According to a report by Colonel Argunov, 13th Army is withdrawing to occupy a defensive line along the Sudost’ River [running through Pochep from south to north].

In connection with the threat created from the direction of Starodub, I draw your special attention to protecting the boundary with the Central Front.

The right wing of the Central Front’s 21st Army is withdrawing to the Luzhki, Lobanovka, and Zamyshevo line [eastward south of Gomel’]. In this regard, 13th Army will withdraw to the Solovo, Borshchevo, and Pogar line and further along the Sudost’ River. Keep the front’s reserve behind the boundary.

2. Report fulfillment.²⁶

Shaposhnikov sent the second directives at precisely the same time:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix N, 7.

1. In connection with the situation at Starodub and the gap that has been created with the Briansk Front’s left wing, 21st Army will withdraw to the Luzhki, Lobanovka, Zamyshevo, and Novoe Mesto front and further along the Iput’ River and Sozh River to Babovichi.

The Briansk Front’s 13th Army will withdraw to the Solovo, Borshchevo, and Pogar front and further along the Sudost’ River.

2. Pay attention to protecting the boundary between 21st and 3rd Armies, for which you will situate 3rd Army’s right flank on the western bank of the Uza River from Babovichi to Teleshi and further to Chernoe. Additionally, keep your reserve behind the boundary.

3. Report fulfillment.²⁷

See Map 69. Armeegruppe Guderian’s and Second Army’s advance, 21 August 1941.

Meanwhile, sealing Central Front’s fate, Geyr’s motorized corps completed constructing a line of imposing blocking positions late on 21 August. Model’s 3rd Panzer Division consolidated its positions around Starodub, Langermann’s 4th Panzer Division closed into positions in Model’s rear, and Löper’s 10th Motorized Division Army’s captured Klintsy and erected a virtually solid armored screen extending northward to block any withdrawal by 21st Army’s forces to the east. Roughly 10 kilometers to the east, Model’s and Langermann’s panzer divisions established a second and far more impregnable barrier of armor facing west from Starodub northward to Mglin to back up 10th Motorized Division. Still further to the east, Lemelsen’s XXXXVII Motorized Corps protected the left flank and rear of Geyr’s motorized corps with Thoma’s 17th Panzer Division, whose reconnaissance elements now spread southeastward from Pochep toward Trubchevsk on the Desna River.

The consequences of the seizure of Gomel’ by Weichs’ Second Army were indeed far reaching. Soon, Weichs’ army reported capturing more than 50,000 Red Army soldiers, almost 500 guns, and more than 100 tanks and tractors.²⁸ Together with Second Army’s share of the successful encirclement at Krichev, this brought the total “bag” of prisoners and booty seized by the army since 14 August to 78,000 prisoners, 700 guns, and 144 tanks.²⁹ Weichs’ casualties during the same period amounted to 5,190 officers and men, including 1,468 killed in action, 3,367 wounded, and 355 missing. From Hitler’s perspective, this certainly confirmed the wisdom of his Directive No. 34.