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252nd RD – organizing all around defenses with strong points on the northern bank of the Western Dvina River [23-28 kilometers north-northwest of Il’ino and 20-25 kilometers south of Staraia Toropa] to protect the army’s right flank, with no enemy activity. |
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246th RD – attacked enemy strongpoints on the outskirts of Trubniki and the forest to the south [15 kilometers north-northeast of Il’ino] at 0800 hours on 24 August after a half-hour artillery preparation, while its left wing cooperated with 243rd RD’s attack on Hill 209.6 and advanced 0.5 kilometer to envelop it from the south. |
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243rd RD – attacked and captured the northeastern outskirts of Malyi Borok [15 kilometers northeast of Il’ino] and is fighting for Hill 209.6, while enveloping it from the south. |
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1st and 2nd MRRs – fighting for Katkovo [15 kilometers east-northeast of Il’ino]. |
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29th CR – fulfilling its previous mission of flank protection [30 kilometers east of Il’ino]. |
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Composite Student Bn – defending the isthmus between Lakes Kodosno and Zhizhitskoe in the Zasekovo and Pashivkino line [30 kilometers south-southwest of Toropets], where the enemy is firing artillery and mortars on Zhizhitsa Station. |
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Losses for 22 and 23 August – 227 killed, 653 wounded, and 38 missing in action. |
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Headquarters, 29th Army – Bentsy. CP, 29th Army – 0.5 kilometer south of Poiarkovo. |
While this summary was most notable for its description of the rapidly deteriorating conditions in 22nd Army’s sector on the Western Front’s right wing, it also indicates Timoshenko’s fixation on his front’s offensive operations in several respects. First, despite 22nd Army’s travails, Maslennikov’s 29th Army was persisting in its assaults in the Il’ino region and immediately to the east, at a cost of about 1,000 casualties in a single day. Second, Khomenko’s 30th Army was still trying to achieve its long sought-after penetration, in this instance, in the Sechenki sector with its 162nd and 251st Divisions, although the remainder of the army was resting and refitting for fresh offensives soon to come. Despite heavy fighting locally, Konev’s 19th, Rokossovsky’s 16th, and Lukin’s 20th Armies too were restoring order in their formations, expectantly awaiting new attack orders. Finally, as indicated by 19th Army’s report, a new phase of operations was beginning along the Loinia and Tsarevich Rivers. This was so because, overnight on 23-24 August, at Strauss’ direction, German 14th Motorized Division moved forward and replaced the remnants of 161st Infantry Division along the western banks of the two rivers. Therefore, by midday on 24 August, the exhausted divisions of Konev’s army now faced 14th Motorized Division’s 11th and 53rd Infantry Regiments and 54th Reconnaissance (Motorcycle) Battalion, supported on the left by a regiment of 28th Infantry Division and on the right by a battalion from the same division, in the sector from Pochepova southward to Novosel’e. Therefore, henceforth, it would be far more difficult for 19th Army to resume its advance. Despite this brief lull in the Western Front’s offensive actions, Timoshenko concentrated virtually all of his air power against German forces attacking 22nd Army, though the weather seriously hindered his air efforts on 24 August.
More than week later, on 1 September, the Military Council of Konev’s 19th Army prepared an overall summary and assessment of the operations it conducted during the last two weeks of the month and submitted it to Timoshenko and the Stavka. Since most of this report related to the heavy but only partially successful fighting from 17-24 August, its contents provide a succinct and accurate view of what transpired in this vital but bloody sector along the Vop’ River. Most important, it noted the Germans significantly bolstered their defenses along the army’s front by 24 August.
See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix O, 55.
