| • | General Situation – the enemy reached the western bank of the Dnepr River in the sector from Solov’evo to the forest south of Golovino with forward units of the fresh 20th Motorized Division and 8th Infantry and 7th Panzer Divisions, units of 17th Motorized [Panzer] Division are operating in the Kolodez, Monchino, Iazveno, and Mileevo region [east of the Dnepr River and 15-18 kilometers south of Solov’evo], and small units from this division are trying to penetrate northward toward Mileevo and Balakirevo [12 kilometers southeast of Solov’evo]. |
| • | Neighbors – on the right, Group Rokossovsky is attacking toward Zadnia and Grishino, while protecting 20th Army’s forces as they cross the Dnepr River, and on the left, Group Kachalov is fighting in the Pochinok and El’nia region. |
| • | 20th Army’s Mission – after completing its withdrawal to the eastern bank of the Dnepr River, defend the front along the Dnepr and Ustrom Rivers from Solov’evo to Brykino [30 kilometers south-southeast of Solov’evo and 18 kilometers northwest of El’nia], with its remaining forces in reserve in the Podkholmitsa, Zaprud’e, and Gorodok region [15-20 kilometers behind the front], where they will remain fully combat ready. |
| • | Missions of Subordinates: |
| ♦ | 144th RD (with the Detachments of Sakhno and Shepeliuk) – occupy and defend the eastern bank of the Dnepr River from the crossing at Solov’evo southward to the bend in the river 1 kilometer north of Zabor’e. |
| ♦ | 153rd RD (with the detachments of Golovin, Tarasov, and Kashchenko) – occupy and defend the Dnepr River line from the bend in the river 1 kilometer north of Zabor’e southward to the mouth of the Mertvaia River [12 kilometers south-southwest of Solov’evo] and southeastward to Kolodezi [16 kilometers south of Solov’evo], with Detachment Kashchenko in reserve in the Klimovo region subject to employment only with my approval. |
| ♦ | 73rd RD – after relieving 16th Army’s forces along the Kolodezi, Sel’tso, Hill 236.5 (1 kilometer south of Slizovo), Hill 224.8, and Klemiatino line [16 kilometers south to 22 kilometers south-southeast of Solov’evo], occupy and defend this line and, simultaneously, conduct reinforced reconnaissance in the Klemiatino and Brykino sector along the Ustrom River until 161st RD arrives in this sector and also toward the El’nia-Smolensk railroad. |
| ♦ | My Reserve – the army’s main forces concentrated and combat ready in the [following] regions by 1600 hours on 6 August: |
| ⋄ | 5th MC – the woods south of Podkholmitsa [20 kilometers southeast of Iartsevo]. |
| ⋄ | 57th TD – the woods 1 kilometer north of Gorodok [18 kilometers east of Solov’evo]. |
| ⋄ | 229th RD – Terenino and the woods south of Terenino [16 kilometers east of Solov’evo]. |
| ⋄ | 233rd RD – the Zaprud’e region [15 kilometers east-southeast of Solov’evo].77 |
At 1525 hours the following day, in response to a directive from Timoshenko, Lukin, who was still titular commander of 16th Army, instructed his forces to complete their assembly and move forward to relieve the Reserve Front’s 107th Rifle Division, which had been occupying second echelon defenses in the region from 12 kilometers west to 20 kilometers southwest of Dorogobuzh on the front’s right flank:
See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix L, 16.
