Hitler’s Changing Strategy (Directives Nos. 33 and 34)
Two weeks after Operation Barbarossa began, Hitler and Halder shared a rare degree of unanimity, if not euphoria, over the Wehrmacht’s spectacular performance, to the extent of even believing the war in the East was already won. However, as early as 3 July, Hitler began displaying signs of anxiety over the vulnerability of his treasured panzer units, first, because they were far outpacing their infantry support, and, second, because he had difficulty deciding where to direct them once the first phase of the campaign was over. Since this crucial decision would likely determine the future course of the war, it was the most important and toughest one Hitler would have to make.1 Hitler’s decision only made the German High Command more anxious to have Bock “finish the Russian armed forces….” and “open the road to Moscow.”2
Although Bock was trying hard at Smolensk to replicate his victories at Belostok and Minsk, and was doing so without a noticeable pause, by mid-July it was clear that the Smolensk encirclement, even if it succeeded, would take far longer than the Belostok and Minsk operations. Hitler waited impatiently, taking out his growing frustration on Brauchitsch and Halder during their weekly joint strategy conferences. As he discussed his dilemma with his aides, he simply could not make up his mind whether to pursue strictly military objectives, such as the destruction of the Red Army’s forces, or political or economic objectives, such as obliterating the enticing symbols of Soviet power like Leningrad and Moscow, or seizing the grain and oil of the Ukraine and Caucasus, respectively.3 In the end, by seeking to reach a synthesis between military, political, and economic objectives, Hitler issued, altered, and reissued half a dozen directives and orders during the five-week period from mid-July through late August. His actions led Halder to complain bitterly that the Führer was meddling in matters he simply did not understand.4
Hitler and the entire chain of command were also disappointed by the Wehrmacht’s failure to encircle and destroy the Soviet 27th and 22nd Armies at Nevel’ and much of 13th and 4th Armies at Mogilev. Coupled with Bock’s inability to shut the trap tightly around Soviet forces at Smolensk, the slow pace of operations on both flanks, which permitted large Red Army concentrations to escape capture, bothered Halder, the chief of staff, depressed Brauchitsch, the Army commander, and made Hitler both nervous and angry despite Halder’s counseling that great successes in the field must be allowed to develop in their own good time.5 Only Bock was relatively unconcerned about the failure at Nevel’ because it was peripheral to Army Group Center’s focus on Smolensk and because he was more concerned with the possible loss of his armor to Army Groups North and South, which would adversely affect his ability to march on Moscow.
Hitler and the OKH began altering their strategy for conducting the next phase of the campaign during the second half of July, largely as a result of the stronger than expected Soviet resistance around Smolensk. Führer Directive No. 33 dated 19 July, announced, “The penetration of the Stalin Line along the entire front and the panzer groups’ further deep advance to the east has completed the second offensive in the East,” and ordered the Wehrmacht, “to prevent large enemy forces from escaping into the depths of Russian territory and annihilate them.”6 Entitled “The Further Conduct of the War in the East,” the directive admitted, “Army Group Center requires a considerable time to liquidate the strong enemy groups, which continue to remain between our mobile formations,” and, in particular, “The Kiev fortifications and the Soviet 5th Army’s operations on our rear have inhibited active operations and free maneuver on Army Group South’s northern flank.”
The directive then established the Wehrmacht’s objectives during of the next phase of the campaign (emphasis added).
