The Stavka Regroups
If doubts plagued the Germans about the progress of their campaign, Stalin and his Stavka were certain of their intent, which remained clearly counteroffensive in nature and aimed at the defense of Moscow at all cost. Although Timoshenko’s July counteroffensive around Smolensk had failed, he had avoided a major encirclement at Nevel’ and had withdrawn a sizeable portion of his three armies encircled at Smolensk. On Timoshenko’s flanks, while the Northwestern and Southwestern Fronts had blunted and slowed the German advance along the approaches to Leningrad and Kiev, they had not halted the Germans along those strategic axes. Yet, Stalin still considered the Moscow axis to be the most dangerous and decisive and expected Army Group Center to resume operations eastward after a short pause to regroup and replenish its forces. Therefore, Stalin ordered the Main Command of the Western Direction to hold firmly to the Velikie Luki and Gomel’ regions on Timoshenko’s right and left flanks to threaten Army Group Center with possible envelopment. All the while, however, the Soviet dictator bolstered his reserves along the Moscow axis and simultaneously ordered his forces to mount fresh large-scale counteroffensives in multiple sectors along the Smolensk-Moscow axis to preempt, blunt, or defeat the expected German thrust toward the Soviet capital.
To this end, at month’s end, Stalin united all of the Stavka’s reserve armies operating west of Moscow, specifically, in the region extending from Rzhev southward to Viaz’ma, into a new Reserve Front subordinate to Timoshenko’s Western Main Direction Command and assigned his most trusted lieutenant, Army General Georgii Konstantinovich Zhukov, to command the new front. Furthermore, to generate maximum offensive power along the Smolensk-Moscow axis, he ordered Zhukov to move roughly half of his new front from second into first strategic echelon. At the same time, Stalin replaced Zhukov as chief of the General Staff with the penultimate Red Army General Staff officer, Boris Shaposhnikov. Stalin supposedly removed Zhukov from his post as chief of the General Staff because the latter persistently questioned the dictator’s strategic priorities, in this instance his decision to hold on to the Kiev region come what may, and had added insult to injury by warning Stalin that this could result in the defeat and destruction of General Kirponos’ Southwestern Front. In reality, however, although clearly annoyed by Zhukov’s insolence, Stalin also wanted a fighting general to direct the Reserve Front during the new counteroffensive, and Zhukov was a proven fighter.1
See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix M, 1.
Issued at 2245 hours on 14 August, the Stavka’s directive creating the Reserve Front read:
1. Form the headquarters of the Reserve Front to combine the actions of the reserve armies operating along the Rzhev-Viaz’ma line.
Appoint the Deputy People’s Commissar of Defense, Army General Zhukov, as the front’s commander and Comrades Kruglov and Popov as the members [commissars] of the front’s Military Council.
Form the front’s headquarters from the First and Second Reserve Groups and locate it at Gzhatsk beginning on 30 July 1941.
2. Include in the Reserve Front:
a) 34th Army, with 254th, 245th, 259th, 262nd, and 257th Rifle Divisions, 25th and 54th Cavalry Divisions, 264th and 644th Corps Artillery Regiments, 171st and 759th Antitank Artillery Regiments, and 16th and 95th Armored Trains.
The boundary line on the left – Zarech’e (20 kilometers northwest of Vyshnii Volochek), Firovo, Naumovo (25 kilometers west of Ostashkov), and Lake Luchanskoe.
Headquarters – Liubnitsa Station.
b) 31st Army, with 249th, 247th, 119th, 246th, and 244th Rifle Divisions, 110th Tank Division, 43rd Corps Artillery Regiment, and 766th and 533rd Antitank Artillery Regiments.
The boundary line on the left – the Moscow Sea, Kniazh’i Gory, Pomel’nitsa Station, Shiparevo, and Shchuch’e.
Headquarters – Rzhev
c) 24th Army, with 248th, 194th, 133rd, 178th, 107th, 19th, and 120th Rifle Divisions, 102nd Tank Division, 103rd Motorized Division, 542nd, 392nd, and 685th Corps Artillery Regiments, 305th and 573rd Gun Artillery Regiments, 18th, 509th, 871st, 872nd, 874th, 876th, 879th, and 880th Antitank Artillery Regiments, and 43rd Antiaircraft Battery on railroad cars.
The boundary line on the left – Ugriumovo Station, Luzhki (60 kilometers south of Viaz’ma), Popovka (10 kilometers south of El’nia), and Pochinok.
