15

 

LOOKOUT VALLEY

» 5–6 SEPTEMBER 1863 «

 

The operations order approved by Rosecrans early on 3 September envisioned that by the end of the next day the Twenty-First Corps would be threatening Chattanooga, the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps would control several gaps on Lookout Mountain, and the Cavalry Corps would be threatening Rome. Because of the collapse of the Bridgeport span and gross misjudgment in the difficulty of crossing Sand Mountain, Rosecrans’s army had fallen well short of that aggressive timeline. Still, the Confederate response had been minimal, so perhaps nothing had been lost. Tucked into Long Island Cove at the western foot of Sand Mountain, Rosecrans remained optimistic that his campaign was proceeding according to plan. He intended to cross Sand Mountain and descend into Lookout Valley at Trenton during the day, joining the Fourteenth Corps. Prior to his departure, he had Garfield prepare instructions for several of the most distant units. At 8:30 A.M. Garfield explained to Stanley the reasons for the delays besetting the main army and expressed the hope that Stanley could still threaten Bragg’s supply line. The timing of the thrust was left to Stanley’s discretion, but Garfield implied that Rosecrans expected him to move soon. Thirty minutes later, Garfield instructed Granger to forego garrisoning Huntsville, Alabama, but to protect the Larkinsville sawmill and the Paint Rock Creek railroad bridge. Morgan was to guard the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad east of the Cumberland Plateau with one brigade and prepare to send Daniel McCook’s brigade to join the main army. Similarly, Granger was to bring forward most of Steedman’s First Division from Middle Tennessee. Garfield asked Granger to forecast both the number of troops coming forward and the timing of Granger’s own arrival at Bridgeport, so that army headquarters could release the deception force. Finally, Garfield sent a brief note to Crittenden, granting him permission to modify slightly the route of the Twenty-First Corps into Lookout Valley.¹

In his note to Crittenden, Garfield indicated that while Rosecrans expected to go to Trenton that afternoon, the headquarters would not move until the next day because the road across Sand Mountain was hopelessly clogged with the trains of several divisions. Unable to get to Trenton expeditiously, Rosecrans decided to while away the long afternoon by exploring a large cave located near the head of Long Island Cove. Known to the Federals as Hill’s Cave, the cavern had been used by contractors Daniel Hill and King Newby to mine niter for the Confederate government. The diggings were far smaller than those at Nickajack Cave, as was the cavern’s mouth, but the cave’s passages extended for several miles. The allure of the cave proved irresistible to a man of Rosecrans’s curiosity, and he decided to spend the afternoon exploring its mysteries to a depth of at least 800 feet. He was accompanied by Goddard, engineer officers Merrill and Burroughs, and numerous officers and men from the Tenth Ohio Infantry and Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry regiments. The party gradually traversed a series of expansive rooms and narrow passageways, one of the latter involving a crawl of more than fifty feet, until they reached a space known to modern cavers as the Registry Room. There Rosecrans and Goddard inscribed their names, and the two engineers scratched their initials, far up a vertical shaft. Below that point, less exalted visitors left their own names as well. In exiting the cave Rosecrans apparently stuck in one of the narrow passageways and was extricated with some difficulty. According to Pvt. Baldwin Colton, who met Rosecrans coming out, “The General was much excited and perspiring at every pore, and oh, tell it not in Gath, he was much frightened.” Chastened by the experience, Rosecrans soon returned to the task of orchestrating the campaign. His inscription on the cave wall in Long Island Cove, however, stands as mute testimony to his momentary escape from the cascading delays afflicting his carefully crafted plan.²

The trains clogging the road across Sand Mountain belonged to Negley’s division, and behind them toiled Sheridan’s three brigades and several hundred more wagons. As he awaited the arrival of his train, Negley sought to expand his control of the territory beyond Brown’s Spring. The division’s camps lay directly at the foot of Sand Mountain in Back Valley and were separated from the main Lookout Valley by a range of low hills. Leaving the remainder of his division at Brown’s, Negley ordered Sirwell to scout into Lookout Valley with two regiments and a section of guns. Their route took them first to Trenton, where they found themselves in a region of nascent industrialization. Little more than two miles from Brown’s Spring the reconnaissance party came to the Macon Iron Works, which had been under construction since the previous year. Created to take advantage of small local deposits of iron ore and coal from the extensive Sand Mountain mines, the Macon Iron Works represented a minor attempt to add to the Confederacy’s meager stock of iron products. In its unfinished state, the establishment posed no threat to Negley’s men, who stripped it of everything usable and moved on. In another mile they came to Payne’s (or Sitton’s, as the locals styled it) Mill, a water-powered gristmill on Lookout Creek. Stocked with 400 bushels of wheat ready for grinding, the mill had far greater utility for the invading Federals than an incomplete ironworks, so the Seventy-Eighth Pennsylvania Infantry regiment became both guards and millers. Leaving the Pennsylvanians to their work, Sirwell pushed forward down Lookout Valley with the Twenty-First Ohio and the artillery section. Several miles southward, they found the Empire State Iron Works, also still under construction. Only the first of a planned series of furnaces was operational, but it too was abandoned. Leaving the second ironworks behind, Sirwell finally halted for the night at the gristmill of James Cureton, where another small quantity of wheat was confiscated. No Confederates appeared to molest the Federals in their march.³

While Sirwell searched for potential threats, other Fourteenth Corps units consolidated their hold on the Trenton area. In Negley’s command, Beatty’s and Stanley’s brigades made themselves comfortable in Back Valley. During the day, two of Beatty’s regiments assisted the division train down Sand Mountain, while other soldiers foraged liberally in the relatively untouched region. Many heard the booming of artillery in the direction of Chattanooga, while others noted the passage of two of Sheridan’s brigades toward Trenton. In Lytle’s First Brigade, Pvt. John Ely was concerned: “It is now very evident to me that our corps has been sent off here to the Right for the purpose of flanking Chattanooga. But I am almost afraid for the result, if Bragg retreats it will be all right, but if he shows fight I cannot see how our corps is to be saved from destruction.” During the afternoon Reynolds’s two brigades appeared, marching from their camps at Cole’s Spring. Turchin’s Third Brigade entered Trenton itself, with King’s Second Brigade following close behind. Capt. Augustus Ward of the Thirty-Sixth Ohio disparaged the village: “Small place, court house and church and the public buildings. … This is a hard poor country so far. I don’t like it.” Division commander Reynolds, however, was satisfied, establishing his headquarters near the courthouse and appropriating a church for divine services. Reynolds’s arrival, coupled with the appearance of most of Sheridan’s division, placed seven Federal brigades in the Trenton area by the end of the day. Two Fourteenth Corps divisions, however, still lagged behind. Brannan’s Third Division remained scattered along the rough mountain track from Nickajack Cave to Warren’s Mill. Several wagons and at least one artillery caisson fell into the abyss during the climb, killing several horses. Similarly, Baird’s two brigades only began to ascend the mountain from Moore’s Spring. As for corps commander Thomas, he and his extensive retinue camped at Warren’s Mill with Connell’s brigade of Brannan’s command.⁴

According to Rosecrans’s plan, Crittenden’s Twenty-First Corps was to threaten Chattanooga from the northern end of Lookout Valley, while Thomas’s Fourteenth Corps served as the connection with McCook’s and Stanley’s forces at Valley Head. Crittenden’s pathway through the mountains was to be the canyon cut by Running Water Creek, a relatively easy passage into Lookout Valley. Although rough, that road was far less difficult than the routes farther to the south. Nevertheless, Crittenden was slow to move, primarily because most of his trains had been caught by the collapse of the Bridgeport trestle. Thus, the Twenty-First Corps spent much of the day resting at Shell Mound, permitting Van Cleve to visit the tristate monument and Pvt. Henry Bowlby to drown in the river while bathing. The longer he delayed, the more Crittenden risked exposing Thomas’s units around Trenton to attack. By the afternoon of 5 September, Crittenden put his three divisions in motion for Running Water Canyon, following the railroad. Wood’s division began its march toward the canyon at 2:30 P.M., followed in order by Palmer’s division and Van Cleve’s men. Only the divisions’ ammunition trains accompanied the long column. Some of the corps supply trains were still crossing the Bridgeport spans at that time and would not reach Shell Mound until dark. Crittenden maintained corps headquarters at Shell Mound until 4:00 A.M. the next morning, although his escort from the Fourth Michigan Cavalry regiment departed during the afternoon after a visit to Nickajack Cave. During the morning Crittenden had asked permission to send Palmer’s command over the mountain via the route passing Gordon’s Coal Mines. While waiting for an answer, he discovered that Brannan’s division clogged that route, so he explained to Garfield that he had been unaware that the route belonged to Brannan. His apologetic tone contrasted sharply with communications from the other corps commanders and spoke volumes about the Crittenden-Rosecrans relationship.⁵

Crittenden’s orders to his division commanders were specific. Wood was to march along the railroad through Running Water Canyon until he had passed the small settlement of Whiteside, where he was to halt for the night. On the following day, he was to enter Lookout Valley and probe the Confederate defenses at the tip of Lookout Mountain. Palmer was to follow Wood to Whiteside, then take a narrow track up Sand Mountain through a defile known as Murphy’s Hollow. Palmer was to halt upon reaching the road from Shell Mound via Gordon’s Coal Mines. Van Cleve was to follow Palmer while maintaining a connection with Wood’s units in Running Water Canyon. Few wagons beyond ammunition carriers were to be taken. Harker’s Third Brigade of Wood’s command began the movement in midafternoon. In a futile effort at stealth, Wood forbade the use of bugles and drums. For four miles the road paralleled the river, but eventually it entered the mouth of Running Water Canyon, where it was constricted by Raccoon and Sand Mountains. Inadvertently leading the advance on a railroad handcar was a five-man wire party intent on advancing the telegraph line from Shell Mound. Reaching the ruins of the Running Water Creek railroad trestle, they halted while telegrapher George Peirce climbed a bridge pier. He was immediately accosted by Confederate cavalrymen, who ordered him to “come down from there.” While Peirce and his comrades headed for Chattanooga under guard, Harker’s Federals arrived. Finding the road blocked by the massive pile of wreckage, they cleared a path and continued to Whiteside, halting around 8:00 P.M. Behind Wood, Palmer’s division turned up the Murphy’s Hollow road and stumbled through the darkness for several hours until Palmer finally called a halt. Last in the column, Van Cleve’s two brigades followed Palmer’s men on the “indescribably rough road.” Around midnight, Van Cleve’s men halted short of Murphy’s Hollow for a few hours of fitful rest.⁶