| • | 34th RC – relieve 107th RD’s 765th and 474th RRs along the Nedniki and Iakovskoe [5-10 kilometers southwest of Dorogobuzh] front by 2000 hours on 6 August and deploy reinforced combat security along the southern bank of the Dnepr River to Dorogobuzh. |
| • | 152nd RD – relieve 107th RD’s 1st Bn, 586th RR along the Iakovskoe and Kalita front [30-32 kilometers southeast of Solov’evo and 18-20 kilometers north of El’nia] and dispatch reinforced combat security forward to the Osovo and Erilovo [8-15 kilometers south of Solov’evo] front. |
| • | Division Commanders – personally go to their defensive sectors to inspect and take over responsibility for defensive works, obstacles, and maps.78 |
On 6 August the Stavka shuffled its senior command cadre within the Western Front by appointing General Kurochkin as the commander of 43rd Army in place of General Zakharkin and assigning General Lukin to take Kurochkin’s place in command of 20th Army. In addition, the Stavka promised to integrate the remnants of 16th Army into Lukin’s army and form a new 16th Army in the front’s rear area, however, under its own control. Lukin’s first act as 20th Army’s commander was to complete Kurochkin’s work by preparing a final order concerning 20th Army’s new defensive belt. Issued at 0120 hours on 7 August, this order assigned missions and defensive sectors to each of the army’s subordinate formations:
See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix L, 17.
| • | General Situation – the enemy reached the Dnepr River crossings in the Solov’evo, Ratchino, Sel’tso, and Klemiatino [22 kilometers south-southeast of Solov’evo] sector with 7th PzD, 20th MotD, 8th ID, and 17th MotD and is trying to force the Dnepr River at Pnevo and Ratchino to the south. |
| • | Neighbors – on the right, the forces on Group Rokossovsky’s left wing are fighting for Zadnia [2 kilometers west of Solov’evo], and on the left, 24th Army’s forces are fighting for the Ushakovo [47 kilometers southeast of Solov’evo] and Lavrovo line. |
| • | 20th and 16th Armies’ Missions – under my overall command, firmly defend the Dnepr River front from the Solov’evo crossing southward to the barn, 5 kilometers south of Zabor’e, Slizovo, Vasiuki, Mikhailovka, and Kazanka [17 kilometers northwest of El’nia] by concentrating their main forces on their left wing. |
| • | Missions of Subordinates: |
| ♦ | 20th Army: |
| ⋄ | 144th RD (with Shepeliuk’s and Sakhno’s Detachments) – defend the sector from the Solov’evo crossing southward to the bend in the Dnepr River 1 kilometer north of Zabor’e [8 kilometers south of Solov’evo]. |
| ⋄ | 153rd RD (with Tarasov’s and Kashchenko’s Detachments and a company of border troops) – defend the Dnepr River line from the bend in the Dnepr River (1 kilometer north of Zabor’e) to Marker 179.1 and to the woods 1 kilometer north of Kolodezi [15 kilometers south of Solov’evo] after sending detachments to the eastern bank of the Dnepr to prevent the enemy from forcing the river. |
| ⋄ | 73rd RD – after relieving 46th and 129th RDs, occupy and defend the Kolodezi, Slizovo, and Mileevo line [15 kilometers south to 16 kilometers south-southeast of Solov’evo by 0600 hours on 7 August and send a detachment to Korsun’ia to prevent the enemy from forcing the Dnepr River. |
| ⋄ | 161st RD (with 129th RD’s artillery) – occupy and defend the Vasiuki and Mikhailovka sector on the Ustrom River [18-21 kilometers southeast of Solov’evo]. |
| ⋄ | 46th RD – after turning your sector over to 73rd RD, occupy and defend the Mikhailovka, Goravitsy, and Kazanka line 21 kilometers southeast of Solov’evo to 17 kilometers northwest of El’nia] by 0700 hours on 7 August. |
| ⋄ | Army Cavalry Squadron – reconnoiter toward the south; |
| • | 16th Army – after relieving 107th RD along the Dorogobuzh and Usviat’e line and along the Uzha River to Staroe Rozhdestvo with 127th, 152nd, and 158th RDs, fortify your positions, paying special attention to defending the El’nia and Dorogobuzh road. |