| • | Army Group South’s immediate mission is to destroy the enemy’s 12th and 6th Armies by “a concentrated offensive west of the Dnepr River” and “prevent them from withdrawing beyond the river.” In addition, it is “to destroy the Soviet 5th Army by means of a closely coordinated offensive by the forces on Army Group Center’s southern flank and Army Group South’s northern flank.” As Army Group Center turns infantry divisions to the south, simultaneously, it is to commit fresh, primarily mobile forces into combat after they complete their previous missions, are re-supplied, and their flanks along the Moscow axis are protected. These forces will prevent Russian forces, which have crossed to the Dnepr River’s eastern bank, from withdrawing farther East, and destroy them; |
| • | Army Group Center, after destroying the numerous encircled enemy units and resolving its supply problems, is to sever communications between Moscow and Leningrad and protect the right flank of Army Group North’s advance to Leningrad with mobile formations not taking part in the advance to the southeast, while continuing its offensive toward Moscow with its infantry formations; and |
| • | Army Group North is to continue its offensive toward Leningrad as soon as Eighteenth Army reestablishes contact with Fourth Panzer Group and its Sixteenth Army can reliably protect its eastern flank. Simultaneously, it will capture the naval bases in Estonia, prevent Soviet forces operating in Estonia from withdrawing to Leningrad, and capture the islands in the Baltic Sea as rapidly as possible.7 |
In effect, although the directive authorized Bock to resume his advance on Moscow with his infantry, its actual effect was to halt Bock’s advance on the Soviet capital until its neighboring army groups eliminated the threats to its flanks. The unstated assumption was that, once these flank problems were resolved, Bock would require little more than his infantry and a portion of his panzers to seize the Soviet capital. In the interim, the bulk of his panzer forces were to join Leeb’s drive on Leningrad and Rundstedt’s pincer movement against Kiev. When all was said and done, however, the directive, which reflected Halder’s concept all along, might also reflect Hitler’s testimony to the fiercer than anticipated Soviet resistance at and around Smolensk and an open admission that, in light of this resistance, an immediate offensive against Moscow was not yet feasible.
At his command center in East Prussia, Hitler was surrounded by men of his own choosing and was actually living in a surreal world of isolation. Those in this “inner circle,” who exercised influence over the Wehrmacht’s command and control to varying degrees, included Göring, (Luftwaffe chief), Keitel (OKW chief), Jodl (OKW chief of operations), Major General Rudolf Schmundt (his Wehrmacht adjutant [aide]), Major Gerhard Engel (his army adjutant), Major Nicolaus von Below (his Luftwaffe adjutant), Navy Captain Karl-Jesko von Puttkammer (his naval adjutant), Major Willy Deyhle (Jodl’s adjutant), Luftwaffe General Karl Bodenschatz (Göring’s liaison to the Führer), and Oberstleutnant Eckhard Christian (Liaison to WFSt).8 On Monday, 21 July, however, Hitler managed to escape briefly from this protective cocoon by making his first round of visits to the army groups in the East. After visiting Leeb on 21 July, he followed with a visit to Bock on 4 August and Rundstedt two days later.9 However, as Hitler exercised ever-increasing influence over tactical operations, his visit to Army Group North was of special import.
The Führer arrived at Malnava airfield at 0615 hours on 21 July in a big Junkers aircraft with an identical backup aircraft protected by two Luftwaffe fighters. Accompanied by Keitel and a small retinue, including SS bodyguards and newsreel and press photographers, Hitler drove the half mile to Leeb’s nearby command post in two special four-wheel-drive staff cars and three limousines, which Hitler’s staff had sent ahead the almost 660 kilometers from Rastenburg by road. According to observers, when he arrived at the gardening school serving as Leeb’s command post, the pale and nervous-looking Hitler wore a light tan raincoat over his self-designed field-gray uniform.10
Briefing Hitler on the situation, but without informing him of the Soviet breakout at Nevel’, Leeb reported that Busch’s Sixteenth Army was already turning north against Leningrad, its next target, and that he would continue his main drive toward Leningrad with Hoepner’s Fourth Panzer Group as soon as Busch’s infantry caught up with the panzers. After adding that he intended to clear Estonia with a portion of Küchler’s Eighteenth Army and seize the Baltic Sea Islands of Saarema (ösel) and Hiiuma (Dagö), Leeb reviewed his past operations, heaping special praise on his infantry divisions for overcoming the severe terrain and weather conditions. Although Hitler listened in silence to Leeb’s description of the enemy situation and supply problems, he appeared preoccupied with thoughts about what to do next and was dissatisfied with the situation in the army group, which he said had failed to concentrate anywhere and “does everything wrong.”11
In fact, Hitler was expecting the Red Army to collapse by the end of August and believed the capture of Leningrad would be the key to that collapse. In this regard, the Führer considered it essential to cut the Moscow-Leningrad rail line to deprive the Soviets of the ability of shifting forces from Moscow to Leningrad. Obviously Hitler was once again thinking of turning Hoth’s Third Panzer Group toward the northeast so its panzers could advance through the Valdai Hills and cut the Moscow-Leningrad railroad line at Vyshnii Volochek, which, in turn, would assist the advance of Leeb’s army group on Leningrad.
