Because of the incessant heavy fighting around the bridgehead, Guderian’s temporary Armeegruppe, which was responsible for operations in the El’nia sector until Fourth Army took control on 26 August, retained XXXXVI Motorized Corps’ 10th and 18th Panzer Divisions in assembly areas west of the Desna River and El’nia to rest and refit their forces and, if necessary, back up Materna’s infantry in the bridgehead. However, as the focal point of Guderian’s forces shifted steadily southward throughout the month, 18th Panzer Division also gravitated southward under XXXXVII Motorized Corps’ control, leaving only 10th Panzer Division to back up German forces in the bridgehead after 18 August. SS “Das Reich” Division also shifted southward after it turned its sector northwest of El’nia over to IX Army Corps’ 263rd and 137th Infantry Divisions on 18-19 August.
On 8 August, the northwestern flank of the El’nia salient, specifically, the 35-kilometer-wide sector extending from the village of Mitino, 11 kilometers north-northwest of El’nia, northwestward to the Dnepr River, 2 kilometers south of Ratchino, was defended by 17th Panzer Division and part of 29th Motorized Division. However, by 10 August, these forces were relieved by SS “Das Reich” Division, which took control of the 22-kilometer-wide sector from Mitino northwestward to Klemiatino, and “Grossdeutschland” Infantry Regiment, which took control of the 15-kilometer-wide sector from Klemiatino to the Dnepr River. This defensive line was vital because it protected the approaches to the Smolensk-El’nia railroad line, situated only 10 kilometers to the south. Quite naturally, this vital railroad line and the clusters of villages and towns to the north became prime objectives for Lukin’s 20th Army, which defended the Western Front’s extreme left flank and was responsible for maintaining close contact with General Rakutin’s 24th Army, which defended the extreme right wing of Zhukov’s Reserve Front and was responsible for containing and destroying German forces in the El’nia bridgehead.
During the entire period from 8-24 August, the divisions of Lukin’s 20th Army repeatedly attacked the most important towns and villages north of the railroad, in particular, Mileevo, Klemiatino, Bereznia, and Kolodezi, as its forces struggled to break through the German defenses and reach the Smolensk-El’nia railroad line. 20th Army’s objective was to cut the railroad line by seizing Pridneprovskaia Station, on the eastern bank of the Dnepr River, 32 kilometers southeast of Smolensk, and Dobromino Station, 10 kilometers further toward the southeast. Understandably, Lukin’s forces tried to coordinate their assaults with those of Rakutin’s 24th Army against the German bridgehead at El’nia. However, most of these attempts to coordinate operations proved unsuccessful.
On the southern flank of the El’nia bridgehead, the left wing of the Reserve Front’s 24th Army and 43rd Army manned defenses which ran southward along the Desna River’s eastern bank to the bridge where the Roslavl’-Spas-Demensk railroad line crossed the river and then southwestward to tie in with the defenses on the Central Front’s right flank south of Roslavl’. After Armeegruppe Guderian’s forces captured the Roslavl’ region in the first week of August and then marched southward in mid-August, forcing the Central Front’s forces to withdraw southward, the Reserve Front had no choice but to extend the defenses on its left wing inexorably southward along the Desna River’s eastern bank, ultimately to the city of Zhukovka, 50 kilometers northwest of Briansk.
As for the opposing forces in and around the El’nia bridgehead, the quality of the troops and the nature of their weaponry were roughly similar to the opposing forces in other sectors of the front. While XX Army Corps’ infantry divisions were well-equipped formations manned largely by combat veterans, the opposing Red Army divisions were recently mobilized, partially-trained, and often poorly equipped rifle formations stiffened somewhat by under-gunned tank and motorized divisions left over from the defeated or disbanded pre-war Soviet mechanized corps.
As of 30 July, General Rakutin’s 24th Army consisted of nine rifle divisions (19th, 100th, 107th, 110th, 120th, 133rd, 178th, 194th Mountain and 248th) and three supposedly mobile divisions (103rd and 106th Motorized, and 102nd Tank), backed up by 4th and 6th People’s Militia Divisions (divizii narodnogo opolcheniia or DNO), which were made up largely of poorly-trained workers’ militiamen from the city of Moscow. By 1 September, however, Rakutin’s army would lose 194th and 248th Rifle Divisions and 4th DNO to 49th Army, 133rd Rifle Division to the front’s reserve, and 178th Rifle Division to 29th Army, while receiving in return 303rd and 309th Rifle Divisions raised in the Orel Military District and 105th Tank Division from 43rd Army. Although most of these divisions were at or near full personnel strength, those that fought in the El’nia region prior to 8 August had already suffered losses.
