Like other orders prepared by the Reserve Front, this order was extremely detailed because Zhukov and his staff understood that their forces and, in particular, their mid-grade, and junior command cadre, lacked experience in conducting military operations of any sort. Therefore, leaving nothing to chance, they literally instructed their division, regiment, and battalion commanders exactly what they were to do and how they were to do it. This ultimately established a pattern followed by virtually all senior Red Army commanders throughout the entire war.

Less than an hour after sending 24th Army its attack order, Zhukov issued a second order, which assigned missions to all of his front’s armies, in particular, to Kurochkin’s 43rd Army, which he tasked with conducting the front’s second major attack, this one against the German Roslavl’ grouping. Issued at 2030 hours on 6 August, this order read:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix M, 5.

• General Situation – the Reserve Front is defending the Ostashkov, Selizharovo, El’tsy, Olenino, Shentrapalovka, Aksiunina, Mal’tsevo, Nishnevo, Mitino Station, Blagoveshchenskoe, Dorogobuzh, Usviat’e, Rozhdestvo Station, Peredel’niki, Mikhailovka, Zhukovka, and Sosnovka front, and, simultaneously, 24th and 43rd Armies will conduct an operation to destroy the enemy’s El’nia and Roslavl’ groupings.
• Missions of Subordinates:
♦ 31st Army (with 249th, 247th, 119th, 246th, and 244th RDs, 43rd CAR, 10 naval artillery guns, and 533rd and 766th ATRs) – defend your positions in accordance with Reserve Front order no. 2/op., and conduct reconnaissance along the Lake Luchane, Moshnitsa River, Andreapol’, and Belyi line.
⋄ The boundary on the right – as before.
⋄ Keep reserve divisions in their previous positions.
⋄ The boundary on the left – the Moscow Sea, Kniazh’i Gory, Pomel’nitsa Station, Shiparevo, and Shchuch’e.
⋄ Headquarters – Rzhev.
• 35th Army (with 248th, 194th, and 220th RDs, 3rd Bn, 392nd CAR, and 765th ATR) – defend the Aksiunina, Ivashkov, and Bonakova line and further along the eastern bank of the Dnepr River to Sumarokovo.
⋄ Keep in reserve 298th RD in Sychevka, 4th DNO in Novo-Duginskaia, and 269th RD in Tumanovo.
⋄ Conduct reconnaissance along the Vop’ River line.
⋄ The boundary on the left – Kasnia Station and Badino Station.
⋄ Form your headquarters from 35th RC’s headquarters and locate it in Novo-Duginskaia.
♦ 24th Army (with 133rd, 178th, 107th, 19th, 120th, and 100th RDs, 102nd and 105th TDs, 106th MD, 6th DNO, 423rd LAR, 685th and 275th CARs, 305th and 573rd GARs, 20 naval artillery guns, 76th Separate “MRL” [“Katiusha”] Btry, 533rd, 872nd, 877th, 879th, and 880th ATRs, and 43rd AABtry on railroad cars) – defend the Serkova, Blagoveshchenskoe, Dorogobuzh, Usviat’e, and Kalita line, conduct an operation to destroy the enemy’s El’nia grouping in the Mitino, Popovka, and El’nia region.
⋄ Maintain in reserve 280th RD in the Sloboda region (15 kilometers southwest of Viaz’ma), 278th RD in the Put’kova region, and 309th RD in the Voronovo region.
⋄ Conduct reconnaissance in the Iartsevo and Gorodok sector.
⋄ The boundary on the left – Ugriumovo Station, Luzhki, Popovka, and Pochinok.
⋄ Headquarters – Semlevo.
• 43rd Army (with 53rd, 217th, 222nd, 145th, and 149th RDs, 104th and 109th TDs, 364th, 646th, and 207th CARs, 320th GAR, and 760th ATR) – defend the Popovka, Kholmets, Snopot, and Zhukovka line and organize an operation to destroy the enemy’s Roslavl’ grouping.
⋄ Keep in reserve 303rd RD in the Mamonovo region, 211th RD in the Baretka region, and 279th RD in the Liudinovo region.
⋄ The boundary on the left – Borovka, Zhukovka, and Shumiachi.
⋄ Headquarters – Kirov
♦ 2nd Sep. RC (with 258th, 260th, and 290th RDs, 151st CAR, and 753rd and 761st ATRs) – defend the Zhukovka, Vysokoe, and Makarovo line to protect the Briansk axis
⋄ Keep one rifle division in reserve in the Sel’tso region.
⋄ Prepare a cut-off position along the Makarovo, Krupets, and Sosnovka line.
⋄ Conduct reconnaissance along the Sukromlia, Mglin, and Pochep line.
⋄ Headquarters – Briansk
♦ The Front Reserve:
⋄ 32nd Army (with 2nd, 7th, 8th, 13th, and 18th DNOs and 873rd and 875th ATRs) – prepare defenses along the Selo Station, Sapegino, Semlevo, and Bol’shoe Starosel’e line and conduct systematic unit combat training in accordance with Reserve Front’s order no. 016. Headquarters – Viaz’ma
⋄ 33rd Army (with 9th, 5th, 1st, 17th, and 21st DNOs and 878th and 876th ATRs) – prepare defenses along the Selishche, Ratki, and Podlesnaia line and conduct systematic unit combat training in accordance with Reserve Front’ order no. 016. Headquarters – Spas-Demensk
♦ 45th Cavalry Division – concentrate in the Gzhatsk region.
♦ VVS of the Front. Missions.
⋄ Cooperate with 24th and 43rd Armies on the battlefield and support the ground forces as they destroy the enemy’s El’nia and Roslavl’ groupings.
⋄ Protect 24th and 43rd Armies’ regrouping.6

