17
The Religious Policy of the ‘Abbāsid Caliph Al-Ma’mūn

Dominique Sourdel

[27] THE POLICY PURSUED by the 'Abbāsid caliph al-Ma'mūn, during a reign the beginning of which was quite turbulent and which twice provoked violent unrest in Iraqi opinion, has rarely been considered in its entirety by modern historians. The choice of an 'Alid heir on the one hand and, on the other hand, the establishment of the Mu'tazilī miḥna at the end of al-Ma'mūn's caliphate, have usually been examined from two different angles—one political, the other intellectual—without any effort to establish a connection between the two. Al-Ma'mūn's Mu'tazilism has recently been presented as an effort at a compromise between the 'Abbāsid state and the Shī'a.¹ This would permit one to regard it as an alternative policy after the failure of the first attempt; yet the validity of this claim remains to be demonstrated, and the motives for this policy remain unclear.

In order to shed some light on this problem it is necessary to carry out two investigations. The first will be concerned with the political and religious milieu during the period immediately preceding al-Ma'mūn's accession. The second will deal with the caliph's personality and the successive attitudes that he adopted or were ascribed to him. The essential question is whether al-Ma'mūn inaugurated an entirely new and personal policy, whether he was content to adopt a programme that had been established by others before him, or indeed—as a third possibility—whether he gave a particular orientation to an already existing movement. Only an investigation dealing with the policies of preceding caliphs and their aides will allow us to respond to this question and to assess correctly the most significant steps taken by the "innovator" caliph.

[28] If one begins with the long reign of Hārūn al-Rashīd, which preceded the reigns of al-Amīn and al-Ma'mūn, one notes that this caliphate, apparently dominated by palace intrigues that continued throughout the vizierate of the Barmakids and ended with their brutal disgrace, also witnessed politico-religious quarrels. These may have been less spectacular, but their influence on later events was no less decisive. Although these quarrels are still not well understood, a series of indications reveals the nature of the tendencies that, beginning in this period, confronted each other in the cultivated circles of Baghdad and at the caliph's court.

The problem of Shī'ism, which one encounters immediately, was certainly not new. Born out of the events that followed the Prophet's death, it had been a leading preoccupation of the Umayyad caliphs and was regarded with a similar gravity during the years following the 'Abbāsid revolution. The new caliphs, who were members of the Prophet's family and had used this merit in order to attain power, were, for their part, confronted with the ambitions of their frustrated rivals, and used various methods to try and bring an end to this state of permanent hostility. Some, like al-Manṣūr, adopted toward 'Alid pretenders a policy of brutal repression that hardly differed from that of the Umayyads. Others, in contrast, such as al-Mahdī, the son and successor of al-Manṣūr, tried to win over the 'Alids by conciliatory measures.

But it is in the era of Hārūn al-Rashīd that one sees for the first time grave disagreements over this issue within the caliph's entourage. Hārūn's repressive attitude was opposed by his viziers, the Barmakids, who rejected any brutal action and thereby frequently provoked their master's displeasure. Al-Faḍl ibn Yaḥyā in particular distinguished himself by initiatives that did not always meet with his sovereign's approval. Initially he doubtless achieved some conspicuous political success, such as winning over the Ḥasanid Yaḥyā ibn 'Abd Allāh, who had rebelled in Daylam, but whom he successfully convinced to accept an amān from the caliph, and with whom he returned to Baghdad in triumph. But this surrender did not entirely satisfy Hārūn; shortly thereafter he found a pretext for annulling the amān and casting Yaḥyā into prison, where he died. This episode thus revealed serious differences of view between the caliph and his servant. There was worse to come. Some reports, which affirmed that al-Faḍl had previously been in favour of allowing this 'Alid to go to Khurāsān, aroused suspicions in the sovereign's mind concerning the attitude of his governor.2

[29] Another incident surfaced a few years later, after al-Faḍl had already been relieved of his duties in the eastern provinces: al-Faḍl refused to order the killing of the Ḥusaynid Mūsā al-Kāẓim, whose arrest the caliph had just ordered. For this refusal he was publicly "cursed" by Hārūn at al-Raqqa. Henceforth he would only play a secondary role in the sovereign's entourage.³ The same al-Faḍl had also demonstrated his generosity to a Ḥasanid, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Ṭabāṭabā.4 While Ja'far appears never to have aroused accusations of this kind, Yaḥyā, for his part, was reproached after his downfall for having supported Aḥmad ibn 'Īsā, a little known Ḥasanid. The pro-'Alid policies of the Barmakids thus provoked, in large part, a disgrace that has long appeared mysterious.⁵

Nevertheless, the exact position taken by al-Rashīd's ministers remains unclear. Were they content to express their sympathy for the 'Alid pretenders and to win them over to the ruling family through conciliatory measures, or, in contrast, were they willing to favour an eventual change of dynasty? These are questions that remain unanswered. One might suppose that the Barmakids were favourably inclined to the establishment of a Shī'ī dynasty in the peripheral regions. This would explain why al-Faḍl had permitted Yaḥyā to reach Daylam in order to establish in this province a state prefiguring the Zaydī state that would come into being a half century later. In any case, the leniency shown by the Barmakids toward the 'Alid pretenders, even if it was not accompanied by any subversive plan, corresponded with a general tendency that was both ideological and cultural in nature.

In effect, the Barmakids distinguished themselves not so much by the heterodoxy of which some contemporaries accused them, but rather by their taste for free discussion on a variety of subjects, whether religious, philosophical or political. Al-Mas'ūdī has preserved for us an account of one of these meetings to which men of diverse beliefs were invited, but which was dominated by Shī'īs, and especially by Mu'tazilīs.⁶ It is also known that the Barmakids encouraged the [30] translation of Greek works that appeared in increasing numbers during al-Ma'mūn's time.⁷ Though one cannot affirm that they adhered to Mu'tazilism, it is clear that they adopted its characteristic intellectual attitude, which consisted of a confrontation between opposing doctrines and the refutation, by reasoning, of ideas considered to be erroneous or dangerous. A report reveals, in addition, that they defended one of the Mu'tazilīs who was reputed to have been in their entourage.⁸

One knows about the old connections that existed between Mu'tazilism and Shī'ism despite their espousal of doctrines that do not agree with one another. Without being a political movement in the proper sense, Mu'tazilism appears in effect from its beginnings as a sect whose members held positions concerning the theological-political problems that arose at the end of the Umayyad period and often went beyond the principle of "neutralism" that seems to have characterized them at first.9 Of the doctrines attributed to Wāṣil ibn 'Aṭā', two should be mentioned here. According to the first, Wāṣil rejected the testimony of 'Alī and all of his adversaries, refusing to decide which faction had been right. According to the second doctrine, he considered a man who was guilty of a grave sin, that is to say one who had taken up arms against his coreligionist, to be in an "intermediate state", one that did not exclude him completely from the community of believers. But Wāṣil himself does not appear to have remained faithful to such a prudent doctrine because he maintained close relations with Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafīya and is credited with having been the master of Zayd ibn 'Alī.¹⁰ His sympathies for Shī'ī circles are thus evident and stand in opposition to the attitude of his contemporary 'Amr ibn 'Ubayd, who detached himself from the 'Alids in order to support the 'Abbāsid dynasty and become an intimate friend of al-Manṣūr.

