•	30th Army – attacked at 1330 hours on 19 August against stubborn enemy resistance, with the following results by 1600 hours:

♦	250th RD – positions unchanged.
♦	242nd RD – advancing forward slowly after capturing Hill 200.0 (southwest of Zhidki [50 kilometers north of Iartsevo]).
♦	162nd RD – destroyed opposing enemy forces in cooperation with 107th TD’s tanks and reached the eastern outskirts of Shelepy [47 kilometers north of Dukhovshchina], where fighting is still underway.
♦	45th CD – committed to combat to exploit 162nd RD’s success and attacking toward Shelepy.
♦	244th RD – concentrated its main forces in the Novo-Vysokoe region [10-12 kilometers east of Shelepy] and one rifle regiment in the Sloboda and Torchilovo [4-5 kilometers east of Zhidki] sector, but its horse-drawn echelon is expected to arrive at 1800 hours on 19 August, although this has not been confirmed.
♦	Losses – 45 killed and 451 wounded.

•	19th Army – attacked at 0800 hours on 19 August to exploit success in its center and on its right wing against the defeated forces of 161st ID, which are conducting a fighting withdrawal toward the west.

♦	50th and 64th RDs – advancing westward successfully from the Kazakova and Muzhilovo line [14-19 kilometers north of Iartsevo] at 1200 hours.
♦	101st TD – Two battalions of its 101st RR fighting in the Skachkova and Chistaia sector [6-9 kilometers north of Iartsevo] on the Tsarevich River’s western bank.
♦	166th RD – positions unchanged.
♦	89th RD – concentrated in second echelon in the Sel’kovo, Gorodno, and Miakishevo region [16-18 kilometers north-northeast of Iartsevo].
♦	Enemy losses – up to 200 bodies abandoned in the Kolkovichi region, and according to preliminary data, 4 105mm guns with 1,000 shells, 45 boxes of mines, 3 light vehicles, 21 rifles, 1 mortar, and 1 headquarters vehicle were captured, three batteries of 45mm guns, 4 antitank guns, and up to a battalion of infantry were destroyed, and, according to a subsequent report, 9 105mm guns, 3 150mm guns, 2 75mm guns, 1,500 shells, and topographic maps and orders of 161st ID’s 336th IR were seized.
♦	Our losses – 8 tanks burned and 4 destroyed, and “the commander of 202nd TR’s 3rd Bn, Senior Lieutenant Korshunov, died a hero’s death” when he and his crew perished in a burning tank.

•	16th Army – assisting 19th Army’s offensive and protecting its left wing with an attack by 38th RD in the general direction of Novosel’e and Samuilova [3-5 kilometers north and north-northeast of Iartsevo] on the army’s right wing to capture the Samuilova and Kudinova line.

♦	38th RD – reached the western bank of the Vop’ River in the sector from the southern slope of the heights with the Marker 200 near Skachikhino to Hill 196.6 with its main grouping by 1800 hours.
♦	108th RD – positions unchanged.

•	20th Army – after regrouping and an artillery preparation, attacked southward at 1000 hours on 19 August, while also preparing an attack in its center toward the northwest [Dukhovshchina].

♦	144th RD – fortifying its positions and attacked unsuccessfully toward Mit’kovo [8 kilometers south of Solov’evo].
♦	153rd RD – strengthening its positions, with 505th RR concentrating in the region west of Zabor’e [10 kilometers south of Solov’evo] by 2400 hours on 18 August in the face of methodical enemy artillery fire against the Zabor’e and Osova region and the crossings over the Dnepr River overnight on 18-19 and on the morning of 19 August.
♦	229th RD – fortifying its positions.
♦	73rd RD – attacking toward Kolpino [18 kilometers south-southwest of Solov’evo] since 0940 hours against stiff enemy resistance.
♦	161st RD – attacked along the Chukhachi and Hill 224.8 front [20 kilometers south-southeast of Solov’evo] at 1000 hours on 19 August after an artillery preparation and, overcoming strong enemy resistance, captured the northwestern slopes of Hill 224.8 by 1300 hours, seizing 30-40 boxes of 37mm shells, and is continuing its attack.
♦	129th RD – attacked at 1000 hours on 19 August after an hour-long artillery preparation and fighting fierce street battles in Klemiatino [22 kilometers south-southeast of Solov’evo] at 1600 hours, with its 343rd RR approaching the eastern outskirts of Gorodok.