| ⋄ | 233rd RD – withdraw from your present positions at 0300 hours on 7 August, concentrate in the Balakirevo, Naidenovo, and Samoilovo region [15-18 kilometers southeast of Solov’evo] in my reserve by 0600 hours on 7 August, and prepare to operate toward west and south. |
| ⋄ | 129th RD – after turning your sector over to 46th and 161st RDs and temporarily transferring your artillery to 161st RD, concentrate in the Bobrovo (No. 1) region in my reserve by 0800 hours on 7 August and prepare to operate toward the southeast or south. |
| ⋄ | 229th RD – while resting and refitting in the Terenino region in my reserve, prepare to operate toward Chelnovaia [9 kilometers east-southeast of Solov’evo]. |
| ⋄ | 1st MRD – remain in my reserve in the Gorodok region to rest and refit. |
| ⋄ | 5th MC (with 57th TD) – concentrate in the Korobkino, Romashkovo, and Nekrasovo region (20 kilometers southeast of Gzhatsk) by taking the highway through Dorogobuzh and revert to Western Front’s control.79 |
A few hours later, 16th Army’s headquarters notified the Western Front it had fulfilled the Stavka’s promise to transfer all of 16th Army’s combat capable forces to Lukin’s 20th Army. In addition to declaring, “All of 16th Army’s units have been transferred to 20th Army and moved to their places of concentration,” 16th Army’s chief of staff, Colonel Ponomarev, also reported, “The hauling of equipment and material from the western bank of the Dnepr River by 16th Army has ceased,” the crossing sites have been “blown up by local means,” and “the enemy offered weak fire resistance during the crossings.”80 However, at the end of the report, Colonel Ponomarev, presumably with Lukin’s permission, took one last critical swipe at Kurochkin by asserting, “It is incorrect that 20th Army has assigned a guard battalion to the crossing and has undertaken energetic measures to haul out the equipment and materials, including the majority of the vehicles and artillery.”81
See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix L, 18.
In the wake of 16th and 20th Armies’ withdrawal to safety and Western Front’s reorganization of its defenses east of Smolensk, at 2000 hours on 7 August, the front issued yet another operational summary describing the situation across its front by day’s end and confirming that a lull in the action was indeed under way:
See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix L, 19.
| • | General Situation – occasional artillery firing and reconnaissance raids occurring across the entire front. |
| • | 22nd Army – positions unchanged, with sparse artillery exchanges and reconnoitering by both sides during the day and 256th RD attacking toward Volok. |
| • | Group Maslennikov |
| ♦ | 252nd RD – 924th RR’s position unchanged, but 928th and 932nd RRs withdrew to the northern bank of the Western Dvina River under heavy enemy pressure, where 928th Regiment is defending the Vypolzovo and Petrovo line [40-45 kilometers south-southeast of Toropets] and 932nd RR, the Liubovitsy, Olenitsa, and Ust’e line [50-65 kilometers south of Toropets]. |
| ♦ | 243rd RD – attacking toward Il’ino [58 kilometers south of Toropets] and fighting for the Tolkachi, Hill 193.8, Zakhody, Bodnevka, and Liubimovo line [45 kilometers south of Toropets] at 1630 hours. |
| ♦ | 50th and 53rd CDs – no news received. [Operational Summary No. 86 at 2000 hours on 8 August stated, “The Cavalry Group (50th and 53rd CDs) withdrew, 50th CD to the Emlen’ region [70 kilometers west of Belyi] and 53rd CD to the Ordynka region [55 kilometers west of Belyi] by 2200 hours on 6 August. |