As for the emissaries whom Wāṣil is said to have sent to the various provinces of the empire in both the east and the west, their activity, though hard to interpret, may nevertheless be connected to movements of Shī'ī inspiration, despite the hypothesis of Nyberg, who saw in them an effort to support the 'Abbāsid pretenders.¹¹ There is in fact nothing to prove that at the end of the Umayyad period [31] Mu'tazilism provided the foundation for the 'Abbāsid movement. In contrast, we are told of a meeting where Mu'tazilīs and Shī'īs, joined by the future al-Manṣūr, recognized as imām a Ḥasanid pretender, Muḥammad ibn 'Abd Allāh.¹² This episode suggests that the Mu'tazilī supporters of Wāṣil were more particularly connected to the Zaydī-leaning opposition. In order to confirm this view we should also note that at the beginning of the 'Abbāsid period, Mu'tazilīs and Zaydīs occasionally made common cause.¹³ Subsequently one continues to refer to a group among the Zaydīs made up of the "Mu'tazilīs of Baghdad". During the period of Hārūn al-Rashīd this tradition persisted and is attested by various small facts: Bishr ibn al-Mu'tamir sympathized with the descendants of 'Alī, which led to his imprisonment;14 Thumāma ibn al-Ashras, another well-known Mu'tazilī, was harassed for having defended the Zaydī Aḥmad ibn 'Īsā.¹⁵ Thus, although the Mu'tazilīs of al-Baṣra had in general adopted Sunnī conceptions of the imamate, and although Abū l-Hudhayl adhered to Wāṣil's purely "neutralist" position (while condemning Mu'āwiya), it is possible to affirm that at the end of the second century of the hijra, an important branch of the Mu'tazilī movement supported Zaydism and that the Barmakid attachment to this school was not devoid of political significance. Equally characteristic was the good-will that the Barmakids appear to have shown toward the tribute-paying non-Muslims, particularly the Christians, whom they defended on occasion against false accusations.¹⁶ These three attitudes, sympathy for the Shī'īs, a Mu'tazilī turn of mind, and tolerance towards the tributaries, generally go together, establishing the outlines of a politico-religious movement that existed only in a sketchy form but which already aroused attacks from many men of religion.

In opposition to the Barmakids one thus sees Abū Yūsuf, the chief qāḍī whose brief appears to have been brought into being by the interference of the former, beginning to condemn the use of kalām, that is reasoning and discussion [32] of matters of faith,¹⁷ and counselling the caliph to take restrictive measures with regard to the tributaries.¹⁸ And, as if in an echo of his objurgations, Hārūn al-Rashīd, who pursued without pity the 'Alid pretenders who had revolted or who might rise up, also harassed the partisans of the doctrine of the created Qur'ān such as Bishr al-Marīsī.¹⁹ This rigorous and strictly anti-Shī'ī attitude seems to have been affirmed particularly following the disgrace of the Barmakids.²⁰ At the end of his reign actions were taken against the Christians, and the imprisonment of leading representatives of Mu'tazilism should apparently also be situated in the same period.21

The two factions whose struggle sheds light on certain aspects of al-Rashīd's caliphate appear to have been subsequently supported by each of his two sons. When al-Amīn was in power, the Mu'tazilīs, who were no longer mentioned in this period, appear to have been forced to cede the field to their adversaries. A qāḍī in Egypt went so far as to reject the testimony of a man suspected of "qadarism". This was an isolated incident to which we should not attach too much importance. However, it does reveal the tension that existed in certain regions and the increasing mistrust that the new ideas inspired among legal scholars.²² In one of his epistles, al-Jāḥiẓ mentions persecutions to which the "followers of tawḥīd" had been subjected without, however, indicating the nature or circumstances of this persecution. In this case his report is doubtlessly partial, since this is a text in which he wishes to justify the Mu'tazilī miḥna by the anti-Mu'tazilī excesses of the preceding governments. One can nevertheless suppose that he based himself on some true facts. In another portion of the same work, al-Jāḥiẓ criticizes the popular masses whom he accuses of ignorance and turbulence. He cites two verses composed in order to describe the fury of the Baghdad crowds who resisted the troops of al-Ma'mūn when these besieged the capital. This allusion makes it possible to ask whether the defenders of al-Amīn should not be identified with the representatives of the "obscurantist" anti-Mu'tazilī party, whom the author had so violently attacked.²³ [33] From this time al-Ma'mūn appears as the champion of a cause the principal manifestations of which we will follow during subsequent events, but without dealing with them in a detailed manner.²⁴

In fact, the new caliph, once he had been recognized throughout the provinces of the empire, adopted a policy of a partial attachment to Shī'ism that was accompanied by an intellectual orientation that has not always received sufficient attention. It was the period during which he resided at Marw and during which, in Ramaḍān 201/March 817, he chose the current Ḥusaynid pretender 'Alī ibn Mūsā as his heir. He was surrounded at the time by well-known Mu'tazilīs such as Bishr ibn al-Mu'tamir and Thumāma, who were among the witnesses signing the act that designated 'Alī as heir under the name of al-Riḍā.25 One might well suppose that these personages played a part in the decision made by the ruler.

Does this mean that all responsibility for this should be attributed to them, considering the pro-'Alid political attitudes of numerous Mu'tazilīs? Bishr and Thumāma certainly belonged to the so-called school of Baghdad, which was known for its Shī'ī sympathies. Moreover, it is known that the doctrinal rapprochement between the Zaydī and Mu'tazilī movements, which had long supported each other, was in this period under way, if not completely realized. This fact is attested concerning Muḥammad ibn al-Qāsim ibn 'Alī, who revolted a short time later, during the reign of al-Mu'taṣim.²⁶ There is, however, one difficulty. The pretender chosen by al-Ma'mūn belonged to the Ḥusaynid line of imāms whom the Zaydīs, for a variety of reasons, did not recognize as such. It is therefore not possible to attribute to Bishr and Thumāma a crucial role in the election of this particular person. What may be ascribed to them is merely the diffusion of Zaydī views on the imamate that made it possible, as we will see, for the caliph to adopt such a surprising plan.