Headquarters – Semlevo.
d) 43rd Army, with 53rd, 217th, and 222nd Rifle Divisions, 105th Tank Division, 106th Motorized Division, 448th, 364th, 643rd, and 207th Corps Artillery Regiments, 320th Gun Artillery Regiment, 760th, 753rd, and 761st Antitank Artillery Regiments, and 41st Antiaircraft Battery on railroad cars.
Form 43rd Army on the base of 33rd Rifle Corps.
Appoint Lieutenant General Comrade Zakharkin, the deputy commander of the Moscow Military District, as the army’s commander.
Headquarters – Kirov
e) 32nd Army, with 2nd, 7th, 18th, 13th, and 8th Peoples’ Militia Divisions [DNO] and 873rd and 875th Antitank Artillery Regiments.
The army will concentrate in the Viaz’ma region by the morning of 4 August by foot march and occupy the Bogoroditskoe, Lysovo, Podrezovo, Panfilovo, and Godunovka line.
Headquarters – Viaz’ma.
3. Include 4th and 6th Peoples’ Militia Divisions and 761st and 765th Antitank Artillery Regiments in the Reserve Front once they complete their formation.2
When ultimately formed by early August, Zhukov’s new Reserve Front included the remaining armies from General Bogdanov’s former Front of Reserve Armies and three armies from General P.A. Artem’ev’s Front of the Mozhaisk Defense Line, specifically, 24th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, and 34th Armies. Zakharkin’s 43rd Army was a new one formed from separate divisions and supporting units previously assigned to the Stavka’s reserves.
See Table 13.
Table 13. The Organization and Command Cadre of the Reserve Front on 1 August 1941 (rifle, cavalry, tank, and mechanized formations and units)
Reserve Front (formed 30 July) – Army General Georgii Konstantinovich Zhukov
• | 24th Army – Major General Konstantin Ivanovich Rakutin |
♦ | 23rd Rifle Corps |
⋄ | 100th Rifle Division |
⋄ | 194th Mountain Rifle Division |
♦ | 19th Rifle Division |
♦ | 107th Rifle Division |
♦ | 110th Rifle Division |
♦ | 120th Rifle Division |
♦ | 133rd Rifle Division |
♦ | 178th Rifle Division |
♦ | 248th Rifle Division |
♦ | 4th People’s Militia Rifle Division |
♦ | 6th People’s Militia Rifle Division |
♦ | 102nd Tank Division – Colonel Ivan Dmitrievich Illarionov |
♦ | 103rd Motorized Division – Major General Ivan Ivanovich Birichev (converted into 103rd Rifle Division on 28 August) |
♦ | 106th (former 106th Tank) Motorized Division – Colonel Alekseev in early August, Colonel Vasilii Petrovich Brynzov on 19 August, and Major Konstantin Sergeevich Monakhov on 28 August (converted into 106th Rifle Division on 28 September) |
• | 31st Army – Major General Vasilii Nikitich Dolmatov |
♦ | 119th Rifle Division |
♦ | 244th Rifle Division |
♦ | 246th Rifle Division |
♦ | 247th Rifle Division |
♦ | 249th Rifle Division |
♦ | 110th Tank Division – Colonel Petr Georgievich Chernov (used to form 141st and 142nd Tank Brigades on 1 September) |
• | 32nd Army – Lieutenant General Nikolai Kuz’mich Klykov and Lieutenant General Ivan Ivanovich Fediuninsky on 23 August |
♦ | 220th Rifle Division |
♦ | 2nd People’s Militia Rifle Division |
♦ | 7th People’s Militia Rifle Division |
♦ | 8th People’s Militia Rifle Division |
♦ | 13th People’s Militia Rifle Division |
♦ | 18th People’s Militia Rifle Division |
• | 33rd Army – Kombrig Dmitrii Platonovich Onuprienko |
♦ | 1st People’s Militia Rifle Division |
♦ | 5th People’s Militia Rifle Division |
♦ | 9th People’s Militia Rifle Division |
♦ | 17th People’s Militia Rifle Division |
♦ | 21st People’s Militia Rifle Division |
• | 34th Army – Kombrig Nikolai Nilovich Pronin and Major General Kuz’ma Maksimovich Kachanov on 3 August |
♦ | 245th Rifle Division |
♦ | 259th Rifle Division |
♦ | 262nd Rifle Division |
♦ | 257th Rifle Division |
♦ | 25th Cavalry Division – Kombrig Nikolai Ivanovich Gusev |
♦ | 54th Cavalry Division – Colonel Iurii Vladimirovich Val’ts |