The lunge across the river by the bulk of the Army of the Cumberland left Hazen’s deception force increasingly isolated. Ominously, the reappearance of Confederate pontoons in the river seemingly foretold a more aggressive Confederate posture. Momentarily unaware of the pontoon activity, Hazen spent the morning orchestrating his demonstration at Harrison and attempting to draw Minty’s brigade nearer his infantry. At 8:00 A.M. he reported that visible Confederate movements were concentrated around Tyner’s Station. Hazen’s firing at Harrison momentarily created a flurry of anxiety in Wilder’s command. At 10:00 A.M. Wilder reported that the Confederate pontoon bridge appeared to be operational and that there was much activity in the Confederate camps he could see. The message was transmitted by flag signal from a new station linking Wilder with the Sequatchie Valley signal line and ultimately to the telegraph line at Shell Mound and Bridgeport. From there it would have to be carried by courier into the depths of Long Island Cove to reach Rosecrans. Given the lengthy transmission time for the message, and Rosecrans’s absence from headquarters, Wilder would not receive a reply for many hours. Unwilling to wait, in late morning he sent the Seventy-Second Indiana Mounted Infantry and 123rd Illinois Mounted Infantry regiments to the river and ordered the first section of the Eighteenth Indiana Battery to fire on the pontoons from Stringer’s Ridge. Lilly’s men expended at least twenty rounds, striking the pontoons five times and sinking two of them. Confederate gunners responded with a few shots of their own but did no damage. Using his new signal capability, Wilder throughout the afternoon reported his “indifferent success,” noting that several spare pontoons were available to replace those he had destroyed.⁷

Although Hazen remained untroubled, others in the deception force became exceedingly nervous as the day progressed. Atop Walden’s Ridge, the noise of Hazen’s morning demonstration at Harrison caused Wagner to start two regiments down the mountain to assist in repelling an apparent assault. Upon learning that no attack was occurring, Wagner’s men retraced their steps. Their feelings of dread were exacerbated anew by Lilly’s afternoon bombardment of the Chattanooga waterfront. As evening neared, Wilder became so concerned that he began to think seriously about retreat. At nightfall he ordered all of his baggage trains and caissons to ascend Walden’s Ridge. At the same time he moved his three regiments nearer the river. In a series of notes to Hazen, Wilder explained that a downstream crossing would sever his 1,200 men from the main army. He detailed several troubling observations: flatboats formerly moored at the city waterfront had disappeared and had probably gone downstream to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek, where a great deal of noise had been heard; infantry pickets upstream from Chattanooga had apparently been replaced by cavalrymen; and, finally, ambulance traffic from Chattanooga toward Tyner’s Station had increased. Deserters from the Thirty-Fourth Alabama Infantry regiment stated that Longstreet’s Corps from Virginia was arriving and that a cavalry force massed upstream was ready to cross at Friar’s Island. Confusingly, deserters from the Nineteenth Tennessee Infantry regiment reported that only Breckinridge’s Division had arrived from Johnston’s army, Jackson’s Brigade was preparing to cross the river, but that Bragg was only feigning a crossing to cover his retreat. The mix of direct observations and deserter statements led Wilder to consider a Confederate assault likely, and he notified Wagner accordingly. At 11:00 P.M. Wagner again sent two regiments down the ridge, accompanied by a section of guns. While Wilder and Wagner fretted, only Minty at Smith’s Cross Roads seemed unconcerned about Confederate activity.⁸

At Valley Head, McCook’s First and Second Divisions remained at ease in William Winston’s plantation fields. Without Sheridan’s Third Division, still entangled with Fourteenth Corps elements around Trenton, McCook did not feel strong enough to advance on Lookout Mountain in force, a mission already assigned to Stanley’s Cavalry Corps. In many units the mail arrived, but rumors soon spread that it would be the last until Chattanooga fell. For soldiers like Pvt. Chauncy Brooks, such rumors were cruel. In a letter to his fiancée, Brooks explained the value of getting mail regularly: “I get so lonsom somtimes that I dont know what to do with my self, but when I get so I eather get your letters and read them over or sit down and write to you. It is comfort to me to eather. I love your kind letters dearly so pleas write often for it cheers me to here from my intended bride.” Other writers, like Capt. Philip Welshimer, had divined Rosecrans’s campaign plan: “It seems that we are flanking the Rebles in order to force them back from Chattanooga. If we fail in this the impression is we will move on Chattanooga from their rear.” He cautioned his wife not to be unduly alarmed, because nothing could be as bad as the Stones River fight had been. Col. John Martin warned his sister not to be surprised if no letters reached her for some time. Noting that it was his fortieth birthday, Capt. Henry Richards waxed philosophical: “I have seen enough confusion during the past year, and I feel like ending the balance of my life in quiet.” Richards worried about how their war experiences might affect men in the ranks: “It seems now that nothing but the strictest military regulations can control them.” Other writers were more positive, noting the large numbers of citizens either joining the Union army or migrating to the North. One teamster even bragged about conquering Sand Mountain with “the best pulling teem in the train.” As for McCook himself, he penned a brief note to Garfield at 6:30 P.M. stating that he had nothing new to report and was simply awaiting further developments.⁹

Rosecrans’s order of 3 September required Stanley to drive beyond Lookout Mountain toward Rome. The force sent to Rome “should push forward with audacity, feel the enemy strongly, and make a strong diversion in that direction.” Stanley, however, hesitated to commence such an aggressive movement. With Minty absent, he had only four cavalry brigades available, and they were not yet complete. During the day several supply trains arrived, along with the regiments guarding them, but others were still toiling across Sand Mountain. Thus Stanley decided to wait until his force was larger and his supplies more secure before beginning his raid. In the meantime, his division commanders reconnoitered the area aggressively. Edward McCook sent Archibald Campbell and two regiments fifteen miles down Wills Valley to the hamlet of Lebanon. Campbell chased a handful of Confederate scouts all the way to Lebanon but captured only a few winded horses and a small stock of whiskey. McCook also sent part of the Fourth Kentucky Cavalry regiment up Lookout Mountain toward Davis’s Gap. The Kentuckians surprised pickets from Crews’s Brigade, capturing eleven and driving the remainder down the mountain. Meanwhile, Crook led most of Long’s Second Brigade up Lookout Mountain on the direct road to Rome. Encountering Confederates on the far edge of the plateau busily obstructing the road, the Federals gave chase. Reaching the descent into Broomtown Valley, Crook led two dismounted companies down to the valley floor. When the fleeing Confederates escaped, he ordered a gradual withdrawal to Valley Head after dark. While awaiting Crook’s return, Stanley wrote to Garfield that he did not wish to begin his movement without Minty’s brigade, “unless the general desires me to go sooner.” Fearing he would be overruled, he initiated a frantic search for tools and explosives suitable for wrecking railroads. Like its compatriots elsewhere in the valley, Stanley’s command was not yet ready to implement the next stage of Rosecrans’s campaign plan.¹⁰

The pause by most of the Army of the Cumberland on 5 September did not extend to Granger’s Reserve Corps. Early in the day Granger reported that he would be sending two regiments from the Third Brigade of Morgan’s Second Division to Stevenson within the next two days. The Twenty-Second Michigan Infantry would leave Nashville by train that very day, and the 108th Ohio Infantry would follow soon thereafter. Whitaker’s First Brigade of Steedman’s First Division would march for Stevenson on 7 September, the same day that Granger himself planned to depart for the front. He planned to garrison McMinnville with the Fifth Iowa Cavalry regiment and a battery. Unmentioned was Reid’s Second Brigade of Steedman’s command, but it too was preparing to move south from Wartrace. At 6:15 P.M., Granger reported that Morgan would bring approximately 4,000 men forward, Steedman would furnish 3,500 more, and the two regiments from the Nashville garrison would add another 1,000, for a grand total of 8,500 reinforcements. Approximately 6,000 of the troops would reach the Tennessee River in four days, while Granger would arrive two days earlier. In Steedman’s command the day was spent concentrating scattered detachments, packing gear, and preparing the regiments for movement. Already moving, Morgan’s two brigades continued their leisurely advance toward Stevenson. On 5 September Tillson’s First Brigade neared Larkinsville. Meanwhile, Dan McCook’s Second Brigade passed through Huntsville to Hurricane Creek with the band of the Fifty-Second Ohio Infantry regiment jauntily playing “Dixie” and “Hail, Columbia” on the way. Far behind, the Eighty-Sixth Illinois Infantry regiment made it only to Pulaski. In a movement unrelated to that of the Reserve Corps, the Ninety-Second Illinois Mounted Infantry regiment departed Wilder’s command by way of Walden’s Ridge and the Sequatchie Valley to join the Twenty-First Corps as its scouting force.¹¹

By the time he wrote to Halleck on the evening of 5 September, Rosecrans had placed twenty-five of the thirty infantry brigades in the Fourteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-First Corps east of the river. Only John King’s brigade guarding Stevenson and Bridgeport, Dick’s brigade marching to Jasper, and the three infantry brigades of the deception force remained west of the stream. Four of Rosecrans’s cavalry brigades were also east of the Tennessee, with only Minty’s brigade absent with the deception force. Although Thomas, McCook, and Crittenden were all behind schedule, they had gained relatively secure positions on Sand Mountain or in Lookout/Wills Valley. On the army’s right, Stanley’s cavalry was preparing for a strike beyond Lookout Mountain toward Bragg’s supply line, with the Twentieth Corps in support. On the army’s left, the Twenty-First Corps soon would threaten Chattanooga from the north end of Lookout Valley, while the Fourteenth Corps in the center was poised to seize passes over Lookout Mountain. If Bragg continued to remain passive, Rosecrans would eventually sever his supply line to Atlanta and force him to stand a siege at Chattanooga. If Bragg withdrew southward to preserve his connection to Atlanta, Chattanooga would fall without a fight. Believing it unwise to detail his plans, Rosecrans said only that he was across the Tennessee in force. He expressed some concern about Confederate pontoon activity, but with Granger coming forward with all available reserves, he implied that he could handle the situation. He did not mention his afternoon foray into the cave. Nor did he tell his wife of his underground adventures. In a brief telegram to Anna, Rosecrans instead outlined his expectations for the future: “We will be in Georgia tomorrow. A great battle will probably ensue should the Rebels think they can stand, this side of Atlanta.” He asked for the prayers of the Roman Catholic community, and closed with the comforting news that their son Louis, still with the army, was safe.¹²

