Endnotes

Chapter 1

  1 The Wehrmacht consisted of the Army [das Heere], Air Force [Luftwaffe], and Navy [Kriegsmarine].

  2 OKW, WFst (Abt. L.), War Diary (MS-C-065-k), 5 Dec 40, 19-20. This is a translation on the German original, Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab) [The War Diary of the High Command of the Armed Forces or OKW War Diary] (The Armed Forces’ Headquarters)], Band I: 1. August 1940-31. Dezember 1941, complied by Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1965), item 41, 981-982.

  3 Gotthard Heinrici, The Campaign in Russia, Volume 1 (Washington, DC: United States Army G-2, 1954). An unpublished translation by Joseph Welch of a German-language manuscript in the US National Archives, 85 and OKW War Diary, WFSt War Diary, 27-28. See this important document in, “Vortrag beim Fuhrer am 5. Dezember 1940” [A Talk with the Führer on 5 December 1940], Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab), Band I: 1. August 1940-31. Dezember 1941 [OKW War Diary, WFSt War Diary] complied by Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1965), item 41, 981-982. This talk is vital to understanding Hitler’s insistence on clearing large Russian forces from Army Group Center’s flanks before advancing to capture Moscow.

  4 See, “Directive for the Concentration of Forces (Plan “Barbarossa”),” No. 050/41, dated 31. 1. 41., issued by the General Staff of the German Army High Command’s [OKH’s] Operations Department, in Sbornik voenno-istoricheskikh materialov Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, vypusk 18 [Collection of military-historical materials of the Great Patriotic War, issue 18] (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo Ministerstva Oborony Soiuza SSR, 1960), 56-57. Hereafter cited as Voenizdat, with year of publication. This translation was prepared by the Military-Historical Department of the Soviet Army General Staff’s Military-Scientific Directorate and classified secret.

  5 The original Plan Marcks had called for employing a force of 147 German divisions, including 24 panzer and 12 motorized divisions. The total force deployed for combat in the East amounted to 138 German divisions (104 infantry and 34 mobile) in the three forward army groups, 9 security divisions, 4 divisions in Finland, 2 divisions under the OKH’s control, and a separate regiment and motorized training brigade. The most recent Soviet sources claim the strength of the German invasion force was 153 divisions and 3 brigades manned by 4.1 million men and equipped with 4,170 tanks, 40,500 guns and mortars, and 3,613 combat aircraft. See V. A. Zolotarev, ed., Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina 1941-1945, Kn. 1 [The Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, Book 1] (Moscow: “Nauka,” 1998), 95. Hereafter cited as VOV with appropriate page. See also, Schematische Kriegsgliederung, Stand: B-Tag 1941 (22.6) “Barbarossa.” This document is the original German order of battle for Operation Barbarossa.

  6 Ibid., Army Group South’s Eleventh Army controlled the forward Romanian forces, and Romanian Third and Fourth Armies controlled the remaining forces.

  7 In July 1940 Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, Chief of the Red Army General Staff, approved a plan drafted by his deputy, Major General Aleksandr Mikhailovich Vasilevsky. Vasilevsky’s plan assumed an attack by Germany, supported by Italy, Finland, Romania, and possibly Hungary and Japan. This plan envisioned an attacking enemy force totaling 270 divisions, 233 of which would be massed along the Soviet Union’s new western borders. Vasilevsky assessed that the Germans would conduct their main effort with 123 infantry divisions and 10 panzer divisions deployed north of the Pripiat’ Marshes, and this force would subsequently advance toward Minsk, Moscow, and Leningrad. Therefore, he proposed deploying the bulk of Red Army’s forces into the same region. For details on Soviet prewar military planning see, David M. Glantz, Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War (Lawrence, Ks: The University Press of Kansas, 1998), 90-98, and the Russian translation, David Glantz, Koloss poverzhennyi: Krasnoi Armii v 1941 godu [Staggering Colossus: The Red Army in 1941] (Moscow: “Iauza” “Eksmo,” 2008).

  8 Peoples’ Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Semen Konstantinovich Timoshenko, rejected Vasilevsky’s plan because he anticipated Stalin’s objections. When Army General Kirill Afanas’evich Meretskov became Chief of the General Staff in August 1940, he had Vasilevsky and the rest of the General Staff draft a new plan. The second draft provided for two strategic variants, concentrating the bulk of Soviet forces either north or south of the Pripiat’ Marshes depending on the political situation. Stalin reviewed this draft on 5 October. While he did not openly reject the northern option, he remarked that Hitler’s most likely goals were the grain of the Ukraine and the coal and other minerals of the Donbas region. Therefore, the General Staff presented Stalin with a new plan, which was approved on 14 October 1940 and oriented the bulk of the Red Army’s forces along the projected southwestern axis.

  9 Zolotarev, VOV, 108.

10 As the tension increased during the first five months of 1941, Zhukov tried to persuade Stalin of the need for a preemptive attack. The new chief of staff wrote a “Report on the Plan of Strategic Deployment of Armed Forces of the Soviet Union to the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars on 15 May 1941,” in essence a contingency plan, and convinced Timoshenko to co-sign the document. In this hand-written proposal, Zhukov argued for an immediate offensive, using 152 Red Army divisions to destroy the estimated 100 German divisions assembling in Poland. The plan required the Southwestern Front to attack westward across southern Poland to separate Germany from her southern allies; the Western Front was to grapple with the main German force and capture Warsaw. Although Timoshenko cosigned Zhukov’s plan, Stalin either never saw the plan or, as indicated by the absence of Stalin’s usually profane notations on the original document, he rejected it, first, because he realized that the Red Army could never meet the plan’s mobilization requirements and, second, he refused to take any overt actions against Hitler for fear of reprisals. Zhukov’s plan, in particular, the portion of it dealing with the employment of a large mechanized force to launch an offensive along the southwestern axis into southern Poland, formed the basis for the Southwestern Front’s “answering strike” (counterstrokes or counteroffensive) called for in DP-41. In any case, given the many problems the Red Army was struggling with during the summer of 1941, launching such an attack would have been a desperate gamble. For the genesis of this document and the ensuing controversy over its validity, see David M. Glantz, The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union: A History (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 87-90, and Glantz, Stumbling Colossus.

11 Ibid.

12 The four military districts along the Soviet Union’s western border fielded 170 divisions, 2 separate rifle brigades, and 12 airborne brigades on 22 June 1941. The first operational echelon, which was situated 10-50 kilometers from the border, consisted of 56 divisions (53 rifle and 3 cavalry) and 2 separate rifle brigades. The second operational echelon, deployed 50-100 kilometers from the border, included 52 divisions (13 rifle, 3 cavalry, 24 tank, and 12 motorized)). The third operational echelon, which stretched 100-400 kilometers eastward from the border, consisted of 62 divisions, most of which were deployed west of the Western Dvina and Dnepr Rivers in the military districts’ reserves. See Zolotarev, VOV, 108-109.

13 For example, 13 divisions designated for assignment to the Southwestern Front and the new reserve armies and the 3 divisions of 21st Mechanized Corps, which were destined for 22nd Army in the High Command Reserve (RGK), had not yet assembled, and another 10 divisions were still moving forward from the Soviet Union’s internal military districts.

14 See Thomas L. Jentz, ed., Panzer Truppen: The Complete Guide to the Creation & Combat Employment of Germany’s Tank Force, 1933-1942, Volume 1 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 1996); Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1984), 81-83 and 96-97; and F. W. von Senger und Etterlin, Die Panzergrenadiere: Geschichte und Gestalt der mechanisierten infanterie 1930-1960 (Munich: J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1961), 72-77.

15 Timothy Wray, Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front During World War II: Prewar to March 1943 (Fort Leavenworth, KS.: Combat Studies Institute, 1986), 1-21.

16 To avoid telegraphing German intentions, many of these aircraft had remained in the West, continuing the air attacks on Britain until a few weeks before the offensive.

17 Similarly, the May 1941 airborne invasion of Crete had devastated German parachute formations and air transport units; 146 Ju-52s had been shot down, and another 150 were seriously damaged. See Williamson Murray, Luftwaffe (Baltimore, Md.: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co. of America, 1985), 79, 83.

18 For the best German assessment of the first six months of the war, see Klaus Reinhardt, Moscow – The Turning Point: The Failure of Hitler’s Military Strategy in the Winter of 1941-1942, trans. Karl B. Keenan (Oxford and Providence: Berg Publisher, 1992), 26-28.

19 For a detailed description of the condition of the Red Army in June 1941, see Glantz, Stumbling Colossus.

20 The 1941 Red Army tank division consisted of two tank regiments, one motorized infantry regiment, and reconnaissance, antitank, antiaircraft, engineer, and signal battalions. For details on the structure of the Red Army’s mechanized forces, see O. A. Losik, ed., Stroitel’stvo i boevoe primenenie Sovetskikh tankovykh voisk v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny [The formation and combat use of Soviet tank forces during the Great Patriotic War] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979), and, in English, David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle (London: Frank Cass, 1991), 74-121.

21 The actual strength of the Soviet mechanized corps varied widely. Some had a considerable amount of new equipment. For example, as of 20 June 1941, the Baltic Front’s 3rd Mechanized Corps had 669 tanks, of which 101 were new KV-1 heavy and T-34 medium tanks, 431 were BT-7s, and, the remainder older model T-28 and T-26 tanks. Other corps, especially those farther away from the frontier, were far weaker. In the Western Front’s 4th Army, for example, 14th Mechanized Corps had only 534 aging T-26 light, T-37/38 medium and heavy, and 6 BT tanks instead of its authorized complement of 1,031 medium and heavy tanks. Draconian factory discipline could only do so much to make up for past neglect in weapons production. The Southwestern Front’s 19th Mechanized Corps had only 450 of its authorized tanks; all but 7 were obsolete models. Moreover, this corps was expected to use requisitioned civilian trucks for its wheeled transportation; when the war actually began, the “motorized rifle” regiments in its two tank divisions had to march on foot 190 kilometers to battle, slowing the movement of the available tanks. As new equipment became available from the production lines, that equipment was distributed to select corps among those in the forward area. The paucity of new machines (1,861), however, was such that even full-strength mechanized corps included a hodgepodge of different vehicles. All this complicated maintenance to an enormous extent. In addition, Soviet formations remained notoriously weak in radio communications and logistical support, making coordinated maneuver under the chaotic conditions of the surprise German invasion almost impossible. For details on Red Army strength on 22 June 1941, see Evgenii Drig, Mekhanizirovannye korpusa RKKA v boiu: Istoriia avtobronetankovykh voisk Krasnoi Armii v 1940-1941 godakh [The RKKA’s mechanized corps in combat: a history of the Red Army’s auto-armored forces in 1940-1941], 135, 375, and 489; and Boevoi i chislennyi sostav vooruzhennykh sil SSSR v period Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (1941-1945 gg.): Statisticheskii sbornik No. 1 (22 iiunia 1941 g.) [The combat and numerical composition of the USSR’s Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945); Statistical collection No. 1 (22 June 1941)] (Moscow: Institute of Military History, 1994). Hereafter cited as BICS.

22 See BICS.

23 See David M. Glantz, Soviet Mobilization in Peace and War, 1924-1942: A Survey (Carlisle, PA: Self-published, 1998).

24 At least one Soviet aircraft designer was shot for “sabotage” when an experimental aircraft crashed, and many other engineers were put to work in prison design shops. To put it mildly, such sanctions did not encourage innovative design solutions.

25 On 12 April 1941, Timoshenko and Zhukov complained to Stalin that training accidents were destroying two or three aircraft each day and demanded the removal of several senior Air Force officers. For the best English coverage of the state of the Red Air Force in 1941, see Van Hardesty, Red Phoenix: The Rise of Soviet Air Power, 1941-1945 (Washington, DC: The Smithsonian Institution Press, 1982).

26 Throughout the disastrous summer of 1941, Soviet bombers stubbornly attacked at an altitude of 8,000 feet, too high to ensure accurate bombing but high enough for German fighters to locate and attack them. Despite the bravery of individual Soviet fighter pilots that repeatedly rammed German aircraft, their combat formations were too defensive to be effective against their dog-fighting opponents.

27 Less Third Panzer Group, which was attacking in the Northwestern Front’s sector, Army Group Center numbered approximately 635,000 men and attacked with 28 divisions, including 4 panzer divisions, forward. Bock’s army group fielded 51 divisions and a third army headquarters (Second) and 15 divisions in OKH reserve. These forces faced Pavlov’s 671,165-man Western Front, which had only 13 rifle divisions deployed near or along the border.

28 Heinrici, The Campaign in Russia, 87-88.

29 Kluge’s force consisted of 10 army and 5 motorized corps, backed up by 3 security divisions and 2 army corps in reserve, for a total of 20 infantry, 3 panzer, and 3 motorized divisions. See Schematische Kriegsgliederung.

30 The 13th Army had no combat forces assigned. Pavlov’s Western Special Military District fielded 671,165 men (including 71,715 soldiers in schools), 14,171 guns and mortars, 2,900 tanks (2,192 operational), and 1,812 combat aircraft (1,577 operational) on 22 June 1941. See BICS, 16-17. Only 13 of Pavlov’s rifle divisions manned border defenses, and most of these divisions had only one regiment forward and the remaining two in garrison.

31 For a detailed account of the hectic first days of war in the Western Front’s sector, see Sbornik boevykh dokumentov Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, vypusk 35 [Collection of combat documents of the Great Patriotic War, Issue 35] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1958). Prepared by the Military-Scientific Directorate of the Red Army General Staff and classified top secret [sovershenno sekretno], this is hereafter cited as SBDVOV, with appropriate volume. See also the memoirs of General Boldin, in I. V. Boldin, Stranitsy zhizni [Pages of a life] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1961).

32 Zolotarev, VOV, 138. The appendices to this volume (498-499) contain the full texts of NKO Directives Nos. 1, 2, and 3.

33 Schmidt’s XXXIX Motorized Corps consisted of 7th and 20th Panzer Divisions, commanded by Major General Hans Freiherr von Funck and Lieutenant General Horst Stumpff, respectively, and 14th and 20th Motorized Divisions, commanded by Major General Heinrich Wosch and General of Infantry Hans Zorn, respectively. Kuntzen’s LVII Motorized Corps included 12th and 19th Panzer Divisions, commanded by Major General Joseph Harpe and Major General Otto von Knobelsdorff, respectively, plus General of Infantry Friedrich Herrlein’s 18th Motorized Division. See Schematische Kriegsgliederung.

34 Khatskilevich’s 6th Mechanized Corps, the best equipped in the Red Army, fielded 1,212 tanks, including 452 new T-34 and KV tanks, 416 BTs, 126 T-26s, and 127 other older models, and 229 BA-10 and BA-20-armored cars. However, it lost most of its tanks during its movement to forward assembly areas, largely because of air attacks and mechanical breakdowns. Complicating the situation, the estimated 200 tanks that made it to their attack positions ran out of fuel by the end of the day. Mostovenko’s 11th Mechanized Corps, which received orders to attack toward Grodno the next day, had 243 mostly older model tanks and suffered the same fate. See Drig, Mekhanizirovannye korpusa RKKA, 221, and Zolotarev, VOV, 139.

35 Geyr’s XXIV Motorized Corps included Lieutenant General Walter Model’s 3rd and Major General Willibald Freiherr von Langermann’s 4th Panzer Divisions, Major General Friedrich-Wilhelm Löper’s 10th Motorized Division, and General of Cavalry Kurt Feldt’s 1st Cavalry Division, cooperating with 267th Infantry Division. Vietinghoff’s XXXXVI Motorized Corps consisted of Major General Ferdinand Schaal’s 10th Panzer Division, SS-Gruppenführer Paul Hausser’s SS “Das Reich” Motorized Division, and “Grossdeutschland” Infantry Regiment. Finally, Lemelsen’s XXXXVII Motorized Corps included Major General Karl Ritter von Weber’s 17th and Major General Walther Nehring’s 18th Panzer Divisions, Major General Walther von Boltenstern’s 29th Motorized Division, and 167th Infantry Division.

36 The Western Front lost 738 aircraft, fully 40 percent of its total strength, on the first day of the war.

37 Filatov’s order was to assemble 21st Rifle Corps, 50th Rifle Division, and other withdrawing forces and employ them to mount an effective defense protecting the approaches to Minsk. The reserve 44th Rifle Corps was to defend Minsk proper.

38 “Boevoe donesenie komanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo fronta narodnomu komissara oborony ot 26 iiunia 1941 g. ob obkhode gor. Minsk tankovoi kolonnoi protivnika” [Combat report of the commander of the forces of the Western Front to the People’s Commissar of Defense of 26 June 1941 about the envelopment of the city of Minsk by an enemy tank column], in SBDVOV, Issue 35, 48.

39 The 20th Mechanized Corps, whose divisions were scattered about the Minsk region, was to attack southward and link up with 4th Airborne Corps’ 214th Airborne Brigade, which was to conduct an air-assault into the region. The mechanized corps dutifully attacked with its 93 older model tanks, but since they lacked the aircraft necessary to launch the air-assault, the airborne corps deployed forward on foot. Neither force posed any threat whatsoever to Guderian’s panzers, and the advancing German armored tide swept both forces aside. See Drig, Mekhanizirovannye korpusa RKKA, 487.

40 For the sordid tale of Pavlov’s arrest and execution, see “Delo No. P-24000 generals Pavlova Dmitriia Grigor’evicha’ [Case no. P-24000 of General Dmitri Grigor’evich], Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil [Communist of the Armed Forces] 8 (April 1991): 70-75; 9 (May 1991): 68-73; 11 (June 1991): 54-60; 13 (July 1991): 63-68; and 14 (July 1991): 57-67.

41 Zolotarev, VOV, 147. During this period, 24 divisions of Pavlov’s initial force of 44 divisions perished entirely, and the other 20 lost from 30 to 90 percent of their personnel.

42 The Halder War Diary 1939-1942, trans. by Charles Burdick and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988), 432-435. See also the unabridged German-language version, in Generaloberst Franz Halder, Kriegstagebuch, ed. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, 3 vols. (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1962-1964). This volume, which contains considerably more detail, is cited in this study by the date of the diary entry.

Chapter 2

  1 The Halder War Diary, 446.

  2 OKW, KTB, vol. 1, 1020; Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab), 1940-1945, Percy E. Schramm, ed., IV/8 vols., vol. 1, 1 August 1940-31 December 1941, Hans Adolf Jacobsen, ed. and commentator (München: Bernard Graefe Verlag, 1982, Lizenzausgabe), 1020, item 67, “Sonderakte, Anlage 11, 4 Jul 41.” Hereafter referred to as OKW, KTB, vol. 1.

  3 OKW, KTB, vol. 1, 102-129, items 72-75.

  4 Ibid., vol. 1, 1020-1021.

  5 The following is based primarily on OKW, KTB, vol. 1; The Halder Diary for the period; Klaus Gerbet, ed., Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock: The War Diary 1939-1945, translated by David Johnston (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 1996), hereafter called The Bock Diary; “AOK 4, KTB Nr. 8, erster und zweiter Teil, 26.6.1941-19.7.1941,” in AOK 4, 17561/1, 2; “Pz AOK 2 (Panzergruppe 2), KTB Nr. 1, 22.6. 41-13.3.42,” in Pz AOK 2 25034/1; “Panzergruppe 3, KTB Nr. 1, 25.5.41-31.8.41,” in Pz AOK 3 14837/2; “AOK 9, KTB, Ostfeldzug Band 2, 22.6.41-29.9. 41,” in AOK 9 14855/2; and “AOK 2, KTB Russland, Teil 1, 21.6. 41-18.9.41,” in AOK 2 16690/1.

