See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix C, 2.

• General Situation – the front’s forces fought with attacking enemy units in the Sebezh, Osveia, Borkovichi, Gorodok, Vitebsk, Barsuki Station, and Borkolobovo region, while directing its main efforts at liquidating the enemy’s advancing Vitebsk grouping.
• 22nd Army [Ershakov] – conducted sustained fighting along its entire front against units of 8th and 39th AC.

♦ 51st RC:

⋄ 170th RD – attacked with its right wing at 1000 hours on 11 July, with its left wing fighting in its previous positions.
⋄ 112th RD – holding off numerically superior enemy forces in the Volyntsy region with its left wing and fighting intensely with enemy tanks penetrating from Iukhovichi toward Kliastitsy at 1000 hours 11 July.
⋄ 98th RD – repelling enemy attempts to force the Drissa River in its previous positions.
⋄ 126th RD – fighting defensively along the Ignatovo and Kulikovo line.

♦ 62nd RC:

⋄ 174th RD – occupying its previous positions at 1000 hours on 11 July, faced by an inactive enemy.
⋄ 186th RD – 238th Regiment is attacking toward Lovsha Station, with its forward units fighting in the vicinity of Lovsha Station and its remaining units concentrated in the Prudok and Bobrovshchina region (14 kilometers east of Trudy).
• 19th Army [Konev] – fighting intensely for Vitebsk with unknown results. Out of 350 trains that arrived on 11 July, 130 have been unloaded. 7th MC and 153rd, 186th, and 50th RDs were subordinated to the army.
• 20th Army [Kurochkin] – withdrawing its mechanized corps [20th] behind the front lines, fighting defensively in its previous positions, and driving back an enemy group that crossed the Dnepr at Kopys and up to two battalions of enemy infantry with tanks that forced the river north of Shklov, with the enemy leaving 15 tanks on the battlefield. 7th MC and 19th and 153rd RDs were transferred from 20th to 19th Army.
• 13th Army [Remezov] – held on to its positions in the Shklov and Novyi Bykhov sector and now fighting with enemy units penetrating in the Barsuki Station and Barkalabovo region and concentrating its approaching units.
♦ 61st RC – holding on to the Shklov, Mogilev, and Buinichi line, while conducting reinforced reconnaissance north of Shklov, where an enemy force of up to two battalions attacked and forced the Dnepr with small groups of infantry and individual tanks on the morning of 11 July.
⋄ 53rd RD – holding on to the Shklov and Pleshchitsy line, while reconnoitering north of Shklov. At 1200 hours the enemy forced the Dnepr River, 2 kilometers north of Pleshchitsy, with a force of up to two battalions with tanks, but a counterattack threw them back to the river, inflicting heavy losses and destroying 15 tanks.
⋄ 110th RD – defending the Pleshchnitsy and Shapochitsy line.
⋄ 172nd RD – defending the Mogilev bridgehead, fortifying its defenses in the Shapochitsy and Buinichi sector along Dnepr River’s eastern bank, and blew up the bridge at Shklov.
♦ 45th RC – fought with enemy units crossing the Dnepr in the Barsuki and Borkolobovo region, which now hold the Sidorovichi and Sladiuki region and the forest to the south, and concentrating its reserves in the Borkolobovo region.
⋄ 148th RD – concentrating and, simultaneously, fighting with enemy crossing the river.
⋄ 187th RD – fought with enemy units crossing the Dnepr River.
⋄ 137th RD – concentrating in the Sukhari and Pridantsy region on 10 July.
♦ 20th MC – withdrawn from combat to behind the front for rest and refitting.
• 21st Army [Gerasimenko] – completing its concentration and defending its previous positions at 1330 hours on 11 July against an inactive enemy.
♦ 102nd RD and 63rd and 67th RCs – positions unchanged.
♦ 66th RC – 53rd RD’s 232nd and 110th RRs, after regrouping, occupied the Streshin and Belyi Bereg line, with 110th RR in the Streshin and mouth of the Berezina sector.
♦ 75th RD – no new information.
♦ 28th MtnRD – concentrated in the Bragin region.
♦ 25th MC – 55th TD and 219th MD concentrating in their previous regions.
♦ 50th TD – positions unchanged.
♦ 16th MC – concentrating in the Mozyr’ region (a MRR and 15th TD’s rear services arrived by 11 July).
♦ Armored Trains Nos. 51 and 52 – cooperating with the Colonel Kurmashev’s detachment and fighting in the Starushki Station, Rabkor Station, and Ratmirovichi region, where it destroyed up to 30 enemy tanks and armored vehicles from 7-9 July.
• 4th Army [Sandalov] – completed regrouping, resting and refitting, and strengthening its defensive positions. Enemy aircraft bombed the Chausy, Propoisk, and Krichev regions on 10 July, killing 25 men and wounding 4 in 42nd RD.
• The VVS of the Front – shot down 3 enemy aircraft in air combat and destroyed 8 aircraft on the ground during the second half of 10 July. Our losses: 1 aircraft shot down and 4 aircraft failed to return to their airfields.11

However, the subsequent operational summary the Western Front issued at 2000 hours on 13 July confirmed that Timoshenko’s optimism was misplaced:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix C, 7.