For several days, Rosecrans had queried Halleck about persistent rumors that troops from Virginia would soon be reinforcing Bragg. On 3 September he wrote, “Have you any news from Burnside? any reason to think forces will be sent from Virginia to East Tennessee?” On 4 September he telegraphed Halleck, “Is it not possible that Lee’s movements are intended to cover the temporary detaching of troops to Bragg?” Halleck’s response was dispatched at 12:30 P.M. on 5 September: “There is no reason here to suppose that any of Lee’s troops have been detached, except, perhaps, a small force to Charleston, S.C.” That statement would soon prove to be incorrect. Davis and Lee had finally agreed that a significant number of troops from the Army of Northern Virginia should indeed move to reinforce the Army of Tennessee. As a result, Lee on 4 September asked Longstreet for an estimate of the time such a movement would require. On 5 September, the day of Halleck’s reassurance to Rosecrans, Longstreet replied that he was unable to provide the answer. Maj. Frederick Sims of the Confederate Railroad Bureau was not so ignorant of such matters. Instructed to initiate the coordination process, Sims began at once to contact the affected railroad companies. For planning purposes he estimated the number of troops at 20,000 men and fifty cannon, with transit time estimated at five days. The direct route from central Virginia to Chattanooga involved only four railroads and was approximately 540 miles in length. The troops would travel via the Orange & Alexandria Railroad to Lynchburg, where they would take the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad to Bristol, thence southward on the East Tennessee & Virginia Railroad to Knoxville, and finally the East Tennessee & Georgia Railroad to Chattanooga. After giving him the requirement, Sims asked Thomas Dodamead, superintendent of the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad, if his road needed assistance with locomotives and cars, and Sims promised, “You shall be advised in time to prepare.”¹³

As Sims began to coordinate the troop movement in earnest, disturbing news arrived from southwestern Virginia. When Buckner withdrew from Knoxville in late August, only Alfred Jackson’s small command south of Bristol and Frazer’s garrison at Cumberland Gap had remained to hold the area. The withdrawal had been designed to prevent Buckner from being overwhelmed, but it had left Knoxville and the railroad corridor vulnerable to a Federal thrust. Now Jackson reported that Federal forces of unknown size were operating on the railroad near Jonesborough, Tennessee. The presumption that Burnside was moving to join Rosecrans had led the Richmond authorities to believe that only transient raids threatened the railroad to Virginia. In an effort to clarify the confused situation, Davis late on 5 September queried Bragg sharply about Federal movements. In the interim, the adjustment of departmental boundaries seemed momentarily sufficient as a response. Accordingly, Samuel Cooper assigned the southwestern Virginia portion of Buckner’s old department and the units east of Knoxville to Maj. Gen. Samuel Jones, commanding the Department of Western Virginia. Jones immediately left his Dublin, Virginia, headquarters for Bristol, hoping to meet Jackson and learn what was happening on the East Tennessee & Virginia Railroad. Privately, Davis was told that Jackson was “a very nervous person under responsibility, although undoubtedly brave and energetic.” Bristol was 100 miles southwest of Dublin, and Knoxville was 130 miles beyond Bristol. In light of such distances and his limited assets, Jones could hardly have had a more difficult task than to maintain the security of the railroad. Given the fact that Burnside’s advance guard had occupied Knoxville three days earlier, a fact unknown to Jones, the War Department, or the Railroad Bureau, it was already impossible.¹⁴

In Chattanooga, Bragg on 5 September continued to prepare his mobile forces for a possible strike across the river upstream from the town. He reiterated his order that Walker send only one brigade to Rome as a counterweight to a Federal thrust from Wills Valley. With his remaining brigades Walker was to form a new command, the Reserve Corps, by joining his division with that of Liddell. Liddell’s small two-brigade division had previously been designated the army’s reserve, an arrangement Liddell had brokered with Bragg earlier. Walker would thus command both the Reserve Corps and his old division, while Liddell retained command of his division only. Brent notified Hill that Walker’s troops no longer were part of his corps. Walker himself was pleased at the promotion, as he explained to his eldest daughter, Mary: “I have met all the Genls of any note here Polk D. H. Hill, Forrest, Buckner Breckinridge Cheatham, Cleburne &c &c. They all speak very confidently. Genl Bragg’s health is quite delicate but he is improving. He has responsibilities and cares enough to break down a hearty man. He has been very kind & friendly to me. He and Genl Mackall & Col Rutlege whom I have met here are old classmates. I have a separate command, Genl Liddell’s (another classmate) Division and mine united & called the Reserve.” Liddell, himself a man of extreme passions, was unhappy about the new arrangement: “General Walker was well-known to be a crackbrained fire-eater, always captious or caviling about something whimsical and changeable and hardly reliable. I was very much annoyed by such a man in business relations, though otherwise I regarded him as honorable and high-strung in all engagements. We were very friendly but constantly differed in our views.” When Liddell asked Mackall how the appointment had come about, the chief of staff responded, “It was done contrary to my wishes.” If nothing else, Bragg in his elevation of Walker had at least found an officer anxious to fight without any reservations whatsoever.¹⁵

While he pondered his options, Bragg during the day received several new items of information. Hazen’s morning bombardment and Wilder’s languid afternoon shelling made it clear that Federal units remained just across the river. More important was a scout’s report about Federal activity on the previous day in Wills Valley and on Sand Mountain. Neither the scout’s identity nor the time his report reached Bragg is extant. Nevertheless, his information was stunning in its accuracy. The scout correctly placed Davis’s and Johnson’s divisions of the Twentieth Corps in Wills Valley and noted the crossing of Sheridan’s and Baird’s divisions at Bridgeport. Most chilling of all, the scout accurately described the progress of 10,000 Federal infantrymen across Sand Mountain, including their bridge-building at Gunter’s Mill. According to the scout, the head of the Federal column had reached Lookout Valley southwest of Trenton by the end of the previous day. At one point he had encountered a Federal regiment on Sand Mountain whose commander inquired about the route to Johnson’s Crook and boasted that the railroad to Atlanta was within his grasp. The scout’s report was duly entered into Brent’s diary: “Reports thicken & confirm the belief that the enemy has passed to our left in force.” Therefore it was all the more imperative that Wheeler’s horsemen be more active. In a message to Wheeler, Brent laid out the requirement plainly: “We are still without definite information as to the positions & designs of the enemy. It is absolutely necessary we should have it. Use every possible effort to obtain it, and forward at once.” Shortly thereafter, Brent was even more direct: “The General Commanding directs that you will without delay move with your command into the [Wills/Lookout] valley, drive in the enemy’s pickets and assail him, so as to develop his designs, strength and position.” In case Wheeler was hesitant, Brent closed, “This must be done even at the sacrifice of troops.”¹⁶

As the day progressed, Bragg continued to assess his situation. Somehow, army headquarters had come into possession of a 26 August 1863 issue of the New York Times, which contained several articles of interest. One piece, copied from the Chicago Evening Journal of an earlier date, clearly explained most of the Federal movements that had already occurred. According to the reporter, writing from Winchester on 18 August, Crittenden’s Twenty-First Corps would face Chattanooga and cross the Tennessee River just above the city so as to interpose between Buckner’s and Bragg’s forces. Meanwhile, Thomas’s Fourteenth Corps and McCook’s Twentieth Corps would cross below Chattanooga and drive on Rome. Bragg would be forced to withdraw southward in haste, probably not halting until reaching Atlanta. Johnston was believed to be at Atlanta already, so the Army of the Cumberland would try to strike Bragg before he and Johnston could unite. A separate article, in the same New York Times, explained Burnside’s role: “It was absolutely necessary, however, that the exposed left flank of Rosecrans’ army should be covered while he makes a right swinging move on Chattanooga. This is the whole purpose of the co-operation of Burnside’s column.” During the day Bragg forwarded the relevant snippets from the Times to Richmond. He explained that the Federal plan described in the newspapers mirrored in most respects what he was actually seeing develop on the ground. Only Crittenden’s movements had not yet fully materialized; otherwise, the newspapers spoke the truth. The scout’s statement placing McCook and Thomas in Wills/Lookout Valley corroborated the paper’s account. Bragg argued that his decision to bring Buckner’s command nearer to Chattanooga had thwarted the Federal designs. Although he gave no details about his next move, he confidently predicted, “The movements of Buckner have frustrated one part of the plan. We shall strive now to turn it to our advantage.” Yet, pending a response from Hill, Bragg remained undecided on a specific offensive response.¹⁷

While he waited to hear from Hill, Bragg busied himself with lesser matters. The one piece of information lacking was the exact location of Crittenden’s Twenty-First Corps. He could see the Federals demonstrating across the river in small numbers, but the towering heights of Walden’s Ridge screened many dangerous possibilities. Troubled by some vague statements in the scout’s report that appeared to refer to the area north of Trenton, he enjoined Mauldin to have his scouts be more specific in naming locations and roads in the future. He raised other concerns with Polk. Polk’s signalmen had for some time operated a station atop the west brow of Lookout Mountain that transmitted to Chattanooga via a relay station on Raccoon Mountain. As that station was growing in importance, he ordered Polk to detail an infantry company to protect it. He also instructed Polk to establish a closer connection between Hindman’s camps at McFarland’s Spring and Smith’s Brigade near the foot of Lookout Mountain. Finally, he ordered Polk to maintain a two-man guard over the army’s pontoons still lying in the river. After issuing so many minute instructions to his senior corps commander, Bragg also promised to act on charges Polk recently had leveled against Hindman for insubordination. Essentially a foolish argument between Hindman and Polk’s staff over a camping site, the dispute hardly merited official notice in view of the situation facing the Army of Tennessee. Nevertheless, Bragg promised that action would be taken as “soon as the exigencies of the service will permit.” He ended the day by ordering Buckner to move his corps southward on the following day to the village of Ooltewah on the railroad between Cleveland and Tyner’s Station. In an effort to hold as much territory as possible, he instructed Buckner to leave one brigade on the Hiwassee River at Charleston to watch for Burnside.¹⁸

