of the river. At Battle Creek, Brannan ordered his three brigades to move inland, even though their artillery batteries and wagons had not yet crossed. First to advance was Van Derveer’s Third Brigade. During the morning Van Derveer and his staff rode east three miles on the Shell Mound road to Graham’s Station, where the brigade joined him during the afternoon. Meanwhile, Connell’s First Brigade took the road past Taylor’s Store and halted at Moore’s Spring. Croxton’s Second Brigade followed Connell only as far as Taylor’s Store. From there Croxton furnished working parties that spent the day ferrying artillery pieces, rations, and baggage across the river. While so engaged, Pvt. Henry Winkler of the Tenth Indiana Infantry regiment was kicked in the head by a fractious mule on one of the makeshift rafts. Knocked unconscious, he fell into the river and drowned, his body disappearing in the current. Still the work went on as the men continued to manhandle artillery pieces across the stream. Similar craft were in use at Shell Mound, where Reynolds supervised the transfer of his two brigades east of the river. First to move were the detachments of King’s Second Brigade left behind with the brigade trains when most of the command crossed the river two days earlier. After bringing over the brigade’s baggage, the new arrivals joined their parent units near the ruined railroad depot. Those not so occupied splashed and swam in the river. Again, tragedy struck, as Pvt. Robert Commons of Company I, Seventy-Fifth Indiana Infantry regiment, drowned in full view of 500 horrified onlookers. The drowning did not stop the ferrying process, as Turchin’s Third Brigade crossed the river during the afternoon. Like Van Derveer, Turchin had a regimental band play patriotic airs while the rafts, flatboats, and skiffs plied the wide river. Across the stream at last, Turchin’s men also camped near the depot. Reynolds now had his division securely on the eastern shore, although he and his staff remained west of the stream.³⁴

For the units executing Rosecrans’s deception plan, news of downstream events came only through rumors brought by supply trains crossing Walden’s Ridge. The regiments under Wilder’s direct command spent the day quietly, with no bombardment of the city. Pickets at several crossings showed themselves to their opponents but initiated no contact. Similarly, Wagner’s infantrymen remained quiescent on Walden’s Ridge. In the Fifty-Seventh Indiana Infantry regiment, the men were delighted to receive a shipment of mail. During the day, Wagner’s regiments welcomed their rear detachments, which had remained in the Sequatchie Valley until the Twenty-First Corps began moving southward. Farther up the river valley, Hazen continued his efforts to distract any watching Confederates. During the morning he dispatched elements of the Ninety-Second Illinois Mounted Infantry regiment, supported by part of the Forty-First Ohio Infantry regiment, to demonstrate at Igou’s Ford, not far above Harrison’s Ferry. Later, he sent portions of the Ninety-Eighth Illinois Mounted Infantry regiment and four cannon, supported by the Ninth Indiana and 124th Ohio Infantry regiments, to Thatcher’s Ferry. Hazen had heard that the Confederates were planning to raid across the river to a grist mill his troops were operating, and he wanted to forestall that possibility. The guns fired a few rounds across the river without response, but Hazen’s point had been made. Meanwhile, he attempted to exchange Col. Isaac Suman’s Ninth Indiana for the Sixth Ohio Infantry regiment. The latter had been attached to Hazen’s command for some time but was under orders to return to Grose’s brigade. Suman and Hazen were both strong personalities who mutually desired to sever their relationship. Nevertheless, Palmer, the division commander and a citizen soldier like Suman, denied Hazen’s request for a divorce. North of Hazen’s command, Minty’s brigade remained quietly at Smith’s Cross Roads, foraging and hoping not to be noticed in its exposed position.³⁵

With specific orders finally in hand, Crittenden executed them with a will. Buell’s First Brigade of Wood’s First Division led the way from Therman at 6:30 A.M. As the temperature rose and the dust clouds billowed, the march became exceedingly unpleasant. Still, Pvt. William Carroll was ready to go: “I want to get out of this valley and get away from the mountains. … I like to be in a level country whair you don’t have to clime a mountain every time you move.” Following Buell was Harker’s Third Brigade. Unwilling to leave the injured Captain Tuttle to an uncertain fate, Wood had ordered him to be transported with the column, though he had to endure “the most excruciating pain it was every my fortune to suffer.” Wood halted near Jasper in midafternoon after a grueling march of twenty miles. Close behind him was Palmer’s Second Division. His troops also were plagued by the heat and the “shoe mouth deep” dust. Palmer’s troops rested more often than Wood’s had done and thus halted five miles short of Jasper at the end of the day. Even though the regimental bands played lively music and tributaries of the Sequatchie River provided relief from the dust, some men still complained that the day’s march had been too long. Such a charge could hardly be lodged against Van Cleve, who halted several miles short of Dunlap in early afternoon. He too was glad to be leaving the Sequatchie Valley, where “the people are happy in their ignorance, as they rarely see the outside of the valley, and consequently cannot know that others can live, or do live, better than they.” Traveling with the column on horseback was Mrs. Alexander Stout, wife of the colonel of the Seventeenth Kentucky Infantry regiment. At least one officer saw her presence as unseemly, writing, “If she were my wife I would send her home.” Far ahead of his toiling infantry, Crittenden reached Jasper in early afternoon. There he learned that Reynolds would not relinquish his rafts until he had ferried a supply train across the Tennessee, so the Twenty-First Corps would have to wait around Jasper for at least a day.³⁶