• | 43rd Army – Lieutenant General Ivan Grigor’evich Zakharkin (never took command), Lieutenant General Pavel Alekseevich Kurochkin on 6 August, and General Petr Petrovich Sobennikov in late August |
♦ | 53rd Rifle Division |
♦ | 217th Rifle Division |
♦ | 222nd Rifle Division |
♦ | 105th Tank Division – Colonel Aleksei Stepanovich Beloglazov |
• | Front forces |
♦ | 127th Rifle Division |
♦ | 444th Rifle Regiment |
♦ | 108th Tank Division – Colonel Sergei Alekseevich Ivanov (converted into 108th Tank Brigade on 2 December) |
Zhukov’s new front initially manned multiple defensive lines extending from north of Rzhev to south of Viaz’ma with 34th, 31st, 24th, 43rd, 32nd, and 33rd Armies. However, in the wake of encirclement battle at Smolensk and the destruction of most of 28th Army at Roslavl’, at 0220 hours on 6 August, the Stavka transferred the Reserve Front’s 34th Army to the Northwestern Front and replaced it with new 35th Army, which it renamed 49th Army on 11 August. Although the stated intent of the Stavka’s new directive was to “improve command and control” within the Reserve Front, in actuality it significantly strengthened the front to enable it to undertake fresh offensive action against the German-occupied El’nia salient. The Stavka’s directive read:
See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix M, 2.
For the purpose of improving command and control of the Reserve Front, include in its composition:
a) 31st Army, with 249th, 247th, 119th, 246th, and 244th Rifle Divisions, 43rd Corps Artillery Regiment, and 766th and 533rd Antitank Artillery Regiments.
The boundary line on the left – the Moscow Sea, Kniazh’i Gory, Pomel’nitsa Station, Shiparevo, and Shchuch’e.
Headquarters – Rzhev.
Commander – Major General Dolmatov
b) 35th Army, with 248th, 194th, 260th, 220th, and 298th Rifle Divisions, 4th People’s Militia Division, and reinforcing artillery units allocated to it from 24th Army in accordance with the instructions of the Reserve Front’s commander.
The boundary line on the left – Vadino Station and Kasnia Station – inclusively for 35th Army.
Form 35th Army’s headquarters from 35th Rifle Corps’ headquarters and locate it in Novo-Dugino.
Commander – Lieutenant General Zakharkin.
c) 24th Army, with 133rd, 178th, 107th, 19th, 120th, and 100th Rifle Divisions, 106th Motorized Division, and 6th People’s Militia Division. Add artillery reinforcements in accordance with the instructions of the Reserve Front’s commander.
Keep 278th, 269th, 280th, and 309th Rifle Divisions in the army’s reserve.
The boundary line on the left – Ugriumovo Station, Luzhki, Popovka, and Pochinok, inclusively for 24th Army.
Headquarters – Semlevo.
Commander – Major General Rakutin.
d) 43rd Army, with 53rd, 217th, 222nd, 145th, and 149th Rifle Divisions, 104th and 109th Tank Divisions, 448th, 364th, 643rd, and 207th Corps Artillery Regiments, 320th Gun Artillery Regiment, and 760th Antitank Artillery Regiment.
Keep 211th, 279th, and 303rd Rifle Divisions in the army’s reserve.
The boundary line on the left – Brovka, Zhukovka, and Shumiachi.
Headquarters – Kirov.
Commander – Lieutenant General Kurochkin.
e) 2nd Separate Rifle Corps, with 258th, 260th, and 290th Rifle Divisions, 2nd Rifle Corps’ artillery regiments, and 753rd and 761st Antitank Artillery Regiments.
Headquarters – Briansk.
Commander – Major General Ermakov.
The Western Front’s commander will immediately send 2nd Rifle Corps’ headquarters and corps’ units to Briansk.
f) In the front’s reserve:
32nd Army, with 2nd, 7th, 8th, 13th, and 18th People’s Militia Divisions and 873rd and 875th Antitank Artillery Regiments.
Headquarters – Viaz’ma.
Commander – Lieutenant General Klykov.
33rd Army, with 9th, 5th, 1st, 17th, and 21st People’s Militia Divisions and 877th and 878th Antitank Artillery Regiments
Headquarters – Spas-Demensk.
Commander – Kombrig Onuprienko.