However, as Hitler described it, the problem rested in Bock’s army group and its objective, Moscow, since, “Bock’s forces were still tied up for several days,” closing the ring around the Smolensk pocket. Hitler explained the critical decision would have to be made within five days whether or not to turn Hoth’s panzer group away from Moscow and to the northeast. If this course of action was taken, Guderian’s Second Panzer Group should turn toward the southeast, and Army Group Center should be left for its drive on Moscow with only the infantry armies, an option that did not bother the Führer, “since Moscow is only a geographic objective.”12 Only after Leeb pointed out the necessity for an early decision, since it would effect the deployment of Sixteenth Army south of Lake Il’men’, did Hitler ask to be shown an operations map.
Although Hitler informed Leeb of the specifics of Directive No. 33, no one as yet had begun to implement the order. On the one hand, Halder suspected Keitel of having urged Hitler to have Hoth move to the northeast. On the other hand, Halder, and Bock as well, had long decided Moscow should be the main objective and sending Hoth to assist Leeb would be tantamount to giving up Moscow as a serious objective since infantry alone could not perform that task. In any case, the divergent opinions were once again out in the open since Halder had monitored the conference through his personal representative Colonel Reinhold Gehlen.13
As late as 16 December 1940, Hitler had reminisced about his original concept, lamenting he had not assigned sufficient forces to Army Group North from the very beginning, and, although he realized this fact, he had been unable to make a change. Had he assigned Hoth’s panzer group to Army Group North earlier, the enemy’s forces south of Lake Ladoga would have been weaker, Leningrad would have been easily encircled, and Leeb could have linked up with the Finns.14
On the day of his departure from Leeb’s headquarters, Hitler rudely declined to share breakfast with Leeb’s staff, even though they were already waiting for him in the officers’ mess. Descending the stairs from the briefing room, ominously, Hitler related how Voroshilov executed an army commander and ten of his staff for evacuating the Baltic States. All the while, SS officers watchfully guarded his aircraft and the headquarters building. Hitler’s plane took off from Malnava at 1130 hours. Left behind was a special SS courier, who had been instructed to report immediately to the Führer when Leningrad had fallen. After ten days had passed, and Leningrad was still in Soviet hands, the SS aide was recalled.
Perhaps inspired by what he heard from Leeb, on 23 July Hitler issued a supplement to his Directive No. 33, which reiterated his intent to capture Leningrad before marching on Moscow and assigned Hoth’s panzer group to Leeb’s so that Army Group North could do so.15 Otherwise, the supplement simply amplified the more general concepts sketched out in the previous directive (emphasis added):
| • | Army Group South must finally defeat and completely annihilate the enemy still located west of the Dnepr. As soon as the operational situation and logistical support permits, First and Second Panzer Groups, subordinate to Fourth Panzer Army’s headquarters [a new command to be established under Rundstedt], with the infantry and mountain infantry divisions following them, are to attack across the Don River into the Caucasus after capturing the Khar’kov industrial region. The priority mission of the main mass of infantry divisions is the capture of the Ukraine, the Crimea, and the territory of the Russian Federation to the Don. When that is accomplished, Rumanian forces will be entrusted with occupation administration of the regions southwest of the Bug River; |
| • | After the situation improves in the Smolensk region and on its southern flank, Army Group Center must defeat the enemy located between Smolensk and Moscow with sufficiently powerful infantry formations from both of its armies and advance with its left flank as far as possible to the east and capture Moscow. Temporarily assign Third Panzer Group to Army Group North to support the latter’s right flank and encircle the enemy in the Leningrad region. To fulfill the subsequent missions – the advance to the Volga – my intention is to return Third Panzer Group’s mobile formations to their former subordination [but not Second Panzer Group]; |
| • | After received control of Third Panzer Group, Army Group North will be capable of allocating large infantry forces for the advance on Leningrad, thus avoiding the expenditure of mobile formations on frontal attacks in difficult terrain. Enemy forces still operating in Estonia must be destroyed. While doing so, it is necessary to prevent their transport by ship and penetration through Narva toward Leningrad. After fulfilling its missions, Third Panzer Group must once again be transferred to Army Group Center’s control; |
| • | Subsequently, as soon as conditions permit, the OKH will withdraw part of Army Group North’s forces, including Fourth Panzer Group, and also part of Army Group South’ s infantry force, to the Homeland. While doing so, the combat readiness of Third Panzer Group must be fully restored at the expense of transferring equipment and personnel to it from Fourth Panzer Group. If necessary, First and Second Panzer Groups must accomplish their missions by combining their formations [still under Army Group South].16 |
Although the implications of Directive No. 33 and its supplement were as problematic for Bock as the battle of Smolensk itself, more ominously, in addition to an offensive toward Kiev, the directives also raised the specter of an enticing but extremely ambitious invasion of the Don and Volga areas and the still distant oil rich Caucasus region.17.