Despite the Stavka’s firm intent to crush the German salient at El’nia and regain the strategic initiative by destroying German forces in the Roslavl’ region before they destroyed group Kachalov, within 24 hours Zhukov revoked the attack orders, primarily because he now understood his offensive would be futile for two reasons. First, by this time it was obvious that by virtually annihilating Group Kachalov, Guderian’s forces threatened to collapse the Reserve Front’s defenses. Second, Zhukov now fully understood just how poorly trained his forces were. Therefore, the front commander decided to postpone 24th and 43rd Armies’ offensive and, instead, spend time reorganizing his defenses and training his forces so that they could perform credibly both on the defense and offensively. Zhukov informed the Stavka of his decision in a situation report he dispatched to the General Staff at 2130 hours on 7 August:

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix M, 6.

1) 24th Army’s operational group did not conduct active operations along the El’nia axis. Artillery and machine guns exchanged fire along the front. Enemy aircraft conducted raids against 10th MD’s artillery observation posts (OPs) on 7 August. The positions of the El’nia Operational Group’s units are unchanged.

2) 222nd RD was in sustained combat with the enemy in the Antonovka, Blagoveshchenka, and Monakhi sector along the Roslavl’ axis. Under the onslaught of an enemy force of at least one infantry regiment with tanks and aircraft, the division slowly withdrew toward the east.

At 1630 hours an enciphered message was sent at the direction of the front commander about the withdrawal of the division to the forward edge of the main defensive belt.

Information about the fulfillment of that order has not been received up to 2000 hours.

3) 53rd RD is occupying its previous positions. During the day an enemy division opposite the division’s front gradually amassed its forces in populated points along the western bank of the Desna River.

An especially strong enemy grouping (at least an infantry division) massed against the division’s right wing west of Shat’kova [20 kilometers south of El’nia].

4) Along the remainder of the front, the Reserve Front’s armies are continuing to fulfill the front commander’s order no. 0021/op of 6 August 1941.7

In fact, the directive the Stavka sent to Zhukov and the orders Zhukov dispatched to the Reserve Front’s armies at the end of the first week of August served as prelude to heavy fighting at El’nia during the second week in August and only a precursor to a much grander Stavka counteroffensive later in the month.