  6The Bock Diary, 235-236.

  7 Ibid., 228-229.

  8 “AOK 4, KTB, 4 Jul 41,” in AOK 4 17561/2.

  9 Ibid., 1-2 Jul 41. A copy of the Army Group Center directive is in “AOK 4, Anlagen zum KTB Nr. 8, 1.-5.7.41,” in AOK 4 17561/12.

10 See “Schematische Kriegsgliederung der Heeresgruppe Mitte, Stand 4. 7. 1941.” in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg: 4. Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion (Stuttgart: Verlags-Anstalt, 1983), 455, and a higher estimate of German strength (62 divisions) in Il’ia Moshchansky and Ivan Khokhlov, “Protivostoianie: Smolenskoe srazhenie, 10 iiulia-10 sentiabria 1941 goda, chast’ 1” [Confrontation: the Battle of Smolensk, 10 July-10 September 1941, part 1], in Voennaia letopis’ [Military chronicle], 3, 2003, 2.

11 The Stavka appointed Marshal Budenny and Lieutenant General Andrei Ivanovich Eremenko as Timoshenko’s deputies. The Group of Reserve Armies had been formed on 29 June under Budenny’s command. See, “Prikaz Stavki GK No. 0097 o sozdanii voennogo soveta gruppy rezervnykh armii” [Stavka GK order no. 0097 about the creation of the military council of the Group of Reserve Armies], in V. A. Zolotarev, Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia Otechestvennaia: Stavka VGK. Dokumenty i materialy. 1941 god. T. 16 (5-1) [The Russian archives: The Great Patriotic [War]: Stavka VGK. Documents and materials, 1941, Volume 16 (5-1)] (Moscow: TERRA, 1996), 31. Hereafter cited as Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK 1941,” with appropriate document title, and page(s).

12 See A. I. Evseev, “Manevr strategicheskimi reservami v pervom periode Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny” [The maneuver of strategic reserves in the first period of the Great Patriotic War], in Voennoistoricheskii zhurnal [Military-historical journal], No. 3 (March 1986), 9-20. Hereafter cited at VIZh with appropriate issue and page(s). The parlous condition of these armies is described in Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, 214-226.

13 Zolotarev, VOV, 171.

14 “AOK 4, KTB Anlagen, 1 Jul 41,” in AOK 4, 17561/2 and “AOK 9, KTB, 9 Jul 41.”

15 DGFP, Series D, vol. XIII, doc. 50.

16 The Halder Diary, 446-447.

17 “AOK 4, KTB, 3, 4 Jul 41,” in AOK 4 17561/2.

18 “Pz AOK 3, KTB Nr. 1, 25 May-31 Aug 41, 2 Jul 41,” in Pz AOK 3 14837/2. The Third Panzer Group alone captured 30,000 tons of fuel during this period.

19 The Halder Diary (unabridged), 1, 5 July 1941.

20 “AOK 4, KTB, 9 Jul 41.”

21 See Klaus Reinhardt, Die Wende vor Moskau. Das Scheitern der Strategie Hitlers im Winter 1941-42 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1972), 55, citing MS P-040 in CMH files.

22 OKH, KTB, vol. 1, 1216. “Other types” included reconnaissance, liaison, and transport aircraft.

23 The Halder Diary, 453-454.

24 The Bock Diary, 239.

25 Hildegard von Kotze, ed., Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, 1938-1943, Aufzeichnungen des Majors Engel, (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1974), hereafter cited as Engel Diary, 22 Jul 40, 23 May 41, 9 Apr 42.

26The Halder Diary, 436-438.

27 Ibid, 432.

28 The Bock Diary and “AOK 4, KTB” for the period.

29“AOK 4, KTB, 15 Jul 41,” in AOK 4 17561/2 and “Pz AOK 2, KTB, 14 Jul 41,” in Pz AOK 2 25034/1. See also The Halder Diary (unabridged), entry for 18 July 1941. Colonel Stauffenberg led the 20 July 1944 attempt to assassinate Hitler.

30 Zhukov, Reminiscences and Reflections, 231ff.

31 John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 140-141 and 153ff. and A. I. Eremenko, V Nachale voiny [In the beginning of the war] (Moscow” “Nauka,” 1965), 80-81.

32 Vladimir Beshanov, Tankovyi pogrom 1941 goda [Tank massacre, 1941] (Moscow: AST, 2001), 277.

33 “Direktiva Stavki GK No. 0081 voennomu sovetu 28-i Armii o zaniatii oboronitel’nogo rubezhe” [Stavka GK Directive No. 0081 to the Military Council of 28th Army about occupation of a defensive line] and “Direktiva Stavki GK No. 0082 voennomu sovetu 24-i Armii o zaniatii oboronitel’nogo rubezhe” [Stavka GK Directive No. 0081 to the Military Council of 24th Army about occupation of a defensive line], in Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK 1941,” 28-30. The 28th Army was responsible for defending the El’nia, Desna River, Zhukovka, Starshevichi, Lopush’, and Sinezerki line and 24th Army, the Nelidovo Station, Belyi, and Dorogobuzh line.

34 “Prikaz Stavki GK No. 0097 o sozdanii voennogo soveta Gruppy Rezervnykh Armii” [Stavka GK Order No. 0097 about the creation of a Military Council of a Group of Reserve Armies], Ibid., 31. The same day the Stavka also ordered the formation of 15 new NKVD divisions to stiffen the Red Army’s defenses and provide the nucleus of new reserve armies. Meanwhile, on 1 July it ordered Konev to move his 19th Army northward from Kiev to the Vitebsk region.

35 “Direktiva Stavka GK No. 00125 komanduiushchim 21-i i 4-i Armii o podchinenii ostatkov chastei 4-i Armii komanduiushchemu 21-i Armiei” [Stavka GK Directive No. 00125 to the commanders of 21st and 4th Armies about the subordination of the remnants of 4th Army to the commander of 21st Army], in Ibid., 40.

36 Beshanov, Tankovyi pogrom, 282.

37 “Direktiva Stavki GK No. 00143 komanduiushchemu 22-i Armiei o zaniatii oborony v raione Vitebska” [Stavka GK Directive No. 00143 to the commander of 22nd Army about the occupation of a defense in the Vitebsk region], in Zolotarev, “Stavka GK 1941,” 41.

38 “Panzergruppe 3, Ic, Feindnachrichtenblatt Nr. 16, 22 Jul 41”, Annex; Pz AOK 3 21818/8 file.

39 For further details on tank strength, Drig, Mekhanizirovannye korpusa RKKA, 189, and 247. Aleksandr Smirnov and Aleksandr Surnov, 1941: Boi v Belorussii [1941: The battle in Belorussia], (Moscow: “Strategiya KM,” 2003), pp. 12-17, in the series Frontovaia illiustratsiia [Front illustrated], 62, claim that 5th Mechanized Corps fielded 956 tanks, including 13 KVs and 20 T-34 models and 7th Mechanized Corps had 929 tanks, including 44 KVs and 29 T-34 models. This is because they count 1st Motorized Division as part of Alekseenko’s corps, when, in fact, Kreizer’s division was fighting in a different sector.

40 Boevoi sostav Sovetskoi armii, chast’ 1 (iiun’-dekabr’ 1941 goda) [The combat composition of the Soviet Army, part 1 (June-December 1941)] (Moscow: Voenno-istoricheskii otdel’, Voenno-nauchnoe Upravlenie General’nogo Shtaba [Military-Historical Department, Military-Scientific Directorate of the General Staff], 1963), 16, 18. Classified secret. See also, Beshanov, Tankovyi pogrom, 279.

41 See also, Pospelov, V. N., ed. Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945, v shesti tomakh, Tom Vtoroi: Otrazhenie Sovetskom narodom verolomnogo napadeniia Fashistkoi Germanii na SSSR. Sozdanii uslovii dlia korennogo pereloma v voine (iiun’ 1941 g. – noiabr’ 1942 g.) [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945 in six volumes, Volume 2: The Repulsion of the Attack by Treacherous Fascist Germany on the USSR by the Soviet People and the Creation of Conditions for a Fundamental Turning Point in the War (June 1941-November 1942)] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1961), chapter 2.

42 Ibid, and Boevoi sostav Sovetskoi armii, 24. By 10 July Timoshenko’s Western Front consisted of 61 divisions, including 35 rifle, 2 cavalry, 16 tank, and 8 motorized divisions. On 2 July, 25 divisions of Bock’s Army Group Center were still involved in liquidating the encirclements west of Minsk.

43 During this phase of the campaign, Kluge’s headquarters was known as Fourth “Panzer” Army.

44 “Pz AOK 2, KTB,” in Pz AOK 2 25034/1 and “Pz AOK 3, KTB,” in Pz AOK 314837/2 for the period.

45 “AOK 9, KTB,” in AOK 9 14855/2.

46 Lothar Rendulic, Gekämpft, gesiegt, geschlagen (Heidelberg: Verlag “Welsermühl,” Wels, 1952), 26.

47 “Pz AOK 3,” in Pz AOK 3 21507, 12.

48 For a graphic day-by-day portrayal of the Battle for Smolensk, see David M. Glantz, Atlas of the Battle for Smolensk, 7 July-10 September 1941 (Carlisle, PA: Self-published, 2003); and a shorter description of the fighting in David M. Glantz, The Battle for Smolensk, 7 July-10 September 1941 (Carlisle, PA: Self-published, 2001).

49 Hermann Hoth, Panzer-Operationen (Heidelberg: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, 1956), 72-73; Pz AOK 3, 21057, 9ff.; and “Pz AOK 3, KTB,” in Pz AOK 3 14837/2.

50 Hoth, Panzer-Operationen, 74.

51 “AOK 9, KTB, Ostfeldzug Band 2, 22 Jun-29 Sept 41, 3, 7 Jul 41,” in AOK 9 14855/2. On 29 June the OKH had assigned its reserve L Army Corps with two divisions to Ninth Army to protect Army Groups North and Centers’ inner flanks.

52 See the attack order Kreizer’s motorized rifle division received on 30 June, “Boevoe rasporiazhenie komanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo fronta ot 30 iiunia 1941 g. komandiram 1-i motostrelkovoi i 50-i strelkovoi divizii na zaniatii oborony po r. Berezina” [Combat instructions of the commander of the forces of the Western Front to 1st Motorized Rifle and 50th Rifle Divisions on the occupation of a defense along the Berezina River]` in SBDVOV, Issue 35, 72.

53 Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, 156-57.

54 Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 147-48. Kluge considered the orders, which violated those from higher up, as an act of insubordination. “Pz AOK 2, KTB, 3 Jul 41,” in Pz AOK 2 25034/1.

55 Carell, Unternehmen Barbarossa, 75ff.

56 Beshanov, Tankovyi pogrom, 281.

57 “Pz AOK 3, KTB, 29 Jun 41,” in Pz AOK 3 14837/2. See also, IVOVSS, vol. 2, 77.

58 A.V. Gorbatov, Gody i Voiny (Moscow: Novy Mir, 1964), translated as Years Of My Life (London: Constable, 1964), 163-165.

59 Luttichau, Charles V. P. von. The Road to Moscow: The Campaign in Russia (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, unpublished Center for Military History Project 26, 1985), citing Konrad Leppa, Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model von Genthin bis vor Moskaus Toren (Nürnberg: Prinz-Eugen-Verlag, 1962), 136.

60 “Donesenie shtaba Zapadnogo fronta ot 4 iiulia 1941 g. v Stavku Glavnogo Komandovaniia o voiskakh fronta, vyshedshikh iz okruzheniia” [Report of the headquarters of the Western Front of 4 July 1941 to the Stavka of the High Command about the forces of the front which escaped from the encirclement], in SBDVOV, Issue 35, 98.

61 Leppa, Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model, 137. For the Soviet account, see, G. Kuleshov, “Na dneprom rubezhe” [On the Dnepr line], VIZh, No. 6 (June 1966), 18-19. For the order Timoshenko issued to 21st Army on 4 July, see “Direktiva Voennogo Soveta Zapadnogo fronta No. 16 ot 4 iiulia 1941 g. na oboronu voisk fronta na rubezhe Polotsk, rr. Zap. Dvina i Dnepr i podgotovku kontrudara 7-m i 5-m. mekhanizirovannymi korpusami v napravlenii Ostrovno, Senno” [Directive of the Military Council of the Western Front No. 16 of 4 July 1941 on a defense of the forces of the front along the Polotsk and Western Dvina and Dnepr River lines and on the preparation of a counterstroke by 7th and 5th Mechanized Corps toward Ostrovno and Senno], in SBDVOV, Issue 35, 107-108.

62 Pz AOK 2, KTB, 7 Jul 41. The 3rd Panzer Division had suffered the greatest personnel losses, 1,863 men or 15 percent, among them 55 officers, an appallingly high number. Model’s reputation as a hard-driving commander was won in these battles, however, at a very high price in casualties.

63 Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 152-53.

64 See “AOK 4, KTB, 3, 5 Jul 41” and The Bock Diary for the period.

65 The Bock Diary, 239 and “AOK 4, KTB, 6 Jul 41.”

66 “AOK 4, KTB, 9 Jul 41.”

67 The two kampfgruppen were Kampfgruppe Streich, with four assault gun battalions, one engineer company, two artillery battalions, and one antitank company and Kampfgruppe Usinger, with the staff of an artillery regiment, two antitank battalions, one engineer company, and one battery of 88mm.antiaircraft guns. See “Pz AOK 2, KTB.”

68 “AOK 4, KTB, 6 Jul 41.”

69 “Pz AOK 3, KTB, 5 Jul 41.”

70 For more details on the battle of Lepel’, see B. Bytkov, “Kontraudar 5-go mekhanizirivannogo korpusa na Lepel’skom napravlenii (6-11 iiulia 1941 goda)” [The counterstroke by the 5th Mechanized Corps along the Lepel’ axis (6-11 July 1941)], VIZh, No. 9 (September 1971), 60; Smirnov, Surkov, 1941: Boi v Belorussii, 54-79.

71 “Direktiva Voennogo Soveta Zapadnogo fronta No. 16 ot 4 iiulia 1941 g. na oboronu voisk fronta na rubezhe Polotsk, rr. Zap. Dvina i Dnepr i podgotovku kontrudara 7-m i 5-m. mekhanizirovannymi korpusami v napravlenii Ostrovno, Senno” [Directive of the Military Council of the Western Front No. 16 of 4 July 1941 on a defense of the forces of the front along the Polotsk and Western Dvina and Dnepr River lines and on the preparation of a counterstroke by 7th and 5th Mechanized Corps toward Ostrovno and Senno], in SBDVOV, Issue 35, 107. Note that the order designates Kreizer’s division as 1st Motorized Rifle. Actually, Kreizer’s division was motorized, but after its forward deployment, it was henceforth called motorized rifle.

72 “Donesenie komanduiushchego 20-i armii Narodnomu Komissaru Oborony Soiuza SSR ot 5 iiulia 1941 g. o zadachakh na kontrudara 5-go i 7-go Mekhanizirovannykh Korpusakh v napravlenii Lepel’” [Report of the commander of 20th Army to the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR of 5 July 1941 about the missions of 5th and 7th Mechanized Corps’ counterattack toward Lepel’], in SBDVOV, vypusk 33 [Issue 33] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1957), 80.

73 Moshchansky and Khokhlov, “Protivostoianie: Smolenskoe srazhenie,” 16.

74 See also, Militärakademie M.W. Frunse, Lehrstuhl für Geschichte der Kriegskunst, Die Entwicklung der Taktik der Sowjetarmee im Grossen Vaterländischen Krieg, Generalleutnant K.S. Kolganow, ed. (Berlin: Deutscher Militärverlag, 1961), 85-86. This German translation of a Soviet book places the effective strength of the two corps at roughly 700 tanks, considerably fewer than that actually reached the field of battle.

75 “Direktiva Stavki GK komanduiushchemu voiskami zapadnogo fronta o nanesenii udara na Borisov” [Stavka GK directive to the commander of the forces of the Western Front concerning the delivery of an attack on Borisov], in Zolotarev, “Stavka GVK 1941,” 51-52.

76 See the full report, “Boevoe donesenie komanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo fronta No. 17 ot 5 iiulia 1941 v Stavku Glavnogo Komandovaniia o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Combat report no. 17 of the commander of the forces of the Western Front of 5 July 1941 to the Stavka of the Main Command about the combat operations of the front’s forces], in SBDVOV, Issue 35, 110-111 and subsequent detailed combat reports in both Issues 33 and 35.

77 Bytkov, “Kontraudar 5-go mekhanizirivannogo korpusa,” 59-65.

78 Beshanov, Tankovyi pogrom, 288. For 5th and 7th Mechanized Corps’ daily reports, see SBDVOV, Issue 33, 85-108.

79 Beshanov, Tankovyi pogrom, 290.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid., 290-291.

82 Ibid., 292 and Zolotarev, VOV, 147.

83 Beshanov, Tankovyi pogrom, 293.

84 “Pz AOK 3, KTB, 6-11 Jul 41,” “After-action Report,” in Pz AOK 3 21057, Hoth, Panzer-Operationen, 79-89, and Hasso E. von Manteuffel, ed., Die 7. Panzer Division im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Einsatz und Kampf der “Gespenster-Division” 1939-1945 (Verdingen am Rhein: Buchdruckerei Josef Broich, 1965), 151-157.

85 See Stavka orders nos. 00293, of 12 July, 00305 of 13 July, and 0034 of 14 July in SBDVOV, Issue 37 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1959), 11-14.

86 “Direktiva komanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo fronta No. 18 ot 9 iiulia 1941 g. komanduiushchim voiskami 19, 20 i 22-i Armii na unichtozhenie protivnika, prorvavshegosia v raione Sirotino, Beshenkovichi, Vitebsk” [Directive No. 18 of the commander of the forces of the Western Front of 9 July 1941 to the commanders of the forces of 19th, 20th, and 22nd Armies on the destruction of the enemy penetrating into the Sirotino, Beshenkovichi, and Vitebsk region], in Ibid., 80.

87 “Pz AOK 3, KTB, 9-13 Jul 41” and Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, 162.

88 For detailed daily reports and a map on 19th and 20th Armies’ fighting in the Vitebsk region, see SBDVOV, Issue 37, 80-90. After being defeated at Vitebsk, Vasil’ev’s 14th Tank Division was encircled and destroyed in the Liozno region on 14 July. The Germans captured Stalin’s son, Iakov Dzhugashvili, two days later as he was trying to escape in civilian clothing, when a peasant surrendered him to the Germans. See Beshanov, Tankovyi pogrom, 383-384.

89 For details, see “Postanovlenie Gosudarstvennogo Komiteta Oborony No. 83 o preobrazovanii Stavki Glavnogo Komandovaniia v Stavku Verkhovnogo Komandovaniia i o naznachenii Glavnokomanduiushchikh voiskami napravlenii” [Decree No. 83 of the State Defense Committee about the transformation of the Stavka of the High Command into the Stavka of the Supreme High Command and about the appointment of Main Commanders of the forces of directions [axes], in Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK 1941,” 62.63.

