See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix O, 16.

With planning complete, in accordance with Timoshenko’s instructions, during the pre-dawn hours of 17 August, the Western Front’s attacking armies reported their readiness status for the offensive. For example, Konev’s 19th Army, whose planning seemed far more efficient than that of his neighbors, sent his morning operational summary, which confirmed his shock groups had reached their jumping-off positions, to the Western Front’s headquarters promptly at 0500 hours. The report also provided some information concerning combat losses on both sides during this critical period and the fighting to seize jumping-off positions and also demonstrated division commanders were heeding the “advice” to place their CPs closer to the fighting troops:

• General Situation – 19th Army’s forces occupied their jumping-off positions and prepared to fulfill our Order No. 028 overnight on 16-17 August.
♦ 166th RD – fortifying the positions it occupies and prepared to fulfill assigned missions by 2000 hours on 16 August against an inactive enemy. The division’s losses on 15 August were 15 enlisted men killed and 33 wounded and 2 horses killed. During the seizure of jumping-off positions in the grove west of Bitiagovo, we captured 72 37mm shells, 30 37mm mines, 18 81mm shells, 6 75mm shells, 15 hand grenades, 2,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, and 6 greatcoats. CP – the grove 1.5 kilometers northeast of Shushlovo.
♦ 91st RD – preparing to fulfill its assigned missions, with 613th and 561st RR occupying their previous positions and 503rd RR reaching the southern edge of the grove at Dura at 2400 hours on 16 August. CP – the brush 500 meters northeast of Bukhvalova.
♦ 50th RD – arriving in its jumping-off positions but still moving at 2400 hours. CP – the woods 1 kilometer northeast of Bobrovitsa.
♦ 89th RD – regrouping after nightfall, while handing its sector on the right to 49th RR and on the left to 288th RR. Losses on 16 August were 2 enlisted men killed and 19 wounded. CP – the ravine 500 meters west of Novoselki.
♦ 64th RD – moving into its jumping-off positions.
♦ 101st TD – now reaching its designated line.
• Communications – working, but with interruptions due to breaks in the wire caused by moving forces.
• Road Conditions--satisfactory.26

After the Western Front received readiness reports from its subordinate armies, on the eve of the offensive, it provided the Stavka and General Staff with details about its dispositions in an operational summary issued at 0800 hours on 17 August.

See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix O, 18.

• General Situation – unchanged on the front’s right wing, with desultory rifle, machine gun, and artillery fire and raids by reconnaissance scouts along the front, in the center the forces are continuing to regroup and are reaching their jumping-off positions, and the offensive by 20th Army on the left wing is developing slowly against stubborn enemy resistance.
• 22nd Army – positions are unchanged.
• 29th Army –defending their existing positions and preparing to attack.
• 30th Army – occupying its jumping-off positions but no news about the arrival of 45th CD.
• 19th Army – occupied jumping-off positions for the attack in accordance with Order No. 01/op, with its divisions situated as follows:
♦ 166th RD – along the Shupenki, Shestaki 2, Zaria, Priglovo, Zanino 1, and Zaovrazh’e front and ready to attack with its left wing.
♦ 91st RD – the Gorbatovskaia and Shuklino front.
♦ 50th RD – the Shuklino and Dubrovka front.
♦ 89th RD – the Dubrovka and Novyi Riadnyi front.
♦ 64th RD – the Novyi Riadnyi front.
♦ 101st TD – the Kurganovo and Manchina front.
♦ Losses on 16 August – 17 killed and 52 wounded.
• 16th Army – after regrouping, the forces are fortifying the eastern bank of the Vop’ River against an inactive enemy as follows:
♦ 38th RD – the Lake Ozerishche and Marker 169.9 sector.
♦ 108th RD – the Marker 169.9 and Buianovo sector.
♦ Army headquarters – the woods 1 kilometer northeast of Khotenova.
• 20th Army – fighting in the positions it occupies, while repelling enemy counterattacks from the Chuvakhi region, and, overnight on 16-17 August, we withdrew 5 guns, 13 trucks, 2 boxes of explosives, 2 field kitchens, and 3 carts [transports] from the western bank of the Dnepr River.
• VVS of the Front – cooperating with ground forces and conducting reconnaissance in the second half of the day on 16 August, with 108 aircraft sorties, including 78 fighter, 31 bomber, and 9 assault, which dropped 44 FAB-100, 104 FAB-50, 2 ZAB-50, 25 AO-25, 64 AO-15, and 440 ZAB-1 bombs, 94 KS ampoules, and 25,800 ShKAS and 5,030 ShVAK.
♦ 43rd MAD – bombed enemy troop concentrations in the Vasil’evo, Mit’kovo, and Pnevo regions and enemy troop columns along the Pochinok-El’nia road, protected marches by our motor-mechanized columns in the Pan’tiukhi region, and conducted reconnaissance for 20th Army, with a total of 31 aircraft sorties.
♦ 47th MAD – destroyed enemy motor-mechanized units and artillery in the Dukhovshchina region and along the road to Iartsevo and conducted reconnaissance in the Dukhovshchina and Smolensk region, with a total of 38 aircraft sorties.
♦ 46th MAD – conducted repeated raids against enemy infantry and artillery in the Shelepy and Shanino region, with 4 aircraft sorties.
♦ 31st MAD – attacked enemy forces in the Tserkovishche region, bombed fuel warehouses in Danchenko, and conducted reconnaissance in the sector of 22nd Army, with 35 aircraft sorties.
♦ Enemy losses – 1 He-111 and 1 Ju-88 shot down.
♦ Our losses – 1 I-16 aircraft shot down by antiaircraft fire but landed on our territory and 1 LAGG-3 aircraft and 4 IL-2 aircraft failed to return to their airfields, of which 3 were forced to land in their own territory with undetermined damage, and 1 IL-2 has not been found.27