Although intense fighting raged across Army Group Center’s entire sector during the second half of July, particularly along the Nevel’, Smolensk, and Sozh River axes, the battles that took place along its southern flank lasted longer, covered a far greater area, and would be far more decisive than those on its northern flank. For example, during the entire northeastern drive by Hoth’s panzer group and Strauss’s Ninth Army from across the Western Dvina River on 10 July to the Velikie Luki and Iartsevo line at month’s end, their front increased only from 165 kilometers to roughly 180 kilometers wide. On the other hand, Guderian’s Second Panzer Group and Weichs’s Second Army, which had three motorized and seven infantry corps to Hoth’s and Strauss’s two motorized and four infantry corps, began their operations along a front roughly 267 kilometers wide on 10 July but were operating across a more than 417 kilometers-wide front at month’s end.18 In addition, during this period Hoth’s and Strauss’s forces failed to close the Nevel’ encirclement, while Guderian’s and Weichs’ forces liquidated the Mogilev and Roslavl’ pockets. In recognition of this reality, on 27 July Bock removed the panzer groups from Kluge’s control, by doing so eliminating a headquarters he considered a nuisance and unnecessary link in his chain of command.19
By late July both Hitler and the OKW were increasingly aware of the vast scope of their undertaking, and, for several reasons, it was clear to them, while still strong, the Wehrmacht was no longer capable of conducting simultaneous full-scale offensive operations along the Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev strategic axes as called for by Plan Barbarossa. First, despite their enormously successful initial advances, by late July the army groups had outrun their fragile logistical support structure and lacked essential supplies. For example, Second Panzer Group’s embattled bridgehead over the Desna River at El’nia was 720 kilometers from the nearest German railhead, poor roads made it difficult for wheeled vehicles, let alone foot infantry, to keep pace with the dwindling number of tanks in the spearheads – the infantry was running short of boots – and now Army quartermasters indicated that winter clothing was available in only limited quantities.
But Hitler was reluctant to send more tanks and major items to the front because he wanted to retain them to form new panzer divisions and refit existing ones after the campaign season ended. Moreover, on 14 July he had increased the production of submarines and new model tanks at the expense of supplying the armies in the field. Illustrating the extent of Hitler’s micro-management, senior commanders had to plead with the Führer to release a mere 350 replacement engines for Mark III tanks during a conference at Army Group Center headquarters on 4 August.20 Compounding these logistical difficulties, German casualties were mounting without adequate replacements. For example, the three German army groups suffered 213, 301 casualties by 31 July, but received only 47,000 replacements.21 As a result, the OKH declared a halt on 30 July so that Army Group Center could rest and refit.
Third, and perhaps most depressing to the German leadership, although the Red Army had suffered enormous losses, rather than collapsing as expected, its resistance became fiercer and more intense by the day. As a result, while the army groups’ advance slowed, it became increasingly difficult to close the gaps between them without adversely affecting their ability to accomplish their primary missions.
Although not all German leaders saw the situation so clearly and pessimistically, many sought clearer guidance as to how to bring the war to a quick conclusion. Even Hitler grumbled that, had he known that Guderian’s prewar Soviet tank strength figures were so accurate, he might not have started the war.22 The solution Hitler and many of his senior commanders chose was to surround and destroy bypassed Soviet forces to prevent their cadres from escaping to fight another day. However, younger commanders like Guderian and von Manstein opposed this policy because it slowed their exploitation and allowed the enemy to reconstruct his defenses after each breakthrough. All of this had provided context for Hitler’s decision to issue a new directive to his Wehrmacht in the East
As Hitler and his senior commanders pondered how to resolve their strategic dilemma, quite naturally they focused on Guderian’s recent success south of Smolensk. In short, within the context of obvious strategic realities and Hitler’s preoccupation with economic objectives, Guderian’s successful counterstroke at Roslavl’, which so easily eliminated the threat to Smolensk from the south, underscored the increased feasibility of a German advance to the south against the northern flank of Soviet forces defending Kiev. By exploiting a perceived “soft spot” in the Soviets’ strategic defenses south of Smolensk, Guderian’s panzers could eliminate the stubborn Southwestern Front, seize Kiev, and open the way for a subsequent advance into the Donets Basin (Donbas), later, even the Caucasus region. At the same time, by eliminating the threat to Army Group Center’s southern flank, it could also clear the way for a more leisurely and less costly advance on Moscow from the west and southwest.