| • | 30th Army – positions unchanged. [Operational Summary No. 85 at 0800 hours on 8 August stated, “30th Army halted its offensive at nightfall on 7 August. The enemy displayed no activity. By 0600 hours on 8 August, the army’s units occupied [the following positions]: 250th RD – Los’mino, Demiakhi (southern), and Buraia [-15-19 kilometers southwest of Belyi]; 242nd RD – Morokhovo Station, Novoe Morokhovo, and Dolgoe, with one battalion of 900th RR in the Klintsy region; 251st RD – (incl.) Guliaevo, eastern outskirts of Zhukova, and Sloboda; and 107th TD – Nazemenki and Hill 236.6]. |
| • | 19th Army – regrouping locally and attacking with limited success against stubborn enemy resistance since 0700 hours on 7 August. |
| ♦ | 166th RD – captured Demeshonki (Temiashenki) [34 kilometers north of Iartsevo] on its right wing, but positions unchanged elsewhere. |
| ♦ | 162nd RD – reached the eastern edge of the woods (1 kilometer west of Ust’e) [28 kilometers north-northeast of Iartsevo] on its right wing and fighting in the forests west of Zaovrazh’e on its left wing. |
| ♦ | 91st RD – advanced westward from Gorbatovskaia [25 kilometers north of Iartsevo] and to Dura on its right wing and in its center. |
| ♦ | 89th RD – positions unchanged |
| ♦ | 303rd, 321st, and 11th Eng. Bns – conducting defensive work along the Neelovo and Gorodok line to the rear. |
| • | Group Rokossovsky – positions unchanged, with the group’s forces occupying defenses in the Kurganovo and Iartsevo sector on the Vop’ River’s eastern bank and at Solov’evo on the northern bank of the Dnepr River. |
| • | 20th Army – after partially regrouping overnight on 6-7 August, occupying an echeloned defense along the eastern bank of the Dnepr River and in the Solov’evo, Zabor’e, Mileevo, Brykino, and Kazanka [18 kilometers south-southeast to 31 kilometers southeast of Solov’evo and 18 kilometers northwest of El’nia] sector. |
| ♦ | 144th RD – defending the Dnepr River crossings at Solov’evo and Zabor’e against small enemy groups on western bank of the Dnepr River. |
| ♦ | 153rd RD – defending the Zabor’e and Marker 179.1 line and liquidated an enemy platoon that crossed the Dnepr at Ratchino. |
| ♦ | 73rd RD – after relieving 129th Rifle Division, occupying the Kolodezi, Slizovo, Mileevo, and Vasiuki line [16 kilometers south to 19 kilometers southeast of Solov’evo]. |
| ♦ | 161st RD – occupying and defending the Vasiuki and Mikhailovka line [19-25 kilometers southeast of Solov’evo]. |
| ♦ | 46th RD – being relieved by 73rd RD along the Kolodezi and Mileevo line and preparing to occupy the Mikhailovka and Kazanka line [25-31 kilometers southeast of Solov’evo]. |
| ♦ | 233rd RD – after crossing to the Dnepr River’s eastern bank, will reach the Balakirevo, Naidenovo, and Samoilovo region [15-20 kilometers southeast of Solov’evo] by 0800 hours. |
| ♦ | 129th RD – preparing to turn its combat sector over to 73rd RD and move forward into the Bobrovo region. |
| ♦ | 229th RD and 1st MRD – positions unchanged. |
| ♦ | 34th RC – after relieving 107th RD, occupying [the following] sectors: |
| ⋄ | 127th RD – Usviat’e and Vygor’ [25 kilometers east to 26 kilometers east-southeast of Solov’evo]. |
| ⋄ | 158th RD – Vygor’ and Kas’kovo [26 kilometers east-southeast to 28 kilometers southeast of Solov’evo]. |
| ⋄ | 152nd RD – Kas’kovo and Kalita [28-33 kilometers southeast of Solov’evo]. |
| ♦ | 5th MC and 57th TD – positions unchanged, but will move into front reserve in the region southeast of Gzhatsk overnight on 7-8 August. |
| ♦ | 153rd and 73rd RDs – will attack to capture Ratchino and Liakhovo regions [9-12 kilometers southwest of Solov’evo] to drive enemy forces from the Dnepr River crossings and protect the army’s logistical units and material as they cross to the Dnepr River’s eastern bank. |
| ♦ | Headquarters, 16th Army – withdrawing into front reserve in the region north of Dorogobuzh by rail. |
| • | VVS of the Front – reconnoitering in the front’s sector and cooperating with ground forces to destroy enemy motor-mechanized units and enemy artillery and infantry.82 |
However, as subsequent events would indicate, this operational lull was only temporary.