The Soviets conducted their initial attacks against the El’nia bridgehead during the last week of July and first week of August, first, to reinforce the offensive by Western Front’s shock groups toward Smolensk and, later, to assist Group Kachalov and, if possible, prevent its destruction (see “The Stavka Regroups,” above). After being assigned command of the Reserve Front on 30 July, General Zhukov sharply criticized 24th Army’s previous offensive efforts and began organizing a new offensive to eliminate the bridgehead. Pressed by Stalin and the Stavka, after Rakutin’s forces once again failed to dent the Germans’ defenses in several days of fighting during the first week of the month, on 6 August Zhukov ordered Rakutin’s 24th Army to eliminate the El’nia bridgehead once and for all. To help it do so, he reinforced 24th Army with the more experienced 100th and 107th Rifle Divisions from the Western Front and aviation units from the Stavka’s Reserve.
See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendices M, 3 and 4.
The objective of Rakutin’s assault, originally planned for 7 August but ultimately postponed to 8 August, was to “destroy the enemy’s El’nia grouping, reach the Dobromino Station, Berniki, Babarykin, Kholm, Staroe Shcherbino, and Svetilovo line [35 kilometers northeast of El’nia to the Desna River 25 kilometers south of El’nia], and link up with the Western Front’s left wing in the vicinity of Dobromino Station.” To support Rakutin’s offensive, 73rd, 161st, and 129th Rifle Divisions of Lukin’s 20th Army were to assault the defenses of “Grossdeutschland” Regiment and SS “Das Reich” Division along the entire front from northwest of El’nia to the Dnepr River. The forces and missions assigned to 24th Army’s shock groups included:
| • | Operational Groups’ Mission (107th, 100th, 103rd, 19th, and 120th RDs, 106th MD, and 105th and 102nd TDs, reinforced by a company of T-34 tanks, 184 combat aircraft, and 275th and 488th CARS and 573rd and 305th GARs) – conduct the main attack from the Dubovezh’e and Ushakovo region [13 kilometers north-northwest to 11 kilometers north of El’nia]. |
| • | Main Shock Group’s Mission (107th RD, 102nd TD, and 100th and 103rd RDs) |
| ♦ | Attack southward from the Dubovezh’e region [12 kilometers north-northwest of El’nia], seize the Bezzabot State Farm, Novoselovka, Tishovo, Kharnia, and Leonovo line [15 kilometers northwest to 10 kilometers southwest of El’nia], and defend that line to prevent enemy forces from penetrating toward El’nia from the west. |
| ♦ | After liquidating enemy forces in El’nia, advance westward to the Dobromino Station, Berniki, and Staroe Shcherbino line [35 kilometers west to 20 kilometers southwest of El’nia], dispatch reinforced detachments westward into the Svetilovo and Shat’kova region by day’s end on 7 August, protect your left flank, and link up with the right flank of Western Front’s 53rd Rifle Division. |
| • | Missions of Subordinates: |
| ♦ | 107th RD (with 102nd TD and two reinforcing artillery regiments) – attack from the Dubovezh’e and Ivanovskie Farm region [12 kilometers north-northwest of El’nia] southward toward Viazovka, Gur’evo, Lysovka, and Leonidovo [7 kilometers west of El’nia]. |
| ♦ | 100th RD (with 10 T-34 tanks) – attack from the Bykovo and Ustinovo line [11 kilometers north-northwest of El’nia] southward toward Chantsovo [7 kilometers northwest of El’nia] and the northwestern outskirts of El’nia. |
| ♦ | 103rd RD – attack from the Ushakovo and Lavrovo line [10 kilometers north of El’nia] southward through Petrianino and Sofievka toward the northern outskirts of El’nia. |
| ♦ | 19th and 120th RDs and 105th TD – attack the eastern and southeastern flank of the bridgehead defenses and advance toward the southeastern part of El’nia. |
| ♦ | 106th MD – attack from the Mal’tsevo and Bol’shaia Lipnia line [10 kilometers south of El’nia] northward toward Bitiakovka and Leonidovo [7 kilometers southwest and west of El’nia].3 |
Thus, Rakutin’s plan called for his main shock group to attack from north and northwest of El’nia and advance southward to envelop the city from the west, while also creating an inner encirclement line to destroy the encircled forces and an outer encirclement line to halt any interference from German reserves. The problem was that Rakutin’s shock group had to attack into the teeth of SS “Das Reich” Motorized and 15th Infantry Divisions’ defenses north and northwest of the city. Given the difficulties already experienced in assaults against well-prepared German defenses, the results were predictable.