Based on these considerations, on 30 July Hitler issued Directive No. 34, which temporarily postponed “the fulfillment of the aims and missions described in Directive No. 33 and its addendum,” because of, “the course of events in recent days, the appearance of large enemy forces before the front, the supply situation, and the necessity of giving the Second and Third Panzer Groups 10 days to restore and refill their formations.”23 In logical progression from his previous directives, this one halted Bock’s drive on Moscow and directed the Wehrmacht’s armored strength toward Leningrad and Kiev (emphasis added):
| • | Army Group North will continue the offensive toward Leningrad by making the main attack between Lake Il’men’ and the Narva River to encircle Leningrad and establish contact with the Finnish Army. Limit this offensive to the Volkhov sector north of Lake Il’men’ and south of this lake, continue the advance as deeply to the northeast as required to protect the right flank of forces attacking north of Lake Il’men’. Restore the situation in the Velikie Luki region beforehand. Transfer all forces not employed in the offensive south of Lake Il’men’ to the forces attacking on the northern flank. Do not begin Third Panzer Groups’ planned offensive toward the Valdai Hills until fully restoring its combat readiness and the readiness of its panzer formations. Instead, the forces on Army Group Center’s left flank must advance northeastward to such a depth as will be sufficient to protect Army Group North’s right flank. Eighteenth Army’s priority mission is to clear all enemy forces from Estonia, after which its divisions can begin to advance toward Leningrad; |
| • | Army Group Center will go on the defense by employing the most favorable terrain in its sector. Occupy favorable jumping-off positions for conducting subsequent offensive operations against the Soviet 21st Army and conduct limited objective offensive operations to this end. A soon as the situation permits, withdraw Second and Third Panzer Groups from combat and quickly refill and refit them; |
| • | For the time being, Army Group South will continue operations in the southern sector of the front with only its own forces to destroy the large enemy forces west of the Dnepr and create conditions for the subsequent crossing of First Panzer Group to the eastern bank of the Dnepr by seizing bridgeheads at and south of Kiev. Draw the Soviet 5th Army, which is operating in the swampy region northwest of Kiev, into combat west of the Dnepr River and destroy it. Prevent this army from penetrating northward across the Pripiat River.24 |
In effect, because of the increased Soviet resistance along the Moscow axis, Hitler decided the Wehrmacht needed to pause before refocusing its main effort against Leningrad in the north and Kiev and the Ukraine in the south. To that end, he ordered Bock to cease his attacks toward Moscow, withdraw his panzer groups for rest and refitting, and then transfer them temporarily to Army Groups North and South. According to an OKH journal entry:
Thus, the enemy was granted a month’s time to dig into an organized defense west of Moscow while simultaneously repelling an offensive conducted with insufficient forces in August. At the same time, in the last analysis, he achieved what was very important for him. He destroyed the unity of our forces by constant threats to their flanks. Simultaneously, he succeeded in eliminating the immediate threat to Moscow for several weeks and, by doing so, achieved a great political success.25
Since the magnitude of the Soviets’ defensive success at Smolensk was not yet apparent to senior German commanders at this point, they made little mention of it in their memoirs. However, in reality, Blitzkrieg’s momentum was slipping away not only because of the German High Command’s indecision but also because of the Red Army’s stubborn resistance. By contrast, its limited victories around Smolensk raised the Red Army’s morale and provided precious time for Timoshenko and the Stavka to organize the defense of Moscow. Sadly, however, neither took advantage of the opportunity. Instead, inspired by its partial successes in July, and urged on by an ever belligerent Zhukov, Stalin ordered his Red Army to conduct an even more ambitious counteroffensive in the Smolensk region during August and early September.