With the Bridgeport bridge still unfinished and the rafts at Battle Creek and Shell Mound slow, the Caperton’s Ferry span represented the best hope for expanding the Federal presence beyond the river on 1 September. During the day drovers pushed a herd of cattle across the stream, and the First Tennessee (Union) Cavalry regiment crossed as well. Campbell’s First Brigade of McCook’s division thus became the first complete cavalry brigade beyond the river. Rosecrans needed to concentrate his Cavalry Corps so that it could lead the Twentieth Corps into the mountains, but the Federal cavalrymen remained scattered. McCook’s Second Brigade reached Caperton’s during the day but was not ready to begin an expedition. His Third Brigade, marching from Larkinsville, was also unready to cross. Long’s Second Brigade of Crook’s command was nearby, but his men spent the day issuing equipment, shoeing horses, and washing their mounts in the river. Thus the Cavalry Corps would not be ready to use the pontoon bridge for at least another day. Impatient, Rosecrans suggested to Negley that his division use the bridge while the cavalry was still coming forward. Thomas agreed, ordering Negley to advance along the river’s eastern shore to Taylor’s Store after crossing at Caperton’s. Negley himself planned to cross at the Hart’s Bar ford, and elements of Rosecrans’s escort guided him to that difficult crossing point. After learning that at least one cavalryman had drowned there, Negley elected to use the pontoon bridge after all. Already at Stevenson, Beatty’s First Brigade was the first of Negley’s units to move. Handing eighty-six Confederate prisoners to other units, Beatty’s men left the town in midafternoon and crossed the bridge just before dark. Their road led toward Sand Mountain for a little over a mile, then turned northward to parallel the river. Beatty himself remained in Stevenson for several hours, adjourning the examining board he chaired. By the time he crossed it was dark, and he spent several anxious hours until he found his command six miles beyond the bridge.³⁷

The late decision to send Negley’s division across the river meant that two brigades would have to negotiate the shaky pontoon bridge at night. Stanley’s Second Brigade left Cave Spring near sunset and traversed the dusty road to the river. Along the way, Pvt. William Christian of the Nineteenth Illinois Infantry regiment met his father, who offered his son an extra pair of shoes. The chance meeting filled Christian with foreboding: “I feel as though I would not see father again,” he wrote. By the time Stanley reached the bridge, darkness had fallen. The waning three-quarter moon had not yet risen, yet the crossing point was illuminated. Large bonfires blazed at both ends of the bridge and hundreds of campfires twinkled on the far bank where Johnson’s division lay, but clouds of dust diffused the light. Sgt. Joseph Johnston vividly recalled that the fires “threw a faint glare over the smooth current revealing the long low bridge with the hobgoblin forms of the troops bobbing up and down.” Crouched in each pontoon was a soldier ready to bail any water that splashed into it. The scene filled Lt. Eben Sturges Jr. with pride: “As I crossed the bridge that night feeling it beneath my feet almost as steady and, for our purposes, as stable as a turnpike, I felt proud of the yankee enterprise that had constructed it.” After crossing, Stanley’s men stumbled through the camps of sleeping Twentieth Corps soldiers and took the river road northward. Sirwell’s Third Brigade followed in Stanley’s footsteps. The moon had now risen in a cloudless sky, adding its pale illumination to the lurid scene. In the Seventy-Fourth Ohio Infantry regiment the men boisterously shouted and sang, while Capt. Robert Findley and Lt. Edward Ballard clutched tightly the six quarts of commissary whiskey they had just purchased in Stevenson for $1.00. The rowdy men of the Twenty-First Ohio Infantry gleefully whistled the “Rogue’s March” as they made their way over the span. It was midnight before Sirwell completed his crossing, and his command marched only two miles beyond the bridge before halting to rest fitfully beside the road.³⁸

When Rosecrans dispatched his nightly summary to Washington at 10:30 P.M., Negley’s troops were still crossing the river. Thus he stated that only four divisions were across the stream. He also reported, erroneously, that one of Stanley’s cavalry divisions was beyond the Tennessee. Rosecrans expected the Bridgeport bridge to be completed before dawn and that Sheridan’s division would then cross to the east bank. Two Reserve Corps brigades were also on the march, with their advance at Huntsville. All was going according to design and the Army of the Cumberland was well on its way to completing the most difficult and dangerous part of the campaign plan. Although he did not say so, Rosecrans had safely placed nearly half of his available infantry beyond the stream. With the arrival of Negley’s division on the far shore, fourteen of the thirty infantry brigades in the Fourteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-First Corps were across the river with only negligible losses. Only one cavalry brigade had crossed, but four others were gathered at Caperton’s Ferry ready to move on the next day. As soon as the Bridgeport bridge was completed, Sheridan’s division would cross the river, as would two brigades of Baird’s division of the Fourteenth Corps. Two of Crittenden’s divisions were near Jasper, within striking distance of the Shell Mound rafting site, and the third was only a day’s march behind them. The only point of concern was the worrisome bottleneck growing at Bridgeport, where hundreds of wagons and ambulances from several divisions had gathered to await the completion of the bridge. Even at Bridgeport, the engineers had promised imminent success. If the Army of Tennessee remained quiescent just a little longer, Rosecrans would able to consolidate his hold on the east bank of the river without fear of being thrown back across the stream. All in all, at the end of Tuesday, 1 September 1863, prospects never looked brighter for Rosecrans and the Army of the Cumberland.³⁹