Chapter 3

  1 Bock Diary, “AOK 4, KTB,” “Pz AOK 3, KTB,” and after-action reports for the period.

  2 SBDVOV, issue 37, for the many orders given to these armies. For the German perspective, see “Second Panzer Group, KTB,” and “Fourth Army, KTB” and “Anlagen.”

  3 The confusing movements of reinforcing mechanized corps are thoroughly explained in Drig, Mekhanizirovannye korpusa RKKA.

  4 The Bock Diary, 245; “Fourth Army, KTB, 9, 10 Jul 41;” and “Second Pz Gp, KTB, 8-10 Jul 41” (for Guderian’s estimate of the situation). In Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 152-153, Guderian claims he had a violent fight with Kluge before he got permission to attack. Other authors have accepted this interpretation, e.g., Carell, Unternehmen Barbarossa, 84, who places Guderian prematurely in Tolochino (he was at Novyi Borisov). Actually, Kluge was sick in bed on 9 July, and Bock could not talk to him. Colonel Blumentritt had visited Guderian’s headquarters on that day, talking to Colonel von Liebenstein, while Guderian was at the front.

  5 “Razvedyvatel’naia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 28 k 8 chasam 10 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh protivnika” [Intelligence Summary No. 28 of the headquarters of the Western Front at 0800 hours 10 July about the combat operations of the enemy], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 80-81.

  6 “Pz AOK 2, 10 Jul 41,” 9.

  7 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 31 k 20 chasam 10 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational Summary No. 31 of the headquarters of the Western Front at 2000 hours on 10 July 1941 about the combat operations of the forces of the front], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 83.

  8 See the English version of Eremenko’s V nachale voiny, in A. Eremenko, The Arduous Beginning (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966), 94, which, because it is complete and unexpurgated, will provide the basis for most of the subsequent citations.

  9 Herman Plocher, The German Air Force Versus Russia, 1941 (USAF Historical Division, Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, July 1965), 97ff., and “Pz AOK 2, KTB, 10 Jul 41,” which contains a report on a conference for air support.

10 Plocher, The German Air Force Versus Russia, 97ff.

11 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 33 k 2000 chasam 11 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational Summary No. 33 of the headquarters of the Western Front at 2000 hours 11 July 1941 about the combat actions of the forces of the front], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 85.

12 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 37 k 2000 chasam 13 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational Summary No. 37 of the headquarters of the Western Front at 2000 hours 13 July 1941 about the combat actions of the forces of the front], in Ibid., 90-91.

13 Mussolini had just accepted an invitation to meet with Hitler in East Prussia; see doc. 62, dated 2 Jul 41, in DGFP, Series-D., vol. XIII, and docs. 88, 89, 105, and ed. note, 141; The Bock Diary, 262-263. While the Italians were eying German economic and military aid, the Japanese were reneging on a commitment to attack Russia “that we had hoped for,” as Field Marshal Keitel informed Bock on 25 July 1941. It appears both Axis allies were inspecting the battle scene to assess German prospects.

14 Ibid. See also, Luttichau, citing Leppa, Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model, 137-38; and “1st Cavalry Division after-action report, 1-31 Jul 41,” in “AOK 4, Ia, Anlagen zum KTB Nr. 8,” von 29.7.-11.8.1941, Folder “Ruhezeit bei Mogilev,” in AOK 4 17561/18.

15 “Pz AOK 2, KTB;” Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 153-57; and Carell, Unternehmen Barbarossa, 85.

16 Eremenko, Arduous Beginning, 100-104. For unknown reasons, SBDVOV, Issue 37 omits Timoshenko’s daily reports numbered 38 through 40, dated 14-17 July.

17 “OKW, KTB, 14 Jul 41.”

18 “Direktiva Stavki VK No. 00290 Glavnokomanduiushchemu voiskami Zapadnogo napravleniia o plane likvidatsii proryva protivnika u Vitebska” [Stavka VK Directive No. 00290 to the Main Commander of the forces of the Western Direction about a plan for liquidating the enemy’s penetration at Vitebsk], in Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK 1941,” 65.

19 “Prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo fronta ot 11 iiulia 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami 21-i Armii na skovyvanie boevykh deistvii protivnika podvizhnymi otriadami” [Order of the commander of the forces of the Western Front of 11 July 1941 to the commander of the forces of 21st Army on the tying down of enemy combat operations with mobile detachments], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 86-87.

20 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie shtaba Glavnogo Komandovaniia Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 12 iiulia 1941 g. komanduiushchim voiskami 19-i i 22-i Armii o sovmestnom nanesenii udara po protivnika v raione Vitebsk” [Combat instructions of the headquarters of the Main Command of the Western Direction of 12 July 1941 about the combined delivery of attacks on the enemy in the Vitebsk region], in Ibid., 24-25. This order was assigned the no. 1012 and issued both at 0300 hours and 0705 hours on 12 July.

21 “Boevoi prikaz Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo napravleniia No. 060 ot 12 iiulia 1941 g na nastuplenie” [Combat Order No. 060 of the commander-in-chief of the forces on the Western Direction of 12 July 1941 on an offensive], in Ibid., 23-24. See the companion order to 19th and 22nd Armies in Ibid., 24-25.

22 See also Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1952), 167-174; and K. Cheremukhin, “Na Smolenskom-Moskovskom strategicheskom napravlenii letom 1941 goda” [Along the Smolensk-Moscow strategic axis in summer 1941], VIZh, no. 10 (October 1966), 3-18.

23 “Razvedyvatel’naia svodka shtaba Glavnogo Komandovaniia Zapadnogo Napravleniia No. 35 k 20 chasam 13 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh protivnika” [Intelligence Summary No. 35 of the headquarters of the Main Command of the Western Direction about the combat operations of the enemy], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 28.

24 “Doklad Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 13 iiulia 1941 g. Stavke Verkhovnogo Komandovaniia o boevykh deistviiakh voisk Zapadnogo fronta 12 i 13 iiulia 1941 g.,” [Report of the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Western Direction of 13 July 1941 to the Stavka of the High Command about the combat operations of the forces of the Western Front on 12 and 13 July 1941], in Ibid., 25-26.

25 “Doklad voennogo soveta Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 14 iiulia 1941 g. Stavke Verkhovnogo Komandovaniia ob obstanovke na Zapadnom fronte na 14 iiulia 1941 g.” [Report of the Military Council of the Western Direction of 14 July 1941 to the Stavka of the Supreme High Command about the situation in the Western Front on 14 July 1941], in Ibid, 30-31.

26 “Boevoi prikaz Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia No. 065 ot 14 iiulia 1941 g. na unichtozhenie prorvavshegosia protivnika” [Combat Order No. 065 of the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Western Direction of 14 July 1941 on the destruction of the penetrating enemy], in Ibid., 32-33.

27 “Prikaz Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 14 iiulia 1941 g. ob ob’edinenii upravleniia voiskami v raione gor. Smolensk” [Order No. 065 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the Western Direction of 14 July 1942 about the combining of command and control of forces in the Smolensk region], in Ibid., 33.

28 “Prikaz Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 15 iiulia 1941 g. o sozdanii sploshnogo fronta na rubezhe Alushkovo, Nevel’, Dubrovo, Surazh-Vitebskii, ct. Zabolotinka” [Order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the Western Direction of 15 July 1941 about the creation of a continuous front along the Alushkovo, Nevel’, Dubrovo, Surazh-Vitebskii, ct. Zabolotinka line], in Ibid., 34.

29 “Prikaz Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 16 iiulia 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami 22-i Armii na otvod armii na rubezh Zaprudy, Ozerishche, Dubrovo” [Order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the Western Direction of 16 July 1941 about a withdrawal of the army to the Zaprudy, Ozerishche, and Dubovo line], in Ibid., 34-35.

30 See, Beshanov, Tankovyi pogrom, 385-386, which quotes Gorbatov’s memoirs. The 25th Rifle Corps consisted of 127th, 134th, and 162nd Rifle Divisions.

31 “Pz AOK 3, KTB, 13-16 Jul 41;” Hoth, Panzer-Operationen, 94-96; “AOK 4, KTB, 15-16 Jul 41;” and Manteuffel, Die 7. Panzer Division, 156-164.

32 The Bock Diary, 249-251.

33 “Prikaz Stavki VK No. 00293 o formirovanii 29-i Armii i zaniatii eiu oboronitel’nogo rubezha” [Stavka VK Order No. 00293 about the formation of 29th Army and its occupation of a defensive line], in Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK 1941,” 64-65. Maslennikov’s army was to consist of 256th, 252nd, 254th, and 245th Rifle Divisions, 69th Motorized Division (from the Trans-Baikal Military District and commanded by Colonel Petr Nikolaevich Domracheev), 264th and 644th Corps Artillery Regiments, 171st, 753rd and 759th Antitank Artillery Regiments, one fighter aviation regiment, one bomber aviation regiment, and one squadron of Il-2 aircraft.

34 The Bock Diary, 242-243. Timoshenko had sent Iakovlev’s 48th Tank Division, which was part of 19th Army’s 23rd Mechanized Corps, to Nevel’ on about 12 July to spearhead 22nd Army’s counterstroke.

35 The Soviets began constructing the Polotsk Fortified Region in 1931 to shield the land bridges between the upper reaches of the Western Dvina and Dnepr Rivers, block the Riga-Moscow railroad line, and protect the rail centers of Vitebsk, Orsha, and Smolensk. In accordance with Tukhachevsky’s original defense plans, by design, he left a gap or “attack window” between Polotsk and Pskov for use by counterattacking Red Army forces. Considering this to be a deliberate case of neglect and sabotage, Stalin ordered the gap closed by constructing the special Sebezh Fortified Region. However, this was not done, and construction of the Sebezh Fortified Region ceased in 1939, with the Sebezh sector being assigned to the Polotsk Fortified Region. The Polotsk Fortified Region, which was strengthened in 1939, was about 112 kilometers wide and up to 4 kilometers deep and paralleled the Western Dvina River, which was about 122-182 meters wide. Altogether it consisted of about 200 bunkers, the Germans penetrated into the particularly strong Baravukha bunker group. “OKH, Denkschrift über die Russische Landesbefestigung, 56ff,” in H21/303.

36 “OKW, KTB, 14-16 Jul 41;” The Bock Diary; “Ninth Army, KTB;” “Fourth Army, KTB,” “Pz AOK 3, Gefechtsbericht,” in Pz AOK 3 21057e; and “HGr Nord, KTB (Zweitschrift), 22 Jun-31 Aug 41,” in HGp Nord 75128/1.

37 Leeb Diary, entry from 14 Jul 41 and OKW, KTB, entry on 14 Jul 41.

38 The Halder Diary, 471-477; and “AGp North, KTB, 14 Jul 41” and following, in AGp Nord 75128/1.

39 “Doklad Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 13 iiulia 1941 g. Stavke Verkhovnogo Komandovaniia o boevykh deistviiakh voisk Zapadnogo fronta 12 i 13 iiulia 1941 g.” [Report of the commander-in-chief of the Western Direction of 13 July 1941 about combat operations of the forces of the Western Front on 12 and 13 July 1941], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 25-26.

40 “Razvedyvatel’naia svodka shtaba Glavnogo Komandovaniia Zapadnogo Napravleniia No. 35 k 20 chasam 13 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh protivnika” [Intelligence Summary No. 35 of the headquarters of the Main Command of the Western Direction about the combat operations of the enemy], in Ibid., 27.

41 “Prikaz Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia no. 0012 ot 13 iiulia 1941 g. ob ustranenii nedostatkov v boevykh deistviiakh voisk Zapadnogo Fronta” [Order No. 0012 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction of 13 July 1941 about the elimination of shortcomings in the combat operations of the forces of the Western Front], in Ibid., 29. The order went on to list the many shortcomings and problems.

42 “Doklad Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 14 iiulia 1941 g. Stavke Verkhovnogo Komandovaniia o boevykh deistviiakh voisk Zapadnogo fronta na 14 iiulia 1941 g.” [Report of the commander-in-chief of the Western Direction of 14 July 1941 about combat operations of the forces of the Western Front on 14 July 1941], in Ibid., 27-28.

43 “Boevoi prikaz Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia No. 065 ot 14 iiulia 1941 g.,” in Ibid., 32.

44 Eremenko, Arduous Beginning, 87-138.

45 “AOK 4, KTB, 15 Jul 41.”

46 Beshanov, Tankovyi pogrom, 392.

47 For more details on the fight at Mogilev, see Eremenko, Arduous Beginning, chapter 4.

48 Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 158.

49 Eremenko, Arduous Beginning, 104.

50 “Doklad Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 13 iiulia 1941 g. Stavke Verkhovnogo Komandovaniia o boevykh deistviiakh voisk Zapadnogo fronta 12 i 13 iiulia 1941 g.,” in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 25-26.

51 See Ibid, 25-26.

52 “Razvedyvatel’naia svodka shtaba Glavnogo Komandovaniia Zapadnogo Napravleniia No. 35 k 20 chasam 13 iiulia 1941 g.,” in Ibid., 27.

53 “Doklad Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 14 iiulia 1941 g. Stavke Verkhovnogo Komandovaniia o boevykh deistviiakh voisk Zapadnogo fronta na 14 iiulia 1941 g.,” in Ibid., 30.

54 Eremenko, Arduous Beginning, 160.

55 “Prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo fronta ot 11 iiulia 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami 21-i Armii na skovyvanie boevykh deistvii protivnika podvizhnymi otriadami” [Order of the commander of the forces of the Western Front of 11 July 1941 to the commander of the forces of 21st Army on the tying down of enemy combat operations with mobile detachments], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 86-87.

56 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 21-i Armii No. 03/op ot 13 iiulia 1941 g. na ovladenie Bobruisk, Parichi” [Combat order no. 03/op of the commander of the forces of 21st Army of 13 July 1941 on the capture of Bobruisk and Parichi], in Ibid., 284-285.

57 For details on 21st Army’s attack, see, Zolotarev, VOV, 175-176 and G. Kuleshev, “Na Dneprovskom rubezhe” [On the Dnepr line], VIZh, No. 6 (June 1966), 16-28. The rank of komkor was a prewar and largely obsolete rank that some commanders still retained.

58 For details about the cavalry group’s formation, see “Direktiva Stavki VK No. 00420 Glavnokomanduiushchemu voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia ob organizatsii reida kavaleriiskoi gruppy po tylam protivnika” [Stavka VK order no. 00420 of the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Western Direction about the organization of a raid by a cavalry group against the enemy rear], in Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK 1941,” 80-81. For further details about the cavalry group’s operations, see SBDVOV, Issue 34.

Chapter 4

  1 The Bock Diary, 248; and “AOK 4, Ia, Anlagen zum KTB Nr. 8, 11.7.41-15.7.41,” in AOK 4 17561/13.

  2 OKW, KTB, vol. 1, 1029.

  3 Leeb sent a special liaison officer to brief Bock, and the field marshal pointedly asked the OKH to bring Rundstedt up to date. See The Bock Diary, 249-251.

  4 Ibid., 247-248.

  5 Bock so briefed Colonel Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant. See Ibid.; and “AOK 4, KTB, 13 Jul 41.”

  6 For the various plans and intentions, see The Bock Diary, 246-251; and “AOK 4, KTB;” “Pz Gp 2, KTB,” and “Pz Gp 3, KTB” for the period.

  7 “Third Panzer Group, Estimate of Situation, morning 13 Jul 41, AOK 4, KTB, Anlagen,” in AOK 4 17561/13.

  8 Ibid.

  9 “AOK 4, Oberquartiermeister, Memo, on conference with Army Group [Center], 13 Jul 41,” in AOK 4 17561/13.

10 Ibid. See also The Halder Diary (unabridged) for this period, which provides many numbers and figures pertaining to logistical support, communications routes, and problems with both.

11 The Halder Diary (unabridged) for the period. Halder believed German armored units had the capability and the supplies to go as far as Smolensk, and its infantry units would be able to reach the eastern bank of the Western Dvina and Dnepr Rivers. However, Second and Ninth Armies were already “living from hand to mouth,” and could not expect an improvement in their supply situation, since, as of 18 July, only two-thirds (14 instead of 22) of their required trains were reaching the front. See also, The Halder Diary, 473-477.

12 Wehrgeographischer Atlas der Union der Sozialistichen Sowjetrepubliken, Oberst Professor Dr. Ritter von Niedermayer, ed. (Berlin: Reichsdruckerei, 1941), clearly reveals the paucity of lines of communications in the Soviet Union. Niedermayer, too, was ignored.

13 The Halder Diary, 473-475.

14 Drig, Mekhanizirovannye korpusa RKKA, 632.

15 “Panzer Gruppe 3, Ic, Feindnachrichtenblatt Nr. 16, 22.7.41,” in Pz AOK 3 21818/8.

16 Glantz, Colossus Reborn, 403-445; Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, 174-175.

17 The Soviet (and Russians today) use generic terms to described forces at every level, often for purposes of security (secrecy). Thus, rather than speaking of a front, army, corps, division, brigade, regiment, battalion, company, platoon, and squad, instead, they talk of a large formation (ob’edinenie), formation (soedeninie), unit (chast’), and subunit (podrazdelenie).

18 “Doklad voennogo soveta 20-i armii ot 27 iiulia 1941 g. Glavnokomanduiushchemu voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia o sostoianii, obespechennosti armii i priniatom reshenii” [A 27 July report of the military council of 20th Army to the commander-in-chief of the forces of the Western Direction about the condition and provision of the army and decisions made], SBDVOV, Issue 37, 266.

19 “Prikaz NKVD SSSR o formirovanii Narkomatom piatnadtsati strelkovykh divizii dlia peredachi v deistvuiushchuiu armiiu” [Order of the NKVD of the USSR about the formation for the Peoples Commissariat of fifteen rifle divisions for reassignment to the operating army], in Vnutrennie voiska v gody mirnogo Sotsialisticheskogo stroitel’stva, 1922-1941 gg,” [Internal troops in the years of peaceful Socialist construction, 1922-1941] (Moscow: Voenizdat, Iuridicheskaia literature, 1977), 544.

20 “Prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 30-i armii No. 15 ot 27 iiulia 1941 g. ob uzzhitii nedostatkov v boevykh deistviiakh voisk armii” [Order No. 15 of the 30th Army commander, dated 27 July 1941 concerning the elimination of deficiencies in army forces’ combat operations], SBDVOV, Issue 37, 386-387.

21 “Doklad voennogo soveta 30-i armii ot 5 avgusta 1941 g. voennomu sovetu zapadnogo fronta ob ukomplektovannosti, snabzhenii i boesposobnosti voisk armii” [A 5 August report of 30th Army’s Military Council to the Western Front Military Council about the completeness, supply status, and combat readiness of army forces], SBDVOV, Ibid., 395-406.

22 Ibid., 395.

23 Ibid., 398.

24 The personnel losses suffered by specific divisions during this period were: 242nd Rifle Division – 3,504 men; 250th Rifle Division--5,775 men; 251st Rifle Division--4,018 men; and 107th Tank Division--4,133 men, for a grand total of 18,431 men or 40 percent of the army’s original strength. Thus, by 1 August the rifle regiments in the army’s division ranged in strength from 379 to 1,195 men. During the same period, the army received only 2,830 replacements, meaning its strength fell to just over 30,000 men.

25 Ibid., 405.

26 “Spravka shtaba 19-i armii ot 24 iiulia 1941 g. o deistviiakh voisk armii s 9 po 24 iiulia 1941 g” [Information from the headquarters of 19th Army of 24 July 1941 about combat action of the forces of the army from 9 through 24 July 1941], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 226.