In the wake of the Stavka’s attempts to destroy the El’nia grouping during the first week of August, it spent much of the second week reinforcing its defenses along the Moscow axis, in particular, by strengthening Zhukov’s front and rationalizing its command and control along this axis as desultory fighting went on in the El’nia region. It is also notable that on 8 August Stalin had himself appointed Supreme High Commander [Verkhovnyi Glavnokomanduiushchii] of the Soviet Armed Forces, by doing so converting the Stavka VK [Headquarters of the High Command] into the Stavka VGK [Headquarters of the Supreme High Command].

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix M, 7.

The Stavka issued the first two of these directives aimed at strengthening its defenses on 9 August. The first, signed by Shaposhnikov and sent out at 1550 hours, noted that Timoshenko’s Western Front had failed to fulfill the 6 August directive to extend its left wing southward to the “Pridneprovskaia Station and Dobromino Station front” north of El’nia. Pointing out that 24th Army’s, “102nd Tank Division… is fighting at Leikino, Goravitsy, and Sel’tso, which are occupied by the enemy,” it asserted the failure to carry out its directives “creates a threat to the right flank of Rakutin’s group but also threatens to disrupt the operation for the destruction of the enemy’s El’nia grouping.” Since those three villages, located 15-20 kilometers northwest of El’nia, were astride the Western Front’s projected defense line, Shaposhnikov demanded Timoshenko “immediately” report “why the directive has not been fulfilled” and “what measures you are undertaking to protect Rakutin’s right flank reliably.”8 The second of these directives, dispatched by Shaposhnikov later in the day, declared the Stavka was taking one of the Western Front’s cavalry divisions and transferring it “to the Mglin and Unecha region to protect the junction between the Central Front and the 2nd RC” in the Briansk region.9

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix M, 8.

On 11 August the Stavka issued two more directives, one directly related to defending the junction of Western and Reserve Fronts and the second announcing purely cosmetic changes to numerical designation of armies operating along the Western Direction. The more important of the two, which Shaposhnikov dispatched to Zhukov’s Reserve Front at 2100 hours on 11 August, was prompted by an inspection of the defenses at the junction of the Western and Reserve Fronts by Stavka representative, Colonel General Nikolai Nikolaevich Voronov, the Chief of the Red Army’s Artillery. Upon his return, according to Shaposhnikov, Voronov pointed out, “The dispositions Appendix on the left flank of 33rd Army’s defensive line hardly encompass the Roslavl’-Moscow M, 9.highway and, therefore, are protecting that axis insufficiently reliably.” Adding, “The forward edge of 33rd Army’s defenses has many open approaches from the enemy’s side and is difficult to defend,” Voronov proposed constructing an additional defensive line along the Snopot River [50 kilometers east and southeast of El’nia] and deploying the forces of 43rd and 33rd Armies along it.”10 The second directive simply renumbered 35th Army as 49th Army, primarily because the Stavka was forming a new 35th Army in the Far East.11

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix M, 9.

With the creation, reorganization, and reinforcement of the Reserve Front, as well as the adjustment of its boundaries with adjacent fronts, the die was cast for Stalin’s main act to materialize along the Moscow axis. Stalin anticipated that Zhukov’s new front, in combination with the Central Front, should have been able to contain any further advance by Guderian’s Second Panzer Group (now Armeegruppe Guderian) southward from the Krichev and Roslavl’ regions. His greatest hope, however, was that his new “fighters,” Zhukov in command of Reserve Front, and Eremenko still in temporary command of Western Front, would together be able to savage Bock’s Army Group Center.

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix M, 10.

By this time, the fierce fighting in the Nevel, Smolensk, El’nia, and Roslavl’ regions had forced Army Group Center to reorganize its forces significantly to provide greater weight to its flanks and retain sufficient forces to checkmate Timoshenko’s Western and Zhukov’s Reserve Fronts east of Smolensk.

See Table 14.