Precisely how many of Kurochkin’s and Lukin’s troops actually escaped from the Smolensk encirclement will probably remain disputed for many years, although new documentary evidence sheds considerable light on the matter. We know that the strength of the two armies in late 22 June totaled roughly 165,000 men, most of whom went into battle in early July. Since as many as 50,000 of 19th Army’s 110,000 soldiers also fell into encirclement, and other forces reinforced them in the Smolensk region, the pocket probably initially contained more than 220,000 troops, of whom as many as 170,000 were killed or captured by 7 August, and roughly 50,000 ultimately escaped, some as organized units but others as separate groups or individuals. For example, the Western Front reported losses of 105,723 men during the last ten days of July, including 46,827 men listed as missing in action, most lost during the encirclement battle at Smolensk.83 Records also indicate that Kurochkin’s 20th Army fielded 65 tanks, 177 field guns, and 120 antitank guns by the end of July.
See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix O, 8 for 20th Army’s final callculation that about 50,000 soldiers escaped.
Whatever the true cost of the battle, on 5 August Bock reported and the Wehrmachtbericht announced two days later that the preliminary count of Soviet losses during the entire Battle of Smolensk, including the fighting along the Dnepr River near Rogachev and at Mogilev, was 309,110 soldiers captured and 3,205 tanks, 3,120 guns, and 1,098 planes destroyed or captured. Although this figure ultimately rose to 350,000 prisoners, it is possible these figures were too low, rather than too high.84
Thus, by 7 August as many as 50,000 soldiers of 16th and 20th Armies succeeded in escaping from the Smolensk “sack” and living to fight another day. When assigning credit for the escape of these forces from encirclement, Rokossovsky’s stolid defense of the Solov’evo corridor played an immensely important role. To forestall German efforts to close the corridor, for the first time in the war, Rokossovsky also created and employed an antitank defense based on a coherent system of interlocking antitank strong points, a practice that would later become routine in Red Army defensive tactics.
In addition to the resolute performance of Rokossovsky’s Group Iartsevo, credit for 16th and 20th Armies’ escape also belonged to the two army commanders, Lukin and Kurochkin, who conducted the breakout by employing small shock groups to lead the escape and rear guards leapfrogging over one another to contain Ninth Army’s advance. For example, on the night of 31 July-1 August, while 129th, 46th, and 108th Rifle Divisions held the corridor open, 5th Mechanized Corps and 127th and 233rd Rifle Divisions moved east, protected by rearguards consisting of stay-behind detachments from 153rd, 144th, 229th, 73rd, and 158th Rifle Divisions, whose positions arced from the north to south. As each group of divisions moved eastward, the frontages of the rearguards shrank as selected rearguards units pulled out of line and joined those forces withdrawing through the corridor. Of course, all of these successes were predicated on Army Group Center’s failure to close the encirclement. This, too, was also the result of the stubborn Soviet defense of Mogilev and the Smolensk pocket, which robbed the Germans of forces necessary to form and man a complete encirclement ring.
In addition and more important for the future, the many orders and reports issued by Red Army headquarters during the period of Kurochkin’s defense of the Smolensk “pocket” and Lukin’s attacks on Smolensk city, together with Timoshenko’s counteroffensive along Army Group Center’s “eastern” front, underscored the Stavka’s and Red Army’s undying fixation on the “offensive” amidst and despite obviously deteriorating and desperate circumstances. This, in itself, did not bode well for Hitler’s Wehrmacht and the future fate of Operation Barbarossa.