27 Glantz, Colossus Reborn, 403-405.

28 Ibid.

29 IVOVSS, vol. 2, 63.

30 “Direktiva Stavki VK komanduiushchim voiskami frontov o sokhranenii i sbore oruzhiia na pole boia” [Stavka VK directive to the commanders of the forces of the fronts about the preservation and gathering of weapons on the battlefield], in Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK 1941,” 69.

31 IVOVSS, vol 2, 63.

32 “Prikaz Stavki VK No. 00401 o reorganizatsii organov politicheskoi propagandy i vvedenii Institute Voennykh Komissarov” [Stavka VK order no. 0401 about the reorganization of political propaganda organs and introduction of the Institute of Military Commissars], in Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK 1941,” 77.

33 By Soviet definition, counterattacks, counterstrokes, and counteroffensives are distinguished by scale and intended significance in terms of impact. Thus, counterattacks are tactical in significance, counterstrokes operational, and counteroffensives strategic.

34 “Direktiva Stavki VK No. 00356 glavnokomanduiushchim voiskami Severo-Zapadnogo, Zapadnogo i Iugo-Zapadnogo Napravlenii, komanduiushchim voiskami frontov o stroitel’stve oboronitel’hykh rubezhei” [Stavka directive no. 00356 to the commanders-in-chief of the forces of the Northwestern, Western, and Southwestern Directions and the commanders of the forces of the fronts about the construction of defensive lines], in Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK 1941,” 74.

35 “Direktiva Stavki VK No. 00421 komanduiushchemu voiskami Fronta Rezervnykh Armii o podgotovku operatsii na okruzhenie protivnika v raione Smolenska” [Stavka VK directive no. 00421 to the commander of the forces of the Front of Reserve Armies about the preparation of an operation to encircle the enemy in the Smolensk region], in Ibid., 81-82.

36 Ibid., 88-89.

37 “Prikaz Stavki VK No. 00493 o razdelenii Zapadnogo fronta” [Stavka order no. 00493 about the division of the Western Front], in Ibid., 88-89.

38 Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-1945: German Troops and the Barbarization of Warfare (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), 20. For graphic day-by-day development of the Smolensk operation, see David M. Glantz, Atlas of the Battle of Smolensk (Carlisle, PA, Self-published, 2001). For further details on the fighting, see VOV, 178-182.

39 “Panzer Gruppe 3, Ic, Feindnachrichtenblatt Nr. 16, 17 Jul 41,” in Pz AOK 3 21818/8; and The Bock Diary, 252.

40 Zolotarev, VOV, 172.

41 K.K. Rokossovsky, Soldatskii dolg [A soldier’s duty] (Moscow: “Golos,” 2000), 60-70.

42 Eremenko, Arduous Beginning, 167.

43 Stalin’s son later died in a German prisoner-of-war camp.

44 “Boevoi prikaz Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia No. 066 ot 17 iiulia 1941 g. na oboronu gor. Smolensk” [Combat order no. 066 of the commander-in-chief of the Western Direction of 17 July 1941 on the defense of the city of Smolensk], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 37-38; and Zolotarev, VOV, 174.

45 Zolotarev, VOV, 174.

46 “Prikaz Stavki VK No. 00436 o naznachenii vysshego komandnogo sostava” [Stavka VK order no. 00436 concerning the appointment of higher command cadre], in Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK 1941,” 82.

47 “Boevoi prikaz Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia No. 066 ot 17 iiulia 1941,” Ibid., 37-38.

48 For distinguishing himself at Iartsevo, Liziukov would perform superbly as deputy commander of 20th Army during the battle for Moscow and would be appointed to command the Red Army’s first tank army (the 5th) in late June 1942.

49 The Germans had no paratroopers here, nor had they made a landing. The Russian impression had been intercepted, however, and the Germans were amused; see “Pz AOK 3, Gefechtsbericht,” and “KTB, 15 July 1941,” in Pz AOK 3 14837/2.

50 Formed from March to June 1941 in the North Caucasus Military District, 26th Mechanized Corps had deployed forward with 24th Army into the Dorogobuzh region southwest of Viaz’ma in early July 1941. There, after the corps was disbanded on 8 July, its 52nd and 56th Tank Divisions became 101st and 102nd Tank Divisions and 103rd Motorized Division formed 103rd Tank Division, all of which were assigned to 24th Army’s reserve. For further details, see Drig, Mekhanizirovannye korpusa RKKA

51 Rokossovsky, Soldatskii dolg, 60-62.

52 Drig, Mekhanizirovannye korpusa RKKA, 635.

53 Ibid.

54 SBDVOV, Issue 37, note 2 on page 93, citing archival document f. 208, op. 10169, d. 7, l. 179.

55 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba 16-i Armii No. 1 ot17 iiulia 1941 g. o polozhenii voisk armii” [Operational summary no. 1 of the headquarters of 16th Army of 17 July 1941 about the positions of the forces of the army], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 205.

56 “Operativnaia direktiva Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia No. 19 ot 18 iiulia 1941 g. na nastupatel’nye i oboronitel’nye deistviia” [Operational directive no. 19 of the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Western Direction of 19 July 1941 on offensive and defensive operations], in Ibid., 38-39.

57 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 45 k 2000 chasam 18 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary no. 45 of the Western Front at 2000 hours on 18 July 1941 about the combat operations of the forces of the front], in Ibid., 94-96.

58 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba 16-i Armii No. 2 ot19 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk armii v raionakh Demidov, Kholm, Smolensk” [Operational summary no. 2 of the headquarters of 16th Army of 19 July 1941 about the combat operations of the forces of the army in the Demidov, Kholm, and Smolensk regions], in Ibid., 206.

59 A. Surchenko, “129-ia strelkovaia diviziia v boiakh za Smolensk” [129th Rifle Division in the battles for Smolensk], VIZh, No. 8 (August 1968), 61-66; and Zolotarev, VOV, 174.

60 “Zapis’ peregovorov po priamomu provodu Stalina s Glavnokomanduiushchim voiskami Zapadnogo napravleniia” [Notes of a conversation by direct wire of Stalin with the commander-in-chief of the forces of the Western Direction], in Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK 1941,” 83-84.

61 “Boevoe donesenie shtaba 16-i Armii No. 18/op ot 20 iiulia 1941 g. shtaba Zapadnogo fronta o polozhenii voisk armii” [Combat report no. 18/op of the headquarters of 16th Army of 20 July 1941 to the headquarters of the Western Front about the positions of the forces of the army], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 207.

62 “Informatsiia shtaba 16-i Armii ot 21 iiulia 1941 g. stabam 20-i i 19-i Armii o perekhode v nastuplenie na Smolensk s severa” [Information of the headquarters of 16th Army of 21 July 1941 to the headquarters of 20th and 19th Armies about the transition to an offensive toward Smolensk from the north], in Ibid., 208.

63 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba 16-i Armii No. 5 ot 21 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk armii po ovladeniiu gor. Smolensk” [Operational summary no. 5 of the headquarters of 16th Army of 21 July 1941 about the combat operations of the forces of the army for the capture of the city of Smolensk], in Ibid., 208.

64 For additional details on the fighting from the Soviet perspective, see Surchenko, “129-ia strelkovaia diviziia v boiakh za Smolensk,” 61-66; and M. Lukin, “V Smolenskom srazhenie” [In the battle of Smolensk], VIZh, No. 7 (July 1979), 42-55.

65 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 50 ot 21 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary no. 50 of the Western Front on 23 July 1941 about the combat operations of the forces of the front], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 98-100.

66 The Bock Diary, 254.

67 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 55 k 2000 chasam 23 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary no. 55 of the Western Front at 2000 hours on 23 July 1941 about the combat operations of the forces of the front], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 101-103.

68 “Razvedsvodka No. 53 shtab Zapadnogo fronta k 20:00 23.7.1941” [Intelligence summary no. 53 of the headquarters, Western Front at 2000 hours 23 July 1941], in Ibid., 104-105. Signed by chief of staff of the Western Front, Lieutenant General V. Sokolovsky; Military Commissar of the Western Front, Regimental Commissar Anshakov; chief of the Intelligence Department of the headquarters, Western Front, and Colonel Korneev; Military Commissar of the Intelligence Department of the headquarters, Western Front Senior Battalion Commissar Steblovtsev.

69 “Doklad komanduiushchego voiskami 16-i Armii ot 24 iiulia 1941 g. Glavnokomanduiushchemu voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia o boevykh deistviiakh voisk armii po ovladeniiu gor. Smolensk” [Report of the commander of the forces of 16th Army of 24 July 1941 to the commander-in-chief of the Western Direction about the combat operations of the forces of the army for the capture of the city of Smolensk], in Ibid., 29.

Chapter 5

1 “Zapis’ peregovorov po priamomu provodu Stalina s Glavnokomanduiushchim voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia” [Notes of conversations by direct line of Stalin with the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Western Direction], in Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK 1941,” 83-84.

2 “Direktiva Stavki VK komanduiushchemu voiskami Fronta Rezervnykh Armii o sozdanii operativnykh grupp voisk, ikh razvertyvanii dlia operatsii po razgromu Smolenskoi gruppirovki protivnika” [Stavka VK directive to the commander of the forces of the Front of Reserve Armies about the creation of operational groups of forces and their deployment for an operations for the destruction of the enemy Smolensk grouping], in Ibid., 85.

3 “Zapis’ peregovorov po priamomu provodu nachal’nika General’nogo Shtaba s General-Inspektorom Kavalerii Krasnoi Armii” [Notes of conversations by direct wire of the chief of the General Staff with the General Inspector of Red Army Cavalry], in Ibid., 86.

4 “Direktiva Stavki VK No. 00455 komanduiushchim voiskami Fronta Rezervnykh Armii, 30-i, 24-i, 28-i Armiiami ob usilenii operativnykh grupp tankami: [Stavka VK directive no. 00455 to the commander of the forces of the Front of Reserve Armies and 30th, 24th, and 28th Armies about the reinforcement of the operational groups with tanks], in Ibid., 87. These tanks were to come from 110th, 102nd, and 104th Tank Divisions, respectively.

5 Eremenko, Arduous Beginning, 175.

6 “Boevoi prikaz Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia No. 0076 ot 21 iiulia 1941 g. na unichtozhenie protivnika v raione gor. Smolensk” [Combat order no. 0076 of the commander-in-chief of the forces of the Western Direction of 21 July 1941 on the destruction of the enemy in the vicinity of the city of Smolensk], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 42-43.

7 For additional details on this stage of the Smolensk operation, see David M. Glantz, ed., The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front: 22 June-August 1941 (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 345-454; and Glantz, The Battle for Smolensk.

8 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 21 iiulia 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami 19-i Armii ob organizatsii operativnogo punkta Zapadnogo Napravleniia” [Combat order of the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Western Direction of 21 July 1941 to the commander of the forces of 19th Army about the organization of an operational post of the Western Direction], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 43-44. At the same time, Timoshenko subordinated the forces belonging to the former 19th Army inside the Smolensk pocket to 16th and 20th Armies.

9 “Doklad nachal’nika operativnogo otdela shtaba Glavnogo Komandovaniia Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 21 iiulia 1941 g. nachal’niku shtaba o sozdanii rezervov” [Report of the chief of the Operations Department of the Main Command of the Western Direction of 21 July 1941 to the chief of staff about the creation of reserves], in Ibid., 44-45.

10 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 28-i Armii no. 035 ot 22 iiulia 1941 g. na nastuplenie gruppoi voisk armii v napravlenii Smolensk” [Combat order no. 035 of the commander of the forces of 28th Army of 22 July 1941 on the attack of the group of forces of the army toward Smolensk], in Ibid., 348.

11 Ibid.

12 “Prikaz Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia No. 0080 ot 22 iiulia 1941 g. na organizatsiiu gruppy Kalinina” [Order No. 0080 of the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Western Direction of 22 July 1941 on the organization of Group Kalinin], in Ibid., 47.

13 See the Western Front’s order to Group Kalinin in, “Chastnyi boevoi prikaz Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 26 iiulia 1941 g. komanduiushchemu gruppoi tov. Kalininu na nastuplenie v obshchem napravlenii na Shchelkina” [Partial order of the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Western Direction of 26 July 1941 to the commander of Group Comrade Kalinin on an attack in the general direction of Shchelkin], in Ibid., 53.

14 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 55 k 20 chasam 23 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary no. 55 of the headquarters of the Western Front of 2000 hours on 23 July 1941 about the combat operations of the front], in Ibid., 101-102.

15 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie shtaba 28-i Armii no. 037 ot 23 iiulia 1941 g. ob ustranenii nedostatkov v boevykh deistviiakh voisk” [Combat order no. 037 of the headquarters of 28th Army of 23 July 1941 about the elimination of shortcomings in the combat operations of the forces], in Ibid., 349.

16 Ibid.

17 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie shtaba 28-i Armii no. 042 ot 24 iiulia 1941 g. o prodolzhenii nastupleniia” [Combat order no. 042 of the headquarters of 28th Army of 24 July 1941 about a continuation of the offensive], in Ibid., 350.

18 Ibid.

19 “Doklad Voennogo Soveta Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 24 iiulia 1941 g. Stavke Verkhovnogo Komandovaniia ob obstanovke na Zapadnom fronte” [Report of the Military Council of the Western Direction of 24 July 1941 to the Stavka of the High Command about the situation in the Western Front], in Ibid., 50-51.

20 Ibid.

21 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 59 k 8 chasam 26 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary no. 59 of the headquarters of the Western Front of 0800 hours on 26 July 1941 about the combat operations of the front], in Ibid., 106-107.

22 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie shtaba 28-i Armii no. 046 ot 26 iiulia 1941 g. operativnoi gruppe voisk armii na zakhvat pereprav cherez r. Khmara” [Combat order no. 046 of the headquarters of 28th Army of 26 July 1941 to the operational group of forces of the army about seizing crossings over the Khmara River], in Ibid., 350.

23 See V. Shevchuk, “Deistviia operativnykh grupp voisk v Smolenskom srazhenii (10 iiulia-10 sentiabria 1941 g.” [The actions of operational groups of forces in the battle of Smolensk (10 July-10 September 1941], VIZh, no. 12 (December 1979), 10-13, and daily operational and intelligence summaries, in SBDVOV, Issue 37.

24 “Boevoi prikaz Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 25 iiulia 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami Tsentral’nogo fronta na nastuplenie v obshchem napravlenii na Mogilev” [Combat order of the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Western Direction of 25 July 1941 to the commander of the forces of the Central Front on an offensive in the general direction of Mogilev], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 51-52.

25 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo fronta No. 077 ot 26 iiulia 1941 g. Gruppe Khomenko na unichtozhenie protivnika v raione Dukhovshchina” [Combat order no. 077 of the commander of the forces of the Western Front of 26 July 1941 to Group Khomenko on the destruction of the enemy in the Dukhovshchina region], in Ibid., 108-109.

26 See Timoshenko’s order to Maslennikov, “Chastnyi boevoi prikaz Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 26 iiulia 1941 g. komanduiushchemu Gruppoi General-Leitenantu Maslennikovu na nastuplenie v napravlenii Demidov” [Individual combat order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the Western Direction of 26 July 1941 to the commander of Group Lieutenant General Maslennikov on an offensive in the direction of Demidov], in Ibid., 52.

27 “Chastnyi boevoi prikaz Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 26 iiulia 1941 g. komanduiushchemu gruppoi tov. Kalinina na nastuplenie v obshchem napravlenii na Shchelkina” [Individual Combat order of the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Western Direction of 26 July 1941 to the commander of the forces of Group Kalinin on an offensive in the general direction of Shchelkina], in Ibid., 53

28 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie shtaba 28-i Armii no. 047/op ot 26 iiulia 1941 g. operativnoi gruppe voisk armii o prodolzhenii nastupleniia s tsel’iu zakhvat pereprav cherez r. Khmara” [Combat order no. 047/op of the headquarters of 28th Army of 26 July 1941 to the operational group of forces of the army about a continuation of the offensive with the aim of seizing crossings over the Khmara River], in Ibid., 351.

29 “Prikazanie shtaba Glavnogo Komandovaniia Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 28 iiulia1941 g. komanduiushchim gruppami o povyshenii aktivnosti v boevykh deistviiakh voisk” [Order of the headquarters of the Main Command of the Western Direction of 28 July 1941 to the commanders of the groups about increasing the energy in the combat operations of the troops], in Ibid., 57.

30 Ibid.

31 “Direktiva Stavki VK No. 00517 komanduiushchemu voiskami Rezervnogo fronta o reorganizatsii fronta” [Stavka directive no. 00517 to the commander of the forces of the Reserve Front about the reorganization of the front], in Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK,” 90. For additional details on this stage of the Smolensk operation, see Glantz, The Initial Period of War, 345-454.

32 Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK 1941,” 90-91.

33 Ibid., 98.

34 “Doklad Voennogo Soveta Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 27 iiulia 1941 g. Stavke Verkhovnogo Komandovaniia ob obstanovke na Zapadnom i Tsentral’nom frontakh” [Report of the Military Council of the Western Direction of 27 July 1941 to the Stavka of the High Command about the situation in the Western and Central Fronts], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 53-54.

35 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie shtaba 28-i Armii no. 052/op ot 27 iiulia 1941 g. voiskam operativnoi gruppy armii o prodolzhenii nastupleniia s tsel’iu zakhvata pereprav na p. Khmara” [Combat order no. 052/op of the headquarters of 28th Army of 27 July 1941 about a continuation of the offensive with the aim of seizing a crossing on the Khmara River], in Ibid., 352.

36 Ibid.

37 “Boevoe prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 28-i Armii no. 058/op ot 28 iiulia 1941 g. na nastuplenie s tsel’iu zakhvata pereprav cherez p. Khmara” [Combat order no. 058/op of the commander of the forces of 28th Army of 28 July 1941 on the offensive with the aim of seizing a crossing on the Khmara River], in Ibid., 353.

38 “Prikaz Voennogo Soveta 28-i Armii no. 059/op ot 30 iiulia 1941 g. voiskam operativnoi gruppy armii ob obstranenii nedostatkov v boevykh deistviiakh” [Order no. 059/op of the Military Council of the forces of the operational group of the army of 30 July 1941 about the elimination of shortcomings in combat operations], in Ibid., 354.

39 Ibid.

40 Zolotarev, VOV, 177.

41 Ibid., 99. Kalinin became deputy commander of the Western Front for force organization but was later arrested and purged on the charge of “wrecking.”

42 Ibid., 101. The Stavka also reinforced Kachalov’s army with the fresh 109th Tank Division.

43 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 20-i Armii No. 36 ot 25 iiulia 1941 g. na Otrazhenie popytok proryva protivnika k gor. Smolensk” [Combat order no. 36 of the commander of the forces of 20th Army of 25 July 1941 on the repelling of enemy attempts to penetrate to the city of Smolensk], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 264-265.

44 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 59 k 8 chasam 26 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary of the headquarters of the Western Front no. 59 at 0800 hours on 26 July 1941 about the combat operations of the forces of the front], in Ibid., 106-107. Signed “For the chief of staff of the Western Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union Shaposhnikov.”

