When the encirclement battle at Nevel’ ended on 23 July, Army Group North’s Sixteenth Army reported it had captured 12,500 prisoners and destroyed or dispersed the bulk of one tank, three motorized, and 13 rifle divisions, an overall “bag” of 17 divisions. In addition, Sixteenth Army’s II Army Corps claimed it captured another 10,000 Red Army soldiers between Nevel’ and Bezhanitsy [90 kilometers north-northwest of Velikie Luki]. By this time, the Soviets’ combat casualties probably equaled the number of soldiers captured, meaning a total loss of 50,000 soldiers, counting those lost by Berzarin’s 27th Army. Correctly concluding that he had eliminated the threat to the Sixteenth Army’s right wing, Leeb now began wheeling Busch’s Sixteenth Army northward toward Leningrad.²⁵ Even in defeat, however, the Soviets had not lost their sting. If only as a reminder of their determination, Soviet aircraft bombed Sixteenth Army’s headquarters shortly before noon on 25 July, just as Busch was moving his staff from Pustoshka northward to Dedovichi, killing three men and wounding five more.²⁶

By 27 July Ershakov’s 22nd Army had reorganized its defenses along a line extending along the Lovat’ River through Velikie Luki to Lake Dvin’e, 45 kilometers to the southeast, with the mission of “holding on to Velikie Luki at all cost”:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix I, 3.

To the commanders of 29th and 62nd Rifle Corps, with a copy to Major General Silkin (through the commander of 29th Rifle Corps)

The commander-in-chief, under the signatures of Timoshenko and Shaposhnikov, once again confirms, “Hold on to Velikie Luki come what may. Liquidate the penetration by the enemy on the flank.”

I demand greater steadfastness in the defense of their positions on the part of corps and division commanders.

Do not permit withdrawals without orders.

I am making General Samokhin [Major General Aleksandr Georgievich Samokhin, 29th RC’s commander] and Commissar Danilov personally responsible for defending Velikie Luki.

Karmanov [Major General Ivan Petrovich Karmanov, 62nd RC’s commander] will firmly protect the boundary line with Samokhin and support him in so far as possible in the successful struggle for the Velikie Luki region and also prevent an enemy penetration or envelopment of Biriukov’s [Major General Nikolai Ivanovich Biriukov, 186th RD’s commander] left flank. Again form mobile groups.²⁷

By this time, Timoshenko had deployed Maslennikov’s 29th Army (Group Maslennikov) into position on 22nd Army’s left or southern flank and ordered it to attack southward toward Smolensk the next day.²⁸ Maslennikov’s small army consisted of 252nd, 256th, 243rd Rifle Divisions, the latter transferred from Khomenko’s 30th Army, limited supporting artillery, and the 53rd Armored Train. After abandoning Velikie Luki, from 23 through 26 July, Hoth’s Third Panzer Group finally transferred Kuntzen’s LVII Motorized Corps eastward toward the Belyi region, where it was to play a significant role in repelling Group Maslennikov’s assaults against Fourth “Panzer” Army’s left wing along the Western Dvina River north of Smolensk. After Kuntzen’s departure, Strauss’s Ninth Army filled in the front from south of Velikie Luki eastward to Kammenoe on the Western Dvina River, 116 kilometers north of Smolensk, but did not attempt to recapture Velikie Luki.

The Stavka’s remarkably successful effort to reestablish viable defenses opposite Army Group Center’s left wing was due more to German inaction than it was to Soviet strength. More than a month would pass before Army Group Center resumed offensive action in this sector, and, when it did, the premature and ill-advised evacuation of Velikie Luki on 21 July made it necessary to recapture the town by storm all over again. As a result, sizeable Soviet forces would remain poised over Bock’s left flank for another 30 days.

