After these two days of intense fighting, N. A. Bulganin, Timoshenko’s commissar, correctly informed Stalin on 20 July, “During the course of 17 and 18 July, separate regions of the city changed hands as a result of heavy fighting. The enemy occupied the greater part of the city by the morning of 19 July. Attacks by our forces on 19 July once again seized the northwestern part of the city.”⁵⁹

The same day, a mollified Stalin discussed the situation with Timoshenko by secure telephone, recommending his commander organize even more decisive offensive action than before. Understandably, Timoshenko agreed:

Stalin – is on the phone. Hello. Up to this time, you have usually thrown in two or three divisions at a time to help the front and, in the meantime, nothing important has come of it. Is it not time to turn away from such tactics and to begin to create fists of seven to eight divisions with cavalry on the flanks? Choose the axis and force the enemy to regroup his forces in accordance with the will of our commands. For example, would it be possible to form [a group] for a time of three divisions of Khomenko, three divisions from Orel, and one tank division which is already fighting at Iartsevo, and add one motorized division and perhaps another two-three divisions from the reserve armies, augment this with one cavalry division, and direct this entire group toward the Smolensk region in order to smash and knock the enemy out of that region and drive them back beyond Orsha? I think that the time has arrived for us to turn away from hairsplitting [narrow pedantry] to operations by large groups. That is all.

Timoshenko – I think that implementation of the concept expressed by you will be correct; moreover, the latest information says that the enemy is operating northwestward – toward Iartsevo with all of the forces of his tank units and motorized divisions along the Smolensk axis and, all the same, the main group of tanks – toward El’nia, while directly blockading Smolensk with tanks and motorized infantry. And, certainly, a threat has been created to Smolensk and along the narrow front immediately at Iartsevo. The attack recommended by you, that is, a powerful blow namely on Smolensk without a large envelopment, could turn out to be decisively to our benefit. Over.⁶⁰

This conversation clearly indicated that, while he wanted to recapture Smolensk, Stalin was now shifting his attention from the combat in the city proper and the adjacent encirclement pocket to the far broader front separating Kurochkin’s and Lukin’s armies from the main forces of Timoshenko’s Western Front.

Despite Stalin’s new fixation on offensive operations, the fighting in Smolensk and the adjacent pocket intensified right through month’s end and involved the forces indicated in Table 11.

Table 11. Opposing Forces in the Struggle for the Smolensk Pocket, 19-23 July 1941

Sector	German	Soviet
Western	V Army Corps’ 5th and 35th Infantry Divisions and VIII Army Corps’ 268th Infantry Division by 23 July	16th Army’s 152nd Rifle Division and 20th Army’s 73rd, 144th, 229th, and 233rd Rifle Divisions and 5th Mechanized Corps
Northern	XXXIX Motorized Corps’ 12th Panzer and 20th Motorized Divisions and XX Army Corps’ 129th Infantry Division after 26 July.	16th Army’s 46th Rifle Division
Eastern	XXXIX Motorized Corps’ 7th Panzer Division and SS “Das Reich” Motorized Division by 23 July.	Remnants of 19th Army
Southern	XXXXVII Motorized Corps’ 17th, and 18th Panzer Divisions and 29th Motorized Division and IX Army Corps’ 137th Infantry Division and Fourth Army’s 5th Machine Gun Battalion by 23 July	16th Army’s 17th and 57th Tank Divisions, 129th Rifle Division, with part of 46th Rifle Division, and 34th Rifle Corps’ 127th and 158th Rifle Divisions

After the first few days of the battle for Smolensk city, Kurochkin, the commander of 20th Army whom Timoshenko entrusted with controlling all of the forces in the pocket, began regrouping his forces, primarily to recapture Smolensk and maintain contact with Group Rokossovsky to the east. Therefore, Kurochkin ordered Lukin, the commander of 16th Army, who was responsible for conducting the assault on Smolensk, to turn his sector west and north of Smolensk to 20th Army, and, after their relief, to use 152nd and 46th Rifle Divisions to reinforce his shock groups attacking the city.