Early on 4 August, Hitler flew to Borisov to personally congratulate Bock on his historic victory at Smolensk and on 6 August met with Rundstedt, both meetings taking place within the context of Rundstedt’s success during the Battle at Uman’.26 While the total bag of prisoners captured at Uman’ was only one third of those captured at Smolensk, it was still far higher than managed by Leeb. As the numbers added up, at high noon on 6 August, with considerable fanfare, four “Special Bulletins” [Sondermeldungen] announced the totals to an astounded world, for the first time, also revealing the names of the army group, army, panzer group, and Luftwaffe commanders on the Eastern Front.27 Special Bulletin no. 4 listed the cumulative totals of 895,000 prisoners and 13,145 tanks, 10,388 guns and 9,082 aircraft destroyed or captured, about double the figure of 400,000 prisoners, 7,615 tanks, 4,443 guns and 6,233 aircraft released on 11 July. Although he did not announce it, Hitler estimated the Red Army had already lost three million men killed in action.28 In Hitler’s words, certain of final victory, the Wehrmacht now stood ready to continue the deadly struggle in a new operational phase.
However, Hitler’s heart did not reflect this overwhelming public display of confidence. For example, during his preliminary visits in advance of Hitler’s arrival, Keitel described the Führer as extremely nervous. Hitler had admitted to his inner circle he was enduring sleepless nights while trying to determine the true status of Operation Barbarossa. On the one hand, the Wehrmacht’s territorial gains and the Red Army’s estimated casualties of three million soldiers killed and close to one million captured during the first six weeks of the war were as overwhelming as they were incomprehensible.29 Combined with the Soviets’ enormous material losses, these losses should have indicated the Red Army was no longer capable of undertaking large-scale coordinated attacks. On the other hand, they were still resisting and doing so relentlessly and repeatedly by attacking across the entire front. Understandably, then, Hitler wanted to hear first-hand about the status of his armor, primarily from the panzer group commanders themselves, because it was these groups that would carry the fight deep into the Soviet Union in accordance with his modified campaign plan.
In this regard, Hitler heard mostly what he wanted to hear. While Guderian promised to rehabilitate 50 percent of his armor by 15 August, Hoth promised 60 percent by 20 August, but both only if they received necessary new tank engines. In turn, Hitler promised to withdraw their divisions from the front beginning 10 August, release 350 engines (one month’s production), and ship them east by air. Ironically, the OKH had already released these engines, half the amount the panzer groups actually needed, without Hitler’s consent or prior knowledge.30 Even so, Guderian’s and Hoth’s estimates were wildly over-optimistic since both panzer groups had been reduced to the strength of a corps, corps to divisions, and divisions to regiments. As a result, even Guderian was reluctant to commit his panzer divisions into combat singly for fear of losing them. In addition, the Special Bulletins did not mention German casualties, which by 31 July had risen to 213,301, including 8,126 officers and 205,175 enlisted men.31 Also, proportionally more had come from the panzer forces that had seen much of the fighting.
While Hitler did not mention these losses to his generals, he also did not discuss his deeper concerns with them.32 These included his hope Japan would recognize its “hour of destiny” by supporting the German offensive with one of its own in the Far East, a hope which was not being fulfilled in time to influence Operation Barbarossa. In addition, he was troubled enough by the threat posed by the United State’s occupation of Iceland to order his U-boats to withdraw from those waters to avoid confrontation and possible war with the U.S. before the war with the Soviet Union was over. When asking himself the core questions, “How much time will it take to finish the war with Russia?” and “How much time do I have?” Hitler could find no clear answer. Thus, it was essential to produce that collapse at the earliest possible time. Ominously, the OKH had already begun assembling and storing winter clothing for Russia on its own.33
Thus, the period encompassing the second half of July and early August was one of the war’s rare moments when its cascading course seemed to halt ever so briefly, when there was momentary freedom of action, and when decisions affecting its outcome could still be made. For almost the first time in his life, Hitler did not know what to do. Nor did his frenetic visits to the field to find a solution provide any respite. As a result, he issued, amended, cancelled, and reissued an unending string of directives, none of which was executed the way he intended, in part due to opposition from within the OKH and his army groups and in part because of Soviet actions. Reflecting this indecision, Directive No. 33 (19 July) required Army Group Center to advance on Moscow with its infantry, a supplement to this directive (23 July) assigned Guderian’s Second Panzer Group to Army Group South permanently and Hoth’s Third Panzer Group to Army Group North temporarily, and Directive no. 34 (30 July) halted Army Group Center’s offensive and withdrew the panzer groups for rest and refitting. Finally, when Soviet attacks continued interfering with the execution of these directives, after further debates with his senior generals, on 12 August Hitler capped this flood of conflicting orders by issuing a supplement to Directive No. 34, which required his three army groups to attack jointly with their inner wings at Velikie Luki and Gomel’.