• 20th Army – after restoring the situation late on 12 July and overnight on 12-13 July by throwing the enemy infantry back at Bogushevskoe and Kopys’, now fighting with enemy tanks and motorized infantry penetrating into the depths of the defenses.
♦ 69th RC – threw the enemy back and now defending:
⋄ 153rd RD – the Vorony, Zabolotinka Station, and Griada sector along the eastern bank of the Luchesa River.
⋄ 229th RD – the Griada, Luchi, and Bogushevskoe sector.
⋄ 233rd RD – the Kolen’ki and Staiki Station sector.
• 20th RC – pushed the enemy behind the Dnepr River and now defending:
⋄ 73rd RD – the Selekta and Orsha line.
⋄ 18th RD – from the southeastern outskirts of Orsha to Kopys’ on the eastern bank of the Dnepr River.
♦ 2nd RC – fighting with enemy forces that crossed the Dnepr River and reached the corps’ flank and rear in the forests west of Gorki, with its positions being verified.
♦ 5th MC (with 69th RC) – fighting to liquidate enemy forces that crossed the Dnepr and reached the Sofievka region [south and southeast of Gorki], while protecting the main road in the Vysokoe region with one battalion, with unknown results.
♦ 57th TD – concentrating in the Gusino region [45 kilometers west of Smolensk].
♦ 144th RD and 1st MRD – holding on to the crossings over the Dnepr River and fighting to destroy the enemy in the Kobryn’ and Lenino sector south of the Dnepr River [45-50 kilometers east of Orsha]
• 13th Army – fighting with enemy forces that crossed the Dnepr in the Shklov and Bykhov Station region [20-30 kilometers north of Mogilev] and penetrated eastward up to 20 kilometers.
♦ 61st RC (with part of 20th MC) – under heavy pressure by large enemy motor-mechanized forces that crossed the Dnepr in the Shklov region and penetrated up to 15 kilometers to the Sas’kovka and Novyi Prudki line and farther along the eastern bank of the Dnepr River to Buinichi.
⋄ 53rd RD – defending the Shklov and Pleshchitsy line, subjected to the enemy’s main attack, withdrew, and its positions now unknown.
⋄ Positions of its remaining units are unknown.
♦ 20th MC – attacked from the Sos’kovka and Nichiporovichi line toward Bel’ at 0500 hours on 13 July, but was stopped by enemy artillery and aviation after advancing 2 kilometers.12

In fact, Guderian’s armor had rendered Timoshenko’s defenses along the Dnepr River from Kopys southward to Mogilev and from Mogilev southward to Staryi Bykhov utterly superfluous. As a result, Timoshenko was losing control of the situation, a weakness Guderian was quick to exploit

Thus, by midday on 11 July, Guderian’s three motorized corps had seized secure bridgeheads at Kopys, Shklov, and Novyi Bykhov, and, to his panzer group’s rear, Weichs’ Second Army had reached the Berezina River and was moving eastward toward the Dnepr River by forced marches. During the day, Guderian moved his headquarters 80 kilometers forward from Novyi Borisov to Tolochino, where Napoleon had situated his headquarters in 1812. There he met General Efisio Marras, the Italian Military Attaché, and Hitler’s Luftwaffe aide, Colonel Nicolaus von Bülow, where, satisfied with his forces’ progress, he invited his guests to join him on the next day’s tour of the battlefield.13

After capturing the three bridgeheads, Guderian wanted Lemelsen’s XXXXVII Motorized Corps to advance directly toward Smolensk, Vietinghoff’s XXXXVI Motorized Corps to move due east through Gorki to Pochinok, 48 kilometers south of Smolensk, and Geyr’s XXIV Motorized Corps to advance eastward through Chausy and Krichev to Roslavl’ on the old Moscow road, 100 kilometers southeast of Smolensk. Since Geyr’s forces were also supposed to defend Second Panzer Group’s right flank, Bock assigned General Feldt’s 1st Cavalry Division, which had relieved Model’s 3rd Panzer Division on 9 and 10 July, to Guderian’s panzer group so that it could form the second wave attack of Geyr’s shock group. Initially, at least, Guderian wanted Geyr’s forces to eliminate Mogilev by enveloping it from the south with 3rd Panzer Division. However, when Model’s panzer division made slow progress on the poor roads and was stopped on 11 July by both a destroyed bridge 24 kilometers south of Mogilev and by determined Soviet resistance, with Kluge’s approval, Guderian decided to bypass Mogilev and have Model’s panzers follow in the wake of Langermann’s 4th Panzer Division via Bykhov.14

After visiting the headquarters of Boltenstern’s 29th Motorized Division at Kopys at midday on 11 July, where the engineers were building a bridge so that the remainder of Lemelsen’s corps could cross the Dnepr, Guderian crossed the river in an assault boat in an attempt to reach the bridgehead of Vietinghoff’s XXXXVI Corps at Shklov. After failing to do so because the two bridgeheads had yet to be linked up, he returned to the river’s western bank and ordered Lemelsen to regroup Weber’s 17th Panzer Division southward from Orsha so that it could use the crossing at Kopys. While returning to his command post, Guderian briefed Kluge on his progress and gained his approval for “redirecting” 17th and 3rd Panzer Divisions.