Attacking at dawn on 8 August, the 20th Army’s 73rd, 161st, and 129th Rifle Divisions assaulting on 24th Army’s right advanced 2-5 kilometers in three days of intense fighting. At a cost of very heavy casualties on both sides, the three divisions captured the villages of Kolodezi, Bereznia, and Mileevo from “Grossdeutschland” Regiment and SS “Das Reich” Division. To the east, however, despite herculean efforts, 24th Army’s shock group seized only a small sector (roughly 500 meters square) of 15th Infantry Division’s defenses due east of Ushakovo. Therefore, at the end of the first day of fighting, Rakutin issue a scathing order to his subordinate division commanders criticizing their lackluster performance:
See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix P, 1.
To the commanders of 107th, 100th, 102nd, and 19th Rifle Divisions
1. Combat during the first half of 8 August 1941 demonstrated that, in spite of our clear superiority, especially in the sectors of 107th and 100th RDs, the advance by our units was extremely slow. In two hours of fighting, 107th RD advanced 2 kilometers and 100th RD approximately 1.5-2 kilometers in three hours. The remaining divisions are marking time in place and, while not moving forward, with countless complaints about intense enemy fire.
2. The infantry are not exploiting the artillery fire in order to move forward rapidly, and the artillery, while firing many rounds, are having little effect.
3. The infantry artillerymen are firing at blank spaces. Eliminate all of the shortcomings noted above.4
The same day, Rakutin’s military commissar, N. I. Ivanov, underscored the many problems 24th Army was experiencing in a message he dispatched to the military commissar of 107th Rifle Division and the head of 106th Motorized Division’s political section, which described numerous disciplinary problems and established a pattern of warning and punishment that would endure for days, if not weeks:
In 106th MD’s units, during the period from 31 July through 8 August 1941, 45 men have been tried by military tribunal, of which 32 were tried for self-mutilation, 10 for desertion, 2 for violating security regulations, and 1 for negligence toward military service. I demand you establish such a high spirit of Soviet patriotism and soldierly duty that there will be no place for or any instances of violation of discipline, desertion, crimes, or self-mutilation.5
Capping this criticism, front commander Zhukov, who resolved to end these problems once and for all by whatever measures necessary, issued an order of his own the following day lambasting the army’s division commanders for gross neglect if not outright incompetence:
See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix P, 2.
To the commanders of 19th, 100th, 102nd, 103rd, 106th, 107th, and 120th Rifle Divisions
The combat practices employed in the El’nia region demonstrate that, in addition to heroic commanders and commissars, we have commanders and commissars who, during the three days of the offensive, did not advance a single kilometer. Such commanders usually use strong [enemy] mortar and automatic weapons fire and heavy bombing by enemy aircraft to excuse their inactivity and their failure to fulfill combat orders, and naïve senior commanders and commissars react liberally to such commanders and, up to this time, however strange it may be, they consider marking time in place and a failure to fulfill orders about advancing to a designated region a usual matter, and the guilty commanders and commissars bear no kind of responsibility.
Unfortunately, there are those commanders who, having reached a line, withdraw to their jumping-off positions without any sort of permission and, the next morning, once again begin to attack a point which was abandoned by them the previous evening without any basis.
I DEMAND:
1. You make all platoon, company, battalion, and unit [regiments] commanders aware of the fact that any marking time in place and any failure to fulfill orders about advancing forward will be viewed as a display of cowardice and a failure to fulfill orders, with all the resulting consequences.
2. You conduct the struggle most decisively – do not stop at extreme measures – with all commanders and commissars who liberally tolerate subunit commanders who mark time in place or fail to fulfill orders about advancing forward to their designated line because of selfish motives or fear of losses.
3. You make all commanders and commissars who mark time in place with their units for several days aware that, in fierce combat, it is far better to suffer losses and achieve your mission than not to achieve any sort of aims and suffer losses every day by marking time in place from day to day under enemy fire.
4. You report to me personally about what you have done to fulfill these instructions through the commander of 24th Army, Comrade Rakutin.