Table 14. The Organization and Command Cadre of Army Group Center in early August 1941

Army Group Center – Field Marshal Fedor von Bock

• Armeegruppe Guderian (Second Panzer Group) – Colonel General Heinz Guderian
♦ VII Army Corps – General of Artillery Wilhelm Fahrmbacher (to Fourth Army in mid-August)
⋄ 7th Infantry Division (to XXIV Motorized Corps in early August)
⋄ 23rd Infantry Division
⋄ 78th Infantry Division (to Army Group Reserve in mid-August)
⋄ 197th Infantry Division
♦ IX Army Corps – General of Infantry Hermann Geyer
⋄ 137th Infantry Division (early August)
⋄ 263rd Infantry Division
⋄ 292nd Infantry Division (to XX Army Corps in mid-August)
♦ XX Army Corps – General of Infantry Friedrich Materna (activated from reserve by mid-August and to Fourth Army in late August)
⋄ 15th Infantry Division
⋄ 292nd Infantry Division
♦ XXIV Motorized Corps – General of Panzer Troops Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg
⋄ 3rd Panzer Division – Lieutenant General Walter Model
⋄ 4th Panzer Division – Major General Willibald Freiherr von Langermann und Erlencamp
⋄ 10th Motorized Division – Lieutenant General Friedrich-Wilhelm Löper
⋄ 7th Infantry Division (from VII Army Corps in early August and to Army Group Center’s reserve in mid-August)
♦ XXXXVI Motorized Corps – General of Panzer Troops Heinrich von Vietinghoff-Scheel (to Army Group Center’s reserve in late August)
⋄ 10th Panzer Division – Lieutenant General Wolfgang Fischer (2 August)
⋄ 18th Panzer Division – Major General Walther Nehring (mid-August but to XXXXVII Motorized Corps in late August)
⋄ SS “Das Reich” Motorized Division – SS-Gruppenführer Paul Hausser (to Army Group Center’s reserve in late August)
⋄ 15th Infantry Division (to XX Army Corps in mid-August)
⋄ 268th Infantry Division (to XX Army Corps in mid-August)
⋄ “Grossdeutschland” Infantry Regiment (Motorized) – Colonel Hörnlein
♦ XXXXVII Motorized Corps – General of Panzer Troops Joachim Lemelsen
⋄ 17th Panzer Division – Major General Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma
⋄ 18th Panzer Division – Major General Walther Nehring (mid-August to XXXXVI Motorized Corps)
⋄ 29th Motorized Division – Lieutenant General Walter von Boltenstern (mid-August in Second Panzer Group reserve)
♦ Reserve:
⋄ HQ, XX Army Corps (early August, with no divisions assigned, activated by mid-August)
⋄ 29th Motorized Division – Lieutenant General Walter von Boltenstern (to XXXXVII Motorized Corps in late-August)
• Third Panzer Group – Colonel General Hermann Hoth
♦ XXIII Army Corps – General of Infantry Albrecht Schubert (Group Schubert from early to mid-August and to Ninth Army in late August)
⋄ 86th Infantry Division
⋄ 110th Infantry Division (to Group Stumme’s LVII Motorized Corps in late August)
⋄ 206th Infantry Division (to Ninth Army’s XXXX Motorized Corps in mid-August)
⋄ 251st Infantry Division (from Army Group North’s L Army Corps in mid-August)
⋄ 253rd Infantry Division (from Army Group North’s L Army Corps in mid-August)
♦ XXXIX Motorized Corps – General of Panzer Troops Rudolf Schmidt (HQ, Group Schmidt in Sixteenth Army in late August)
⋄ 7th Panzer Division – Lieutenant General Hans Freiherr von Funck (to LVII Motorized Corps in mid-August)
⋄ 12th Panzer Division – Major General Josef Harpe (with Group Schmidt)
⋄ 18th Motorized Division – General of Infantry Friedrich Herrlein (after mid-August and to Sixteenth Army’s I Army Corps in late August)
⋄ 20th Motorized Division – General of Infantry Hans Zorn (with Group Schmidt)
⋄ 5th Infantry Division (mid-August to Ninth Army’s V Army Corps)
♦ LVII Motorized Corps – General of Panzer Troops Adolf Kuntzen (Group Stumme in late August)
⋄ 7th Panzer Division – Lieutenant General Hans Freiherr von Funck (mid- to late August, but to Ninth Army’s VIII Army Corps in late August)
⋄ 19th Panzer Division – Lieutenant General Otto von Knobelsdorff
⋄ 20th Panzer Division – Lieutenant General Horst Stumpff
⋄ 14th Motorized Division – Major General Heinrich Wosch (to Ninth Army’s VI Army Corps in mid-August)
⋄ 18th Motorized Division – General of Infantry Friedrich Herrlein (in mid-August but to XXXIX Motorized Corps after mid-August)