All of these directives and amendments led inexorably to Hitler’s decision to postpone his advance on Moscow and instead conduct a major envelopment operation against Soviet forces in the Kiev region. Thinking consistently in economic rather than military terms throughout this entire period, Hitler’s inner “compass” pointed in the direction of a new sequence of priority objectives, beginning with Leningrad, followed closely by Khar’kov and the Donbas in the eastern Ukraine, and only lastly toward Moscow. At least this was the impression Hitler left on Bock’s headquarters and the OKH on 4 August. However, still hedging his bets, Hitler informed Bock he was also considering a concentrated but limited attack from Army Group Center’s easternmost salient at El’nia, a course Guderian and Hoth were recommending.34 A delighted Bock assured him such an assault could be decisive because it would smash the Soviets’ last defensive concentration and open the way to Moscow.
Despite all of these burning strategic issues, most of the decisions made at the 4 August conference regarded strictly tactical and organizational matters directly related to the situation on the ground, such as at Velikie Luki, on Bock’s left flank, El’nia in his center, and along the Sozh River from Roslavl’ to Gomel’ on his right flank because these were the pressure points vexing both Hitler and Bock. In a broader sense, although Hitler’s many directives were unequivocal, they were not binding because virtually the entire Army leadership and even Jodl’s and the OKW’s Operations Staff resisted them. As a result, the OHK implemented only his order to bomb Moscow, this with only meager tactical results.35 When all was said and done, while all of these changing directives reflected disagreements between Hitler, the OKH, and his field commanders as well as the Red Army’s surprisingly tough and unrelenting resistance, most importantly, they indicated Hitler’s quandary regarding the future course of operations.36
The Destruction of Group Kachalov, 31 July–6 August
During the waning stages of Bock’s battle to reduce the Smolensk pocket and Weichs’ struggle to liquidate the Mogilev pocket, XXXXVI and XXIV Motorized Corps of Guderian’s Second Panzer Group began perceptively “tilting” Army Group Center’s main effort southward to deal with one of the most dangerous threats to the ongoing operations against the Smolensk pocket. The strongest operational group that Timoshenko had created to participate in his counteroffensive toward Smolensk, Group Kachalov, which was formed from Kachalov’s 28th Army, began its offensive from the Roslavl’ region, 110 kilometers south of Smolensk and east of the Sozh River, northward toward Rudnia, Pochinok, and Smolensk early on 23 July. At the time Kachalov’s group consisted of 145th and 149th Rifle Divisions, attacking northward astride the Roslavl’-Smolensk road, with Colonel V. G. Burkov’s 104th Tank Division on their right flank east of the road, and 222nd Rifle Division, which Kachalov left west of Roslavl’ to protect his group’s left flank. At this time, Burkov’s division fielded 42 KV and T-34 tanks.
See Map 21.
Initially, Kachalov’s assaulting tanks and infantry struck “Grossdeutschland” Motorized Regiment and a kampfgruppe from Nehring’s 18th Panzer Division, both of which were protecting the open right flank of Vietinghoff’s XXXXVI Motorized Corps as it advanced toward El’nia, and slowly drove the German forces northward through Rudnia toward Pochinok. Although Nehring conducted his withdrawal skillfully, Kachalov’s forces threatened to envelop both of his flanks as well as the forward positions of Vietinghoff’s corps at El’nia from the south. Bock had no choice but to reinforce the threatened sector with IX Army Corps’ 263rd and 292nd Infantry Divisions, which moved into positions at Monastyrishche, adjacent to 18th Panzer Division’s right flank.