45 “Doklad voennogo soveta 20-i Armii ot 27 iiulia 1941 g. Glavnokomanduiushchemu voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia o sostoianii, obespechennosti armii i priniatom reshenii” [Report of the military council of 20th Army of 27 July 1941 to the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction about the condition, possibilities, and accepted decision], in Ibid., 265-268.

46 “Boevoe donesenie komanduiushchego voiskami 16-i Armii no. 23/op ot 27 iiulia 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami Zapadnogo Napravlenii o boevykh deistviiakh voisk armii po ovladeniiu gor. Smolensk” [Combat report no. 23/op of the commander of the forces of 16th Army of 27 July 1941 to the Commander-in-Chef of the forces of the Western Direction about the combat operations of the forces of the army for the capture of Smolensk], in Ibid., 210-211.

47 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego Operativnoi Gruppoi Voisk Iartsevo Napravleniia No. 03 ot 28 iiulia 1941 g. na nastuplenie v obshchem napravlenii na Dukhovshchina” [Combat order no. 03 of the commander of Operational Group of Forces on the Iartsevo Axis of 28 July 1941 on an attack in the general direction of Dukhovshchina], in Ibid., 411-412.

48 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba 16-i Armii ot 29 iiulia 1941 g. shtaba Zapadnogo fronta o polozhenii i obespechennosti voisk armii” [Operational summary of the headquarters of 16th Army of 29 July 1941 about the situation and provisioning of 16th Army], in Ibid., 211-212.

49 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 29 iiulia 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami 20-i i 16-i Armii na ovladenie gor. Smolensk” [Combat order of the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Western Direction of 29 July 1941 to the commander of the forces of 20th and 16th Armies on the capture of Smolensk], in Ibid., 60.

50 Ibid.

51 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 16-i Armii No. 020/op ot 30 iiulia 1941 g. na ovladenie severo-vostochnoi chast’iu gor. Smolensk” [Combat order no. 020/op of the commander of the forces of 16th Army on 30 July about the capture of the northeastern part of the city of Smolensk], in Ibid., 212-213.

52 “Doklad komanduiushchego voiskami 16-i Armii ot 31 iiulia 1941 g. Glavnokomanduiushchemu voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia o boevykh deistviiakh voisk armii” [Report of the commander of the forces of 16th Army of 31 July 1941 to the commander-in-chief of the Western Direction about the combat operations of the forces of the army], in Ibid., 214-215.

53 “Doklad Voennogo Soveta Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 31 iiulia 1941 g. Stavke Verkhovnogo Komandovaniia o prichinakh otkhoda nashikh voisk iz gor. Smolensk” [Report of the Military Council of the Western Direction of 31 July 1941 to the Stavka of the High Command about the reasons for the withdrawal of our forces from the city of Smolensk], in Ibid., 60-61.

54 Eremenko, Arduous Beginning, 195.

55 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie shtaba Glavnogo Komandovaniia Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 28 iiulia 1941 g. komanduiushchim gruppoi voisk General-Maior Rokossovskomu na unichtozhenie protivnika v raione Iartsevo, Solov’evskaia pereprava” [Combat order of the headquarters of the Main Command of the Western Direction of 28 July 1941 to the commander of Group of Forces Rokossovsky on the destruction of the enemy in the vicinity of Iartsevo and the Solov’evo crossing], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 57-58.

56 For Rokossovsky’s daily orders during this fighting, see Ibid., 411-414.

57 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 66 k 20 chasam 29 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary of the headquarters of the Western Front no. 66 at 2000 hours on 29 July 1941 about the combat operations of the forces of the front], in Ibid., 113-115.

58 K. K. Rokossovsky, Soldatskii dolg [A Soldier’s Duty] (Moscow: “GOLOS,” 2000), 58-68.

59 “Doklad voennogo soveta 20-i Armii ot 30 iiulia 1941 g. Glavnokomanduiushchemu voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia o polozhenii voisk armii I reshenii na ovladenie gor. Smolensk” [Report of the military council of 20th Army of 30 July 1941 to the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction about the situation of the forces of the army and the decision on the capture of the city of Smolensk], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 268-269.

60 “Boevoi rasporiazhenie komanduiushchego Operativnoi Gruppoi Voisk Iartsevo Napravleniia No. 12 ot 31 iiulia 1941 g. komandiru 44-go Strelkovogo Korpusa na unichtozhenie protivnika v raione Solov’evo, Kamenka” [Combat order no. 12 of the commander of Operational Group of Forces on the Iartsevo Axis of 31 July 1941 on the destruction of the enemy in the Solov’evo and Kamenka regions], in Ibid., 412-413.

61 “Boevoi rasporiazhenie komanduiushchego Operativnoi Gruppoi Voisk Iartsevo Napravleniia ot 31 iiulia 1941 g. komandiru 44-go Strelkovogo Korpusa na nastuplenie vo vzaimodeistvii s gruppoi Kurochkina” [Combat order of the commander of Operational Group of Forces on the Iartsevo Axis of 31 July 1941 on an attack in cooperation with Group Kurochkin], in Ibid., 413-414.

62 “Boevoi rasporiazhenie komanduiushchego Operativnoi Gruppoi Voisk Iartsevo Napravleniia No. 13 ot 31 iiulia 1941 g. komandiram 101-i Tankovoi i 38-i Strelkovoi Divizii o zakreplenii na dostignutykh rubezhakh” [Combat order of the commander of Operational Group of Forces on the Iartsevo Axis No. 13 of 31 July 1941 to the commanders of 101st Tank and 38th Rifle Divisions about digging in along the lines you have reached], in Ibid., 414.

63 The Bock Diary, 264-270. Although Brauchitsch approved this directive on 30 July, he also wanted Hoth to mount an operation to recapture Velikie Luki.

Chapter 6

1 The Halder Diary, 471-475.

2 OKW, KTB, 17 Dec 40, 233.

3 Ibid., 3 Feb 41, 297-98, and 1000.

4 Ibid., 26 Jun-4 Aug 41, 1019-1042.

5 See Bock’s memorandum to OKW and telephone conversation with Heusinger, in The Bock Diary, 255-257.

6 See Hoth, Panzer-Operationen, 99; and “Pz AOK 3, Gefechtsbericht,” in Pz AOK 321057.

7 For example, Third Panzer Group had to rely on uncertain radio communications for four days until the night of 17 July. Only then was a telephone connection established; see “Pz AOK 3, KTB, 17 July 1941,” in Pz AOK 3, 14837/2. The maps of the tactical operations during this period are also misleading. Army Group North, “Der Feldzug gegen die Sowjet-Union, Kriegsjahr 1941,” in HGr Nord: 75884, admits that on 19 July 1941, “The Sixteenth Army’s situation is somewhat unclear because its units are bunched up and details are unknown.” The same holds true for the OKH maps of the period.

8 “Pz AOK 3, KTB,” in Pz AOK 3, 14837/2 and “Pz.AOK 3, Gefechtsbericht,” in Pz AOK 3, 21057.

9 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 41 k 20 chasam 16 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary no. 41 at 2000 hours on 16 July 1941 about combat operations of the forces of the front], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 91.

10 Specifically, Ershakov ordered:

4. Withdraw 179th and 170th RDs and 48th TD into reserve, concentrating 179th RD in Velikie Luki, 170th RD in Krupevitsa, Kokoreva, and Prudok, and 48th TD in the vicinity of Nazimovo Station.

5. Concentrate the headquarters of 29th RC, with the corps’ units, in Velikie Luki, include in it 179th and 170th RDs, and complete filling out and reorganizing them no later than 20 July.

6. For the struggle with enemy tanks, create army destroyer detachments, whose formation I entrust to Captain Comrade Zoroastrov. Also create groups for destroying enemy tanks in the corps and divisions in accordance with my instructions. Besides this, have mobile obstacle detachments and covering detachments.

See, “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 22-i Armii No. op/5 ot 17 iiulia 1941 g. na peregruppirovka i otvod voisk armii na novye rubezhi” [Combat order no. op/5 of 17 July 1941 on the regrouping and withdrawal of the army’s forces to new positions], in Ibid., 299.

11 See The Halder Diary, 478-479; and The Bock Diary, 249-254.

12 The Germans identified these as the portions of 5th, 30th, 33rd, 128th, 181st Rifle and 84th Motorized and 48th Tank Divisions.

13 See “AGp North, KTB and daily situation maps for the period;” and “AOK 16, KTB 5, Pt. 2, 7-31 Jul 41,” in AOK 16, 22745/1.

14 The Bock Diary, 252, 255-256; and telephone conversation between Colonel Henning von Tresckow and Colonel Hermann, in “AGp North, KTB, 20 Jul 41.”

15 Blumentritt, Fourth Army’s chief of staff, also complained to Bock he too had not been told what was going on. Adding to the confusion, Kluge’s aircraft was forced down by bad weather near Vitebsk and feared lost.

16 The Bock Diary, 250-255; “AGp North, KTB;” “AOK 4, KTB;” “AOK 9, KTB;” “Pz AOK 3, KTB,” and “Gefechtsbericht; AOK 16, KTB 5, Teil 2” for the period.

17 “AOK 16, KTB, 19 Jul 41.”

18 The Bock Diary, 255-257.

19 “Pz AOK 3, KTB,” “Gefechtsbericht; AOK 9, KTB;” “AOK 16, KTB, Teil 2.”

20 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie komanduiushchego voiskami 22-i Armii ot 21 iiulia 1941 g. na sosredotochenie i boevoe obespechenie 62-go Strelkovogo korpusa] [Combat order of the commander of the forces of 22nd Army of 21 July 1941 on the concentration and combat protection of 62nd Rifle Corps], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 299.

21 Ibid.

22 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 22-i Armii No. 07 ot 21 iiulia 1941 g. na unichtozhenie protivnika iuzhnee Velikie Luki” [Combat order no. 07 of the commander of the forces of 22nd Army on the destruction of the enemy south of Velikie Luki], in Ibid., 300.

23 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 50 ot 21 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary no. 50 of the Western Front on 21 July 1941 about the combat operations of the forces of the front], in Ibid., 98-100.

24 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 55 k 20 chasam 23 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary no. 55 at 2000 hours on 23 July 1941 about combat operations of the forces of the front], in Ibid., 101.

25 “AGp North, KTB, 23-27 Jul 41.”

26 “AOK 16, KTB 5, Pt. 2,” in AOK 16, 22745/1.

27 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie komanduiushchego voiskami 22-i Armii ot 26 iiulia 1941 g. komandiram 29-go i 62-go Strelkovykh korpusov na uderzhanie Velikie Luki” [Combat order of the commander of the forces of 22nd Army of 26 July 1941 to the commanders of 29th and 62nd Rifle Corps on holding on to Velikie Luki], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 303.

28 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 29-i Armii No. 02 ot 19 iiulia 1941 g. na sosredotochenie v raione Toropets” [Combat order no. 02 of the commander of the forces of 29th Army of 19 July 1941 on concentrating in the Toropets region], in Ibid., 362-263 and subsequent pages for 29th Army’s daily operational and intelligence summaries.

29 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 41 k 20 chasam 16 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary of the headquarters of the Western Front No. 41at 2000 hours on 16 July 1941 about the combat operations of the forces of the front], in Ibid., 91. See a detailed account of the defense of Mogilev in V. Kuznetsov, “Iz oborony Mogileva” [From the defense of Mogilev], VIZh, no. 12 (December 1963), 88-91.

30 For a realistic description of the bombing and its effects, see Shtemenko, Arduous Beginning, 37-38.

31 “Svedeniia shtaba 13-i Armii o polozhenii i sostoianii voisk na 21 iiulia 1941 g” [Report of the headquarters of 13th Army about the positions and condition of its forces on 21 July 1941], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 196-197.

32 Ibid., 197.

33 “AOK 2, Ia, KTB, Russland I, 21 Jun-18 Sept 41,” in AOK 2 16690/1. Weichs had seven army corps moving east: The XXXV Corps, under the OKH’s direct control, was in the Pripiat’ Marshes, 161 kilometers west of Rechitsa and the Dnepr River; XXXXIII Corps was between the Ptich’ and Berezina Rivers, defending Bobruisk against 21st Army’s assaults and several raiding Soviet cavalry divisions; LIII Corps was defending between Zhlobin and the region south of Bykhov, also under attack by 21st Army; XII Corps was crossing the Dnepr River north of Bykhov in the tracks of XXIV Motorized Corps; XIII Corps, was still in Army Group reserve, but following XII Corps; VII Corps was approaching Mogilev; and IX Corps, which was advancing in the wake of XXXXVII Motorized Corps, was moving toward Smolensk to seal the western side of the pocket in coordination with V Corps of Strauss’s Ninth Army; see OKH Lage Ost, daily situation maps.

34 Together with 112th and 197th Infantry Divisions, 15th Infantry Division was the last of the OKW’s reserve. See OKW, KTB, 26 Jul 41.

35 For a detailed description of 23rd Infantry Division’s assault on Mogilev, see Carell, Hitler Moves East, 87-88.

36 Zolotarev, VOV, 177.

37 Ibid.

38 A. A. Maslov, Captured Soviet Generals: The Fate of Soviet Generals Captured by the Germans, 1941-1945 (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 11.

39 See “Doklad Voennogo Soveta Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 27 iiulia 1941 g,” in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 54.

40 K. K. Rokossovsky, “Soldatskii dolg [A Soldier’s duty], VIZh, No. 6 (June 1989), 52.

41 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 41 k 20 chasam 16 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta,” 93.

42 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 45 ot 20 chasam 18 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary no. 45 of the Western Front on 2000 hours on 18 July 1941 about the combat operations of the forces of the front], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 95-96.

43 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 50 ot 21 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta,” in Ibid., 100.

44 Zolotarev, Ibid., 80-81.

45 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 21-i Armii No. 05 ot 22 iiulia 1941 g. na unichtozhenie Bobruisko-Bykhovskoi gruppirovki protivnika” [Combat order no. 05 of the commander of the forces of 21st Army of 22 July 1941 on the destruction of the enemy’s Bobruisk-Bykhov grouping], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 287-288.

46 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 55 k 20 chasam 23 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary no. 55 of the headquarters of the Western Front of 2000 hours on 23 July 1941 about the combat operations of the front], in Ibid., 101-102.

47 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 59 k 8 chasam 26 iiulia 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary no. 59 of the headquarters of the Western Front of 0800 hours on 26 July 1941 about the combat operations of the front], in Ibid., 106-107.

48 “Prikaz Stavki VK No. 00491 Glavnokomanduiushchemu voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia o proverke deiatel’nosti komandovaniia i shtaba 13-i Armii” [Stavka VK order no. 00491 of the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Western Direction about checking the activities of the command and staff of 13th Army], in Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK 1941,” 88.

49 “Prikaz Stavki VK No. 00493 o razdelenii Zapadnogo fronta” [Stavka VK order no. 00493 about the division of the Western Front], in Ibid., 88-89

50 See “Direktiva Stavki VK komanduiushchemu voiskami Tsentral’nogo fronta o zapreshchenii otvoda 63-go Strelkovogo korpusa i aktivizatsii boevykh deistvii po oborone pravoberezh’ia Dnepra” [Stavka VK directive to the commander of the forces of the Central Front about forbidding the withdrawal of 63rd Rifle Corps and activation of combat operations for the defense of the right bank of the Dnepr River], in Ibid., 97.

Chapter 7

1 OKW, KTB, vol. 1, 1020-1021; The Halder Diary, 458-59; and Walter Warlimont (German ed.), Im Hauptquartier der Wehrmacht 1939-1945 (Bonn: Athenaum Verlag, 1964), 193-195.

2 The Halder Diary, Report on Führer Conference, 458-459.

3 Engel Diary, 28 Jul 41; Leeb Diary, 21 Jul 41; and The Halder Diary, 458-459, 469-471, 483-484.

4 The Halder Diary, 471-472.

5 Halder visited Army Group South, which was struggling to complete the encirclement battle at Uman’, on 20 July 1941, the very day the Soviet 22nd Army broke out of the Nevel’ encirclement. See The Halder Diary, 480-481; and “AGp South, KTB” for the period.

6 The full text of this and other Führer directives are in Sbornik voenno-istoricheskikh materialov Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, vypusk 18 [Collection of military-historical materials of the Great Patriotic War, Issue 18] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960). Prepared by the Military-Historical Department of the General Staff’s Military-Scientific Directorate and classified secret. Hereafter cited as SVIMVOV.

7 Ibid. Paraphrased except where indicated.

8 See OKW, KTB, Introduction, 188.

9 See “AGp Center, KTB;” and “AGp South KTB,” for the period.

10 Memo, Major Baron von Griessenbeck (Leeb’s aide), Leeb Diary, 21 Jul 41; “AGp North, KTB, 21 Jul 41,” in 75128/1; and OKW, KTB, vol. 1, Pt. C, Appendix 77, 1029-1030.

11 Hitler reserved the harsh criticism for Brauchitsch until the next day. See The Halder Diary, 483-484.

12 Memo, General Brennecke, AGp North chief of staff, on Hitler’s visit, in “AGp North, KTB, 21 Jul 41.”

13 Halder sent Gehlen to Malnava the day before Hitler’s visit and received a full report the next day. See The Halder Diary, 482-484.

14 Memo on the 16 December Führer Briefing by the army group’s commander-in-chief, dated 17 Dec 41, “HGr Nord, Ia, Besprechungs- und Vortragsnotizen, 19.9.41-12.1.42, Band 2,” in AGp North 14985/60.

15 Führer Directive No. 34, dated 30 July, provided even more precise instruction regarding the capture of Leningrad.

16 SVIMVOV, Issue 18, 233-234. Paraphrased.

17 OKW, KTB, 19-23 Jul 41; The Halder Diary; and The Bock Diary, for the period; Führer Directive No. 33, 19 Jul 41 and Supplement to Directive No. 33, 23 Jul 41, in German High Level Directives, Jul-Aug 41, in the files of the Center for Military History, United States Army (CMH).

18 Hoth’s panzer group and Strauss’s army included LVII and XXXIX Motorized and XXIII, VI, VIII, and V Army Corps, and Guderian’s panzer group and Weichs’ army XXIV, XXXXVI and XXXXVII Motorized and VII, IX, XII, XIII, XXXXIII, LIII, XXXV Army Corps, the latter still subordinate to the OKH.

19 The Bock Diary; “AOK 4, KTB,” 26 Jun-19 Jul 41, in AOK 4 17561/2; “AOK 2, KTB, 21 Jun-18 Sept 41,” in AOK 2 16690/1; and “Pz Gp 2, KTB, 22 Jun-20 Aug 41,” in Pz AOK 2 25034/1.

20 Reinhardt, Die Wende vor Moskau, 26-27; and The Halder Diary, 482-489.

21 By way of contrast, from 22 June through 30 September, the Red Army and Fleet lost 2,129,677 soldiers, including 236,372 killed, 40,680 died of wounds, 153,526 died from illness and other non-combat causes, and 1,699,699 were missing and prisoners-of-war. Another 687,626 soldiers were wounded sufficiently to cause hospitalization. All told, the casualty figure equals more than 50 percent of the armed forces’ prewar strength. See G. F. Krivosheev, ed., Grif sekretnosti sniat: Poteri vooruzhennykh sil SSSR v voinakh, boevykh deistviiakh i voennykh konfliktakh [The classification secret is removed: The losses of the armed forces of the USSR in wars, military operations, and military conflicts] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1993), 146-153.