Although this regrouping took time because most of these forces were in contact with the advancing Germans, Lukin managed to throw 152nd Rifle Division into the fight for Smolensk on 20 July. The combat orders and reports of 16th Army on 20 and 21 July and the same army’s operational summary late on 21 July describe the process and the effects.

See Map 19. The situation, 2300, 20 July 1941 and see Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix F, 7, 8, and 10.

2000 hours on 20 July – 16th Army’s combat report

•	Enemy – deployed along the Smolensk, Donets, Kholm, and Demidov front [along the southern bank of the Dnepr River to 25 kilometers west of Smolensk, 30 kilometers northwest of Smolensk, 35 kilometers north of Smolensk, and along the northern outskirts of Smolensk], with at least one motorized division and two-three tank battalions, not counting the forces opposing 34th RC’s 127th and 158th RDs southeast of Smolensk.
•	16th Army – defending in the north and attacking Smolensk in the south.
•	32nd RC – three motor-mechanized battalions of 46th RD repelled enemy counterattacks with tanks and infantry on trucks, supported by aircraft, withdrew its right wing to the Opol’e region [30 kilometers north-northwest of Smolensk] and its left wing to Peresudy Station [15 kilometers southeast of Demidov and 50 kilometers north-northeast of Smolensk], and now faces up to two and one half enemy motorized infantry battalions and four tank companies.
•	152nd RD – defending the Alfimovo, Buda, and Katyn’ Station line at 1200 hours, but ordered to turn sector over to 20th Army and regroup to Muk and Iatsinino [5-7 kilometers northwest and north-northwest of Smolensk] to join 129th RD’s attack on the city, and engaged small enemy reconnaissance groups on its right wing and two battalions of enemy motorized infantry and up to a battalion of artillery brought up to the Borovaia region (on the southern bank of the Dnepr River).
•	129th RD (four battalions) – attacking Smolensk from the north, seized the airfield with its left wing and reached the Chernichka River, but facing two battalions of enemy motorized infantry with tanks, supported by massed mortar and automatic weapons fire and “impudently” operating aircraft.
•	Comments – experiencing shortages of food, ammunition, and radios, complicating command and control, and medical support “not as it should be.” Commander prohibited use of stragglers because “it has a negative influence on the combat steadfastness of the subunits.”61

0145 hours on 21 July – 16th Army’s combat order

•	16th Army – attacked toward Smolensk from the north at 0100 hours on 21 July, with 19th Army to attack southeastward and southward from the Dresna, Bublevka, and Shabanova line [5-10 kilometers southeast of Smolensk] at 0500 hours.62

2000 hours on 21 July 1941 – 16th Army’s operational summary

•	16th Army – after attacking toward Smolensk at 0100 hours on 21 July, conducting sustained street fighting for the northern part of the city all day, separate detachments engaged enemy tanks at Syro-Lipki [35 kilometers southeast of 30 kilometers and north of Smolensk] and repelled enemy attacks southeastward from Demidov, and the attack by 127th and 158th RDs of 19th Army’s 34th RC against the southern and southeastern outskirts of Smolensk failed because it was organized too late.
•	46th RD (three composite detachments) – defending the Syro-Lipki region, with two detachments encircling the enemy in Syro-Lipki region by day’s end and the third detachment, which attacked the enemy’s Demidov grouping, reaching the woods near Peresudy Station [15 kilometers southeast of Demidov and 50 kilometers north-northeast of Smolensk].
•	152nd RD – conducting sustained street fighting in the northwestern outskirts of Smolensk, with 480th RR (less one battalion) capturing Smolensk Station and advancing 1 kilometer toward the city’s center and 544th RR reaching the Dnepr River.
•	129th RD (four under-strength battalions) – attacking the northern part of Smolensk at 0100 hours, with 343rd RR (330 men) at the road junction 1 kilometer north of Smolensk, and 457th RR (470 men) on the northern slope of Hill 251.9.
•	Comments – personnel losses have reached 40%.63