45th and 55th Cavalry Divisions and 765th Antitank Artillery Regiment.3
Imposing on paper, the Reserve Front’s chief weakness rested in the fact that 12 of its 48 divisions were so-called people’s militia formations (DNO), which consisted largely of worker militiamen from Moscow’s factories, with a cadre of regular army officers. Although most of these divisions were near full-strength, at roughly 9-10,000 soldiers each, their soldiers were hastily trained and armed largely with rifles and machine guns. Because most of the former militiamen had operated either in workers’ detachments or battalions, the divisions themselves lacked any small unit training so necessary for building unit cohesion. Despite these drawbacks, the Stavka believed experienced commanders like Zhukov, Kurochkin, Rakutin, and Ermakov could whip them into shape.
In fact, no sooner had the bulk of the remnants of 16th and 20th Armies crossed the Dnepr River to safety than the Stavka and Zhukov put the Reserve Front to the test, in particular, its 24th and 43rd Armies. They did so because the capture of Roslavl’ by Guderian’s panzer group on 3 August had created another “dangerous hole” in the defenses of Timoshenko’s Main Direction Command. If and when the Germans defeated Group Kachalov, that hole promised to turn into a major gap threatening the coherence of Timoshenko’s entire defense. Therefore, at 0216 hours on 6 August, the Stavka ordered Zhukov’s Reserve Front to destroy Guderian’s concentration in its key strategic bridgehead at El’nia and, simultaneously, also attack Guderian’s Roslavl’ grouping to save Group Kachalov. This directive, which assigned Zhukov “personal responsibility” for the attack, read:
See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix M, 3.
For the purposes of the final destruction of the enemy’s El’nia grouping, the Stavka orders, under the personal responsibility of the Reserve Front’s commander, Army General Comrade Zhukov:
1. Comrade Zhukov, after reinforcing his units operating at El’nia, will continue an energetic and decisive attack on El’nia with 107th Rifle Division and two regiments of 100th Rifle Division, with their artillery, to encircle and destroy the enemy’s El’nia grouping.
2. Upon receipt of this directive, the Western Front’s commander, Marshal Timoshenko, will transfer two of 100th Rifle Division’s regiments with their artillery to the disposal of the Reserve Front’s commander.
Relieve 107th Rifle Division with the Western Front’s units by 2000 hours on 6 August by occupying its positions along the Dorogobuzh, Usviat’e, Kas’kovo, and Kalita front [north of El’nia].
3. The Western Front’s commander will extend his left wing [flank] from the Solov’evo crossings southward along the Dnepr River to Pridneprovskaia Station and farther southeast along the railroad to Dobromino Platform [Station] [25 kilometers south of Solov’evo and 35 kilometers northwest of El’nia].
4. To conduct the operation at El’nia, on 6 August rebase two light bomber regiments and one fighter regiment subordinate to the chief of the Air Forces (VVS) from the Stavka’s Reserve to the Reserve Front’s commander.
To reinforce the Reserve Front’s aviation, on 6 August rebase two light bomber regiments and one fighter regiment from the Stavka’s Reserve to the Roslavl’ axis.
5. Confirm receipt and immediately submit a plan for the operation at El’nia.4
Zhukov, acting hurriedly in an attempt to prevent further damage to Group Kachalov and restore offensive momentum to his front, responded to the Stavka’s directive by issuing two offensive orders on the evening of 6 August. Collectively, the two orders sought nothing short of the complete destruction of the German force occupying the El’nia salient and Guderian’s forces pummeling Kachalov’s operational group in the Roslavl’ region. Although it is doubtful whether Zhukov really expected his armies to actually achieve these feats, there is no doubt about his determination to regain the strategic initiative, if not permanently, at least temporarily.
See Map 60. The situation at El’nia on 6 August 1941.
The order Zhukov dispatched to 24th Army at 2000 hours required the army to attack and liquidate the salient round El’nia, which was defended by three divisions of Armeegruppe Guderian’s XX Army Corps. Addressed to Major General Konstantin Ivanovich Rakutin, the army’s commander, with a copy sent to the commander of 43rd Army, the order categorically stated, because the Stavka of the High Command attaches “exceptional significance to the El’nia region,” you are “to destroy the enemy El’nia grouping” in the following fashion:
See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix M, 4.