After spending less than three hours at Tolochino, where he briefed Hitler’s adjutant, Schmundt, who was collecting first-hand information for the Führer, accompanied by his operations officer, Colonel Fritz Bayerlein, Guderian spent three hours traversing the abominable roads to the bridgehead held by Vietinghoff’s XXXXVI Motorized Corps at Shklov. Although Schaal’s 10th Panzer Division and “Grossdeutschland” Motorized Infantry Regiment had encountered stronger resistance at Shklov than Lemelsen’s forces faced at Kopys, the engineers had finally managed to repair the damaged bridges there. Guderian’s quick tour convinced him his assault crossing had been a success, and he urged the corps commander to push on ahead and exploit his success, even during the night. By the time he returned to his headquarters the next morning, his panzer group thus held bridgeheads about ten miles deep at Kopys, Shklov, and Bykhov. With their four new bridges, in Guderian’s opinion, these bridgeheads formed a more than adequate base from which to begin his exploitation.15 However, tempering Guderian’s optimism, on 12 July XXXXVII and XXIV Motorized Corps each lost one of these precious four bridges owing to over-use, which slowed down their operations.

Taken aback by Guderian’s surprise gambit, Timoshenko was at a marked disadvantage because the German attack had struck the vulnerable boundary between his 20th and 13th Armies and broken it wide open. In addition, severe command turbulence was hindering his operations. Only days before, on 10 July the Stavka had appointed Timoshenko as commander of the Main Command of the Western Direction (in short, Main Western Direction Command), a new task which only complicated his command and control problems. Furthermore, after Remezov replaced the mortally wounded Filatov as the 13th Army’s commander on 8 July, Remezov was also wounded while personally leading a counterattack against Geyr’s XXIV Motorized Corps on 12 July. Thereafter, Gerasimenko, 21st Army’s commander, took command of 13th Army on 14 July, only to be replaced by Colonel General Fedor Isidorovich Kuznetsov, ending a series of turbulent command changes, which were further aggravated by constant poor signal communications.16

See Map 9. The situation, 2300, 13 July 1941.

In sum, by day’s end on 13 July, when 17th Panzer Division of Lemelsen’s XXXXVII Motorized Corps captured Orsha, Timoshenko’s defenses along the Dnepr River had simply collapsed. By this time, Boltenstern’s 29th Motorized Division had broken out of its bridgehead at Kopys and was already halfway to Smolensk. To the south, Schaal’s 10th Panzer Division of Vietinghoff’s XXXXVI Motorized Corps had passed through Gorki toward Mstislavl’ on the road to the Sozh River, and Langermann’s 4th Panzer and Löper’s 10th Motorized Divisions of Geyr’s XXIV Motorized Corps were pushing westward from Bykhov, leaving a major portion of 13th Army threatened with encirclement in the Mogilev region.

While Guderian’s panzer group was seizing crossings over the Dnepr River and beginning to carve a corridor with its armor toward Smolensk from the south, after routing Ershakov’s 22nd Army along the Western Dvina River northwest of Polotsk and Konev’s 19th and Kurochkin’s 20th Armies near Vitebsk, Hoth’s Third Panzer Group was again on the move, its left wing toward Nevel’ and its right wing toward Velizh and Smolensk from the north. By nightfall on 13 July, the spearheads of Hoth’s and Guderian’s panzer groups, Funck’s 7th Panzer Division and Boltenstern’s 29th Motorized Division, respectively, were about 55 kilometers apart and rapidly closing in on Smolensk from the north and south. Behind Guderian’s advancing armor, after completing their grisly work west of Minsk, three infantry corps of Weichs’ Second Army were crossing the Berezina River, followed closely by three more infantry corps only two days’ march behind. Threatened by the converging pincers of this German armored armada, the bulk of Timoshenko’s 19th, 16th, and 20th Armies fought desperately to survive.17

The Timoshenko Offensive, 13–16 July

As early as 11 July, the Stavka realized it faced a crisis in the sector of Timoshenko’s Western Main Direction Command. With Vitebsk and the Dnepr River crossings south of Orsha in German hands, desperate measures were required to restore the situation, if it could be restored at all. Accordingly, at 1545 hours on 12 July, the Stavka ordered Timoshenko, “Immediately organize powerful and coordinated counterstrokes from the Smolensk, Rudnia, Orsha, Polotsk, and Nevel’ regions with your forces at hand to liquidate the enemy penetration at Vitebsk,” but “do not weaken the Orsha-Mogilev front,” and, in addition, “Conduct active operations along the Gomel’ and Bobruisk axis to threaten the rear of the enemy’s Mogilev grouping.18

However, Timoshenko and his chief of staff, Malandin, had already anticipated the Stavka’s intentions by issuing a series of preliminary orders of his own. First, at 2020 hours the previous evening, he had directed F. I. Kuznetsov’s 21st Army to activate limited offensive actions to tie down the advancing forces of Guderian’s Second Panzer Group:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix C, 3.