[34] No less important was the presence in the entourage of al-Ma'mūn of his vizier al-Faḍl ibn Sahl, the former "creature" of the Barmakids, who had played an active role in organizing the struggle against al-Amīn. As is known, public opinion in Baghdad charged him with seeking personally to assume power in favour of a change in dynasty for which the nomination of 'Alī al-Riḍā would set the stage. Numerous chroniclers present the all-powerful minister as the real promoter of a measure that went against the interests of the 'Abbāsid regime. Gabrieli could easily have corrected this interpretation, by relying on the one hand on the loyalty of al-Faḍl and on the other on the formal account of a well-informed author, the Zaydī Abū l-Faraj al-Iṣfahānī. Nevertheless, as we have demonstrated elsewhere, al-Faḍl was aligned with Imāmī traditionalists and allowed himself to become associated with a policy that ultimately cost him his life, whatever the true instigator of the murder to which he subsequently fell victim.27

In considering al-Ma'mūn's personal thoughts, the development of which remains poorly known, it is at least possible to perceive his motives via a bold political conduct and the justifications that were offered in its support. That the revolt of Abū l-Sarāyā in Iraq at the very beginning of the reign set in motion the caliph's policy has long constituted a principal piece of evidence: it is well-known that the heir was given the appellation al-Riḍā, which is the precise term by which the rebel had previously defined the imām in whose name he was acting (al-riḍā min āl Muḥammad). It is also known that this new measure immediately bore fruit by winning over certain pretenders, notably the brother of 'Alī al-Riḍā²⁸ and many Zaydīs.²⁹

Al-Ma'mūn was thus committed to a kind of compromise between Sunnism and Shī'ism in order to bring an end to the incessant revolts and try to place the caliphate on a more solid footing. How was an 'Abbāsid ruler able to conceive of such a solution? Gabrieli, basing himself on traditions according to which al-Ma'mūn desired to make up for the injustice suffered by the 'Alids and to repay them for the favours that members of al-'Abbās's family had received from 'Alī, believes that the personal veneration of the caliph for 'Alī's descendants suffices to explain his frame of mind.³⁰

[35] In fact, if one examines the justification put forward both by the chroniclers and by the act of designating the new heir, it appears that it was rather his sympathy for the Zaydī conceptions of the imamate that led al-Ma'mūn to adopt this policy. It was because of this, and by profiting from intellectual notions that were widely held among his entourage, that he could elaborate this adroit compromise that did not corrupt Sunnī principles.

It has been noted that al-Ma'mūn never rallied to 'Alid legitimism, even when he adopted 'Alī al-Riḍā. The latter was chosen as the caliph's successor not in his capacity as Imāmī pretender but rather because, according to the caliph, he was "the best" (al-afḍal)—whether among the 'Alids or the 'Alids and 'Abbāsids—and the most worthy of this designation because of his moral integrity, his piety, and his knowledge. Furthermore, it was never specified that the caliphate would have to remain in the hands of the descendants of the new heir. As for the decision itself, it depended on ratification by the subjects according to the traditional Sunnī procedure of giving an oath, with only minor modifications in the ceremony.³¹ In addition to the care given by the ruler in respecting certain customs, attention should also be paid to his desire to emphasize the notion of "merit" in defining the qualities required in an imām, a notion that was dear to the Zaydīs.32 Without a doubt, 'Alī al-Riḍā, an eirenic person incapable of assuming leadership of a rebellion, did not meet all the requirements stipulated by the Zaydīs, which included leading an armed revolt alongside knowledge, piety, and membership of 'Alī's family.³³ Nevertheless, he possessed sufficient qualifications so that, from this perspective, he could be judged worthy of acceding to supreme power. Thus al-Ma'mūn, by following Zaydī ideas, sought a compromise that he hoped would establish a durable reconciliation between the two enemy factions within the Islamic community. His official adoption of the green colour in place of the black of the 'Abbāsids was to be a symbol of this reconciliation.³⁴

[36] The nomination of 'Alī al-Riḍā was set in motion by a particular event and, as Gabrieli has already demonstrated, was almost certainly decided by the caliph himself. This nomination can be explained all the better when it is connected to a current of public opinion that began during the reign of Hārūn al-Rashīd and was widely held at the Khurasanian court of al-Ma'mūn. In order to appreciate the precise significance of this initiative, one should now examine to what extent it could be predicted on the basis of the earlier attitude of the ruler.

At the beginning of his reign, al-Ma'mūn distinguished himself by declarations or attitudes that one would be tempted to consider as strictly Sunnī. In his first khuṭba, he reportedly said:

People, I have pledged to God that, should He entrust me with your affairs, I would always obey Him in whatever concerns you and would not shed blood deliberately except in so far as His law authorizes me to do so or His prescriptions require me; nor would I take possession of money, goods, or dowries that are forbidden to me, nor pass judgment in accordance with my passions, whether in anger or contentment, but only in conformity with God's commands.35

This text corresponds to the commitment that al-Faḍl had made al-Ma'mūn sign when he promised him the caliphate, a commitment in which the future caliph announced that in his fictions he would conform strictly to the Book and to the Sunna.³⁶ Moreover, al-Faḍl advised al-Ma'mūn to assemble the fuqahā' and invite them to revive the Sunna.³⁷ Should one conclude that this vizier, who is thought to have had Shī'ī sympathies, behaved on these occasions as a fervent defender of Sunnism?

A first point that should be made is that, as has often been emphasized, Shī'ism is not opposed to the application of the Sunna but only to the principle of ijmā' that, properly speaking, characterizes "Sunnism". During the period under consideration here, the Shī'ī movements, which were in the main of Zaydī inspiration, did not put forth any heterodox ideas. They contented themselves with a demand for the strict application of the Book and the Sunna, which according to them had been neglected by the government. This had become a regular propaganda item of all those who put themselves forward as legitimate rulers facing a usurper.

Characteristic in this context was the proclamation by Abū l-Sarāyā in which he called on his partisans "to apply the Book and the Sunna". This proclamation enabled him to rally to his cause a certain number of men of religion.³⁸ It turns out that al-Ma'mūn [37] too found himself in the role of ousted pretender facing his brother al-Amīn, whom he accused of not having respected the last wishes of his father and of having violated the commitments whose text was displayed on the walls of the Ka'ba. When he therefore presented himself as a restorer of the Sunna and of "God's rights", this was less as an heir of the 'Abbāsid tradition than as a victim of oppression.

Moreover, it appears that from the beginning al-Ma'mūn was attracted by Shī'ī concepts and hoped to exercise the powers that even "moderate" Shī'īs attributed to their imāms. It should be noted that he was the first 'Abbāsid caliph officially to bestow on himself the title of imām, which appears on his coins and inscriptions.39 His successors maintained this title so as not to deprive themselves of the prestige associated with it. It should also be noted that formulas with a Shī'ī flavour appear in the texts that were carved in honour of al-Faḍl on the throne and crown of the king of the land of Kabul, which was conquered and converted in the aftermath of the expeditions conducted by the vizier in 199/815. The conqueror is in efFect described there as the "prefect of the imām" (wall l-imām) and the "chief of his mission" (ṣāḥib da'watihi), at the same time that a reference is made to his attachment to the Book and the Sunna. From this period on, al-Ma'mūn launched a "call", a da'wa, opposing the impiety of his perjured brother, and entrusted his vizier with an expedition that was presented as an act of jihād because it aimed at the expansion of Islam. Thus his conduct, even before his decision to transfer the caliphate to an 'Alid, was not without analogies to that of Shī'ī, or more exactly Zaydī pretenders, whose vocabulary he employed. Like them, he based his rights on a call (da'wa) and on the application of jihād against usurpers. Was he seeking to thwart their efforts by modelling his own attitude, in part, on their own? This is difficult to know, and his efforts were not sufficient to prevent the revolt by Abū l-Sarāyā, nor the concomitant upheavals. One thing, however, is certain: from the time of his accession to power al-Ma'mūn, apparently on the advice of al-Faḍl, claimed to lead the community of believers in a new spirit that remained centered on the Book and the Sunna, but that thereby made possible the transformation of the agenda established by the 'Abbāsids. This was already an indication of the policy of reconciliation that was to be crowned by the temporary choice of an 'Alid heir.