Thus, by dawn on 17 August, the Western Front’s shock groups were either in or nearing their jumping off positions. Either way, the steady movement of Guderian’s and Weichs’ forces southward toward Gomel’ made it essential for Timoshenko to launch his offensive on schedule. Although Maslennikov’s 29th Army was supposed to participate in the offensive, for many reasons, the most important of which were associated with movement and concentration and the late arrival of 246th Rifle Division into its assembly area, his army would not join the effort in a major way until 19 August. Until then, Timoshenko relied on the northern and southern shock groups to do their deadly work

The Western Front’s southern shock group, consisting of 91st, 50th, 89th, and 64th Rifle and 101st Tank Divisions of Konev’s 19th Army, concentrated in attack positions on a roughly 15-kilometer-front extending from the eastern bank of the Vop’ River east of Prisel’e northward along the river to Pechenichino. The army’s 166th Rifle Division, which deployed on its extended right wing northward to Markovo, was to conduct a supporting attack toward Morevo, on the division’s left wing roughly 6 kilometers north of Losevo. The five divisions of Konev’s shock group faced the German 161st Infantry Division, which was commanded by Lieutenant General Hermann Wilck, whose 336th, 364th, and 371st Regiments were deployed in a single echelon on the left wing of General Walter Heitz’s VIII Army Corps. The remaining two divisions of VIII Corps, 28th and 8th Infantry, defended the corps’ center and right wing in the sector extending from the right boundary of 161st Division, just north of Iartsevo, southward along the western banks of the Vop’ and Dnepr Rivers to the vicinity of the famous Ratchino crossing.

The 166th Rifle Division, on 19th Army’s right wing, faced 5th Infantry Division of General Ruoff’s V Army Corps. Commanded by General of Infantry Karl Allmendinger, 5th Infantry’s 14th, 56th, and 75th Regiments defended the 14-kilometer-wide sector extending from east of Losevo northward to Markovo. It was backed up by the single tank and two grenadier battalions of 900th Motorized Lehr (Training) Brigade and General of Infantry Walther Fischer von Weikersthal’s 35th Infantry Division, which was assembled in reserve positions in the rear. Elements of 900th Motorized Brigade were already supporting the forward infantry regiments, and the remainder of this brigade, as well as the entire 35th Infantry Division, would be inserted on 5th Infantry Division’s left wing once the Soviet offensive began.

The Western Front’s northern shock group, which consisted of 242nd, 251st, and 162nd Rifle Divisions of Khomenko’s 30th Army, backed up by the army’s 107th Tank and 45th Cavalry Divisions, deployed on the left wing and in the center of 30th Army’s sector, was poised to strike and penetrate the Germans’ defenses along the 15-kilometer-wide front extending from Markovo northwestward to Novyi Morokhovo. These forces faced German V Army Corps’ 106th Infantry Division, which was commanded by General of Infantry Ernst Dehner and consisted of 239th, 240th, and 241st Regiments. On Khomenko’s long right flank, one regiment of 242nd Rifle Division defended the sector from Novoe Morokhovo westward to Orlovo, 5 kilometers east of the Belyi-Dukhovshchina road, and 250th Rifle Division defended positions stretching 15 kilometers northeastward along the Belyi road between the villages of Zyki and Lukino. The 250th Division faced the bulk of V Army Corps’ 129th Infantry Division, whose forces were defending a salient jutting northward to Frolovo and Lukino.