The “Nevel’ diversion, which never should have occurred in the first place, resulted from poor planning by the OKH, which dispersed Leeb’s and Bock’s force at a time when no reserves were available to plug the inevitable gaps in so wide a front. By permitting Army Group North’s Sixteenth Army to drift toward Nevel’ and its Eighteenth Army to turn northward into Estonia, little was available to strengthen Army Group North’s Fourth Panzer Group as it spearheaded Leeb’s advance on Leningrad. When the OKH corrected the problem by shifting one of Hoth’s motorized corps to help Sixteenth Army eliminate the problem at Nevel’, Hoth was left with insufficient forces to carry out his portion of the Smolensk encirclement. As a result, Bock’s army group lost an excellent opportunity to destroy Timoshenko’s 16th, 19th, and 20th Armies at Smolensk and was far more vulnerable than it should have been to the Stavka’s July counteroffensive in the Smolensk region. Nor did Strauss cover himself with glory, since he failed to concentrate his Ninth Army fast enough to destroy Ershakov’s forces encircled at Nevel’. Finally, and a bit ironically, it was Stalin himself who pulled some of Bock’s “chestnuts out of the fire” at Smolensk by issuing stand-fast orders to his armies at Smolensk. Given the weakness of Hoth’s panzer group, if he had not, it is unlikely Army Group Center would have encircled any forces whatsoever in and around Smolensk.

Therefore, the battle of Nevel’ was a serious mistake on the part of the German High Command, a mistake symptomatic of a growing nervousness and touchiness about open flanks. Although this syndrome was strongest in Hitler, the OKH was not immune to it either. The problem on Army Group Center’s northern flank set the stage for an even more serious crisis on its southern flank, where this syndrome once again raised its ugly head. Following a pattern he established at Nevel’, step-by-step Hitler once more began diverting another of his precious panzer groups to a threatened flank, this time Guderian’s Second Panzer Group toward Army Group South and the enticing but elusive target, Kiev.

The Southern Flank, the Fall of Mogilev and the Problem of 21st Army

The Situation on 16 July

The problems Bock faced on the southern wing of his army group were just as complex and daunting as those he faced in the north. The most serious of these were the encirclement at Mogilev, which distracted the attentions of Guderian’s Second Panzer Group and prevented it from fulfilling its vital role at Smolensk. Second was the persistent offensive activity by Soviet 21st Army in the Rogachev, Zhlobin, and Bobruisk regions, which slowed Weichs’ relief of Guderian’s forces at Mogilev and threatened the army group’s lines of communications in the south. As a result, the motorized corps of Guderian’s panzer group were dispersed and would remain so unless and until Weichs brought his infantry forward to take over the task of reducing the Mogilev encirclement.

See Map 40. The situation on Army Group Center’s right wing late on 15 July 1941.

By day’s end on 15 July, the three motorized corps of Guderian’s Second Panzer Group were fanned out across a 194-kilometer-wide front. Lemelsen’s XXXXVII Motorized Corps formed the southern face of the encirclement ring around the Smolensk pocket, Vietinghoff’s XXXXVI Motorized Corps contained the northern face of the Mogilev pocket with its SS “Das Reich” Motorized Division and was preparing to strike eastward through Pochinok to El’nia with Schaal’s 10th Panzer Division. Further south, Geyr’s XXIV Motorized Corps formed the southern face of the Mogilev pocket, with Model’s 3rd Panzer and Löper’s 10th Motorized Divisions facing north and protecting the panzer group’s southern flank from the Dnepr River eastward to the town of Propoisk on the Sozh River, 70 kilometers southeast of Mogilev, and northeastward along the river to the town of Cherikov, 80 kilometers east-southeast of Mogilev, with Feldt’s 1st Cavalry and Langermann’s 4th Panzer Divisions. Meanwhile, on the army group’s extreme right wing, the infantry of Weichs’ Second Army fended off Soviet attacks in the Rogachev, Zhlobin, and Bobruisk regions, all the while trying to assemble forces to relieve Guderian’s panzers around the Mogilev encirclement.

In order of priority, Bock had to accomplish three tasks on his army group’s southern wing. First, he had to relieve Guderian’s panzers at Mogilev with Weichs’ infantry so that Vietinghoff’s XXXXVI and Geyr’s XXIV Motorized Corps could fulfill their main missions to the east. Second, he had to reduce the Mogilev pocket without disrupting the forward progress of Guderian’s two motorized corps. Third, he had to repel 21st Army’s attacks in the Rogachev, Zhlobin, and Bobruisk regions, also without hindering Guderian’s further advance. All of the operations on Bock’s southern wing were aimed at one priority mission, the eastward advance of Guderian’s two motorized corps to form a continuous and impermeable outer encirclement line to protect Bock’s larger encirclement in the Smolensk region.