22 Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 190.

23 SVIMVOV, Issue 18, 236.

24 Ibid, 236-237.

25 Zolotarev, VOV, 180.

26 For Hitler’s visit to Army Group Center, see The Bock Diary; “Pz AOK 2, KTB” for the period; Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 171-72; The Halder Diary, 494-496; OKW, KTB, 1041-1043; and “AGp Center, KTB Anlagen,” in AGp Center 26974/8.

27 Much to Leeb’s dismay, Sondermeldung No. 1 also revealed his intended thrust toward Leningrad; see Leeb Diary.

28 See daily situation maps in “AGp North KTB.”

29 According to official count, the Red Army’s and Navy’s permanent losses during the first three months of the war were 2,129,677 soldiers, including 1,699,099 captured. See Krivosheev, Grif sekretnosti sniat, 146-147.

30 The Halder Diary, 494-496 (see also the unabridged version for this period); and OKW, KTB, 1041-1043.

31 The Halder Diary, 491-496. Broken down further, the 213,301 casualties included 149,609 enlisted men and 5,464 officers wounded; 44,027 enlisted men and 2,443 officers killed in action; and 11,539 enlisted men and 219 officers missing. The high casualty rate among officers was the most serious problem. While Army Group Center had suffered 74,500 casualties, it had received 23,000 replacements and had another 10,000 on request within 7-10 days. After receiving their allocated replacements, Second Army would still be short 30,500 men; Ninth Army, 15,000; Second Panzer Group, 5,000; and Third Panzer Group, 4,000.

32 See comments of the Keitel-Bock conference, in The Bock Diary, 262-263.

33 Ibid.

34 Protocol of Hitler’s visit at Borisov. Bock was correct in that last estimate; see Conference in the Kremlin, 30 July 1941, cited in G. K. Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov (New York: Delacorte Press, 1971), 287-288.

35 Warlimont, Im Hauptquartier der Wehrmacht, 198-199. The bombings of Moscow began 21-22 July 1941. Field commanders criticized the diversion of bombers from direct tactical support of their ground forces to so-called strategic bombing. The official reason given for the Moscow raids was retaliation for Soviet air attacks on Helsinki and Bucharest. See Directive No. 33.

36 The Bock Diary, 272.

37 Ibid.; and “Pz AOK 2, KTB,” for the period; and Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 165-168.

38 Bock returned 1st Cavalry Division to Weichs’s Second Army and shifted 7th Infantry Division from VIII Army Corps to XXIV Motorized Corps. See “Pz AOK 2, KTB.”

39 “Chastnyi boevoi prikaz Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 1 avgusta 1941 g. gruppe tov. Kachalova na nastuplenie v napravlenii Pochinok” [Particular combat order of the commander-in-chief of the Western Direction of 1 August 1941 to the Group of Comrade Kachalov on the offensive toward Pochinok], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 62.

40 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 28-i Armii no. 9 ot 1 avgusta 1941 g. na podgotovku k otrazheniiu nastupleniia motomekhanizirovannykh chastei protivnika” [Combat order no. 9 of the commander of the forces of 28th Army of 1 August 1941 on preparations to repel an offensive by motor-mechanized units of the enemy], in Ibid., 355-356

41 Ibid.

42 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 28-i Armii no. 10 ot 2 avgusta 1941 g. na nanesenii udara po tylam El’ninskoi gruppirovki protivnika” [Combat order no. 10 of the commander of the forces of 28th Army of 2 August 1941 on the conduct of an attack against the rear of the enemy’s El’nia grouping], in Ibid., 356-357.

43 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 76 k 20 chasam 3 avgusta 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary no. 76 of the headquarters of the Western Front at 2000 hours 3 August 1941 about the combat operations of the front], in Ibid., 120-121.

44 “Doklad nachal’nika shtaba Rezervnogo fronta ot 3 avgusta 1941 g komanduiushchemu voiskami Rezervnogo fronta o polozhenii voisk u Roslavl’” [Report of the chief of staff of the Reserve Front of 3 August 1941 to the commander of the forces of the Reserve Front about the situation of the forces at Roslavl’], in Ibid., 165-166.

45 “Direktiva Stavki VK no. 00679 komanduiushchim voiskami Zapadnogo, Rezervnogo, i Tsental’nogo frontov o perepodchinenii voisk” [Stavka VK directive no. 00679 to the commanders of the Western, Reserve, and Central Fronts about the re-subordination of forces], Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK 1941,” 101.

46 “Chastnyi boevoi prikaz zamestitelia komanduiushchego voiskami Rezervnogo Fronts ot 3 avgusta 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami 24-i Armii na podgotovku k otrazheniiu nastupaiushchego protivnika” [Separate combat orders of the deputy commander of the forces of the Reserve Front of 3 August 1941 to the commander of the forces of 24th Army on the preparations to repel the attacking enemy], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 166-168.

47 “Chastnyi boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami Rezervnogo fronta no. 0017/op ot 4 avgusta 1941 g. komanduiushchemu gruppoi voisk General-Leitenantu Kachalovu na otvod levogo flange i tsentra gruppy na rubezh Faddeeva Buda, r. Ostrik” [Individual combat order of the deputy commander of the forces of the Reserve Front no. 0017/op of 4 August 1941 to the commander of the group of forces Lieutenant General Kachalov on a withdrawal of the left wing and center of the group to the Faddeeva Buda and Ostrik River line], in Ibid., 167-168.

48 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie shtaba Rezervnogo fronta ot 4 avgusta 1941 g. o podchinenii komanduiushchemu voiskami 43-i Armii chastei gruppy Kachalova” [Combat order of the headquarters of the Reserve Front of 4 August 1941 about the subordination of the units of Group Kachalov to the commander of the forces of 43rd Army], in Ibid., 169.

49 See Aleksander A. Maslov, Fallen Soviet Generals: Soviet General Officers Killed in Battle, 1941-1945 (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 17-18. Subsequently, on Stalin’s instructions, a military tribunal found Kachalov guilty of treason and sentenced him to death in absentia, a decision rescinded in 1954 after Stalin’s death.

50 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego gruppoi voisk 28-i Armii no. 1 ot 4 avgusta 1941 g. na peregruppirovku” [Combat order no. 1 of the commander of the group of forces of 28th Army of 4 August 1941 on a regrouping], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 357-358.

51 “Direktiva komanduiushchego voiskami Reservnogo fronta no. 22 ot 5 avgusta ob ustranenii nedostatkov v organizatsii i vvedenii boevykh deistvii” [Directive no. 22 of the commander of the forces of the Reserve Front of 5 August about the elimination of shortcomings in the organization and conduct of combat operations], in Ibid., 169-170.

52 “Ukazaniia voennogo soveta Rezervnogo fronta ot 5 avgusta 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami 28-i armii po organizatsii oborony” [Instruction of the Military Council of the Reserve Front of 5 August 1941 to the commander of the forces of 28th Army on the organization of a defense], in Ibid., 170.

53 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie shtaba Rezervnogo fronta ot 5 avgusta 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami 24-i Armii ob izmenenii sistemy artilleriiskoi oborony v polose 107-i Strelkovoi Divizii” [Combat order of the headquarters of the Reserve Front of 5 August 1941 to the commander of the forces of 24th Army about changes in the system of artillery defenses in the sector of 107th Rifle Division], in Ibid., 171.

54 “Direktiva Stavki VK no. 00731 komanduiushchim voiskami Rezervnogo i Zapadnogo frontov o merakh po razgromu El’ninskoi gruppirovki protivnika” [Stavka VK directive no. 00731 to the commanders of the Reserve and Western Fronts on the defeat of the enemy’s El’nia grouping], Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK 1941,” 106.

55 “Donesenie shtaba Rezervnogo fronta ot 7 avgusta 1941 g. General’nomu Shtabu o otkhode voisk Gruppy Kachalova” [Report of the headquarters of the Reserve Front of 7 August 1941 to the General Staff about the withdrawal of the forces of Group Kachalov], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 175-176. Major General Butorin commanded 63rd and 80th Rifle Corps in 1943 and 1944, Major General Pavel Grigor’evich Egorov, chief of staff, 28th Army, was killed in action late in the operation, and Major General Zuev would later become chief of staff of 43rd Army.

56 “Prikaz Stavki Verkhovnogo Glavnokomandovaniia ob otvetstvennosti voennosluzhashchikh za sdachu v plen i ostavlenie vragu oruzhiia” [Stavka VGK order No. 270 about the responsibility of soldiers for surrendering and abandoning weapons to the enemy], in V. A. Zolotarev, ed., Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia Otechestvennaia [voina]: Prikazy Narodnogo Komissara Oborony SSSR 22 iiunia 1941 g.—1942 g., T. 13 (2-2) [The Russian archives: The Great Patriotic [War]: Orders of the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR 22 June 1941-1942, volume 13 (2-2)] (Moscow: “TERRA,” 1997), 58-60; and Zolotarev, VOV, 179.

57 “Razvedyvatel’naia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 69 k 8 chasam 1 avgusta 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh protivnika” [Intelligence summary no. 69 of the headquarters of the Western Front at 0800 hours on 1 August 1941 about the combat operations of the enemy], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 118-119.

58 “Boevoe donesenie komanduiushchego voiskami 16-i Armii ot 1 avgusta 1941 g. Glavnokomanduiushchemu voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia o polozhenii voisk armii” [Combat report of the commander of the forces on 16th Army of 1 August 1941 to the commander-in-chief of the Western Direction about the situation of the forces of the army], in Ibid., 215-216.

59 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie komanduiushchego Operativnoi Gruppoi Voisk Iartsevskogo Napravleniia no. 14 ot 1 avgusta 1941 g. na nastuplenie” [Combat order no. 14 of the commander of the Operational Group of Forces on the Iartsevo Axis of 1 August 1941 on an attack], in Ibid., 415.

60 Ibid.

61 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 16-i Armii no. 024/op ot 2 avgusta 1941 g. na oboronu rubezha po r. Bol’shoi Vop’ets, Tiushino, and Vernebisovo, i po r. Dnepr” [Combat order no. 024/ op of the commander of the forces of 16th Army of 2 August 1941 on the defense of a line along the Bol’shoi Vop’ets River, Vernebisovo, and along the Dnepr River], in Ibid., 216-217.

62 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 20 i Armii no. 49 ot 2 avgusta 1941 g. na otvod voisk 20-i i 16-i Armii za r. Dnepr” [Combat order no. 49 of the commander of the forces of 20th Army of 2 August 1941 on the withdrawal of 20th and 16th Armies behind the Dnepr River], in Ibid., 270-271.

63 “Chastnyi boevoi prikaz Glavnokomanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia ot 3 avgusta 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami 20-i Armii na otvod voisk armii na vostochnyi bereg p. Dnepr” [Individual combat order of the commander-in-chief of the Western Direction of 3 August 1941 to the commander of the forces of 20th Army on a withdrawal of the army’s forces to the eastern bank of the Dnepr River], in Ibid., 64-65.

64 “Chastnyi boevoi prikaz zamestitelia komanduiushchego voiskami Rezervnogo fronta ot 3 avgusta 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami 24-i Armii na podgotovku k otrazheniiu nastupaiushchego protivnika” [Individual combat order of the deputy commander of the forces of the Reserve Front of 3 August 1941 to the commander of the forces of 24th Army on preparations to repel the attacking enemy], in Ibid., 166-167.

65 “Chastnyi boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami Rezervnogo fronta ot 3 avgusta 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami 24-i Armii na okruzhenie protivnika v raione El’nia” [Individual combat order of the deputy commander of the forces of the Reserve Front of 3 August 1941 to the commander of the forces of 24th Army on the encirclement of the enemy in the El’nia region], in Ibid., 167.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid., 168.

68 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 76 k 20 chasam 3 avgusta 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary no. 76 of the headquarters of the Western Front at 2000 hours 3 August 1941 about the combat operations of the front], in Ibid., 120-121.

69 For further details, see Il’ia Moshchansky and Ivan Khokhlov, Protivostoianie: Smolenskoe srazhenie 10 iiulia-10 sentiabria 1941 goda, chast’ 1 [Opposition: The Battle of Smolensk 10 July-10 September 1941, Part 1] (Moscow: “BTV-MN,” 2003), in the series Voennaia letopis’ [Military notes].

70 “Donesenie voennogo soveta 20-i Armii ot 4 avgusta 1941 g. Glavnokomanduiushchemu voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia o sostoianii voisk 20-i i 16-i Armii” [Report of the Military Council of 20th Army of 4 August 1941 to the commander-in-chief of the forces of the Western Direction about the condition of the forces of 20th and 16th Armies], SBDVOV, Issue 37, 271-272.

71 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo fronta no. 046 ot 4 avgusta 1941 g. na unichtozhenie Dukhovshchinskoi gruppirovki protivnika” [Combat order no. 046 of the commander of the forces of the Western Front of 4 August 1941 on the destruction of the enemy’s Dukhovshchina grouping], in Ibid., 124-125.

72 Jentz, Panzer Truppen, vol. 1, 190-193, and 206.

73 “Donesenie komanduiushchego voiskami 20-i Armii no. 010 ot 5 avgusta 1941 g. Glavnokomanduiushchemu voiskami Zapadnogo Napravleniia o khode perepravy voisk armii za r. Dnepr” [Report of the commander of the forces of 20th Army no. 010 of 5 August 1941 to the commander-in-chief of the forces of the Western Direction about the course of the crossings of the forces of the army behind the Dnepr River], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 272-273.

74 “Boevoe prikaz komanduiushchego Operativnoi Gruppoi Voisk Iartsevskogo Napravleniia no. 4 ot 5 avgusta 1941 g. na otvod voisk gruppy za r. Vop’’ i organizatsiiu oborony na ee vostochnom beregu” [Combat order no. 4 of the commander of the Operational Group of Forces on the Iartsevo Axis of 5 August 1941 on a withdrawal of the forces behind the Vop’ River and the organization of a defense on its eastern bank], in Ibid., 415-416.

75 “Doklad voennogo soveta 16-i Armii ot 5 avgusta 1941 g. voennomu sovetu Zapadnogo fronta o sostoianii voisk armii” [Report of the Military Council of 16th Army of 5 August 1941 to the Military Council of the Western Front about the condition of the forces of the army], in Ibid., 217.

76 “Doklad voennogo soveta 16-i Armii ot 5 avgusta 1941 g. voennomu sovetu Zapadnogo fronta o sostoianii voisk armii” [Report of the Military Council of 16th Army of 5 August 1941 to the Military Council of the Western Front about the condition of the forces of the army], in Ibid., 217.

77 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 20 i Armii no. 50 ot 5 avgusta 1941 g. na oboronu rubezha po r. Dnepr” [Combat order no. 50 of the commander of the forces of 20th Army of 5 August 1941 on a defense line along the Dnepr River], in Ibid., 273-274.

78 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 16-i Armii no. 027/op ot 6 avgusta 1941 g. voiskam armii o smene chastei 107-i Strelkovoi Divizii” [Combat order no. 027/op of the commander of the forces of 16th Army of 6 August 1941 to the forces of the army about the relief of the units of 107th Rifle Division], in Ibid., 217-218.

79 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 20 i Armii no. 52 ot 7 avgusta 1941 g. na oboronu voiskami 20-i i 16-i Armii rubezha po r. Dnepr” [Combat order no. 52 of the commander of the forces of 20th Army of 7 August 1941 on a defense by the forces of 20th and 16th Armies of a line along the Dnepr River], in Ibid., 274-275.

80 “Donesenie shtaba 16-i Armii ot 7 avgusta 1941 g. shtabu Zapadnogo fronta o peredache vsekh chastei 16-i Armii v sostav 20-i Armii” [Report of the headquarters of 16th Army of 7 August 1941 to the headquarters of the Western Front about the transfer of all of the units of 16th Army to the composition of 20th Army], in Ibid., 218.

81 Ibid.

82 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 84 k 20 chasam 7 avgusta 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary no. 84 of the headquarters of the Western Front at 2000 hours 7 August 1941 about the combat operations of the front], in Ibid., 128-129.

83 Lev Lopukhovsky, Viazemskaia katastrofe 41-go goda [The Viaz’ma tragedy of 1941] (Moscow: “Iauza” “Eksmo,” 2006), 20.

84 The Bock Diary, OKW, War Diary; and the unabridged version of The Halder Diary for the period.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.

Chapter 8

1 Stalin’s decision to assign Zhukov command of the new front reflected the dictator’s rationale for appointing Eremenko as temporary commander of Western Front on 19 July. In this case too, Stalin was simply opting for a proven “fighter.”

2 “Prikaz Stavki VK no. 00583 o formirovanii Rezervnogo fronta” [Stavka VK Directive no. 00583 concerning the Formation of the Reserve Front], in Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK 1941,” 98-99.

3 “Direktiva Stavki VK no. 00732 komanduiushchim voiskami Rezervnogo i Zapadnogo frontov o sostav Rezervnogo fronta” [Stavka VK directive no. 00732 to the commanders of the Reserve and Western Fronts on the composition of the Reserve Front], in Ibid., 106-107.

4 “Direktiva Stavki VK no. 00731 komanduiushchim voiskami Rezervnogo i Zapadnogo frontov o merakh po razgromu El’ninskoi gruppirovki protivnika” [Stavka VK directive no. 00731 to the commanders of the forces of the Reserve and Western Fronts about measures for the destruction of the enemy’s El’nia grouping], in Ibid., 106.

5 “Chastnyi boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami Rezervnogo fronta No. 19/op ot 6 avgusta 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami 24-i Armii na unichtozhenie El’ninskoi gruppirovki protivnika” [Individual combat order no 19/op of the commander of the forces of the Reserve Front of 6 August 1941 to the commander of the forces of 24th Army on the destruction of the enemy’s El’nia grouping], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 171-172.

6 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami Rezervnogo fronta no. 0021/op ot 6 avgusta 1941 g. komanduiushchim voiskami 24-i i 43-i Armii na unichtozhenie El’ninskoi i Roslavl’skoi gruppirovok protivnika” [Combat order no 0021/op of the commander of the forces of the Reserve Front of 6 August 1941 to the commanders of the forces of 24th and 43rd Armies on the destruction of the enemy’s El’nia and Roslavl’ groupings], in Ibid., 173-174.

7 Boevoe donesenie shtaba Rezervnogo fronta no. 17 ot 7 avgusta 1941 g. General’nomu Shtabu o boevykh deistviiakh voisk Rezervnogo fronta” [Combat report no. 17 of the headquarters of the Reserve Front of 7 August 1941 about the combat operations of the forces of the Reserve Front], in Ibid., 175.

8 “Direktiva Stavki VGK no. 00815 komanduiushchim voiskami Zapadnogo fronta ob ugroze sryva operatsii po unichtozheniiu El’ninskoi gruppirovki protivnika” [Stavka VGK directive no. 00815 to the commander of the forces of the Western Front about the threat of disruption of the operation for the destruction of the enemy’s El’nia grouping], Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK 1941,” 109.

9 “Direktiva Stavki VGK no. 00825 komanduiushchim voiskami Rezervnogo fronta o perepodchinenii kavaleriiskoi divizii” [Stavka VGK directive no. 00825 to the commander of the forces of the Reserve Front about the re-subordination of a cavalry division], in Ibid., 110.