[38] The denouement of this episode is known:⁴⁰ revolt in Iraq, the departure of the caliph for Baghdad, the assassination of al-Faḍl, and the poisoning of 'Alī al-Riḍā during his return trip to the central provinces of the empire. But what was the attitude of al-Ma'mūn following it? The period of transition itself remains full of obscurities. It will never be known at exactly which point the caliph abandoned the idea of choosing an 'Alid heir, nor whether he was responsible for the death of 'Alī al-Riḍā; it would at any rate be difficult to impute this death to him without assuming a surprising duplicity on his part. According to al-Ya'qūbī,41 he demonstrated great sadness at 'Alī's death and stayed at his tomb for three days.

A short time later the turning point was reached when the caliph, now established in the Iraqi capital, followed the advice of his council by restoring the traditional black colour of the 'Abbāsids.⁴² This rupture with the Shī'īs does not, however, appear to have been accompanied by any change in his private convictions. In this context one should examine a tradition, reported by al-Ya'qūbī, whereby this was the period in which the marriage took place between one of al-Ma'mūn's daughters and Muḥammad, the son of 'Alī al-Riḍā.⁴³ The caliph is supposed to have explained his gesture by saying: "I wish to be the grandfather of a descendant of 'Alī." This declaration proves that he maintained his persona! veneration of 'Alī; it is clear why an Imāmī historian reproduced it. This account cannot be accepted without reservations, because the same marriage is reported by al-Ṭabarī for the year 202/817, at the same time as that of 'Alī al-Riḍā to whom al-Ma'mūn had given another of his daughters.⁴⁴ But whatever the date adopted for this alliance, it is another proof that the caliph, following his return to Baghdad, distinguished himself by tashayyu'. Gabrieli sees in this a purely "sentimental" attitude, but in our view it may have constituted an expression of a definite political and religious option.

A series of anecdotes shows us al-Ma'mūn discussing the fundamental themes of Shī'ī doctrine with scholars and men of religion. In these gatherings the caliph vigorously defended [39] the superiority of 'Alī, which was disputed by some people,⁴⁵ or praised the legendary courage of the Prophet's cousin, which was one of his outstanding qualities.⁴⁶ It is important to stress that the manner in which al-Ma'mūn demonstrated 'Ali's personal merits to the fuqahā'⁴⁷ recalls the argumentation employed by the Zaydīs—as it is set out first by al-Jāḥiẓ and then by al-Qāsim al-Rassī⁴⁸—with the aim of bestowing on 'Alī preeminence as the successor of the Prophet by virtue of his own qualities; early conversion to Islam, renouncement (zuhd), theological and legal knowledge, and military valour in the service of the faith. This perspective, where the notion of "designation" (naṣṣ) remains secondary and sometimes disappears completely, and where there is no method of transmitting the imamate, explains why the debates concerning the personality and the "courage" of 'Alī were for al-Ma'mūn of a dogmatic rather than a sentimental importance.

Certainly, it was not impossible for tafḍīl 'Alī in itself to be reconciled with Sunnism, as the Zaydīs had succeeded in professing it without for all that denying the validity of the first caliphates. But his affirmation went beyond mere reverence owed to members of the Prophet's family, such as had been recognized and even commended by Sunnī traditionalists on condition, of course, that 'Alī be kept in his correct, fourth place: that is, fourth after Abū Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthmān.49

Al-Ma'mūn went so far in his attachment to this doctrine that in 211/826 or 212/827 he officially proclaimed the superiority of 'Alī over all the Companions.⁵⁰ He also wished to curse Mu'āwiya publicly from the pulpit; although he gave up this plan when Yaḥyā ibn Aktham warned him that he risked causing discontent in Khurāsān among elements of the population who were faithful to the memory of the Umayyads,⁵¹ he nevertheless had the names of the Umayyad caliphs removed from certain monumental inscriptions. Such was the case at the Qubbat al-Ṣakhra [40] in Jerusalem, where the mosaic fillet that relates the construction of the edifice in 72/691–92 bears the name of al-imām al-Ma'mūm, which clearly replaced that of the caliph 'Abd al-Malik. This was also the case, according to Ibn 'Asākir, at the great mosque of Damascus, where the name of al-Walīd was replaced by that of al-Ma'mūn.⁵² However, as van Berchem has stressed, this was not done merely to efface the names of the early caliphs from popular memory. Al-Ma'mūn also wished "to turn to his own advantage the religious and political prestige attached to the creations of his predecessors," and probably also, in the case of the Qubbat al-Ṣakhra, to appropriate an inscription whose religious and political significance has recently been highlighted.53

In considering the care that he gave to diminishing the merits of the Umayyads and exalting the qualities of 'Alī, is it appropriate to see in al-Ma'mūn a firm supporter of Zaydism? This would be going too far, because it is clear that he could not acknowledge all the doctrines of this movement. On the other hand, he appears to have been interested in a general way in the various forms of Shī'ism and, on occasion, to have adopted positions" that were in fact Imāmī. It is reported that he enjoyed listening to discussions among representatives of the Zaydīs and Imāmīs in gatherings where everyone was free to express his opinion and where anyone who advanced convincing arguments was rewarded in the manner he deserved.⁵⁴ A discussion of this type is reported by the chroniclers around the year 205/820–21, shortly before Ṭāhir's nomination in Khurāsān. Such discussions, in which the caliph does not appear to have participated, have been described by Gabrieli as academic; in fact, however, they demonstrate the caliph's concern to know the points of divergence among the various Shī'ī sects.

Several anecdotes might be interpreted as revealing that al-Ma'mūn held an avowedly Rāfiḍī attitude. It is thus related that he interrogated the qāḍī Aḥmad ibn Abī Du'ād on the subject of Abū Bakr and 'Umar. When the qāḍī affirmed that they had been just imāms, al-Ma'mūn is said to have replied: "You deserve to be put to death," The narrator found this conversation so astounding that he stated that the caliph must have been intoxicated that day.⁵⁵ But there is another account, this one recorded by al-Ya'qūbī, [41] which describes a similar situation: sometime before 213/828—the person concerned ceased to exercise his duties that year—the qāḍī Bishr ibn al-Walīd was reprimanded for having inflicted corporal punishment on a man who had insulted the memory of Abū Bakr and 'Umar.⁵⁶ Thus al-Ma'mūn may already have added to tafḍil 'Alī the condemnation of the Companions (takfīr al-ṣaḥāba), a tenet that genuine Zaydīs condemned.⁵⁷ Accounts such as these, even if they must be treated with caution, cannot but evoke for us certain aspects of a manner of thought that strove to reconcile the diverse doctrines that were current in his day.