⋄ 110th Infantry Division
⋄ 129th Infantry Division (to Ninth Army’s V Army Corps in mid-August)
• Second Army – Field Marshal Maximilian Reichsfreiherr von Weichs
♦ XII Army Corps – General of Infantry Walter Schroth (to Fourth Army in mid-August)
⋄ 31st Infantry Division
⋄ 112th Infantry Division (in XXXXIII Army Corps in mid-August)
⋄ 167th Infantry Division (to XIII Army Corps in mid-August)
♦ XIII Army Corps – General of Infantry Hans Felber
⋄ 17th Infantry Division
⋄ 34th Infantry Division (to Group Behlendorff in mid-August)
⋄ 131st Infantry Division
⋄ 258th Infantry Division (to Group Behlendorff in mid-August)
⋄ 1st Cavalry Division – General of Cavalry Kurt Feldt
♦ XXXXIII Army Corps – Colonel General Gotthard Heinrici
⋄ 34th Infantry Division (mid-August but temporarily to Fourth Army’s XII Army Corps)
⋄ 45th Infantry Division mid-August but temporarily to XXXV Army Corps Command)
⋄ 112th Infantry Division (mid-August)
⋄ 134th Infantry Division (to XII Army Corps in late August)
⋄ 258th Infantry Division (late August but temporarily to Fourth Army’s XII Army Corps)
⋄ 260th Infantry Division (to XII Army Corps in late August)
⋄ 267th Infantry Division (mid-August and to LIII Army Corps in Army Group Center’s reserve in late August)
♦ LIII Army Corps – General of Infantry Karl Weisenberger
⋄ 52nd Infantry Division
⋄ 252nd Infantry Division (in late August)
⋄ 255th Infantry Division
⋄ 267th Infantry Division (to XXXXIII Army Corps in mid-August)
♦ XXXV Army Corps – General of Artillery Rudolf Kämpfe
⋄ 45th Infantry Division (to XXXXIII Army Corps temporarily in mid-August)
⋄ 293rd Infantry Division
♦ Group Behlendorff (disbanded in late August)
⋄ 34th Infantry Division (in mid-August)
⋄ 258th Infantry Division (in mid-August)
• Fourth Army – Field Marshal Günther von Kluge
♦ No assigned divisions until mid-August
♦ VII Army Corps – General of Artillery Wilhelm Fahrmbacher (in mid-August)
⋄ 23rd Infantry Division
⋄ 197th Infantry Division
♦ IX Army Corps – General of Infantry Hermann Geyer (in mid-August)
⋄ 15th Infantry Division
⋄ 137th Infantry Division
♦ XII Army Corps – General of Infantry Walter Schroth (in mid-August)
⋄ 31st Infantry Division
♦ XX Army Corps – General of Infantry Friedrich Materna (in late August)
• Ninth Army – Colonel General Adolf Strauss
♦ V Army Corps – Colonel General Richard Ruoff
⋄ 5th Infantry Division (mid-August)
⋄ 35th Infantry Division
⋄ 106th Infantry Division
⋄ 129th Infantry Division
♦ VI Army Corps – General of Engineers Otto-Wilhelm Förster
⋄ 6th Infantry Division
⋄ 14th Motorized Division – Major General Heinrich Wosch
⋄ 26th Infantry Division
♦ VIII Army Corps – Colonel General Walter Heitz
⋄ 8th Infantry Division
⋄ 28th Infantry Division
⋄ 161st Infantry Division
♦ Group Schubert (HQ, XXIII Army Corps and L Army Corps from early to mid-August)
♦ Group Stumme – General of Panzer Troops Georg Stumme (HQ, XXXX Motorized Corps in late August)
⋄ LVII Motorized Corps (late August)
▪ 19th Panzer Division – Lieutenant General Otto von Knobelsdorff
▪ 20th Panzer Division – Lieutenant General Horst Stumpff
▪ 110th Infantry Division
⋄ XXIII Army Corps – General of Infantry Albrecht Schubert (from Third Panzer Group as Group Schubert in late August)
▪ 86th Infantry Division
▪ 251st Infantry Division
▪ 253rd Infantry Division
⋄ 102nd Infantry Division
⋄ 206th Infantry Division (to VI Army Corps in early September)
⋄ 256th Infantry Division (mid-August)
♦ Reserve
⋄ 256th Infantry Division (to XXXX Motorized Corps in mid-August)
• Rear Area Command Center
• Army Group Reserves
♦ HQ, Fourth Army (to mid-August)
♦ HQ, XXXX Motorized Corps – General of Panzer Troops Georg Stumme (to Ninth Army in mid-August and Group Stumme in late August)
♦ 1st Cavalry Division – General of Cavalry Kurt Feldt (to Second Army’s XIII Army Corps in early August)
♦ 15th Infantry Division (to Second Panzer Group’s XXXXVI Motorized Corps in early August and XX Army Corps in mid-August)
♦ 131st Infantry Division (to Second Army’s XIII Army Corps in early August)
♦ 161st Infantry Division (to Ninth Army’s VIII Army Corps in early August)
♦ 7th Infantry Division (in mid-August)
♦ 162nd Infantry Division