•	Front reserves – 1 tank division in the woods south of Vadino [47 kilometers north-northeast of Iartsevo].
•	VVS of the Front – supported the ground forces, struck approaching enemy reserves, and protected our force concentrations with 107 sorties, including 51 bomber and 56 fighter, 36 of which were conducted at night, and dropped 24 FAB-100, 6 FAB82, 6 AO-82, 99 FAB-70, 40 FAB-50, 2 SAB-25, 44 AO-32, 34 AO-10, and 146 AO-2.5 bombs, 5,172 KS ampoules, and 427,000 leaflets.

♦	23rd MAD – struck enemy forces, set fires to the forests in the Boldino, Skaliaevka, Lomonosovo, Ushchapovo, Ivoshino, Sushchevo, Khudkova, Butsevo, Bykhovo, Krivtsy, and Ponkratova region, and noted many large fires and powerful explosions.
♦	46th MAD – set fire to the forest in the vicinity of Lake Shchuch’e, creating many large fires and explosions, and supported 30th Army on the morning of 19 August.
♦	47th MAD – bombed enemy forces on the night of 18-19 August, set fires to a radius of 5-6 kilometers around the Dukhovshchina region, and supported 19th Army on the morning of 19 August.
♦	43rd MAD – supported 19th Army.
♦	31st MAD – supported 29th Army.49

[Author’s note: the paragraph in this summary describing the Cavalry Group’s operations was erroneously included under the section referring to 19th Army but has been restored to its correct location]

Despite 29th Army’s assertions that the Germans were reinforcing Ninth Army’s left wing south of the Western Dvina River, these movement reports, apparently received from aerial observations, most likely involved the forces of LVII Motorized Corps regrouping westward toward the Velikie Luki sector. Timoshenko, although encouraged by the actual progress of 19th Army and the anticipated advance by 30th Army, did understand the likelihood of a German armored counterstroke. However, he anticipated the counterstroke against 19th Army’s penetration west of the Vop’ River and still failed to appreciate the danger to his front’s right wing posed by the departure of Third Panzer Group’s panzer and motorized divisions toward the northeast. This was entirely understandable since Army Group North’s forces had just suffered a near defeat in the Staraia Russa region south of Lake Il’men’ and needed fresh panzer forces to reinvigorate their advance on Leningrad. Thus, although critical developments were about to occur in several sectors of the front, Timoshenko failed to grasp their full importance.

The action during the first phase of the offensive by Timoshenko’s Western Front met, if not exceeded, the front commander’s wildest expectations. And both Stalin and the Stavka were equally encouraged. The violent assault by Konev’s 19th Army north of Iartsevo had torn a gaping hole in the defenses along German Ninth Army’s “eastern front” and severally damaged VIII Army Corps’ 161st Infantry Division and inflicted grievous losses on 5th and 28th Infantry Divisions and the reinforcing tanks of 900th Motorized Brigade. Even though the German Ninth Army’s defenses bent but did not break, by nightfall on 19 August, Konev’s 19th Army carved a firm lodgment on the western bank of the Vop’ River north of Iartsevo, while Maslennikov’s 29th Army pushed Ninth Army’s left wing back south of the Western Dvina River to the approaches to Il’ino. If Khomenko’s 30th Army failed to replicate Konev’s success, at least his heavy assaults managed to push Ninth Army southwestward along and south of the Belyi-Dukhovshchina road. More encouraging still, the fact that the errant 244th Rifle Division was now forward encouraged Khomenko’s belief his forces could be far more successful in the near future.

From General Strauss’ perspective at Ninth Army, with his right wing pierced and his center and left wing under intense pressure, he had no choice but to turn to Army Group Center for assistance. At the army group, Bock, like Strauss, had no choice but to “scrape the bottom of the barrel” to generate reserves necessary to sustain Ninth Army’s defense. Complicating matters further, Hitler’s decision to send the bulk of Third Panzer Group’s armor northward left Bock and Strauss with barely adequate reserves with which to solidify their defenses along the army group’s “eastern front.” Thus, with the impact of Hitler’s gamble still in question, Bock and Strauss had no choice but deal with the crisis with those forces they had at hand. On the night of 19 August, the fate of Ninth Army, and with it Bock’s hopes of renewing his army group’s advance on Moscow, rested firmly on the shoulders of his meager panzer reserves. Accordingly, shortly before nightfall, the alarm order was dispatched to General Funck’s 7th Panzer Division, directing it to move northward to restore Ninth Army’s defenses before they utterly collapsed. Within 12 hours, Timoshenko’s counteroffensive would be put to its hardest test.