10 “Direktiva Stavki VGK no. 00857 komanduiushchim voiskami Rezervnogo fronta o postroenii rubezha oborony po r. Snopot” [Stavka VGK directive no. 00857 to the commander of the forces of the Reserve Front about the erecting of a defense line along the Snopot River], in Ibid., 112-113.

11 “Direktiva Stavki VGK no. 00850 komanduiushchim voiskami Rezervnogo fronta o pereimenovanii 35-i armii” [Stavka VGK directive no. 00850 to the commander of the forces of the Reserve Front about the renaming of 35th Army], in Ibid., 113.

12 German records show 160th, 132nd, and 137th Rifle Divisions and part of 4th Airborne Corps were encircled at Krichev. The Russians have released no records pertaining to the Central Front, which is not surprising given its subsequent destruction.

13 “Pz AOK 2, KTB, 13 Aug 41.”

14 The following account is based primarily on OKW, KTB for the period; The Bock Diary, 255-288, “AOK 2, KTB;” “Pz AOK 2, KTB;” “AOK 2, Ia, Bericht über die Schlacht Rogachev-Gomel, 13 Sept 41,” in Pz AOK 2 52701/10, and MS P-114b, Ch. IV. The 1st Cavalry Division’s after-action-report is in “AOK 4, Anlagen zum KTB Nr. 8, 29.7.-11.8.41,” in AOK 4 17561/18.

15 The Bock Diary, 274.

16 German records show the pocket northwest of Gomel’ contained 63rd Rifle Corps’ 61st, 154th, and 167th Rifle Divisions and 67th Rifle Corps’ 102nd, 151st, and 155th Rifle Divisions.

17 For a detailed account of this action from the perspective of 82nd Regiment of XII Army Corps’ 31st Infantry Division, see Friedrich Hossbach, Infanterie im Ostfeldzug, 1941-42 (Osterode [Harz]: Verlag Giebel & Oehlschlägel, 1951). After serving as Hitler’s adjutant, Oberst Hossbach later rose to command an army and was highly critical of the higher commands’ obsession with encirclement battles, which he believed led to excessive and untimely commitment of infantry units and unnecessary losses.

18 According to Beshanov, Tankovyi pogrom, 395, many of the soldiers of 21st Army’s 63rd and 69th Rifle Corps, as well as 16th and 24th Armies and many other second strategic echelon armies, were primarily “Zekes” [zaklyuchennie], or political prisoners or criminals released from the GULAG (labor camps administered by the NKVD’s Main Directorate of Camps) or other types of “shtrafniki” [penal troops], who Stalin expected “to expatiate their guilt to the Motherland with their blood” by service in the army. Their commanders too, such as generals Petrovsky, Rokossovsky, Lukin, and Gorbatov, and many others, had also been released from NKVD imprisonment shortly before the war began. Therefore, it was no coincidence that many of the commanders and cadre of these and other armies, such as Rakutin, Khomenko, Kalinin, were NKVD officers.

19 The Stavka had re-formed the headquarters of 3rd Army under its control by 14 July and filled it out with forces and assigned it to the Central Front by 1 August to bolster its left wing east of Gomel’.

20 “Direktiva Stavki VGK No. 00880 komanduiushchemu voiskami Zapadnogo Fronta o nedopushchenii neopravdannogo otkhoda 3-i Armii” [Stavka directive no. 00880 to the commander of the forces of the Western Front about the non-admission [banning] of the unjustified withdrawal of 3rd Army], in Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK 1941,” 113.

21 “Direktiva Stavki VGK No. 00926 komanduiushchim voiskami TsentraI’nogo i Rezervnogo frontov ob organizatsii Brianskogo fronta” [Stavka VGK directive no. 00926 to the commanders of the forces of the Central and Reserve Fronts about the organization of the Briansk Front], in Ibid., 116.

22 “Doklad komanduiushchego voiskami Rezervnogo fronta No. 2402 Verkhovnomu Glavnokomanduiushchemu ob obstanovke i merakh po protivodeistviiu protivniku v vykhode na tyly Iugo-zapadnogo fronta” [Report of the commander of the forces of the Reserve Front no.2402 to the Supreme High Commander about the situation and measures for opposing the enemy in entering the rear of the Southwestern Front], in Ibid., 361.

23 “Direktiva Stavki VGK No. 001082 komanduiushchemu voiskami Rezervnogo frontov ob predotvrashchenii obkhoda protivnikom Kievskoi gruppirovki voisk i okruzheniie 3-i i 21-i Armii” [Stavka VGK directive no. 001082 to the commander of the forces of the Reserve Front about preventing the envelopment of the Kiev grouping of forces and the encirclement of 3rd and 21st Armies by the enemy], in Ibid., 119-120.

24 V.I. Kuznetsov’s 3rd Army consisted of 66th Rifle Corps’ 75th and 232nd Rifle Divisions, the separate 214th Airborne Brigade, and 65th Fortified Region. Although most of the divisions of Golubev’s 13th Army managed to escape eastward through Guderian’s armor screen, by the time they linked up with the Briansk Front in late August, their strength decreased to roughly two-three battalions and several hundred men each. See Boevoi sostav Sovetskoi armii, 42; M. A. Kozlov, ed., V plameni srazhenii [In the flames of battles] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1973), 34.

25 “Direktiva Stavki VGK No. 001092 komanduiushchim voiskami Tsentral’nogo i Iugo-Zapadnogo frontov, Glavnokomanduiushchemu voiskami Iugo-Zapadnogo Napravleniia ob otvode voisk 3-i Armii za Dnepr” [Stavka VGK directive no. 001092 to the commanders of the forces of the Central and Southwestern Fronts about a withdrawal of the forces of 3rd Army behind the Dnepr River], in Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK 1941,” 121.

26 “Direktiva Stavki VGK No. 001139 komanduiushchemu voiskami Brianskogo fronta ob obespechenie styka s Tsentral’nym frontom” [Stavka VGK directive no. 001139 to the commander of the forces of the Briansk Front about the protection of the boundary with the Central Front], in Ibid., 122.

27 “Direktiva Stavki VGK No. 001140 komanduiushchemu voiskami Tsentral’nogo fronta ob obespechenie styka s Brianskim frontom” [Stavka VGK directive no. 001140 to the commander of the forces of the Central Front about the protection of the boundary with the Briansk Front], in Ibid., 122-123.

28 Second Army After-action Report, cited above.

29 The Bock Diary, 278.

Chapter 9

1 “Chastnyi boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami Rezervnogo fronta ot 3 avgusta 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami 21-i Armii na okruzhenie protivnika v raione El’nia” [Individual combat order of the deputy commander of the forces of the Reserve Front of 3 August 1941 to the commander of the forces of 24th Army on the encirclement of the enemy in the El’nia region], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 168, 333-335. Zhukov singled out 19th, 103rd, 105th, 106th, and 120th Rifle Divisions for harsh criticism.

2 Ibid., 124-125.

3 Ibid., 169-170.

4 Ibid., 171-174. Rakutin’s shock group consisted of 107th, 10th, 103rd, 19th, and 120th Rifle, 10th Motorized, and 105th and 102nd Tank Division, plus a company of T-34 tanks. Kurochkin’s shock group contained 53rd, 217th, 222nd, 145th, and 149th Rifle and 104th and 109th Tank Divisions. See the Stavka order in Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK 1941,” 106.

5 Albert Kesselring, A Soldier’s Record (New York: William Morrow, 154), 123; and Plocher, The German Air Force versus Russia 1941, 97-111. Once Richthofen’s VIII Air Corps was pulled out of the line on 3 August to help Leeb get to Leningrad, the chances to hold El’nia were sharply diminished.

6 See the daily maps of Third Panzer Group in August, “Anlagen zum Kriegstagebuch. Lagenkarten. Pz. Gr. 3, Ia, 21 Jul-31 Aug 1941,” in Pz AOK 3, 15415/12; and Zolotarev, VOV, 181.

7 The Bock Diary, 280.

8 The Halder Diary, 506.

9 “Doklad shtaba Zapadnogo fronta ot 12 avgusta 1941 g. General’nomu Shtabu o namechaemykh nastupatel’nykh operatsiiakh na Dukhovshchinsko-Smolenskom i El’ninsko-Roslavl’skom napravleniakh” [Report of the headquarters of the Western Front of 12 August 1941 to the General Staff about the intended offensive operations along the Dukhovshchina-Smolensk and El’nia-Roslavl’ axes], in SBDVOV, Issue 41 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960), 11-12. Group Boldin, which was commanded by the Western Front’s former Chief of Operations, consisted of the remnants of 3rd Army, which were just completing their trek westward from the Belostok and Minsk encirclements of late June. Like many other groups, Boldin’s travelled about 400 kilometers eastward in a period of about 16 days after escaping from the Minsk encirclement in late June.

10 Ibid., 12.

11 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 16-i Armii No. 01 ot 15 avgusta 1941 g. o podgotovke voisk armii k nastupleniiu” [Combat order no. 01 of the commander of the forces of 16th Army of 15 August 1941 about preparations for an offensive], in Ibid., 137-138.

12 “Prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo fronta no. 0109 ot 15 avgusta 1941 g. ob osobennostiakh taktiki protivnika i razvertyvanii voiskami fronta nochnykh deistvii” [Order no. 0109 of the commander of the forces of the Western Front of 15 August 1941 about the characteristics of enemy tactics and the employment of the forces of the front in night operations], in Ibid., 13-14.

13 “Doklad komanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo fronta ot 15 avgusta 1941 g. Verkhovnomu Glavnokomanduiushchemu o nastupatel’noi operatsii na Dukhovshchinskom napravlenii” [Report of the commander of the forces of the Western Front of 15 August 1941 to the Supreme High Commander about an offensive operation along the Dukhovshchina axis], in Ibid., 14-15.

14 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo fronta no. 01 ot 15 avgusta 1941 g. na unichtozhenie Dukhovshchinskoi gruppirovki protivnika” [Combat order no. 01 of the commander of the forces of the Western Front of 15 August 1941 on the destruction of the enemy’s Dukhovshchina grouping], in Ibid., 17-18.

15 Ibid., 14-15 and 17-18.

16 “Doklad starshego pomoshchnika nachal’nika operativnogo otdela shtaba Zapadnogo fronta nachal’niku operativnogo otdela shtaba fronta o boevykh deistviiakh voisk 20-i Armii v period s 9 po 15 avgusta 1941 g. [Report of the senior assistant chief of the Operations Department of the headquarters of the Western Front to the chief of the Operations Department of the headquarters of the Western Front about the combat operations of the forces of 20th Army during the period from 8 through 15 August 1941], in Ibid., 20-25; and “Svedeniia shtaba Zapadnogo fronta o boevom i chislennom sostave voisk 20-i Armii na 15 avgusta 1941 g. [Information of the headquarters of the Western Front about the combat and numerical composition of the forces of 20th Army on 15 August 1941], in Ibid., 211.

17 “Doklad komanduiushchego voiskami 19-i Armii ot 16 avgusta 1941. komanduiushchemu voiskami Zapadnogo fronta o reshenii na nastupatel’nuiu operatsiiu” [Report of the commander of 19th Army of 16 August 1941 to the commander of the forces of the Western Front about the decision for an offensive operation], in Ibid., 157.

18 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 19-i Armii No. 027 ot 16 avgusta 1941 na zaniatie iskhodnogo polozheniia dlia nastupleniia” [Combat order no. 027 of the commander of the forces of 19th Army on the occupation of jumping-off positions for the offensive], in Ibid., 159-160.

19 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 30-i Armii No. 036 ot 16 avgusta 1941 na nastuplenie v napravlenii Shanino, Dorofeevo, Ponomari” [Combat order no. 036 of the commander of the forces of 30th Army of 16 August 1941 on an offensive in the direction of Shanino, Dorofeevo, and Ponomari], in Ibid., 281-232.

20 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie komanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo fronta ot 16 avgusta 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami 30-i Armii o vnesenii popravok v reshenie na nastuplenie voisk armii” [Combat order of the commander of the forces of the Western Front of 16 August 1941 to the commander of the forces of 30th Army about corrections in the attack plan of the army’s forces], in Ibid., 41, 32.

21 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 20-i Armii No. 55 ot 16 avgusta 1941 na ovladenie rubezhom Sopshino, Dobromino, Klokovo, Glinka” [Combat order no. 55 of the commander of the forces of 20th Army on the capture of the Sopshino, Dobromino, Klokovo, and Glinka line], in Ibid., 212-213.

22 It is interesting to note that, in virtually every instance, the names and signatures of the commanders, commissars, and chiefs of staffs of the units preparing the orders and reports appear at the bottom of the documents. However, on 19th Army’s documents, the name of the chief of staff, Colonel Malyshkin, is absent – the signature block simply reads, “The chief of staff of 19th Army.” We now know why. This is because Malyshkin became a “non person” in October 1941, after his capture by the Germans in the Viaz’ma encirclement. By then a Major General, Malyshkin marched off into German captivity, where he went over to the Germans’ side, first by conducting pro-German propaganda among Red Army prisoners of war, and later by joining the so-called Russian Liberation Army formed by General Vlasov, the famed general who was captured by the Germans in July 1942, along with the bulk of his 2nd Shock Army, after his army was encircled during the failed Soviet offensive south of Leningrad. Malyshkin was taken into custody by the Americans at war’s end and, after considerable negotiation, was turned over to the Soviets in September and tried and executed for treason. See Malyshkin’s entire story in Aleksander A. Maslov, Captured Soviet Generals: The Fate of Soviet Generals Captured by the Germans, 1941-1945 (London: Frank Cass, 2001).

23 “Boevoe donesenie shtaba 19-i Armii No. 06 ot 16 avgusta 1941 g. nachal’niku shtaba fronta o sosredotochenie 50-i I 64-i Strelkovykh i 101-i Tankovoi Divizii” [Combat report no. 06 of the headquarters of 19th Army of 16 August 1941 to the chief of staff of the front about the concentration of 50th and 64th Rifle and 101st Tank Divisions], in SBDVOV, Issue 41, 160.

24 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 19-i Armii No. 028 ot 16 avgusta 1941 na unichtozhenie Dukhovshchinskoi gruppirovki protivnika” [Combat order no. 028 of the commander of the forces of 19th Army on the destruction of the enemy’s Dukhovshchina grouping], in Ibid., 160-162.

25 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 102 k 20 chasam 16 avgusta 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary no. 102 of the headquarters of the Western Front at 2000 hours on 16 August 1941 about the combat operations of the front], in Ibid., 25-27.

26 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba 19-i Armii No. 145 k 5 chasam 17 avgusta 1941 g. o zaniatii voiskami iskhodnogo polozheniia i podgotovke k nastupleniiu” [Operational summary no. 145 of the headquarters of 19th Army at 0500 hours on 17 August 1941 about the occupation of jumping-off positions and preparations for the offensive], in Ibid., 163.

27 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 103 k 8 chasam 17 avgusta 1941 g. o zaniatii voiskami fronta iskhodnogo polozheniia dlia nastupleniia” [Operational summary no. 103 of the headquarters of the Western Front at 0800 hours on 17 August 1941 about the occupation of jumping-off positions for the offensive by the forces of the front], in Ibid., 33-34.

28 “Boevoe donesenie shtaba Zapadnogo fronta ot 17 avgusta 1941 g. nachal’niku General’nogo Shtaba

o nachale nastupatel’noi operatsii” [Combat report of the headquarters of the Western Front of 17 August 1941 to the chief of the General Staff about the beginning of the offensive operation], in Ibid., 35.

29 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie shtaba 19-i Armii ot 17 avgusta 1941 g. komandiram 91-i i 50-i Strelkovykh Divizii o vvode v boi vtorykh eshelonov divizii” [Combat order of the headquarters of 19th Army of 17 August 1941 to the commanders of 91st and 50th Rifle Divisions about the commitment into combat of the second echelons of the divisions], in Ibid., 164.

30 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba 19-i Armii No. 0146 k 17 chasam 17 avgusta 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk armii” [Operational summary no. 0146 of the headquarters of 19th Army at 1700 hours on 17 August 1941 about the combat operations of the forces of the army], in Ibid., 164-165.

31 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie komanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo fronta ot 17 avgusta 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami 20-i Armii o vnesenii popravok v reshenie na nastuplenie voisk armii” [Combat order of the commander of the forces of the Western Front of 17 August 1941 to the commander of the forces of 20th Army about corrections in the attack plan of the army’s forces], in Ibid., 36.

32 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 104 k 2000 chasam 17 avgusta 1941 g. o perekhod voisk fronta v nastuplenie i rezul’tatakh boia” [Operational summary no. 104 of the headquarters of the Western Front at 2000 hours on 17 August 1941 about the transition of the front’s forces to the offensive and the results of the fighting], in Ibid., 36-39.

33 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 19-i Armii No. 029 ot 18 avgusta 1941 g. na prodolzhenii nastupleniia s tsel’iu razvitiia uspekha 50-i Strelkovoi Divizii” [Combat order no. 029 of the commander of the forces of 19th Army of 18 August 1941 on a continuation of the offensive with the aim of developing the success of 50th Rifle Division], in Ibid., 165-166.

34 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 20-i Armii No. 56 ot 18 avgusta 1941 o podgotovke voisk armii k nastupleniiu” [Combat order no. 56 of the commander of the forces of 20^h Army about preparations of the forces of the army for an offensive], in Ibid., 213-214.

35 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 105 k 8 chasam 18 avgusta 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary no. 105 of the headquarters of the Western Front at 0800 hours on 18 August 1941 about the combat operations of front’s forces], in Ibid., 40-42.

36 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie komanduiushchego voiskami 19-i Armii ot 18 avgusta 1941 g. o razvitii uspekha v polose 64-i Strelkovoi Divizii” [Combat order of the commander of the forces of 19th Army of 18 August 1941 about the development of success in the sector of 64th Rifle Division], in Ibid., 166.

37 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie nachal’nika shtaba 19-i Armii ot 18 avgusta 1941 g. o priblizhenii komandnykh punktov komandirov divizii k boevym poriadkam nastupaiushchikh voisk” [Combat order of the chief of staff of 19th Army of 18 August 1941 about the commanders of divisions drawing their command posts nearer to the combat formations of their forces], in Ibid., 167.

38 “Boevoe donesenie shtaba 19-i Armii No. 09 ot 18 avgusta 1941 g. nachal’niku shtaba Zapadnogo fronta o khode nastupleniia voisk armii” [Combat report of the headquarters of 19th Army of 18 August 1941 to the chief of staff of the Western Front about the course of the offensive of the army], in Ibid., 168.

39 “Boevye rasporiazheniia shtaba 19-i Armii ot 18 avgusta 1941” [Combat orders of the headquarters of 19th Army of 18 August 1941], in Ibid., 168-170.

40 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie shtaba 20-i Armii No. 2 ot 18 avgusta 1941 komandiram 144, 153, 229-i i 73-i Strelkovykh Divizii ob uderzhanie platsdarma na pravom beregu r. Dnepr” [Combat order no. 2 of the headquarters of 20^h Army of 18 August to the commanders of 144th, 153rd, 229th, and 73rd Rifle Divisions about holding on to the bridgeheads on the right bank of the Dnepr River], in Ibid., 214.