This attitude is further expressed, during the period extending approximately from 210/825–26 to 218/833, by measures that the caliph took or wished to take in order to introduce Shī'ī practices into the Muslim community or to satisfy certain demands made by the descendants of 'Alī. Thus, according to al-Ya'qūbī, al-Ma'mūn decided, after consulting the fuqahā', to give back to the 'Alids the oasis of Fadak, a property that had belonged to the Prophet and that Abū Bakr had refused to leave to Fāṭima.58 Various texts report, in addition, that in 215/830 al-Ma'mūn wished to authorize mut'a marriage, which is characteristic of Imāmī Shī'ī law.⁵⁹ This reform was abandoned at the instigation of the qāḍī Yaḥyā ibn Aktham because for the Sunnīs this practice was tantamount to fornication (zinā). It was none the less put forward and seriously debated in the caliph's entourage. It is reported that during this same period al-Ma'mūn ordered his soldiers to pronounce supplementary takbīrs standing up after each daily prayer.⁶⁰ The late chronicler Ibn Taghrībirdī declares that this was an innovation, without specifying its significance, which is not well understood. It is known, however, that during the funeral prayers the Shī'īs, whether Zaydīs or Imāmīs, used to pronounce a greater number of takbīrs than the Sunnīs. This is attested for the Zaydīs of Ṭabaristān during the mid-third/ninth century, as well as for the Fāṭimids.⁶¹

[42] Moreover, a tradition transmitted by a Fāṭimid author on the authority of Ja'far al-Ṣādiq recommends—without establishing an obligation—that three takbīrs be pronounced after the final taslīm.⁶² Al-Ma'mūn's desire to increase the number of takbīrs appears to have arisen from his wish to modify existing practices in the direction favoured by Shī'ī circles. Al-Ya'qūbī, for his part, confirms this information to a certain extent when he declares that the caliph had a takbīr added at the end of each prayer and that this became a sunna, which we understand as "current practice".63 This must have ceased to be in force after al-Ma'mūn's era because, to our knowledge, the treatises concerning the prayer ritual make no mention of it.⁶⁴ We should also note that the caliph reportedly had the maqṣūras removed from the mosques in order to put a stop to a bid'a associated with the Umayyads.⁶⁵ Finally, we note that he did not renounce his matrimonial policy: in 215/830 he celebrated the marriage, arranged many years previously, between his daughter IJmm al-Faḍl and the imām Muḥammad ibn 'Alī.⁶⁶

At the same time al-Ma'mūn. acting on the advice of Abū 1-Hudhayl,⁶⁷ encouraged translations of Greek texts, which brought fame to the Bayt alḥikma of Baghdad. Above all, the Mu'tazilī doctrine of the created Qur'ān was adopted in 212/827 and was followed in 218/833 by the establishment of the miḥna.⁶⁸ It is interesting to look for indications of these two events from the very beginning of his reign. Thus, the caliph had in fact long demonstrated his sympathy for Mu'tazilism. Its supporters found refuge with him at Marw, whereas in Baghdad the anti-caliph Ibrāhīm ibn al-Mahdī pursued Bishr al-Marīsī and obliged him to retract his views. This Jahmī partisan of the doctrine of the created Qur'ān had already been condemned by Hārūn al-Rashīd.⁶⁹ There is an account according to which al-Shāfī'ī, who died in 204/819–20, predicted to Ibn Ḥanbal that the latter would be subjected to [43] persecutions for his fidelity to traditional concepts.⁷⁰ This would seem to be a clear indication that there were fears during this period that al-Ma'mūn would impose the Mu'tazilī doctrine. Some even wondered why the caliph had delayed introducing such a measure; there were those who argued that he waited for the death of the traditionalist Yazīd ibn Hārūn, whose opposition he feared.⁷¹ This account must however be treated with caution, since this person died in 206/821. Perhaps we are simply dealing here with a text that was forged in order to emphasize Yazīd ibn Hārūn's rigorous attachment to orthodoxy. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to conclude from this that the caliph's decision, far from surprising anyone, was in keeping with a cultural orientation that had long been affirmed. It is known, moreover, that from the time he arrived in Baghdad, al-Ma'mūn chose an entourage of ten fuqahā', including the Mu'tazilī qāḍī Aḥmad ibn Abī Du'ād and the Jahmī Bishr al-Marīsī.72

On the other hand, it is striking to note that al-Ma'mūn proclaimed the "superiority" of 'Alī and his own adherence to the doctrine of the created Qur'ān at the same time. It was no coincidence that these two declarations were issued simultaneously. In fact, it would appear that the proclamation of Mu'tazilism was closely linked to his adoption of a fundamental doctrine of Shī'ism. The caliph clearly sought to satisfy all of those who held these views: Zaydīs who had adopted Mu'tazilī theology and Mu'tazilīs who had taken up more or less moderate Shī'ī doctrines.⁷³ He thus placed the 'Abbāsid regime, of which he was the master, on a new doctrinal footing, in the hope thereby to surmount the sterile opposition between 'Abbāsids and 'Alids. Thus al-Ma'mūn's Mu'tazilism, far from merely satisfying intellectual aspirations, was an element in a well-defined policy, while at the same time justifying his claims to provide effective leadership to the community on the doctrinal level.

By instituting the miḥna, the ruler adopted in effect an approach that brought him close to the Shī'ī imāms and demonstrated the originality of the role he intended to play. There is no doubt that the Sunnī caliphs had always regarded as their [44] mission the safeguarding of dogma; thus al-Mahdī had worked vigorously to repress zandaqa. But never before had a caliph presented himself as a "doctor" who had been charged by God to enlighten the community and to communicate to it the knowledge that had been entrusted to him. Yet this is how al-Ma'mūn presents himself in the preamble of the letters in which he initiates the miḥna. Although he does not declare himself to be an infallible and sinless imām like the Rāfiḍī imāms, he none the less describes himself as the repository of "knowledge" and as the "heir of prophecy". He is not only the "successor" of the Prophet and the caliphs, but also an heir of Muḥammad's message, charged with leading the community effectively and introducing them to the "true religion". As such, the caliph places himself against the mass of fuqahā' who, he says, too often allow themselves to be seduced by the ignorant masses instead of guiding them. The contempt for the people, who are incapable of guiding themselves, and the disdain for their would-be guides, who are not up to their task, rings out from each line of these letters, the redaction of which was doubtless carried out by a Mu'tazilī. This contempt comes out, perhaps even more violently, in the epistle by al-Jāḥiẓ dedicated to a refutation of anthropomorphism74 and in declarations attributed to people such as Thumāma.⁷⁵ One senses in each case this Mu'tazilī-inspired spirit of "authority", which stands in radical contrast to the Sunnī "communal" spirit that bases the imamate and, in part, religion itself, on the consensus of the "doctors", if not of the believers. One can also detect here an echo of Shī'ī concepts that, although diverging on the powers of the imām, do not accord any value to popular judgement.