In beleaguered Chattanooga and its environs, everyone continued to wait for something to happen. According to Mobile Tribune correspondent Samuel Reid, Chattanooga itself was a virtual ghost town, with only a few commercial establishments open for business. The much reduced Chattanooga Daily Rebel, however, still struggled to publish a one-page edition. Soldiers still manned the forts on the river, but otherwise the city streets were deserted. In Polk’s Corps, several hundred detailed men returned to their regiments. The sounds of the various Federal bombardments echoed throughout Polk’s encampments but were no longer seen as indicators of coming events. Only in Strahl’s Brigade, occupying the mouth of Lookout Valley, was there any sign of concern, and that was simply a requirement for soldiers to remain close at hand in camp. Still, most men were of similar belief as Pvt. Henry Wulff, who wrote to a friend, “We are expecting a very hard fought battle to take place shortly up in this vicinity.” Farther upstream, all remained quiet in Hill’s Corps as well, but veteran soldiers saw ominous signs that the calm would soon be shattered. Although he may have been in the area, Breckinridge apparently had not resumed formal command of his division, leaving Helm in charge at Tyner’s Station. In Cleburne’s Division, coordination problems arose with Forrest’s cavalrymen, as the latter slowly relieved the infantry regiments holding the defensive positions along the river. The Seventeenth Texas Cavalry (Dismounted) regiment spent the day moving its camp to a new location, described by one diarist as “a pleasant camping place; rather too much so to stay long.” In Walker’s new Reserve Corps, elements of Gist’s Brigade continued to depart for Rome. Across the army, from Tyner’s Station to Chattanooga Valley, many soldiers continued to attend religious services and impromptu camp meetings. In at least two commands, visitors from home brought much-needed stocks of new clothing and delicacies far removed from army rations.¹⁹

Troops on Bragg’s flanks continued to change position on 5 September. The Twenty-Fourth South Carolina Infantry regiment of Gist’s Brigade reached Rome around sunrise. Several mountain ranges west of Rome, Wheeler finally joined Wharton at the hamlet of Alpine. Harrison’s Brigade of Wharton’s Division also reached Alpine, joining Crews’s Brigade already picketing Lookout Mountain. Not yet in receipt of Bragg’s orders to push beyond Lookout Mountain, Wheeler contented himself with blocking the roads at Henderson’s, Neal’s, Tap’s, Standifer’s, Leavell’s, and Davis’s Gaps with trees and large rocks. Such barriers would do little to halt a large Federal force and would hinder any offensive movement by Wheeler’s men. Clearly, Wheeler saw no prospect of any movement beyond Lookout Mountain, aggressive or otherwise. He would send scouts forward, but would not probe the Federal positions in a serious way. Wheeler’s other division, Martin’s, remained all day at LaFayette, still gathering its limited strength. East of Alpine, a detachment from Hagan’s Brigade bringing horses to Martin’s command reached Summerville. There rumors of Federals nearby caused the detachment to depart hastily after dark toward LaFayette. Far to the southwest, the Eighth Confederate Cavalry regiment, also of Hagan’s Brigade, finally left its lonely picket posts on the Tennessee River and headed northeast in search of the Army of Tennessee. In the north, on Bragg’s other flank, Buckner’s Corps was also in motion. Although Buckner himself during the day moved only along the railroad from Charleston to Cleveland, his troops continued to sidle westward toward the Tennessee River. Two brigades of Preston’s Division pushed close to Harrison. Ten miles to the north, Stewart’s Division halted around Savannah Church. Left increasingly isolated was Trigg’s Brigade, still gamely holding the line of the Hiwassee River at Charleston. There Trigg’s men were so bereft of support that they were forced to forage locally in order to have any rations at all.²⁰

During the evening, new information caused Bragg to alter his assessment. First, a courier arrived around 11:00 P.M., carrying Hill’s response to Bragg’s suggestion of an offensive movement. Although Hill’s note is not extant, its content can be inferred from the accompanying response of Cleburne, which has survived. Late to receive Hill’s query, Cleburne generally favored a strike across the river, but with serious reservations. Most notably, the near impossibility of crossing his artillery would prevent him from overcoming Federal defensive positions. Pending new orders, Cleburne would continue to withdraw his division from the river to campsites around Ooltewah. He noted further that two of his regiments had not yet been relieved from their picket posts on the river. Clearly Cleburne was skeptical of any river crossing, and Hill no doubt added skepticism of his own. At any rate, Mackall quickly acknowledged receipt of the messages and on Bragg’s behalf approved Cleburne’s continued movement toward Ooltewah. Mackall’s telegram was brief, probably because army headquarters now was wrestling with more troubling information. Three Federal prisoners, including telegrapher George Peirce, had just arrived in Chattanooga. During the night they were brought to army headquarters, where Bragg himself led the interrogation. Peirce would later claim that he feigned ignorance and around midnight was dispatched to the guardhouse. Perhaps he succeeded in his subterfuge, but at least two privates were captured with him, and they may have been more talkative. Certainly the Federals knew of the movements of Crittenden’s three divisions, which they had inadvertently led toward Lookout Valley. No matter who gave up the secret, Bragg now knew more about the location of the Twenty-First Corps than he had had earlier in the day. On Bragg’s direction, Brent telegraphed both Hill and Buckner to come to army headquarters as soon as possible.²¹

Bragg’s information that a significant Federal force was on the verge of debouching into the northern reaches of Lookout Valley was correct. Early on the morning of Sunday, 6 September, Wood’s First Division, Twenty-First Corps, resumed its march eastward from Whiteside. Although only Buell’s and Harker’s brigades were present, Wood’s orders required him to push into Lookout Valley and probe toward Chattanooga. In the lead, Harker placed the Third Kentucky Infantry regiment in skirmish order at the head of his column and began to advance not long after sunrise. Almost instantly the Kentuckians encountered opposing skirmishers, most likely some of Mauldin’s cavalrymen. With a large numerical advantage, Harker made slow but steady progress. Gradually Running Water Canyon widened to reveal the imposing Lookout Mountain, rising far above some intermediate hills. Approximately five miles from Whiteside, Harker reached Lookout Valley itself. The Confederate skirmishers continued their fighting withdrawal but changed their direction to the northeast. Harker slowly followed them, and Buell followed Harker. As the division entered the main valley, Wood and others noticed a signal station high on Lookout Mountain furiously transmitting messages over their heads to another station on Raccoon Mountain. Still, Harker pushed on for two more miles. Crossing the Tennessee state line, in early afternoon he reached Wauhatchie, junction of the Nashville & Chattanooga and Wills Valley Railroads. There, on the bank of Black Creek, the Federals stopped and assumed a defensive posture. Confederate skirmishers remained visible, and Wood believed many more Confederates were concealed on the lower slope of Lookout Mountain. The more he assessed the ground around the railroad station, the more he believed it to be utterly indefensible with the force he then commanded. Nor was there any source of reinforcement nearby—Wood and his small command were completely alone.²²

Had he been free to select his own route into Lookout Valley, Crittenden would probably have chosen a different path for the Twenty-First Corps than Running Water Canyon. On the previous day, he had sought permission to follow Reynolds’s route from Shell Mound on a rough track called the Nickajack Road. Told that Brannan’s troops had been assigned to follow Reynolds, Crittenden was forced to use Running Water Canyon at least as far as Whiteside. At that hamlet the Murphy’s Hollow Road climbed out of the canyon for three miles to a junction with the Nickajack Road on top of Sand Mountain. Preferring to remain near the Fourteenth Corps in such forbidding terrain, Crittenden had sent Palmer’s and Van Cleve’s divisions up the Murphy’s Hollow Road from Whiteside, while Wood met the requirement for a reconnaissance toward Chattanooga. Like Wood, Palmer and Van Cleve each lacked a brigade, making it even more important to remain within supporting distance of Fourteenth Corps units. While Wood began his advance in Running Water Canyon, Palmer sent Cruft’s and Grose’s brigades up Murphy’s Hollow. The road was clogged with fallen trees, slowing the advance. Behind Palmer’s men, Van Cleve’s brigades entered Murphy’s Hollow as well. Crittenden, who had spent the night at Shell Mound, soon appeared with his staff and quickly made his way to the head of the column. Shortly after 9:00 A.M., he reached the junction of the Murphy’s Hollow and Nickajack Roads on top of Sand Mountain. There Crittenden found the Nickajack Road filled with regiments of Brannan’s division. Momentarily unable to move farther, Crittenden at 9:35 A.M. wrote a long note to Garfield. In it, he described his location, passed along some information from Wood about Confederate cavalry detachments at Kelly’s Ferry, and stated that he was forwarding a message to Burnside that had inadvertently been sent to him. Other than the fact that the cavalry regiment he had requested had not reported, Crittenden gave no indication he saw any difficulties ahead.²³