Despite Kurochkin’s, Lukin’s, and Rokossovsky’s heroics, the effects of the Smolensk encirclement and the failed Red Army counteroffensive did seriously weaken Timoshenko’s Western Front. By early August, many of the front’s rifle divisions fielded only from 1,000 to 2,000 men each and far fewer combat infantrymen, and its tank forces were distinctly threadbare. Nonetheless, Timoshenko could still draw on a healthy supply of reserve armies while Bock at Army Group Center had virtually no reserves at all.
A postwar comment by General Günther Blumentritt, the chief of staff of Kluge’s Fourth Panzer Army, was indicative of widespread German frustration over the results of the July fighting, in particular, their failure to destroy the entire encircled force:
A large group of Russians were encircled in the Smolensk region. Two field armies… held on to three sides of the cauldron at the same time as our tanks blockaded the exit from it near Iartsevo. Once again, the operation was not crowned with success. During the night the Russian forces penetrated from the encirclement ring and exited to the east.85
The desperate Soviet defensive and offensive efforts in the Smolensk region also exacted a heavy toll on German forces, both physically and psychologically. In addition to increasing German casualty rates dramatically, the incessant Soviet action also tied down and wore out Army Group Center’s forces, in particular, its panzer and motorized divisions. Describing the effects of the fighting in a report he wrote during this period, Bock wrote:
I was now forced to commit all of my combat-capable divisions from the army group’s reserve into combat…. We needed every man forward… In spite of huge losses… the enemy attacked daily in several sectors so that, up to this time, it has not been possible to regroup forces and bring up reserves. If we do not strike a shattering blow against the Russians somewhere in the near future, it will become difficult to fulfill the mission of their complete destruction before the onset of winter.86
At the very least, the strong and determined Soviet resistance around Smolensk prompted Hitler to revisit the offensive priorities he had established for this stage of Operation Barbarossa and provided context for his ultimate decision to turn Guderian’s panzers southward in late August..
Conclusions
By nightfall on 5 August, the warring parties and their respective high commands viewed the recent struggle for Smolensk from strikingly differing perspectives. From Bock’s perspective, the battle for Smolensk was over by 5 August, and his army group had won the struggle. In addition to routing Soviet forces threatening its flanks, his army group’s main forces had achieved their principal objective of defeating and destroying a large part of the Western Front and capturing Smolensk. Therefore, if provided a short period to rest and refit, Bock was convinced his army group could resume its successful march on Moscow. From Hitler’s perspective, however, and increasingly from the OKH’s perspective as well, Guderian’s victory at Roslavl’, coupled with Timoshenko’s and Zhukov’s fierce resistance east of Smolensk and the Southwestern Front’s stubborn defense of the Kiev region in the south, offered new opportunities to conduct a massive and decisive encirclement operation in the Kiev region east of the Dnepr River.
However, the struggles for Nevel’, Smolensk, and Roslavl’ left entirely different impressions on Timoshenko and the Stavka. From their perspective, despite the loss of their prepared defenses along the Western Dvina and Dnepr Rivers and their failure to halt the German juggernaut short of Nevel’, Smolensk, and Roslavl’, they had rescued the better part of four encircled armies (16th, 19th, 20th, and 22nd) and reestablished a solid and continuous defense line along the entire front from Velikie Luki southward east of Smolensk to the Desna River west of Briansk. Most important, while doing so, they had inflicted significant damage on Army Group Center’s forces, particularly, the infantry component of its panzer and motorized divisions. In short, the Stavka was convinced its decision to conduct violent counteroffensive actions on an ever larger scale was bearing fruit. Furthermore, in light of its large number of uncommitted reserve armies and apparent increasing German weakness, the Stavka resolved to continue its determined war of attrition against Army Group Center in the firm belief its forces could ultimately halt and perhaps even destroy Bock’s army group. Therefore, at the very moment the Germans were concluding the Battle for Smolensk was over, Stalin and his Stavka were busily preparing a massive new counteroffensive marking what they were convinced would be the battle’s second and most decisive stage.