The last stage of al-Ma'mūn's thought is clearly revealed in the waṣīya, the text of which has been preserved by al-Ṭabarī and which can be understood as a personal profession of faith.⁷⁶ In addition to providing political recommendations concerning, in particular, the struggle against the rebel Bābak (who himself had some connections with extremist Shī'ī sects) or the choice of Ibn Abī Dū'ād as chief qāḍī and sole advisor, al-Ma'mūn tells his brother and heir Abū Isḥāq that he should continue the same line regarding belief in the created Qur'ān and should treat the 'Alids with kindness. He also proclaims his belief in tawḥīd as it is conceived by the Mu'tazilīs and his belief in a God who is distinct from the world and who [45] cannot be compared to anything. He recommends that certain customs be respected at his funeral, notably that one should pronounce a five-fold takbīr in conformity with Shī'ī practice.⁷⁷ This confirms the caliph's personal attachment, on the one hand, to a doctrine that satisfied his intellectual aspirations and, on the other, to practices foreign to Sunnism.

By considering these testamentary dispositions, as well as the political and cultural measures taken by al-Ma'mūn throughout his reign, one can grasp the precise orientation of the caliphate and how it was able to seduce certain moderate followers of Shī'ism. One can also understand why it offended so blatantly all those who remained attached to traditional concepts and refused to accord 'Alī any preeminence. In reaction to the proclamation of tafḍīl 'Alī and the created character of the Qur'ān, these opponents professed their veneration for Mu'āwiya and the Umayyad caliphs as well as their belief in the eternity of the divine word, forming a movement that al-Jāḥiẓ characterized as nābita. They were aligned with the Ḥanbalī traditionalists and grew under the impact of al-Ma'mūn's persecution.78 This was a politico-religious movement that did not intend to assume power by force. But there were other opponents who already at an earlier date had tried to overthrow the 'Abbāsid regime by announcing the arrival of a type of mahdī called al-Sufyānī, after Mu'āwiya's father Abū Sufyān. During the war of succession following the death of Hārūn al-Rashīd, a descendant of the Sufyānids had in fact appeared in Damascus and had managed to control it for almost three years.⁷⁹

These two opposition movements are generally considered to have been distinct; they did in fact assume different forms. Nevertheless, they had a common trait: attachment to the memory of the Umayyads and rejection of compromise with Shī'ism. Al-Ma'mūn appears to have feared them both. This explains why, in the face of the refractory attitude of the Damascene traditionalist Abū Mushir, who refused to subscribe to the doctrine of the created Qur'ān, the caliph is said to have exclaimed: "Are you working in the service of the Sufyānī?"⁸⁰

Nevertheless, al-Ma'mūn, who faced opposition from rigorist circles, [46] did not make any concessions to Shī'ī extremists. He went so far as to combat, admittedly without much success, the Bābakīya who had certain ties with them. He also crushed the 'Alid revolts that continued to take place.⁸¹ He affirmed thereby that he did not intend to give up his leadership of the community, but only to promote a regime capable of realizing its union under his aegis, an orientation not very different from that which he had adopted at the beginning of his reign. In fact, the two successive solutions that he attempted were in response to a constant spiritual state that was dominated by al-Ma'mūn's personal pro-Shī'ī and pro-Mu'tazilī convictions as well as by his desire to reconcile the two enemy factions by going beyond their sterile conflict. Later but well-informed historians correctly sensed this continuity; Ibn Taghrībirdī, for one, listed all the changes introduced by the caliph since coming to power in the same series of blameworthy innovations: the adoption of the green colour, the rapprochement with the 'Alids, the adoption of the doctrine of the created Qur'ān, the order given to the army to pronounce supplementary takbīrs, and finally the authorization of the mut'a marriage.82 Although this point of view is somewhat limited—al-Ma'mūn's acts being judged solely with regard to the notion of bid'a—it nevertheless demonstrates a correct appreciation of a policy the coherence of which has too often gone unrecognized but the broad outlines of which can now be reconstituted.

From the very beginning of his reign, al-Ma'mūn demonstrated his claims to guide the community in his capacity as imām. He first attempted to prepare the transfer of the caliphate to an 'Alid without abandoning Sunnī principles. This attempt, which was doubtlessly inspired by the Mu'tazilī and Zaydī circles that surrounded the caliph, was insufficiently prepared at a time when he had not reestablished direct contact with Iraq, and it did not achieve the desired results. He then adopted a more subtle approach whereby he undertook to establish his regime on a new doctrine and to introduce practices that were dear to the anti-'Abbāsid forces while, at the same time, retaining leadership of his subjects in his own hands. Thus he adopted Shī'ī doctrines that were compatible with Sunnism and based his hope for a reconciliation of the splintered community on a personal examination of theories that did not conform to 'Abbāsid orthodoxy.

[47] Thus, one is better able to understand the attitude of al-Ma'mūn over the course of his reign when one provides a more accurate interpretation of the politico-religious movements to which the caliph adhered or from which he drew his inspiration. It has long been known that Mu'tazilism, whose tenets he imposed, was not a manifestation of "liberal thought".⁸³ But neither was it a theological system without connection to reality. Its official adoption makes sense when one considers that the partisans of this school attributed to the imām a doctrinal power that was more extensive than that of the preceding 'Abbāsid caliphs, and that they were particularly hostile to the veneration of the Umayyads. As for al-Ma'mūn's Shī'ī sympathies, one can hardly see in them simple marks of "piety", as Gabrieli had assumed.84 In reality, these implied the adoption of dogmatic principles the correctness of which was recognized by the caliph, and the desire to gain the support of numerous dissident elements through conciliatory measures.

Al-Ma'mūn's actions demonstrate both the influence that Mu'tazilī and Zaydī doctrines exercised on certain individuals during this period, as well as the caliph's strong personality and the steadfastness of his effort. His two most spectacular initiatives were those of a wide-ranging man of state who tried to overcome the problems of his time and allowed himself to be carried along by certain existing currents that he strove to turn to his own ends. But his analysis of the situation, which was more concerned with logic than with an impartial evaluation of the facts, always underestimated the importance of certain traditional positions that continued to be defended by the fuqahā' and the urban plebs. This was al-Ma'mūn's error, and his authoritarian spirit could not come to grips with a popular resistance that he made the mistake of minimizing.

Nevertheless, this effort to solve the 'Alid problem is a milestone in the history of Islam. Despite its failure, the direction that had been given to the Muslim community would occasionally be partially revived by other Sunnī rulers who would seek to destroy political Shī'ism while acceding to certain claims of what might be called religious Shī'ism. In fact, Sunnism and Shī'ism continued [48] for a long time to react against one another, and this mobility of the political-religious situation explains many subsequent controversies and transforations. This may be the most important lesson from the study of these curious episodes and failed efforts that provide the caliphate of al-Ma'mūn with its special character.