Finding Brannan’s men filling the Nickajack Road, Crittenden halted Palmer and Van Cleve, whose soldiers sprawled on the roadside in Murphy’s Hollow and filled their canteens at Murphy’s Spring. Brannan, meanwhile, was in no hurry. With Van Derveer’s Third Brigade still struggling up the western side of Sand Mountain with the division’s trains, he remained at Gordon’s Coal Mines to await their arrival. At the road junction where Crittenden and Palmer waited, Connell’s First Brigade was very near the eastern brow of the mountain where the Nickajack Road dropped precipitously into Slygo Valley. Separated from the much larger Lookout Valley by an intervening ridge, Slygo Valley was the location of William Cole’s extensive plantation and Cole’s Academy. Reynolds’s division had passed through the Slygo Valley two days previously, on its way to Trenton, so Cole was hardly surprised when Connell’s Federals appeared. Behind Connell, Croxton’s Second Brigade slowly began its descent to the same area. Eventually, Croxton’s men also established campsites on Cole’s property. Glad to have the dry and dusty Sand Mountain behind them, they found themselves in an idyllic setting, with good water and no Confederates to disturb them. Brannan remained atop Sand Mountain to greet Van Derveer’s men and the struggling trains. Exhausted by the climb, Van Derveer’s troops halted soon after reaching the summit. The attenuation of Brannan’s division furnished an opening for Crittenden to descend the mountain as well. Palmer led Cruft’s First Brigade into the Nickajack Road and thence down the track into the Slygo Valley. Grose’s Third Brigade followed Cruft. Because Brannan’s men had already appropriated the best campsites near Cole’s Spring, Palmer’s two brigades were forced to continue to Cole’s Academy. Crittenden himself remained at the junction of Murphy’s Hollow and Nickajack Roads, where he established Twenty-First Corps headquarters. Van Cleve’s division did not climb out of Murphy’s Hollow but remained dispersed along the road on both sides of Murphy’s Spring.²⁴

As Crittenden worked to untangle Palmer and Van Cleve from Brannan’s command on top of Sand Mountain, Wood at Wauhatchie was becoming increasingly nervous. Resistance had noticeably stiffened, the road beyond Wauhatchie climbed through heavily wooded terrain, and the signalmen far above him continued their inscrutable conversations over his head. To Wood, all signs pointed toward a strong Confederate force ready to pounce on his small command. After considering his predicament for an hour, at 2:00 P.M. he offered corps headquarters some advice: “As my position here, if the enemy is in force in Chattanooga, is hazardous, all the routes leading here should be promptly explored, and some part of the force with General Crittenden should be advanced at once, at least in supporting distance.” Told that Crittenden probably was in Lookout Valley eight miles south of Wauhatchie, Wood sent his note in that direction. His only means of communication were courier lines manned by a company of the Thirty-Ninth Indiana Mounted Infantry regiment that stretched back to Whiteside and southward down Lookout Valley. Unknown to Wood, Twenty-First Corps headquarters was at neither place, but on Sand Mountain at the junction of Murphy’s Hollow and Nickajack Roads. Growing more alarmed when no reply from Crittenden arrived, Wood wrote again at 4:00 P.M. By that time he had learned that Crittenden’s headquarters was still on Sand Mountain, so he repeated his earlier information in a dispatch sent via Whiteside. Noting that he had been skirmishing with the Confederates all day, he again asked that Twenty-First Corps units be moved within supporting distance. He also suggested that the direct road from Trenton to Wauhatchie might be a better route by which to bring that assistance. Staring at the Confederate signal flags waving above him on Lookout Mountain, Wood remarked, “You don’t know what I am going to do, for I’ll be damned if I know myself.”²⁵

Just before 5:00 P.M., Capt. John Leavell of Company G, Thirty-Ninth Indiana Mounted Infantry regiment, arrived at Crittenden’s headquarters with Wood’s first message. Crittenden responded quickly, acknowledging that Rosecrans’s order to reconnoiter toward Chattanooga had been accomplished, but he gave no orders to withdraw from Wauhatchie. If Wood needed to withdraw, he should retreat via Lookout Valley toward Trenton. Any decision to fall back would be Wood’s alone; no one would be moving toward him. Although Captain Leavell reported that Wood had been skirmishing with the Confederates all day, Crittenden was skeptical because Wood had not mentioned it in his 2:00 P.M. note. Dismissing Leavell to return to Wood, Crittenden next wrote to Garfield explaining what he had done. He admitted that Wood’s position was “quite hazardous,” but deserters’ statements indicated that only Strahl’s Brigade was in front. Crittenden closed by stating that if Wood withdrew, the decision would be his alone. Having absolved himself of any consequences that might develop, Crittenden sent the dispatch by courier to Reynolds at Trenton for forwarding to Rosecrans. He remained at the Nickajack/Murphy’s Hollow Road junction on top of Sand Mountain. At 7:00 P.M., Wood’s second dispatch arrived. Capt. Percival Oldershaw responded for Crittenden: “The general commanding appreciates your position as hazardous, and urges the greatest vigilance, as he is in no position to bring on an engagement in the absence of all advices from department headquarters, where I have sent all information promptly.” In an effort to reassure Wood, Oldershaw repeated the deserters’ statements that only Strahl’s Brigade confronted Wood. He noted that one of Van Cleve’s regiments was at Whiteside, that both Palmer’s and Brannan’s divisions were at the Cole plantation, and that Reynolds’s division was at Trenton. Wood therefore knew where all the friendly units were, but still there were no orders for him to withdraw or for anyone else to move to his aid.²⁶

As night fell at Wauhatchie, Wood’s troops prepared to spend the evening in close proximity to whatever Confederate forces were concealed in the woods beyond Black Creek. Wood himself, however, was not prepared to accept passively the disaster he fully expected to occur the next day. During the afternoon he had interrogated citizens and a prisoner taken by his skirmishers. Collectively, their statements indicated that Cheatham’s Division lay just beyond the jutting point of Lookout Mountain, and Hindman’s Division was only a few miles beyond Cheatham. The frenetic activity of the Confederate signalmen on the heights, which continued after dark with lights replacing flags, clearly indicated that Wood’s position and strength had been well known in Chattanooga for several hours. In the gathering darkness, sounds coming from beyond the Federal picket line were interpreted by several officers as Confederate attack preparations. Unlike Crittenden, who seemed unwilling to move without positive orders from Rosecrans, Wood believed he needed to act decisively to save his command from potential annihilation. Accordingly, he decided to withdraw his two brigades under cover of darkness to a more defensible position. At 10:00 P.M., Buell’s and Harker’s troops stealthily moved to the road, formed column, and departed, leaving their pickets in place along the creek for two more hours. The division trains did not encumber the column, having been left with the corps trains near Whiteside. No Confederates molested the marching Federals, who halted on a range of small hills approximately two miles south of Wauhatchie. There Wood’s troops covered both the road to Whiteside through Running Water Canyon and the main road through Lookout Valley toward Trenton. If he were to be attacked there, Wood could make a fighting withdrawal in either direction. With their minds now more at ease, Wood and his men lay down to rest for the remainder of the night in their new position.²⁷

Wood’s reconnaissance toward Chattanooga was not the only offensive movement made by the Federals on 6 September. Negley’s division was under orders to probe south from its camps at Brown’s Spring toward a crossing of Lookout Mountain known as Stephens’s Gap. Unaware that the division would soon depart Brown’s Spring, Stanley early in the morning sent the Eighteenth Ohio Infantry regiment beyond Trenton to climb Lookout Mountain above Payne’s [Sitton’s] Mill. The regiment scaled the mountain, drove off a handful of Confederate pickets, and scouted briefly on the plateau before returning to camp. They found the camps of their brigade and division empty. Just before noon Negley led the division southward with Beatty’s First Brigade at the head of the column. Reaching Cureton’s Mill a little after 1:00 P.M., Negley continued his march to the large plantation of Benjamin Easley. Easley, sixty-three, was the largest slave owner in Dade County, and his property included a store, blacksmith shop, and private racetrack. Although Negley initially planned to leave one of his brigades at Easley’s, pressure from Sheridan’s division on his heels caused him to continue his march southward. A little more than a mile beyond Easley’s, the road to Stephens’s Gap diverged eastward toward the great horseshoe bend of Lookout Mountain called Johnson’s Crook. Near the intersection, at the junction of Lookout and Hurricane Creeks a few miles short of the mountain, Negley posted Stanley’s and Sirwell’s brigades and established division headquarters. Still in the lead, Beatty’s brigade turned into the narrow side valley and headed for the steep mountain wall two miles to the east. Arriving at Hugh McKaig’s house at the foot of the mountain at 5:00 P.M., Beatty sent the Forty-Second Indiana Infantry regiment cautiously up the rough track toward the crest. Halfway up they were fired upon by Confederate skirmishers, who wounded one of the Federals in the leg. With night approaching, Beatty withdrew to the foot of the mountain.²⁸

Behind Negley, other units were also on the move. Forced to follow Negley’s troops all the way from the river, Sheridan cursed the delays preventing him from joining his own Twentieth Corps. Disputes over campsites and slow wagon trains showcased the widely divergent personalities of the impetuous Sheridan and the affable Negley. Now, with Negley’s troops once more moving forward, Sheridan quickly put his division on the road. Riding ahead, he told Negley that he wanted Easley’s plantation for his own use, so Negley continued southward. The end of the day found Sheridan’s division encamped along the road stretching from James Cureton’s property on Lookout Creek south to Easley’s. Still on Sand Mountain, Baird’s division was just beginning to follow the route blazed by Negley and Sheridan several days earlier. With their trains finally out of the way, Baird spent the day lifting his own artillery and wagons up the western side of Sand Mountain. The passage of thousands of troops had not improved the road, forcing Baird to deploy infantrymen to assist the struggling teams. Amid clouds of swirling dust and sulphurous oaths from drivers, the guns, wagons, and a herd of cattle slowly crawled up the mountainside. In some cases battery commanders used ten horses per gun to reach the crest. Nevertheless, Baird’s men gained the summit before dark. They then continued along the road to Warren’s [Gunter’s] Mill, where they halted and camped at the improvised bridge constructed earlier by Negley. Ahead of Baird, Thomas and his entourage crossed to the eastern side of Sand Mountain and established corps headquarters at Brown’s Spring. Of all of the Fourteenth Corps divisions, only Reynolds’s did not move on 6 September. While King’s and Turchin’s brigades foraged vigorously in the tiny courthouse hamlet of Trenton, Reynolds himself attended preaching in a local church. During the day, the distant booming of cannon could be heard in the direction of Chattanooga.²⁹