• | General Situation – in the El’nia region, the enemy’s 16th and 248th IDs, 20th PzD’s 49th MotR, 29th MotD’s 86th Mot, and 31st and 41st Eng. Bns occupy defenses along the Bykovo, Ushakovo, Semeshino, Klematina, Maloe Pronino, and Bol’shaia Lipnia front [from 11 kilometers north, to 10 kilometers east, and to 10 kilometers south of El’nia]. Although prisoners-of-war report that an SS Division and 10th PzD are being withdrawn from the region, the El’nia grouping has a significant quantity of artillery. |
• | 24th Army’s Mission –attaching exceptional significance to the El’nia region, the Stavka of the High Command makes Major General Comrade Rakutin personally responsible for destroying the enemy El’nia grouping, reaching the Dobromino Station, Berniki, Babarykin, Kholm, Staroe Shcherbino, and Svetilovo line [from 35 kilometers northeast, to 20 kilometers west, to 20 kilometers southwest, and to 25 kilometers south of El’nia] and linking up with the Western Front’s left wing in the vicinity of Dobromino Station. |
• | 24th Army’s Forces – an operational group consisting of 107th, 100th, 103rd, 19th, and 120th RDs, 106th MD, and 105th and 102nd TDs, with a company of T-34 tanks, 184 combat aircraft, and 275th and 488th CARs and 573rd and 305th GARs conducting the main attack from the Dubovezh’e and Ushakovo region [from 13 kilometers north-northwest to 11 kilometer north of El’nia]. |
• | Missions of Subordinates: |
♦ | Main Attack– from the Dubovezh’e and Ushakovo region [13 kilometers north-northwest to 12 kilometers north of El’nia]. |
⋄ | 107th RD (with 102nd TD and two reinforcing artillery regiments) – attack from the Dubovezh’e and Ivanovskie Farm region [13 kilometers north-northwest of El’nia] southward toward Viazovka, Gur’evo, Lysovka, and Leonidovo [7 kilometers west of El’nia]. |
⋄ | 100th RD (with 10 T-34 tanks) – attack from the Bykovo and Ustinovo line [12 kilometers north-northwest of El’nia] southward toward Chantsovo [7 kilometers northwest of El’nia] and the northwestern outskirts of El’nia. |
⋄ | 103rd RD – attack from the Ushakovo and Lavrovo line [12 kilometers north of El’nia] southward through Petrianino and Sofievka toward the northern outskirts of El’nia. |
♦ | Secondary Attacks: |
⋄ | 19th and 120th RDs and 105th TD – attack toward the southeastern part of El’nia. |
⋄ | 106th MD – attack from the Mal’tsevo and Bol’shaia Lipnia line [10 kilometers south of El’nia] northward toward Bitiakovka and Leonidovo [7 kilometers southwest and west of El’nia]. |
♦ | Main Shock Group’s Subsequent Missions: |
⋄ | After advancing southward from the Dubovezh’e region, seize the Bezzabot State Farm, Novoselovka, Tishovo, Kharnia, and Leonovo line [15 kilometers northwest, 15 kilometers west, and 10 kilometers southwest of El’nia] and defend that line firmly to prevent the enemy from penetrating toward El’nia from the west. |
⋄ | After liquidating the enemy in El’nia, move part of the shock group forward to the Dobromino Station, Berniki, and Staroe Shcherbino line and send reinforced detachments into the Svetilovo and Shat’kova region by day’s end on 7 August to protect your left flank and link up with the right flank of Western Front’s 53rd RD. |
• | Planning Considerations: |
♦ | Carefully reconnoiter enemy targets and dispositions on 6-7 August. |
♦ | Carefully organize cooperation between infantry, tanks, artillery, the rocket launchers, and aircraft. |
♦ | Develop tactics and techniques with platoon, company, battalion, and artillery battery and battalion commanders to destroy enemy firing points by all types of forces, paying special attention to designating and identifying air targets to their own ground forces. |
♦ | Complete transporting shells, bombs, and fuel forward, organize airfield support services for aircraft, and organize communications and messenger services by day’s end on 7 August. |
• | Special Instructions: |
♦ | Deploy 879th ATR and 6th DNO into defensive positions prepared in depth to protect the Borisovka, Gorodok, and Ugra River line. |
♦ | Deploy 533rd and 880th ATRs in antitank positions according with previous instructions. |
♦ | Place a tank company with 7 KV tanks at the disposal of 880th ATR’s commander as an antitank reserve. |
♦ | Conduct concealed ranging [adjustment] fire with 107th and 100th RD’s artillery before the attack and methodical fire to destroy enemy fortified positions during the attack. |
♦ | Send your operational plan to this headquarters by courier by 1200 hours on 7 August and be prepared to report on the terrain.5 |