The report began with a curt summary statement, “After sustained fighting along the Vop’ River, the enemy began a withdrawal to the west, after which the grouping of German forces was as follows:”
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First. 35th ID operated to the north of the Krasnitsa, Brakulevo, and Morozova line [34-38 kilometers north of Iartsevo]. South of this line, 5th ID (with 14th, 56th, and 75th IRs and 44th AR) withdrew and then went over to the defense in the Shatuny [Priglovo] and Balashova sector [22-34 kilometers north of Iartsevo]. This division went over to the defense with the forward edge of its main defensive belt along the Panova, Shakhlovo, Novoselishche, Ivaniki, and Balashova line. The Germans conducted a delaying action in front of this defensive belt, at first along the Mamonovo and Gorbatovskaia line [24-30 kilometers north of Iartsevo], and then along the Zanino and Zubova line. 5th ID occupied its defenses with its three regiments in single echelon. Its defensive front extended 11-12 kilometers. Evidently, because of the comparatively broad front, 5th ID did not have large reserves. During the period of the fighting, two reserve groups were established, including, first, up to an infantry battalion in the woods northwest of Shakhlovo [30 kilometers north-northwest of Iartsevo], and, second, up to an infantry battalion in the Staraia Kazarina region [25 kilometers north-northwest of Iartsevo]. A total of 5-6 artillery batteries operated in 5th ID’s sector, of which one battery was heavy. |
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Second. 161st ID (with 336th, 364th, and 371st IRs) operated in the Kapyrevshchina, Kazakova, Chistaia, and Krovopuskovo sector [5-22 kilometers north of Iartsevo]. This division, while conducting a fighting withdrawal, went over to the defense in the Kazakova and Chistaia sector [3-24 kilometers north of Iartsevo] along the line of the Loinia and Tsarevich Rivers. 161st ID occupied its defense with all of its regiments in single echelon, and the width of its defensive sector reached 12-13 kilometers. |
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Third. The forces of 312th IR, 900th MotB, and even 1st Bn, 34th IR of 35th ID were detected operating in the space between the 5th and 161st IDs. |
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Fourth – At the beginning of 19th Army’s offensive operation, the Germans’ densest combat formation was north of the Potelitsa and Balashova line [20-24 kilometers north of Iartsevo]. The main mass of enemy artillery was situated in the forest in the Zanino, Losevo, and Moteva regions. This circumstance can be explained only by the fact that, before the offensive operation began, especially in the period of Group Boldin’s escape from encirclement, 19th Army mounted its main effort on its right wing. In addition, camouflage [maskirovka] measures played a significant role during the preparation for the operation and deceiving the enemy in regard to the actual direction of the main attack. |
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Thus, the offensive by 19th Army, which conducted its main attack in the Balashova and Nefedovshchina sector, found the German forces in an unfavorable grouping. The main attack, which 91st 89th, 50th, and 64th RDs conducted, focused primarily on the enemy’s 161st ID, and, therefore, during the period from 17 through 21 August, this division lost more than two-thirds of its personnel and more than half of its weapons. The German command had to remove the remnants of 161st ID from the front, and, in order to prevent a penetration of the front, it began to throw units in from the depths and remove units from passive sectors of the front (16th Army). 8th ID’s 84th IR and 28th ID’s 83rd IR were thrown into the Pochepova and Zaitseva State Farm sector [13-20 kilometers north of Iartsevo]. The remaining regiments of 28th ID (7th and 49th IRs) occupied the Popova and Chistaia line [3-11 kilometers north of Iartsevo], after relieving the remnants of two battalions of 336th and 364th IRs. |
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During the period from 18 through 23 August, the enemy threw his tanks into the Losevo and Muzhilova sector [15-25 kilometers north of Iartsevo], and, on the evening of 20 August, his tank subunits made an attempt to penetrate to the crossing over the Vop’ River by attacking from the Losevo region toward Potelitsa and Zadnia [23 kilometers north-northeast of Iartsevo]. In addition, during the period from 20 through 22 August, he tried to conduct attacks by separate groups of tanks (10 to 30) in the Pochepova, Bolotino, and Muzhilova regions [15-20 kilometers north of Iartsevo]. However, all of these attempts ended as enemy failures. After losing more than 130 tanks, the enemy was forced to cease his counterattacks. According to documents taken off the dead, we determined that units of the 7th PzD participated in these counterattacks. |
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Fifth. The fighting during the period from 17 through 22 August forced the German command to “thicken” the combat formations of German forces south of the Borniki and Novoselishche line [27 kilometers north of Iartsevo]. By day’s end on 26 August, by virtue of the heavy losses suffered by 8th ID’s 84th IR and 28th ID’s 7th IR, the forces of the enemy’s 44th and 87th IDs and 14th MotD began to approach 19th Army’s front. Based on the interrogation of prisoners on 28 and 29 August, we determined that units of 44th ID were moving toward Balashova [22 kilometers north of Iartsevo], and units of 87th ID were moving further south, toward Stepanidino [northeast of Dukhovshchina]. At the same time, 14th MotD’s 53rd IR relieved 28th ID’s 7th IR in the Siniakovo and Osipova sector [10-12 kilometers north of Iartsevo]. Thus, during 18 days of combat, 161st ID, 8th ID’s 84th IR, and 28th ID’s 7th IR were smashed along 19th Army’s front. The enemy then brought forward forces from three fresh divisions by 1 September, but the grouping of these has yet to be determined. Units of 35th ID, 5th ID, 8th ID, 28th ID, 44th ID, 87th ID, 14th MotD, and 7th PzD have been identified along the front. Overall, 30 enemy batteries are operating along the army’s front. |
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Sixth. During the period from 28 through 31 August, the army’s forces reconnoitered the enemy’s defenses, while conducting offensive fighting. This is shown on the attached scheme [unavailable].27 |