¹ Cf. Bernard Lewis, in EI², I, 18.

² Concerning this episode, see Dominique Sourdel, Le vizirat 'abbāside de 749 à 936 (132 à 324 de l'hégire), I (Damascus, 1959), 164–65.

³ Ibid., I, 166.

⁴ Ibid., I, 166.

⁵ Ibid., I, 169.

⁶ Al-Mas'ūdī, Murūj al-dhahab wa-ma 'ādin al-jawhar, ed. and trans. C. Barbier de Meynard and Pavet de Courteille (Paris, 1861–77), VI, 368–76.

⁷ See Sourdel, Le vizirat 'abbāside, I, 178.

⁸ Ibid., I, 180.

⁹ Concerning this question, see Albert Nader, Le systèms philosophique des Mu'tazila (Beirut, 1958), 322–30.

¹⁰ According to al-Shahrastānī, Kitāb al-milal wa-l-niḥal, ed. William Cureton (1842–46), I, 116.

¹¹ See H.S. Nyberg, in EI¹, s.v. "Mu'tazila"; and Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Ṭabaqāt al-mu'tazila, ed. Suzanna Diwald-Wilzer (Wiesbaden, 1961), 32.

¹² Al-Ṭabarī, Ta'rīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk, ed. M.J. de Goeje et al. (Leiden, 1879–1901), III, 152. Cf. G. van Vloten, "Zur Abbasiden Geschichte", ZDMG 52 (1898), 213ff.; Cornelius van Arendonk, Les débuts de l'imāmat zaidite au Yémen (Leiden, 1960), 47–48.

¹³ According to a report in al-Ash'arī, Maqālāt al-islāmīyīn, ed. Hellmut Ritter (Istanbul, 1929–33), 79.

¹⁴ Al-Malaṭī, Kitāb al-tanbīh wa-l-radd 'alā ahl al-ahwa', ed. Sven Dedering (Istanbul, 1936), 27.

¹⁵ Sourdel, Le vizirat 'abbāside, I, 169 n. 3.

¹⁶ Ibid., I, 180.

¹⁷ Wakī', Akhbār al quḍāt, ed. 'Abd al-'Azīz Muṣṭafā al-Marāghī (Cairo, 1366–70/1947–50), III, 257–58 (he is said to have declared already during the reign of al-Hādī: man ṭalaba al-'ilm bi-l-kalām tazandaqa ["He who pursues learning through recourse to speculative theology makes himself a heretic"]).

¹⁸ See Abū Yūsuf, Kitāb al-kharāj (Cairo, AH 1302), 72–73; trans. E. Fagnan, Le livre de l'impôt foncier (Paris, 1921), 195–97.

¹⁹ Ibn al-Jawzī, Manāqib al-imām Aḥmad (Cairo, 1930), 348.

²⁰ In 191/807: al-Ṭabarī, III, 712. Cf. Antoine Fattal, Le statut légal des non-musulmans en pays d'Islam (Beirut, 1958), 100.

²¹ Concerning the measures taken by al-Rashīd, see the traditions preserved by Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Ṭabaqāt al-mu'tazila, 54–59.

²² Al-Kindī, Wulāt Miṣr, ed. Rhuvon Guest (Leiden, 1912), 422.

²³ Al-Jāḥiẓ, Al-Risāla fī nafy l-tashbīh, ed. Charles Pellat in Al-Mashriq 47 (1953), 283. Concerning the ideas of al-Jāḥiẓ, see now Charles Pellat, "L'imāmat dans la doctrine de Ǧāḥiẓ", Studia Islamica 15 (1961), 23–52.

²⁴ For the details of these events, see Francesco Gabrieli, Al-Ma'mūn e gli 'Alidi (Leipzig, 1929); Walter M. Patton, Ahmed ibn Hanbal and the Mihna (Leiden, 1897).

²⁵ Gabrieli, Al-Ma'mūn, 45.

²⁶ See Abū l-Faraj al-Iṣfahānī, Maqātil al-ṭālibīyīn, ed. Aḥmad Ṣaqr (Cairo, AH 1368), 378.

²⁷ Concerning this episode, see Sourdel, Le vizirat 'abbāside, I, 209–11.

²⁸ Van Arendonk, Les débuts de l'imāmat zaidite, 104.

²⁹ According to al-Nawbakhtī, Firaq al-shī'a, ed. Hellmut Ritter (Istanbul, 1931), 73.

³⁰ Gabrieli, Al-Ma'mūn, 34 and n. 2.

³¹ Ibid., 37 and n. 8.

³² Al-Ma'mūn's concept appears to be very close to the ideas of al-Jāḥiẓ, as expounded by Pellat, "L'imāmat dans la doctrine de Ǧaḥiẓ", esp. 44.

³³ Cf. Rudolf Strothmann, in EI¹, s.v. "Zaidiyya".

³⁴ Concerning this question, which is not yet fully clarified, see Gabrieli, Al-Ma'mūn, 37 n. 4. It should be noted that green standards are already mentioned in an inscription adorning the throne of the king of Kabul, dating from AH 200; see Répertoire chronologique d'épigraphie arabe (Cairo, 1931-proceeding), no. 116. If one accepts the authenticity of this text in its entirety, one would have to suppose that the green colour was adopted from the moment that the caliph made the decision to choose an 'Alid heir, and not only at the time of the bay'a.

³⁵ Al-Ya'qūbī, Ta'rīkh, ed. M.T. Houtsma (Leiden, 1883) II, 531–32 (ed. Beirut 1960, II, 438).

³⁶ Al-Jahshiyārī, Kitāb al-wuzarā' wa-l-kuttāb, ed. Muṣṭafā al-Saqqā, Ibrāhīm al-Abyārī, and 'Abd al-Ḥafīẓ Shalabī (Cairo, 1357/1938), 279, Cf. Sourdel, Le vizirat 'abbāside, I, 199.

³⁷ Al-Ṭabarī, III, 774.

³⁸ Cf. van Arendonk, Les débuts de l'imāmat zaidite, 199.

³⁹ Cf. Sourdel, Le vizirat 'abbāside, I, 204; Répertoire chronologique d'épigraphie arabe, nos. 100, 115, 116, 189, 209, 210.

⁴⁰ See Gabrieli, At-Ma'mūn, 46–60.

⁴¹ Al-Ya'qūbī, Ta'rīkh, II, 551 (ed. Beirut, II, 453).

⁴² Gabrieli, Al-Ma'mūn, 60.

⁴³ Al-Ya'qūbī, Ta'rīkh, II, 553–53 (ed. Beirut, II, 454), Cf. al-Nawbakhtī, Firaq al-shī'a, 72, 74.

⁴⁴ Al-Ṭabarī, III, 1030. Cf. al-Qāḍī al-Rashīd ibn al-Zubayr, Kitāb al-dhakhā'ir wa-l-tuḥaf, ed. Muḥammad Ḥamīd Allāh (Kuwait, 1959), 118, trans. in La Pensée chiite 8 (March-April, 1961), 9.