Twenty-three miles south of Reynolds at Trenton and fifteen miles south of Negley at Johnson’s Crook, the Twentieth Corps spent a quiet Sunday at Valley Head. During the morning McCook forwarded to Garfield a statement from Crook recounting the testimony of an elderly civilian named Crow. Encountered during Crook’s earlier foray into Broomtown Valley, the old man offered secondhand information that the Army of Tennessee was under orders to withdraw toward Atlanta. Otherwise, McCook spent a remarkably relaxed day. No orders forecast departure from William Winston’s increasingly ravaged plantation, so the men of Davis’s and Johnson’s divisions spent the day in various pleasurable pursuits. In Post’s First Brigade of Davis’s command, there was preaching in the regiments during the morning and more preaching at division headquarters in the afternoon. According to Lt. Chesley Mosman, the surge of religious fervor was probably generated by the presence of Marietta Davis. Another junior officer, Leroy Mayfield, recorded in his diary, “Day passes drearily away, as always does the Sabbath in the army.” In a letter to his wife in Wisconsin, Heg also noted the presence of Marietta Davis: “She is a young, fine intelligent Woman but not handsome.” In Johnson’s Second Division, letter writing, preaching, dress parade, and a band concert helped many pass the time on a very hot day. Col. Thomas Harrison had no illusions about the loyal mountain people who lived in the vicinity: “I have seldom found so degraded a population as lives in this country.” Pvt. Alpheus Bloomfield explained to his sister that the army’s morale was high: “You may look for stirring news from this portion of the army, before the coming forty days.” The news was already bad for Lt. Philander Miller, who had his shoulder straps cut off publicly and received a dishonorable discharge for refusing to take his company on picket.³⁰

Alex McCook was in no hurry to leave his pleasant camp at Winston’s. He needed Sheridan’s division to join the corps, but, even more important, the Cavalry Corps was slated to lead the advance, not the Twentieth Corps. McCook’s role was to serve as a strong support to Stanley’s horsemen as they pushed beyond Lookout Mountain to threaten Bragg’s supply line to Atlanta and force the evacuation of Chattanooga. Although the failure of the Bridgeport bridge and the difficulty in crossing Sand Mountain had put everything behind schedule, Rosecrans still expected Stanley to initiate his part of the plan quickly. Stanley, however, was reluctant to begin his expedition, especially after learning of the army’s delays. He lacked Minty’s brigade, and his trains with their escorts were still toiling across Sand Mountain. In addition, he lacked tools for railroad wrecking and was unsure what support the Twentieth Corps might provide. Thus his cavalrymen remained relatively inactive on 6 September. In Edward McCook’s First Division, most of the day was spent in search of forage. Although some wagons had arrived on the previous night, most of the division’s trains and the Fourth Indiana Cavalry regiment were still on Sand Mountain. According to a man in the Second Michigan Cavalry regiment, food was scarce and the sick list lengthening, although the unit’s mail did arrive. Other than dispatching a few scouts to the top of Lookout Mountain, McCook did little more than send a few prisoners to corps headquarters. In Crook’s Second Division, the day’s work consisted solely of moving Long’s camps several miles southward to escape Davis’s marauding infantrymen. Meanwhile, the Second Kentucky Cavalry regiment continued to plod forward on Sand Mountain with Crook’s train and the Chicago Board of Trade Battery. At 10:00 P.M., Stanley summarized his situation for Garfield. Like Alex McCook, he offered the testimony of a “reliable” citizen that Bragg’s army had been ordered to retreat. As for his own inertia, Stanley blamed the delay on the slow movement of his supply trains.³¹

With seven Federal divisions in Lookout Valley visible to Confederate pickets from Wauhatchie to Valley Head, the deception force’s mission was complete. In fact, the deception force was now itself being deceived. During the previous night some of Wilder’s men stationed opposite Chattanooga had heard considerable hammering inside the town. Coupled with the pontoons still lashed to the riverbank and the appearance of cavalry at the upstream fords, a credible case for a Confederate crossing could be made. In response, Wilder’s command had spent a sleepless night under arms and Wagner sent half his brigade to the valley floor. By 6:00 A.M., Hazen began to doubt that a crossing was imminent, but prudence required covering all contingencies. Having already ordered all trains up Walden’s Ridge, he instructed Wilder and Wagner to block all routes into the Sequatchie Valley and told Minty to be prepared to return to Walden’s Ridge if threatened. By 10:00 A.M., Hazen was certain that there would be no Confederate attack, so he turned to the question of whether he or Wagner should be the true commander of the “U.S. Forces, Left Flank.” In long letters to both Garfield and Goddard he argued that he outranked Wagner by as many as twenty numbers but would return to a subordinate position if necessary. While Hazen defended his seniority, Wilder and Wagner began to notice significant new activity in front of them. It appeared that a Confederate division-sized unit with its trains was moving from the vicinity of Tyner’s Station toward Chattanooga. Recent deserters from Breckinridge’s Division reported that their command was the only reinforcement Bragg had received. Also, Wagner somehow discovered in early afternoon that Wood’s division had reached the vicinity of Wauhatchie. Wagner had been preparing to return his two regiments to the top of Walden’s Ridge, but in light of Wood’s advance, he bombarded Chattanooga with sections of the Tenth and Eighteenth Indiana Batteries. Confederate response was minimal, but Wagner could do no more.³²

In the army’s rear, reinforcing units continued to move forward. Detached from Wilder’s command, the men of the Ninety-Second Illinois Mounted Infantry regiment walked their horses across the wildly swaying spans at Bridgeport and marched to Shell Mound. There, they explored Nickajack Cave, taking their band inside to bounce patriotic airs off the cavern’s walls. In the Sequatchie Valley, Dick’s Second Brigade of Van Cleve’s division resumed its march toward the Bridgeport crossing. During the day, the Twenty-Second Michigan Infantry regiment, coming by train from Nashville, reached Bridgeport and camped on Long Island. At the same time both Whitaker’s First Brigade and Reid’s Second Brigade of Steedman’s First Division concentrated at Tullahoma and Estill Springs before heading over the Cumberland Plateau to Stevenson. Meanwhile, the 108th Ohio Infantry regiment left the Nashville garrison and took a train for Bridgeport. At Larkinsville, Morgan reported that most of his Second Division was also heading for Stevenson. Tillson’s First Brigade reached Bellefonte by nightfall. A day’s march behind Tillson, Daniel McCook left his bivouac at Hurricane Creek and headed for Larkinsville. He soon became distracted when his column passed the ancestral home of Frank Gurley, the alleged killer of his older brother Robert in 1862. Throughout their march, McCook’s men had been seeking an opportunity to gain revenge and had treated a number of civilians badly along the way. Now, McCook had another opportunity for vengeance, and he sent Maj. James Holmes and a detail from the Fifty-Second Ohio Infantry regiment to destroy all Gurley property within reach. By the time Holmes was finished, the orgy of destruction had consumed, by one soldier’s account, twenty-five structures, an orchard, and all of the fences within sight. Holmes then rejoined the brigade, which halted for the night west of Larkinsville. Meanwhile, the Eighty-Sixth Illinois Infantry regiment of McCook’s command finally crossed the Alabama state line on its way to Huntsville.³³

With more than half of his divisions beyond Sand Mountain, it was time for Rosecrans to join them. Slow to leave Long Island Cove, headquarters consumed the remainder of the day crossing Sand Mountain and descending to Brown’s Spring. From there, Rosecrans rode ahead to Trenton, arriving around sunset. First Sgt. Newton Parker, who saw the party pass, noted in his diary that the army commander “looks well.” Although it would be some time before the remainder of the staff arrived, and the First Ohio Battalion Sharpshooters would not straggle in until the next day, Rosecrans began work immediately. Stanley reported that Wharton’s Division held the Lookout Mountain passes, and that a citizen had heard that Bragg had been ordered to retreat. Contradictory information came from Crittenden, who provided deserters’ testimony that Johnston was in Chattanooga with heavy reinforcements and that Buckner was at Cleveland. The deserters placed Bragg’s strength at 50,000 men, as did a scout who arrived during the evening. All reports except Stanley’s indicated that Bragg would probably make a stand at Chattanooga. In response to the news, Rosecrans issued a flurry of orders. At 9:30 P.M., Garfield told Sheridan to remain in Lookout Valley to support the Fourteenth Corps at Stephens’s Gap. Thirty minutes later, he instructed Stanley to proceed with his push toward the Western & Atlantic Railroad: “The enemy appear [sic] to be preparing for making a stand at Chattanooga, and it is of the utmost importance that his line of communication be broken.” At 11:30 P.M., Garfield approved Crittenden’s dispositions and ordered him to send Wood “to feel the enemy at the point of Lookout Mountain, and find out certainly what he is doing.” In contrast to what he told Stanley, Garfield informed Crittenden that “there is considerable evidence today that the enemy is preparing to fall back on Dalton, and has already moved part of his force.” Rosecrans’s nightly report to Halleck indicated still another possibility: “Enemy still in force in Chattanooga, threatening to cross the river.”³⁴

If Lookout Mountain was a formidable barrier to the Army of the Cumberland, it was a powerful defensive shield for the Army of Tennessee. By the early morning hours of 6 September, Bragg saw clearly that the shield was in grave danger of being breached, placing his supply line at risk. Scout reports and interrogation of the captured telegraph party had finally clarified the location of Rosecrans’s three primary army corps. There were large concentrations of Federal troops at Valley Head, Trenton, and Running Water Canyon, all poised to push across Lookout Mountain. With major Federal elements as near to Atlanta as the Army of Tennessee, the city itself was potentially in peril. While he awaited the arrival of his senior commanders, Bragg at 3:00 A.M. sought additional reinforcements from Johnston. Unaware that Johnston was absent in Montgomery, he wrote, “Hasten a Division of Infantry to Atlanta if you can spare it only for a few days. It will save that depot and give me time to defeat the enemy’s plans.” Simultaneously, Bragg informed Davis of his request. Hardee, commanding at Morton during Johnston’s absence, forwarded the request but opposed the transfer. Johnston agreed in principle with Hardee, but in light of the recent Vicksburg fiasco he was unwilling to risk being blamed for another city’s loss. Consequently, he telegraphed Bragg, “I can spare no troops without risking Mobile; but if it is to save Atlanta I will send two small brigades for a few days. Reply and tell me the plan to be defeated.” At the same time, he sought Richmond’s permission to make the loan. Before receiving an answer, Johnston told Hardee to send the brigades of Brig. Gen. John Gregg and Brig. Gen. Evander McNair to the Army of Tennessee. Hardee dutifully notified Bragg that the two brigades, approximately 2,500 men, would soon be on their way. The orders sending Gregg and McNair to Atlanta specified that no field transportation was to go with them. Johnston was willing to loan soldiers to Bragg in an emergency, but not wagons.³⁵