These frequent changes in the composition and task organization of Army Group Center’s armies, panzer groups, and corps, in particular, the formation of temporary groups, illustrates the extreme flexibility of German command and control organs in response to the changing operational conditions.

Armeegruppe Guderian’s Advance across the Sozh River and the Krichev Encirclement, 8–14 August

Amidst this flurry of strategic decision-making, beginning on 8 August, when his forces advanced southward across the Sozh River, the operations by Guderian’s Second Panzer Group became the catalyst for both the Stavka’s and Hitler’s subsequent strategic decision-making. The destruction of the Western Front’s Group Kachalov (28th Army) did not solve all of the problems on Guderian’s southern wing. After capturing Roslavl’, Guderian slowly replaced the divisions of Vietinghoff’s XXXXVI Motorized Corps, which were defending the El’nia bridgehead on his left wing, with infantry from General of Infantry Walter Schroth’s XX Army Corps. By doing so, by 7 August Vietinghoff was able to withdraw 10th Panzer and SS “Das Reich” Motorized Divisions into reserve west of El’nia, replacing them in the bridgehead with XX Corps’ 15th and 268th Infantry Divisions and part of 292nd Infantry Division. However, the local attacks Rakutin’s 24th Army launched against the bridgehead during the following week forced Guderian to retain the two divisions as backup for the bridgehead’s defenses.

During the same period, while Guderian rested and refitted 3rd and 4th Panzer and 10th Motorized Divisions of Geyr’s XXIV Motorized Corps in assembly areas west of Roslavl’, in stages, he moved Geyer’s IX and Fahrmbacher’s VII Army Corps into positions along the Desna River east of and south of Roslavl’. At the same time, 18th Panzer and 29th Motorized Divisions of Lemelsen’s XXXXVII Motorized Corps also rested and refitted south of Smolensk, while the corps’ 17th Panzer Division clung to defenses southeast of Smolensk, fending off attacks by Rokossovsky’s Group Iartsevo.