Thus, Timoshenko’s two shock groups were able to concentrate each of their divisions on attack frontages of roughly 2-3 kilometers. This enabled both Konev and Khomenko to establish local superiorities of between 5 and 8 to 1 in infantry and slightly less in artillery. However, the Germans retained air superiority and, counting the supporting 900th Motorized Brigade, rough parity in armor. However, although the OKH had just dispatched LVII Motorized Corps and 19th and 20th Panzer Divisions northwestward to operate in the Velikie Luki region and XXXIX Motorized Corps’ 12th Panzer and 18th and 20th Motorized Divisions to support Army Group North’s Sixteenth Army, German Ninth Army still retained General Funck’s 7th Panzer Division in operational reserve northeast of Smolensk. Funck’s division numbered roughly 100 tanks, with 70-80 operational on any given day.

The German infantry divisions defending against Timoshenko’s shock groups operated in sectors 15-18 kilometers wide in the case of 8th, 28th, 161st, and 106th Infantry Divisions, 8 kilometers wide for 5th and 35th Infantry Divisions, but only after the latter was committed to action, and over 30 kilometers wide for 129th Infantry Division. As such, the German divisions normally defended with all three regiments forward, backed up by battalion-size tactical reserves at regimental level and company-size reserves at battalion level. Therefore, the forward defenses amounted to company and platoon strongpoints strung out across the front, with gaps between these strongpoints supposedly protected by pre-planned and on-call interlocking artillery and mortar fire. The most durable elements of these defenses were strongpoints anchored in and around villages, whose defenses were interlaced with bunkers and communications trenches. Coupled with the vaunted German air support, these strongpoints often proved to be hard nuts to crack.

See Map 77. The situation on Ninth Army s “Eastern Front” late on 17 August 1941.

Timoshenko’s Offensive, 17-19 August

17 August

Several hours after dawn on 17 August, Zhukov’s and Khomenko’s armies unleashed their offensives. After Soviet artillery pounded German defenses for 60 minutes and Red Army aircraft followed to deliver several waves of bombing strikes and strafing runs, led by sappers who cut through the tangled web of obstacles to their front, battalion-size assault groups from the first echelon regiments of 19th Army’s five assaulting divisions moved forward in waves. The infantry, supported by 76mm regimental guns, pulled forward by hand by their crews, struck the forward line of scattered German security patrols. As the security forces withdrew as best they could, the waves of infantry moved forward, if possible through gaps between German strongpoints. Where no gaps existed, the infantry simply rose with a collective “hurrah” and rushed the German positions with fixed bayonets. As German machine guns raked the advancing ranks of infantry, mortar rounds began erupting midst the rows of grey-clad infantry as they advanced. Where lead battalions faltered under the steadily intensifying fire, new battalions appeared, whose massed ranks simply passed through their decimated comrades to keep the momentum of the advance moving forward. Where the withering fire did its most deadly work, the advance simply halted as the surviving infantry went to ground. Where the advance succeeded, the multiple ranks of infantry, now turned by shellfire into clumps and individual groups of men, pushed forward in between the strongpoints and their bunkers, as if seeking some sort of respite from the incessant fire.

In some sectors, the combination of resolute infantry, supported by creeping barrages and occasional Red Air Force fighter strikes, overcame the German defenses, killing or wounding the defenders and forcing the survivors to seek refuge in new trenches to the rear. As they did, the commanders of the lead regiment ordered their second echelon and reserve battalions to advance, and, further to the rear, the division commanders committed their second echelon regiments into the fight. The results were predictable. Where German defenses were stout and their artillery and mortar fires effectively coordinated, the “hurrahs” of the assaulting troops faded once the advance faltered. Where the defenses proved weak or the men defending them less resolute, the advancing Soviet infantry and assault guns tore gaping holes, which even reserves could not repair.

The same pattern repeated itself along the front of Khomenko’s 30th Army, but with one important exception. Here, not all of the forces managed to reach their jumping-off positions before the attack order was issued. Unwilling to mar what was supposed to be a coordinated offensive, Khomenko simply ordered his forces to attack as they reached their jumping-off positions. As a result, the forces that did so shortly after 1000 hours reaped the reward of surprise. Those that did not were condemned to pay the price of attacking the forewarned, with predictably mixed results. As for Maslennikov’s 29th Army, it participated in the first wave of assaults by attacking the defenses of German 106th Infantry Division along the Western Dvina River north of Il’ino.