At some point between 3:00 A.M. and 9:00 A.M. on 6 September Bragg apparently met with his senior commanders. No record of this meeting has come to light, but the previous night’s call for Hill and Buckner to rush to headquarters, Buckner’s presence later that day in Chattanooga, Hill’s apparent absence from his headquarters during the day, Forrest’s early morning movements toward Rome, and Brent’s early rising all point to such a meeting. At the conference Bragg offered his assessment of the available intelligence. It was obvious that the Federal force at Valley Head was nearer to Rome than the Army of Tennessee was. If the railroad was to be saved, the army would have to move southward from Chattanooga. Bragg had long anticipated making the Federals commit themselves before he moved against them, and that Chattanooga would have to be evacuated in the process. Now the wire party’s disclosure of the location of the Twenty-First Corps brought the entire Federal array into focus; it was time to act, and act rapidly. Beginning at 9:00 A.M. urgent telegrams flowed from army headquarters. In the belief that Rome was in the most immediate danger, Brent sent three telegrams to States Gist, whose brigade was near the threatened spot. Brent’s instructions were peremptory: “Destroy all bridges but one, and defend that; if unable to hold it, destroy it, and retire towards Atlanta.” Bragg himself wired Davis: “Rosecrans’ army has certainly crossed Tennessee River. Reported now as moving toward Rome. We shall move on him promptly.” Bragg admitted that he did not know Burnside’s location but stated that he could only deal with one Federal army at a time. Knowing that Davis would not favor the loss of Chattanooga, he explained, “We are obliged to make great sacrifices and abandon territory; in striking at one we must open the country to the other. Atlanta should be strengthened as far as possible.” In another telegram, Bragg promised assistance to Governor Brown: “Will do all I can to equip your troops, every available man should be ready to defend Atlanta.”³⁶

Bragg’s admission that he had lost track of Burnside’s command highlighted the need to dispose of the last remnants of Buckner’s old department. Most of Buckner’s troops were resting near Savannah Church, northeast of Chattanooga, but he remained in charge of three brigades around Charleston, Alfred Jackson’s scattered units on the railroad south of Bristol, and John Frazer’s lonely garrison at Cumberland Gap. First, Buckner’s two mobile divisions needed to be put on the road southward to Ooltewah. At 9:00 A.M., with Buckner in Chattanooga, Mackall ordered Stewart, the senior officer present, to begin the movement. Bragg also wanted Trigg’s Brigade, which Buckner had left at Charleston, to be moved to Ooltewah as well. No mention was made of Hodge’s cavalry command, which guarded Hiwassee fords eastward into the mountains. Momentarily, Scott’s Brigade beyond the Hiwassee was the only unit in contact with any of Burnside’s units. That day Jackson’s remnants were formally incorporated into Samuel Jones’s Department of Western Virginia, as was Frazer’s command at Cumberland Gap, although Buckner was unaware of it. Under instructions received from Bragg at the morning conference, Buckner telegraphed Jones to have Frazer evacuate the gap and withdraw toward Abingdon. Before receiving Buckner’s telegram, which traveled by a roundabout route, Jones ordered Frazer to remain where he was. Later, when Buckner’s message arrived at Abingdon, Jones refused to act, eventually telegraphing Secretary of War Seddon for instructions. Believing that the reinforcements moving from Virginia to Tennessee would pass through his department, Jones strongly preferred that Frazer hold the gap. There the matter stood at the end of the day. Until the authorities at Richmond decreed otherwise, Bragg’s decision to withdraw Frazer from danger was nullified. Thus Frazer continued to stand his ground in the mountain fortress with his small command.³⁷

While Buckner fretted over the fate of Cumberland Gap, Brent drafted the circular that would result in the evacuation of Chattanooga. It envisioned the army moving southward in two parallel columns toward Rome. Polk was to lead the westernmost column, taking a route through Rossville Gap to a crossing of Chickamauga Creek just north of Snow Hill, past the town of LaFayette, and ultimately to Summerville. Hill’s Corps was to follow Polk’s route, with Polk leaving two regiments in Chattanooga and at the point of Lookout Mountain as a rear guard. Several miles to the east, Walker’s Corps would move southward via Graysville and Ringgold to Maddox Gap, where it would cross to the east side of Taylor’s Ridge, then continue via Subligna to Mount Hickory. Buckner’s Corps was to follow Walker. The Reserve Artillery was divided between Polk and Hill, while the army’s supply train moved with Walker. Forrest was to cover Polk’s front with Dibrell’s Brigade, while his remaining regiments guarded the army’s rear as it moved south. Mauldin’s Third Alabama Cavalry regiment, still guarding the north end of Lookout Valley, was to join Forrest’s rear guard even though it nominally belonged to Wheeler. Wheeler’s orders to probe the Federal positions at Valley Head remained unchanged. The circular specified that the troops were to carry six days’ rations. Finally, all hospital patients were to be sent south of Resaca. Although the circular specified no time for execution beyond “immediately,” it described an orderly movement that would ultimately place the army’s major elements at Summerville and Mount Hickory, on one of the main roads to Rome. After finishing the circular, Brent joined other staff officers in dispatching more telegrams. At 10:00 A.M. he wrote to Col. Moses Wright, commanding at Atlanta: “Should the enemy advance defend Atlanta at every hazard and to the last extremity.” At the same time his assistant Kinloch Falconer instructed the quartermaster at Marietta to send the army’s papers to Atlanta for safekeeping.³⁸

Sunday, 6 September, was a beautiful day, although the dry conditions had placed a heavy coating of dust on everything. Throughout Polk’s and Walker’s camps men began their morning with religious services. In Cheatham’s Division, Sgt. Edwin Rennolds heard a “good” sermon by one of the company officers, while Capt. Alfred Fielder rejoiced in the baptism of three young soldiers. Similar scenes occurred in Liddell’s Division, with sixteen men being baptized in Chickamauga Creek. Before the morning was far advanced, however, orders arrived for all regiments to cook three days’ rations, strike their tents, and pack their baggage for a movement. Camp rumors soon began to circulate, with some men arguing that the army was headed for Rome, while others speculated about the pontoon bridge floating just above the city wharf. Claudius Wilson waxed philosophical in a letter to his wife, Kate: “We are in the midst of stirring times, making history and it becomes us only to see to it that the page which records our share in it, shall record nothing dishonorable to ourselves or disastrous to our cause.” Suddenly, in late morning the work was interrupted in two brigades by an alarm. Strahl, whose brigade guarded the north end of Lookout Valley, reported, “Enemy just in front of my pickets. Send battery, if you can, immediately.” What Strahl saw was the arrival of Wood’s division in his front at Wauhatchie. Strahl’s artillery, Stanford’s Mississippi Battery, had gone to Chattanooga to receive new guns in exchange for their condemned pieces. Cheatham responded to Strahl’s plea by reinforcing him with the Thirteenth Tennessee Infantry regiment of Smith’s Brigade. He also sent the battery back toward the toe of Lookout Mountain, but halted it before it came into action. When the Federals at Wauhatchie remained quiescent, Cheatham concluded they were not a serious threat and returned to preparing for his division’s departure from Chattanooga. Strahl, meanwhile, deployed the Thirteenth Tennessee as skirmishers in front of his position.³⁹

Hill’s Corps was on the road even before receipt of the movement order. Already under orders to move to new camps between Tyner’s Station and Ooltewah, Cleburne’s Division marched as planned during the morning and reached Tyner’s by noon. There they received the order to cook three days’ rations. Breckinridge’s Division meanwhile left its Tyner’s Station camps and marched westward toward Chattanooga. Breckinridge himself had just returned from leave and seemed not to understand the situation. Having left their wagons in Mississippi, Helm’s Brigade was forced to leave its baggage at Tyner’s under guard and Stovall’s Brigade marched with rations for only one day. Breckinridge was told only to go to Chattanooga, but because he had not yet regained control, his three brigades moved under a welter of confusing orders from corps and army staff officers. By the end of the day, Helm’s and Adams’s Brigades had reached Chattanooga and camped a mile south of the town. Stovall’s Brigade had followed what seemingly was Hill’s intent and had continued southward to Rossville, where it halted for the night. At 6:45 P.M. Breckinridge admitted to Hill that he had no idea where his brigades were and apologized for their disarray. Circumstances were no better in Cleburne’s Division, which had occupied Breckinridge’s old camps at Tyner’s Station for only three hours when the army’s movement orders reached them. Cleburne apparently wanted to concentrate at Chickamauga Bridge then head south from there without going to Chattanooga. His intentions were thwarted when someone ordered the brigades to follow Breckinridge. By the time Cleburne discovered the error, even his artillery batteries were west of Chickamauga Creek. He halted the guns and sent them southward by his preferred route. The infantry brigades made a long, exhausting march through the town and southward beyond Breckinridge’s camps. It was near midnight when the last of Cleburne’s men staggered into temporary bivouacs in the shadow of Lookout Mountain.⁴⁰