However, before Guderian could undertake any further operations in any direction, he had to secure his left flank along the Sozh River east and west of Krichev, where the remnants of Central Front’s 13th and 4th Armies were firmly dug in. By this time, XIII and XII Army Corps of Weichs’ Second Army had defeated all attempts by the Soviet 21st Army to recapture Bykhov and were manning positions from the Dnepr River eastward to the Sozh and northeastward along the Sozh on Guderian’s right flank. The remainder of Weichs’ army, LIII and XXXXIII Army Corps, were west of the Dnepr River south of Rogachev, ready to cross the river and begin a concerted assault on Gomel’, which Weichs had repeatedly postponed, first, for lack of forces, and then for inclement weather, poor roads, a shortage of ammunition, and possibly for a lack of nerve.

Thus, by the end of the first week in August, Guderian was in position to strike southward across the Sozh River in concert with a general assault by Weichs’ Second Army into the Rogachev and Gomel’ regions. In this sense, while a continuation of his battle at Roslavl’, Guderian’s attack on Krichev coincided with and reinforced Weichs’ larger operation to seize Rogachev and Gomel’. Most important, these operations satisfied the spirit and requirement of Führer Directive No. 34 that Hitler had issued on 30 July. Specifically, as the battle for Roslavl’ indicated, a further advance to the south satisfied three of the directives’ key requirements. First, it promised to eliminate large Red Army forces threatening Army Group Center’s right wing. Second, as at Roslavl’, the maneuver of large panzer forces seemed to take advantage of acute Soviet vulnerabilities and, accordingly, produce heavy Red Army losses. Third, and most important, such a strategy avoided the strongest concentrations of Red Army forces, specifically, the armies the Stavka deployed in depth along the Moscow axis and, by doing so, avoided the heavy German casualties which were likely if Bock’s army group drove head-on toward Moscow.

Guderian began implementing Hitler’s Directive No. 34 shortly after dawn on 8 August when Model’s 3rd and Langermann’s 4th Panzer Divisions of Geyr’s XXIV Motorized Corps struck southward across the Sozh River between Roslavl’ and Krichev. With 78th and 197th Infantry Divisions of Fahrmbacher’s VII Army Corps protecting Geyr’s left flank and the same corps’ 7th Infantry Division covering the motorized corps’ right flank, Löper’s 10th Motorized Division marched in the two panzer divisions’ wake. The concerted German attack collapsed the fragile defenses on the right wing and in the center of Golubev’s 13th Army and subsequently produced almost a week of heavy fighting, during which the defending 13th Army was virtually demolished.

See Map 61. Armeegruppe Guderian’s attack across the Sozh River, 8 August 1941.

The Stavka, anticipating just such a move, had created the new Reserve Front on 30 July in order to strengthen the defenses on the left wing of the Western Main Direction Command. In fact, during the ten days before Guderian’s new attack, Stalin had also shaken up the Central Front’s command cadre in the hope that such a measure would improve its defensive capabilities. Therefore, on 26 July he had replaced Gerasimenko as commander of 13th Army with Major General Konstantin Dmitrievich Golubev. The latter had commanded Western Front’s 10th Army during the border battles, when he had earned the dictator’s praise by orchestrating the ambitious but failed counterstroke at Grodno and later escaping from the Minsk encirclement. Then, on 7 August he had relieved the front’s commander, General F. I. Kuznetsov, and replaced him with General Efremov, the former commander of the front’s 21st Army. At the same time, he replaced Efremov with Lieutenant General Vasilii Mikhailovich Gordov, 21st Army’s chief of staff. The dictator also considered Golubev, Efremov, and Gordov as proven “fighters.” At the same time, Stalin also reiterated the Central Front’s critical mission, which was to protect the junction between the Southwestern Front and Reserve and Western Fronts and assist Zhukov’s and Timoshenko’s fronts by conducting active operations northwestward along the Gomel’ and Bobruisk axes to weaken Army Group Center’s thrust toward Smolensk.