41 “Boevoi rasporiazhenie shtaba 30-i Armii ot 18 avgusta 1941 komandiru 244-i Strelkovoi Divizii o podgotovke divizii k nastupleniiu na Dukhovshchinskom napravlenii” [Combat order of the headquarters of 30th Army of 18 August 1941 to the commander of 244th Rifle Division about the preparation of the division for an attack along the Dukhovshchina axis], in Ibid., 283-284.

42 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba 30-i Armii No. 64 ot 18 avgusta 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk armii” [Operational summary no. 64 of the headquarters of 30th Army of 18 August 1941 about the operations of the forces of the army], in Ibid., 284-285.

43 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 106 k 2000 chasam 18 avgusta 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary no. 106 of the headquarters of the Western Front at 2000 hours on 18 August 1941 about the combat operations of front’s forces], in Ibid., 45-47.

44 “Boevoe donesenie komanduiushchego voiskami 19-i Armii No. 010 ot 19 avgusta 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami Zapadnogo fronta o boevykh deistviiakh voisk armii 18 avgusta i o svoem reshenii na 19 avgusta 1941 g.” [Combat report no. 010 of the commander of 19th Army of 19 August 1941 to the commander of the forces of the Western Front about the combat operations of the forces of the army and about my decision on 19 August 1941], in Ibid., 172-173.

45 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 19-i Armii No. 030 ot 19 avgusta 1941 g. na razvitie nastupleniia s v napravlenii Dukhovshchina” [Combat order no. 030 of the commander of the forces of 19th Army on 19 August 1941 on the development of the offensive toward Dukhovshchina], in Ibid., 171-173.

46 “Boevoe donesenie shtaba 19-i Armii No. 011 ot 19 avgusta 1941 g. nachal’niku shtaba Zapadnogo fronta o perekhod voisk armii v nastuplenie” [Combat report no. 011 of the headquarters of 19th Army of 19 August 1941 to the chief of staff of the Western Front about the transition of the forces of the army to the offensive], in Ibid., 173.

47 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 108 k 2000 chasam 19 avgusta 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary no. 108 of the headquarters of the Western Front at 2000 hours on 19 August 1941 about the combat operations of the front’s forces], in Ibid., 48-50.

48 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 29-i Armii No. 9 ot 19 avgusta 1941 g. na unichtozhenie Il’inskoi gruppirovki protivnika” [Combat order no. 9 of the commander of the forces of 29th Army of 19 August 1941 on the destruction of the enemy Il’ino grouping], in Ibid., 262-263.

49 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 108 k 2000 chasam 19 avgusta 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary no. 108 of the headquarters of the Western Front at 2000 hours on 19 August 1941 about the combat operations of the front’s forces], in Ibid., 48-50.

Chapter 10

1 The Bock Diary, 287.

2 Ibid.

3 “Boevoi prikazy komanduiushchego voiskami 19-i Armii Nos. 031, 032, i 033 ot 20-21 avgusta 1941 g.[Combat orders nos. 031, 032, and 033 of the commander of the forces of 19th Army of 20-21 August 1941], in SBDVOV, Issue 41, 173-178.

4 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 110 k 2000 chasam 20 avgusta 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta v techenie dnia 20 avgusta 1941 g.” [Operational summary no. 110 of the headquarters of the Western Front at 2000 hours on 20 August 1941 about the combat operations of the front’s forces during the day on 20 August], in Ibid., 51-53.

5 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie shtaba Zapadnogo fronta ot 20 avgusta 1941 g. komandiru 1-i Tankovoi Divizii o podgotovke divizii k razvitiiu uspekha 19-i Armii” [Combat order of the headquarters of the Western Front of 20 August 1941 to the commander of 1st Tank Division about preparing the division to develop 19th Army’s success], in Ibid., 50.

6 “Boevoi prikazy komanduiushchego voiskami 19-i Armii Nos. 031, 032, i 033 ot 20-21 avgusta 1941 g.” [Combat orders nos. 031, 032, and 033 of the commander of the forces on 19th Army of 20-21 August 1941], in Ibid., 173-178.

7 “Prikazanie komanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo fronta ot 21 avgusta 1941 g. komanduiushchim voiskami 19-i i 30-i Armii o chastichnoi peregruppirovke voisk” [Order of the commander of the forces of the Western Front of 21 August 1941 to the commanders of 19th and 30th Armies about a partial regrouping], in Ibid., 55.

8 The Bock Diary, 288.

9 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 112 k 2000 chasam 21 avgusta 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary no. 112 of the headquarters of the Western Front at 2000 hours on 21 August 1941 about the combat operations of the front’s forces], in SBDVOV, Issue 41, 55-57.

10 “Boevoi prikazy komanduiushchego voiskami 19-i Armii Nos. 031, 032, i 033 ot 20-21 avgusta 1941 g.[Combat orders nos. 031, 032, and 033 of the commander of the forces of 19th Army of 20-21 August 1941], in Ibid., 173-178.

11 “Boevoe donesenie komanduiushchego voiskami 19-i Armii ot 21 avgusta 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami Zapadnogo fronta o boevykh deistviiakh voisk armii 21 avgusta i reshenii na 22 avgusta 1941 g.” [Combat report of the commander of the forces of 19th Army of 21 August 1941 to the commander of the forces of the Western Front about the combat operations of the forces of the army on 21 August and my decision on 22 August 1941], in Ibid., 178-179.

12 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie komanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo fronta ot 21 avgusta 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami 29-i Armii o utochnenii plan operatsii voisk armii po razgromu Il’inskoi gruppirovki protivnika” [Combat order of the commander of the forces of the Western Front of 21 August 1941 to the commander of the forces of 29th Army about refining the operational plan of the army’s forces for the destruction of the enemy’s Il’ino grouping], in Ibid., 54.

13 Ibid.

14 “Boevye prikazy i rasporiazhenie komanduiushchego voiskami 20-i Armii ot 21-23 avgusta 1941 g.” [Combat orders of the commander of the forces of 20th Army from 21-23 August 1941], in Ibid., 216-220.

15 “Doklad nachal’nika shtaba 19-i Armii ot 22 avgusta 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami Zapadnogo fronta o plane dal’neishego nastupleniia voisk armii” [Report of the chief of staff of 19th Army of 22 August 1941 to the commander of the forces of the Western Front about a plan for a further offensive of the forces of the army], in Ibid., 179-180.

16 “Boevye prikazy i rasporiazhenie komanduiushchego voiskami 20-i Armii ot 21-23 avgusta 1941 g.” [Combat orders of the commander of the forces of 20th Army from 21-23 August 1941], in Ibid., 216-220.

17 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 114 k 2000 chasam 22 avgusta 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta v techenie dnia 22 avgusta 1941 g.” [Operational summary no. 114 of the headquarters of the Western Front at 2000 hours on 22 August 1941 about the combat operations of the front’s forces on 22 August 1941], in Ibid., 58-61.

18 “Boevye prikazy komanduiushchego voiskami 19-i Armii Nos. 031, 032, i 033 ot 20-21 avgusta 1941 g.[Combat orders nos. 031, 032, and 033 of the commander of the forces of 19th Army on 20-21 August 1941], in Ibid., 173-178.

19 “Boevye prikazy komanduiushchego voiskami 19-i Armii Nos. 031, 032, i 033 ot 20-21 avgusta 1941 g.[Combat orders nos. 031, 032, and 033 of the commander of the forces of 19th Army on 20-21 August 1941], in Ibid., 173-178.

20 “Boevye prikazy i doneseniia komanduiushchego voiskami 19-i Armii ot 22-24 avgusta 1941 g [Combat orders and reports of the commander of the forces of 19th Army of 22-24 August 1941], in Ibid., 180-183.

21 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 30-i Armii No. 043 ot 22 avgusta 1941 g. o zakreplenii voisk armii na dostignutom rubezhe i razvitii uspekha noch’iu” [Combat order no. 043 of the commander of the forces of 30th Army of 22 August 1941 about consolidation of the forces of the army along the positions they have reached and the development of success during the night], in Ibid., 288-289.

22 “Boevye prikazy i rasporiazhenie komanduiushchego voiskami 20-i Armii ot 21-23 avgusta 1941 g.” [Combat orders of the commander of the forces of 20th Army from 21-23 August 1941], in Ibid., 216-220.

23 “Prikaz No. 03/op voiskam Zapadnogo fronta ot 23 avgusta 1941 g. ob uspeshnom nastuplenii 19-i Armii v period s 20 po 23 avgusta 1941 g.” [Order no. 03/op to the forces of the Western Front of 23 August 1941 about the successful offensive of 19th Army in the period from 20-23 August 1941], in Ibid., 61-62.

24 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie komanduiushchego voiskami 29-i Armii No. 26 ot 23 avgusta 1941 g. komandiru 252-i Strelkovoi Divizii na oboronu rubezha Krasnye Sosny, Osinovka, Petrovo, Averkovo” [Combat order No. 26 of the commander of the forces of 29th Army of 23 August 1941 to the commander of 252nd Rifle Division on the defense of the Krasnye Sosny, Osinovka, Petrovo, and Averkovo line], in Ibid., 268.

25 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 116 k 2000 chasam 23 avgusta 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary no. 116 of the headquarters of the Western Front at 2000 hours on 23 August 1941 about the combat operations of the front’s forces], in Ibid., 63-66.

26 “Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta No. 118 k 2000 chasam 24 avgusta 1941 g. o boevykh deistviiakh voisk fronta” [Operational summary no. 118 of the headquarters of the Western Front at 2000 hours on 24 August 1941 about the combat operations of the front’s forces], in Ibid., 70-72.

27 “Doklad voennogo soveta 19-i Armii voennomu sovetu Zapadnogo fronta o gruppirovke i boevykh deistviiakh protivnika pered frontom armii v period s 17 po 31 avgusta 1941 g.” [Report of the Military Council of 19th Army to the Military Council of the Western Front about the grouping and combat operations of the enemy before the front of the army during the period from 17 through 31 August 1941], in Ibid., 195-196.

Chapter 11

1 As of 17 July, General Geyer’s IX Army Corps included 137th, 263rd, and 292nd Infantry Divisions, General Materna’s XX Army Corps controlled 129th and 256th Infantry Divisions, and 15th Infantry Division was in OKH’s reserve. All of these infantry divisions were still en route to the Vitebsk and Smolensk regions. After the Germans reshuffled their forces to destroy Group Kachalov, on 8 August IX Army Corps still controlled 137th, 263rd, and 292nd Infantry Divisions, defending the Desna River’s western bank south of El’nia, and XX Army Corps consisted of 15th and 292nd Infantry Divisions, which relieved SS “Das Reich” Division and “Grossdeutschland” Infantry Regiment in the bridgehead. When they did, XX Corps took control of 268th Infantry Division, already in the bridgehead, SS “Das Reich” Division and “Grossdeutschland” Regiment took over the front northwest of El’nia. Completing this complex shuffling of forces, IX Army Corps’ 137th and 263rd Infantry Divisions relieved SS “Das Reich” Division and “Grossdeutschland” Regiment on 18-19 August.

2 For superbly accurate descriptions of the fighting around El’nia from late July through early September, see Boris Kavalerchik, “Srazhenie za El’niu,” in 1941: Zabytye pobedy Krasnoi Armii [1941: Forgotten victories of the Red Army] (Moscow: “IAUZA” “EKSMO,” 2009), 128-183; and Mikhail Lubiagov, Pod El’nei v sorok pervom [At El’nia in forty-one] (Smolensk: “Rusich,” 2005).

3 “Chastnyi boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami Rezervnogo fronta No. 19/op ot 6 avgusta 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami 24-i Armii na unichtozhenie El’ninskoi gruppirovki protivnika” [Individual combat order no 19/op of the commander of the forces of the Reserve Front of 6 August 1941 to the commander of the forces of 24th Army on the destruction of the enemy’s El’nia grouping], in SBDVOV, Issue 37, 171-172.

4 Lubiagov, Pod El’nei v sorok pervom, 229, citing TsAMO [Central Archives of the (Soviet Union’s] Ministry of Defense], f. [fond]. 1087, o. [opus] 1, d. [file], l. [page] 70.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., 249-250, citing TsAMO [Central Archives of the (Soviet Union’s) Ministry of Defense], f. 1087, o. 1, d. 5. l. 75.

7 Ibid., 252.

8 The Bock Diary, 281.

9 The Halder Diary, 508.

10 See Kavalerchik, “Srazhenie za El’niu,” 150.

11 “Direktiva Stavki VGK No. 001043 komanduiushchemu voiskami Rezervnogo fronta ob izmeneniakh v plane operatsii pod El’nei” [Stavka VGK directive no. 001043 to the commander of the forces of the Reserve Front about changes in the plan of operations at El’nia], in Zolotarev, “Stavka VGK 1941,” 118.

12 Lubiagov, Pod El’nei v sorok pervom, 248, 261, 276-277, 284-285, 304, 311-313, 322, citing TsAMO [Central Archives of the (Soviet Union’s) Ministry of Defense], f. 1087, o. 1, d. 5., l. 75-98, 124.

13 “Boevoe donesenie komanduiushchego voiskami Rezervnogo fronta Verkhovnomu Glavnokomanduiushchemu o khode operatsii v raione El’ni” [Combat report of the commander of the forces of the Reserve Front to the Supreme High Commander about the course of operations in the El’nia region], in Zolotarev, Stavka VGK 1941,” 363-364.

14 Kavalerchik, “Srazhenie za El’niu,” 142.

15 Timothy A. Wray, “Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front During World War II,” Research Survey No. 5 (For Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1986), 47.

16 See The Halder Diary, 514-515, which cites the directive as WFST I. No. 441 412/41; and The Bock Diary, 289-290.

17 The Halder Diary, 515.

18 Ibid.

19 The Bock Diary, 219.

20 Ibid.

21 AOK 9, KTB; Pz AOK 3, KTB for the period. Hoth took command of the Ninth Army on 5 August after Strauss fell ill. See also, Bock Diary, 273-274.

22 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie komanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo fronta ot 18 avgusta 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami 22-i Armii o vnesenii popravok v plan nastupleniia voisk armii” [Combat order of the commander of the forces of the Western Front of 18 August 1941 to the commander of the forces of 22nd Army about corrections in the attack plan of the army’s forces], in SBDVOV, Issue 41, 40.

23 “Boevye prikazy komanduiushchego voiskami 22-i Armii ot 19 avgusta 1941 g.” [Combat orders of the commander of the forces of 22nd Army of 19 August 1941], in Ibid., 235-237.

24 “Spravka razvedyvatel’nogo otdela shtaba 22-i Armii o gruppirovke i deistviiakh protivostoiashchego protivnika s 20 po 23 avgusta 1941 g.” [Information from the Reconnaissance Department of the headquarters of 22nd Army about the grouping and actions of the opposing enemy from 20 through 23 August 1941], in Ibid., 239.

25 Ibid.

26 “Boevoe donesenie shtaba Zapadnogo fronta ot 23 avgusta 1941 g. nachal’niku General’nogo Shtaba o priniatykh merakh po likvidatsii proryva protivnika v polose oborony 186-i Strelkovoi Divizii” [Combat report of the headquarters of the Western Front of 23 August 1941 to the chief of the General Staff about measures taken for the liquidation of the enemy penetration in the defensive sector of 186th Rifle Division], in Ibid., 62-63.

27 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie komanduiushchego voiskami Zapadnogo fronta ot 23 avgusta 1941 g. komanduiushchemu voiskami 22-i Armii o uderzhanie zanimaemogo rubezha” [Combat order of the commander of the forces of the Western Front of 23 August 1941 to the commander of the forces of 22nd Army about holding on to the positions we occupy], in Ibid., 63.

28 “Chastnyi boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 29-i Armii No. 6 ot 23 avgusta 1941 g. komandiru svodnogo otriada na oboronu rubezha Toropets, r. Toropa, Staraia Toropa, (incl.) Luk’ianovo” [Individual combat order of the commander of the forces of 29th Army no. 6 of 23 August 1941 to the commander of the composite detachment on the defense of the Toropets, Toropa River, Staraia Toropa, and (incl.) Luk’ianovo line], in Ibid., 269.

29 “Boevoe rasporiazhenie komanduiushchego voiskami 29-i Armii ot 24 avgusta 1941 g. nachal’nikam garnizonov Toropets i Staraia Toropa ob organizatsii oborony etikh punktov” [Combat order of the commander of the forces of 29th Army of 24 August 1941 to the chiefs of the garrisons of Toropets and Staraia Toropa about the organization of the defenses of these points], in Ibid., 270.

30 “Zapis’ peregovora nachal’nika shtaba Zapadnogo fronta s nachal’nikom operativnogo otdela shtaba 22-i Armii 24 avgusta 1941 g. o polozhenii voisk armii” [Notes of a conversation of the chief of staff of the Western Front with the chief of the Operations Department of the headquarters of 22nd Army on 24 August 1941 about the situation of the forces of the army], in Ibid., 68-69.

31 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 22-i Armii No. 18 ot 24 avgusta 1941 g. na otvod voisk armii na rubezh Zadorozh’e, Mishovo, Pleshkovo, Begunovo” [Combat order of the commander of the forces of 22nd Army no. 18 of 24 August 1941 on a withdrawal of the forces of the army to the Zadorozh’e, Mishnovo, Pleshkovo, and Begunovo line], in Ibid., 240-241.

32 “Zapis’ peregovora nachal’nika shtaba Zapadnogo fronta s nachal’nikom operativnogo otdela shtaba 22-i Armii 24 avgusta 1941 g. o reshenii komanduiushchego armiei na nastuplenie i gruppirovke voisk protivnika” [Notes of a conversation of the chief of staff of the Western Front with the chief of the Operations Department of the headquarters of 22nd Army on 24 August 1941 about the decision of the commander of the army and the grouping of enemy forces], in Ibid., 73-74.

33 “Boevoe donesenie shtaba Zapadnogo fronta ot 24 avgusta 1941 g nachal’niku General’nogo shtaba ob obstanovke i plane dal’neishego nastupleniia voisk 22-i armii” [Combat report of the headquarters of the Western Front of 24 August 1941 to the chief of the General Staff about the situation and a plan for the further offensive by the forces of 22nd Army], in Ibid., 69-70.

34 “Boevoi prikaz komanduiushchego voiskami 29-i Armii No. 11 ot 25 avgusta 1941 g. ob usilenii oborony na Rzhevskom napravlenii” [Combat order of the commander of the forces of 29th Army no. 11 of 25 August 1941 about strengthening the defenses along the Rzhev axis], in Ibid., 270-271.

35 “Dokladnaia zapiska Voennogo Soveta 22-i Armii Voennomu Sovetu Zapadnaia fronta o boevykh deistviiakh armii na Velikolukskom i Toropetskom napravleniakh s 21 po 25 avgusta 1941 g.” [Report of the Military Council of 22nd Army to the Military Council of the Western Front about the combat operations of the army along the Velikie Luki and Toropets axes from 21 through 25 August 1941], in Ibid., 241-244.

Chapter 12

1 In brief, these “rows” of armies included five in late June and early July (16th, 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd), twelve in mid- and late July (24th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 34th, 35th (renumbered 49th), 43rd, 53rd, and 57th), three in early October (5th, 49th, and 50th), and ten in November and early December (10th, 26th, 39th, 56th, 57th, 58th, 59th, 60th, 61st, and 1st Shock). See Glantz, Colossus Reborn.

2 The Bock Diary, 271 and 281.

3 Ibid, 292-293.

4 The Halder Diary, 493 and 519.