The commander of the Reserve Front, Army Commander Zhukov6
Most important, this message expressed principles that would guide Zhukov throughout his entire wartime career – the simple belief that, “In fierce combat, it is far better to suffer losses and achieve your mission than not to achieve any sort of aims and suffer losses every day by marking time in place from day to day under enemy fire.” In fact, Zhukov’s application of this principle at Leningrad and Moscow in September and November 1941, at Stalingrad in August and September 1942, to a lesser extent, at Kursk in July 1943, and along the Oder River east of Berlin in April 1945, while resulting in heavy losses, would indeed produce great strategic victories.
See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix Q, 4, for examples of 24th Army’s daily orders and Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix P, 3.
In the meantime, at Zhukov’s direction, Rakutin’s army continued its assaults virtually every day from 12 through 20 August, scarcely ever modifying the army’s missions, but constantly shuffling forces, reprimanding and replacing commanders and commissars, and reducing others in rank, sending them to command combat units at ever lower levels. Rakutin and Zhukov illustrated this liberal use of threats, warnings, and demotions in orders they issued to their forces on 10 and 11 August, respectively:
10 August – Zhukov, the Commander of the Reserve Front
Lieutenant Colonel Gruzdev, the former chief of staff of 100th RD, having displayed confusion and inactivity, is transferred to command a regiment…. [Gruzdev was demoted to command 85th RR on 11 August]
I am announcing a reprimand to the commander of 100th RD, Major General Russianov, and the commissar of 100th RD, Senior Battalion Commissar, Comrade Filiashkin, for failing to fulfill my orders and am warning that, if the division does not fulfill its assigned mission on 11 and 12 August, I will consider the matter of relieving them of their duties and turning them over for judgment [to a military tribunal].
11 August 1941 – Rakutin, the Commander of 24th Army
The 100th RD achieved no success over the course of 7, 9, and 10 August. The division marked time in place, and, as a result, frustrated the group of forces’ fulfillment of its overall operational mission. The division commander failed to organize forward movement, failed to organize the struggle with deserters and panic mongers, and obscenely treated this phenomena in 331st RR and 85th RR too liberally.7
See Maps 100 and 101. The situation at El’nia, 11 and 14 August 1941.
24th Army’s shock groups, driven on relentlessly by Rakutin and Zhukov, advanced only 1-4 kilometers into the Germans’ defenses from 12-14 August and suffered heavy losses in the heavy fighting. For example, 107th and 100th Rifle and 102nd Tank Divisions, attacking near the boundary between SS “Das Reich” and 15th Infantry Divisions, 15-20 kilometers northwest of El’nia, penetrated up to 4 kilometers and seized the villages of Gorovitsy, Luginovo, and Novoe Brykino during this period. However, 24th Army’s other divisions failed to even dent the German perimeter defenses elsewhere around the El’nia bridgehead. Underscoring the intensity of the fighting, although it lost no ground, German 15th Infantry Division lost 15 officers killed and another 20 wounded and probably several hundreds of its infantrymen in these battles. However, 24th Army’s shock group suffered even greater attrition, in particular, the attacking 107th and 100th Rifle and 102nd Tank Divisions.
By mid-August, the heavy losses suffered by XX Army Corps’ divisions prompted General Materna, the corps’ commander, to turn to Guderian for help. As army group commander Bock recorded in his dairy late on 14 August, General Materna informed him, “He had only one battalion in reserve,” and “El’nia could not be held in the long term.”8 From his vantage point in the OKH, General Halder confided to his diary, “I warned Greiffenberg [Army Group Center’s chief of staff] against abandoning Yelnya. No matter how badly off our troops are, it is even worse for the enemy.”9
After several intense discussions between XX Corps and Armeegruppe Guderian’s headquarters, on 15 August Guderian promised to relieve the beleaguered SS “Das Reich” Division and “Grossdeutschland” Regiment with IX Army Corps’ 263rd and 137th Infantry Divisions and replace XX Army Corps’ severely worn-down 15th Infantry Division in the bridgehead proper with the fresher 78th Infantry Division. By this time, SS “Das Reich” Division had repelled 83 separate Soviet attacks and delivered 27 counterattacks of its own during the previous four weeks, and 15th Infantry Division had lost 2,254 soldiers and 97 officers, most of them from its combat units, just in the previous week’s fighting.10 Accordingly, IX Corps’ 263rd and 137th Divisions conducted their relief operation overnight on 18-19 August, and 78th Division its relief on the nights of 20-21 and 21-22 August. All the while, Lukin’s 20th and Rakutin’s 24th Armies continued their relentless but futile assaults whenever and wherever thought feasible.
See Maps 102 and 103. The situation at El’nia, 18-19 August and 21-22 August.