⁴⁵ Ibn Abī Ṭāhir Ṭayfūr, Kitāb Baghdād, ed. Muḥammad Zāhid ibn al-Ḥasan al-Kawtharī (Cairo, 1368/1949), 45.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 150.

⁴⁷ Gabrieli, Al-Ma'mūn, 60 n. 4, following Ibn 'Abd Rabbihi, Al-'Iqd, ed. 1923, III, 42–47.

⁴⁸ Cf. van Arendonk, Les débuts de l'imāmat zaidite, 75–77.

⁴⁹ See, for example, the Ḥanbalī position in Henri Laoust, La profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa (Damascus, 1958), 114–15.

⁵⁰ Al-Ṭabarī, III, 1098–99; al-Mas'ūdī, Murūj al-dhahab, VII, 90–93 (ed. Cairo, IV, 40–41); Ibn al-'Imād, Shadharāt al-dhahab (Cairo, AH 1350–51), II, 25, 27; Ibn Taghrībirdī, Al-Nujūm al-zāhira, I (Cairo, 1929), 619. Cf. Charles Pellat, "Le culte de Mu'āwiya au IIIe siècle de l'hégire", Studia Islamica 6 (1956), 55.

⁵¹ Al-Mas'ūdī, Murūj al-dhahab, VII, 93 (IV, 41); Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Ṭabaqāt ai-mu'tazila, 64–67.

⁵² Max van Berchem, CIA Jérusalem, II (Cairo, 1927), 237–38.

⁵³ Oleg Grabar, "The Umayyad Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem", Ars Orientalis 3 (1959), 33–62.

⁵⁴ Ibn Abī Ṭāhir Ṭayfūr, Kitāb Baghdād, 22; al-Ṭabarī, III, 1040.

⁵⁵ Wakī, Akhbār al-quḍāt, III, 295.

⁵⁶ Al-Ya'qūbī, Ta'rīkh, II, 571 (ed. Beirut, II, 468–69).

⁵⁷ Cf. van Arendonk, Lea débuts de l'imāmat zaidite, 79 and n. 4 (below).

⁵⁸ A14-Ya'qūbī, Ta'rīkh, II, 572 (ed. Beirut, II, 469). Cf. al-Bāladhurī, Futūḥ al-buldān, ed. M.J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1866), 32–33 (the event is placed in AH 210).

⁵⁹ Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Ta'rīkh Baghdād (Cairo, 1349/1931), XIV. 199–200; Ibn Taghrībirdī, Al-Nujūm al-zāhira, I, 631. Cf. Ibn Abī Ya'lā, Ṭabaqāt al-ḥanābila, ed. Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Fiqī (Cairo, 1952), I, 413; Laoust, La profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa, 138 n. 2.

⁶⁰ Al-Ṭabarī, III, 1105. It was on a FViday in the middle of Ramaḍān that the soldiers (al-jund), while standing, pronounced for the first time the three tabkīrs at the end of the prayer. Afterwards they did the same following every prescribed prayer (maktūba). Cf. Ibn Taghrībirdī, Al-Nujūm al-zāhira, I, 631.

⁶¹ Cf. Ibn Isfandiyār, History of Tabaristan, 175, apud Ignaz Goldziher, Le dogme et la loi de l'Islam (Paris, 1958), 290; Robert Brunschvig, "Fiqh fâtimide et histoire de l'Ifriqiya", in Mélanges d'histoire et d'archéologie de l'Occident musulman, II: Hommage à Georges Marçais (Algiers, 1957), 16–18; A. Querry, Recueil de lois concernant let rnusulmans schyites (Paris, 1871–72), I, 71, 98.

⁶² See al-Qāḍī al-Nu'mān, Da'ā'im al-islām, ed. A.A. Fyzee (Cairo, 1951–60), I, 205.

⁶³ Al-Ya'qūbī, Ta'rīkh, II, 571 (ed. Beirut, II, 468). Let us recall the classical distinction, in the prayer ritual, between "strict, obligations" (furūḍ) and "current practices" (sunan). See, for example, the lists of each type according to the Shāfi'ī school in Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, Al-Tanbīh fī l-fiqh, ed. Th.W. Juynboll (Leiden, 1879), 25.

⁶⁴ See especially the detailed treatise by al-Shīrāzī), mentioned above.

⁶⁵ Al-Ya'qūbī, Ta'rīkh, II, 571 (ed. Beirut, II, 468).

⁶⁶ Al-Ṭabarī, III, 1103.

⁶⁷ Al-Dīnawarī, Al-Akhbār al-ṭiwāl, ed. Vladimir Guirgass (Leiden, 1888), 369. Abū l-Hudhayl is said to have been presented to al-Ma'mūn by Thumāma (Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Ṭabaqāt al-mu'tazila, 46).

⁶⁸ Concerning these events, see Patton, Ahmed ibn Hanbal and the Mihna.

⁶⁹ Wakī, Akhbār al-quḍāt, III, 269–70.

⁷⁰ Ibn al-Jawzī, Manāqib al-imām Aḥmad, 313.

⁷¹ Ibid., 309–10.

⁷² Ibn Abī Ṭāhir Ṭayfūr, Kitāb Baghdād, 36. For these persons, see EI², s.v.

⁷³ One might add here to what was noted above (31) that the celebrated al-Naẓẓām openly learned to Rāfiḍism (al-Shahrastānī, Kitāb al-milal, ed. Cairo 1948, 76–79). As for Abū l-Hudhayl, who, according to al-Ash'arī (Maqālāt al-islāmīyīn, 458) refused to take sides between 'Alī and his adversaries, he is also said, according to other testimonies (Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Ṭabaqāt al-mu'tazila, 48), to have professed the superiority of 'Alī over 'Uthmān.

⁷⁴ Al-Risāla fī nafy al-tashbīh, 283ff.

⁷⁵ See, for example, Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Ṭabaqāt al-mu'tazila, 64–67; Ibn Abī Ṭāhir Ṭayfūr, Kitāb Baghdād, 54–55.

⁷⁶ Al-Ṭabarī, III, 1135–38.

⁷⁷ Cf. above, 41.

⁷⁸ See Charles Pellat, "La 'Nâbita' de Djâhiz, un document important pour l'histoire politico-religieuse de l'Islam", AIEO (Algiers) 10 (1952), 307ff.

⁷⁹ Al-Ṭabarī, III, 830; Ibn Taghrībirdī, Al-Nujūm al-zāhira, I, 553, 567.

⁸⁰ Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Ta'rīkh Baghdād, XI, 72.

⁸¹ Gabrieli, Al-Ma'mūn, 61–62.

⁸² Ibn Taghrībirdī, Al-Nujūm al-zāhira, I, 631.

⁸³ This is the position of Gustav Weil, Geschichte der Chalifen (Mannheim, 1846–62), II, 258, noted by Gabrieli, Al-Ma'mūn, 35 n. 1.

⁸⁴ Gabrieli, Al-Ma'mūn, 35.