The mistakes of the day revealed serious deficiencies in both Bragg’s and Hill’s headquarters. Left with little to do by Bragg’s reliance upon the efficient and self-effacing Brent, Chief of Staff Mackall apparently inserted himself into the minutia of divisional movements without reference to Hill. In Mackall’s defense, he may have acted because of the disarray within Hill’s Corps. Hill himself was new to corps command, and his troop list had recently been in great flux. Breckinridge had been absent on leave for some time, leaving Helm to manage the division’s transfer to the Army of Tennessee and its recent operations. An efficient corps staff would have published a detailed movement order for the divisions, specifying order of march, time of movement, and bivouac sites. According to Hill’s inspector general, Maj. Alphonso Avery, no such order was issued on 6 September. To Archer Anderson, Avery wrote, “It is absolutely essential, if the corps is expected to prove any thing else than a mob on the march, to publish an order with regard to the manner of conducting marches.” To Hill himself, Avery observed, “While the divisions receive orders from Corps Hd Qrs & at the same time from Hd Qrs of the army, we will have nothing but confusion.” Hill’s location and activities during the day are unknown. Col. Taylor Beatty, judge of Hill’s military court, left corps headquarters at 2:30 P.M., passed through Chattanooga, and ended the day near Rossville, but he made no mention of Hill. Hill clearly did not manage the day’s activities or prepare for the next day’s work. Exasperated by the amateurish performance, Cleburne himself complained to Hill that his infantry lacked artillery support. As for the next day’s movements, “You have not prescribed the order of march. Must I or Breckinridge move first? Please inform me on this point and should our trains proceed or follow the troops.” With an active campaign looming, clearly Hill’s Corps had much work to do before it could be considered an efficient part of the Army of Tennessee.⁴¹

Buckner’s Corps fared little better than Hill’s on 6 September. The corps was even more of an ad hoc formation than Hill’s, having been created only on 3 September. Stewart’s Division was a solid, veteran formation, with strong leadership at the brigade and division levels, but Preston’s Division had been formed only on 26 August, and its troops were inexperienced. William Preston, forty-six, was a Kentucky lawyer and politician who had strong political connections in Richmond but whose only significant battle experience had been at the brigade level at Stones River. Like his friend Breckinridge, Preston was an extreme opponent of Bragg who had been banished from the army in the spring of 1863. When the day began, the corps was under orders to march to the railroad at Ooltewah. Stewart’s Division departed Savannah Church at 3:00 P.M. and covered the thirteen miles to Ooltewah with relative ease. In at least one Tennessee unit, many men deserted rather than leave their native state. Preston’s Division, meanwhile, did not leave its camps north of Harrison until sundown. In Gracie’s Brigade, Pvt. John Hall wrote to his father, “Our men are in fine spirits and eager for a fight. Don’t like the idea of leaving E. Tenn. Will probably discourage them very much. There is no telling where we will stop. I am not discouraged. Feel confident of our success.” In Kelly’s Brigade, Pvt. Joseph Espey was less sanguine, telling his sister, “The darkning cloud that seem to be ore us loseing may be raised and a thousand rays of light may burst forth or it may continue still to lose. But let us allway hope for the better.” Kelly’s men had only reached Tyner’s Station when they stopped at midnight. Trigg’s Brigade spent the day still guarding the Hiwassee River crossings, twenty-four miles north of Ooltewah. When Buckner’s order to rejoin the corps reached Trigg, the First Florida Cavalry (Dismounted) regiment was able to take a train to Ooltewah at midnight, but other regiments remained behind, destroying items useful to the enemy. Like Hill, Buckner thus found his command unready to begin a general withdrawal.⁴²

Bragg’s cavalry loomed large in his plan to leave Chattanooga. At 1:00 P.M. Wheeler received orders to probe aggressively into Wills Valley to learn more about the Federals massing at Winston’s plantation. Convinced that Neal’s Gap, eight miles north of Alpine, was the most likely Federal approach route, he immediately ordered Wharton to concentrate there and remove the obstructions blocking the road to Winston’s. Almost instantly he reversed himself and halted the movement. After consulting with Wharton, Maj. Pollok Lee, and Capt. Salvanus Steele, his engineer, Wheeler elected to do nothing. In a long letter to Brent, he detailed his reasons for disobeying Bragg’s explicit orders: It would take a long time to remove the obstructions, and Neal’s Gap should remain blocked; he could learn nothing new by entering Wills Valley; the march would exhaust his horses; the enemy could cross the mountain on either side of him and race unimpeded to Rome; and the Federals were in sufficient strength to prevent his movement. Thus he would await further orders from army headquarters. Martin’s Division also remained inactive at LaFayette. Unlike Wheeler, Forrest saw no reason to remain passive on 6 September. Brent’s circular called for Forrest to lead the way southward with one division, while his second division guarded the army’s rear. Forrest construed that order to mean rushing quickly to Wheeler’s support. If the Federals were making another raid toward Rome, Forrest planned to be there to stop them. Believing there was no time to lose, he immediately dispatched Dibrell’s Brigade southward from Ringgold. He also informed Wheeler that Armstrong’s other brigade, under James Wheeler, would follow at 2:00 P.M. The rearguard duties would be left to Pegram’s lone brigade, Scott’s and Hodge’s Brigades being still on the Hiwassee around Charleston. Forrest himself gathered his escort at Ringgold for an early departure southward on the next morning.⁴³

Ripples from Bragg’s decision to retreat spread far beyond Chattanooga Valley. At Rome, Gist anxiously awaited the arrival of his remaining regiments from Kingston. At Cartersville, ninety miles south of Chattanooga, Lt. George Gordon saw a train of multiple engines and cars being removed from the scene of potential conflict. Southbound passenger trains were crowded with civilians also fleeing the area. Gordon was contemptuous: “Whole families, often consisting of the father at a desk, the mother on a sofa and a collection of children with furniture fill a box (or freight) car, and so with a little variety, for the whole train. And I think them fools. Fleeing like craven cowards.” Nearby, Henry Wayne received official notice of the Federal threat and began an inspection of his two regiments defending the Western & Atlantic Railroad. In Chattanooga, Medical Director Edward Flewellen ordered Samuel Stout to evacuate all hospitals north of Resaca. Stout had already surveyed suitable locations, but Marietta’s Georgia Military Institute continued to be withheld by Governor Brown. Originally, Flewellen had hoped to retain the hospitals within the limits of Bragg’s command, but that proved impossible because no one knew where the armies would move next. Hospitals located at Ringgold, Catoosa Springs, Cherokee Springs, Tunnel Hill, Dalton, Calhoun, and Adairsville were affected. Their new locations were projected to be in towns south and west of Atlanta, but it would be some time before they could operate efficiently. Momentarily, hospital administrators struggled to reassign medical personnel, weed out malingerers, place all the truly ill on trains, and pack the hospital baggage for shipment. At the Cherokee Springs hospital, nurse Kate Cumming was anxious: “I suppose the cooks will be up all night, preparing rations. We will have to spread comforts on the floor to rest on for the night, as our bedding has been carried off. We do not expect to leave before morning. If the enemy do not capture us I shall be thankful.”⁴⁴

As night fell, thousands of soldiers cooked their travel rations, loaded wagons and freight cars, or stumbled along dusty roads in Chattanooga Valley. In widely separate parts of the Confederacy, other soldiers began preparations to join the Army of Tennessee. In Mississippi, Gregg’s and McNair’s units received orders to prepare for their trip to Atlanta. At Meridian Frank Hayley hurriedly wrote to his wife, Laura: “We have just received orders to cook three days rations and get ready to move immediately. I expect we will go to Chattanooga Tennessee, and I expect it will be a long time before we draw again.” In Richmond, Lee spent the day conferring with Quartermaster General Alexander Lawton on the transfer of several of his divisions to assist Bragg. As the infeasibility of the Knoxville route became evident, the Railroad Bureau’s Major Sims began to plot an alternate pathway through the Carolinas. Unfortunately, the new route would be longer and more complex, delaying the arrival of the reinforcements. Nor was the question of the contingent’s commander fully settled. Davis strongly preferred Lee, but Lee demurred, satisfied that officers already in Tennessee could handle the task. Of course, Longstreet for some time had been lobbying Senator Wigfall and Secretary of War Seddon to be given the position. With Lee unwilling to go, Davis unwilling to force him, and Seddon pressing Longstreet’s case, at some point on 6 September Longstreet by default became the commander of the troops traveling to Tennessee from Virginia. The warning order for the men of Longstreet’s First Corps was telegraphed to their central Virginia camps that afternoon. That order reached the Fifteenth Alabama Infantry regiment on Sunday night, just as a protracted camp meeting closed with a half dozen candidates anxious for baptism. Rather than wait for an uncertain future to offer a better opportunity, the unit’s chaplain found a suitable place in a swamp to conduct the ceremony at midnight. All then turned to the task of cooking travel rations for the journey to Tennessee.⁴⁵

Not long before nightfall, Bragg learned that Johnston had responded positively to his plea for troops to save Atlanta. At 5:00 P.M. he acknowledged Johnston’s offer without elaboration: “Please send the Brigades for such time as you can spare them.” According to reports from Strahl in Lookout Valley and signalmen on Lookout Mountain, the Federal force at Wauhatchie had become passive. Polk’s Corps was ready to move by nightfall, and Walker’s Corps at Chickamauga Station was also ready for departure. Hill’s Corps, however, was scattered on the roads from Harrison through Chattanooga to Lookout Mountain. Cleburne’s Division had been separated from its artillery, and Breckinridge had no idea where his brigades were. Likewise, Buckner’s Corps was still clogging the roads from Ooltewah to Tyner’s Station, with most of a brigade still at Charleston. At nightfall, half of the army was exhausted from a frustrating march through heat and choking dust but was still short of its assembly areas. Meeting with Bragg, Polk and Hill vigorously urged a suspension of the movement, although Mackall strongly disagreed. Clearly, Hill’s and Buckner’s men were in no condition to continue their march all night. The Federal inaction at Wauhatchie perhaps indicated that Rosecrans was not yet ready to leap over the Lookout Mountain barrier, giving the Army of Tennessee more time to gather itself. Thus, at 8:00 P.M., Bragg instructed Brent to issue new instructions: “Suspend all further movements until further orders.” The delay also would permit more orderly evacuation of the army’s depot at Chickamauga Station. Across the army, except for those units still marching, time stood still. The travel rations had been cooked, the tents had been struck, and the wagons had been loaded, but there would be no departure from Chattanooga that night. According to Lt. William Richmond of Polk’s staff, “The feeling is one of great doubt as to the movements of the enemy, all want to fight him but the question is can we make him fight us?”⁴⁶