Largely due to the ineffectiveness of Kachalov’s forces, in particular their tendency to conduct costly frontal attacks and their inability to employ armor en masse and provide the infantry with adequate artillery support, the combined weak kampfgruppen of IX Army Corps and 18th Panzer Division managed to halt Kachalov’s advance and even recaptured Rudnia at day’s end on 27 July. However, they were too weak to drive the Soviets back toward Roslavl’ since Nehring had to regroup his division northeastward to El’nia to help 10th Panzer Division repel Timoshenko’s repeated heavy assaults there. Frustrated by Kachalov’s inability to capture Pochinok, much less the crossings over the Khmara River, on 29 July the Stavka ordered him to bring 21st Mountain and 52nd Cavalry Divisions forward from 28th Army’s reserve to protect his left flank west of Roslavl’ and reorganize to renew his attacks. Thereafter, a brief lull ensued south of Smolensk as Bock and the OKH searched for a way to deal with Kachalov’s force, the most obvious of which was to assign the task to Geyr’s XXIV Motorized Corps.
See Map 29.
After consulting with the OKH, Bock decided to resolve the “Kachalov problem” once and for all by unleashing Guderian’s southernmost motorized corps, Geyr’s XXIV Motorized, in an all-out assault to capture Roslavl’, an important road junction and communications center in Kachalov’s immediate rear, and then encircle and destroy Kachalov’s pesky force. Guderian briefed Bock on his planned offensive at Borisov on 27 July, in the presence of Brauchitsch, where he received a go-ahead from his commander to prepare and conduct the operation.
By this time, the OKH had elevated Guderian’s panzer group to the status of a full army group [Armeegruppe Guderian] and had withdrawn the shrunken headquarters of Kluge’s Fourth Army to Mogilev. Concurrently, the OKH also reassigned Hoth’s panzer group from Fourth Panzer Group to Strauss’s Ninth Army, but on 5 August Hoth assumed overall command of both forces when Strauss fell ill. With these changes, once again Bock found himself dealing directly with his armies without Kluge’s interference. To strengthen Guderian’s army group so that it could hold firm to Smolensk and El’nia, while, at the same time, attack toward Roslavl’ and rehabilitate some of his armor, Bock assigned Guderian seven infantry divisions, including XX Army Corps’ 15th and 268th Infantry Divisions to employ in the El’nia sector and VII Army Corps’ 7th, 23rd, 78th, and 197th Infantry Divisions to use along the Sozh River front.37
See Map 24.
The prospective battlefield around Roslavl’ stretched 130 kilometers from the Krichev region along the Sozh River eastward to the Desna River and roughly 56 kilometers from Pochinok southward to Roslavl’. The city of Roslavl’ itself was 65 kilometers beyond the Germans’ front lines, little more than a day’s march, at the crossroads of the Mogilev-Briansk and the so-called Moscow shosse [main highway], which led from Bobruisk through Rogachev, Krichev, and Roslavl’ to Moscow. Guderian assigned Geyr’s XXIV Motorized Corps the twin missions of protecting his army group’s right flank at Krichev against Soviet attacks from the Gomel’ region with 10th Motorized and 7th Infantry Division and attacking northeastward toward Roslavl’ with 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions. The two panzer divisions were to link up with IX Army Corps’s 292nd, 263rd, and 197th Infantry Divisions, which were to attack southward from the Pochinok region toward Roslavl’.38 At the same time, VII Army Corps’ 7th, 23rd, and 78th Infantry Divisions were to follow XXIV Motorized Corps’ advance and join the fighting from its left flank to fill in the gap between the panzer divisions and IX Army Corps’ infantry, thereby completing the encirclement ring. Although fairly simple in concept, this operation was fraught with danger since Guderian conducted it at the height of Timoshenko’s counterstrokes against El’nia, where, on 30 July alone, the Germans turned back 13 assaults. The operation was also threatened by potential attacks against its flanks, however, only if Timoshenko could react quickly enough.
See Map 24.
Kachalov was decidedly unhappy with his army’s slow progress during the first six days of its offensive and chided his subordinates on their poor performance, particularly the commanders of his rifle divisions. Timoshenko agreed. Despite issuing numerous orders to correct these obvious deficiencies, at the Stavka’s instigation, at 2200 hours on 1 August, hours after Guderian’s panzers began their assault from the west, the front commander sent a blistering rebuke to Kachalov:
See Volume 3 (Documents), Appendix K, 1.
In spite of the clear superiority of your group in tanks and artillery during the initial period of the operation, you have not achieved decisive success because you have incorrectly appreciated the tactics of the enemy, who are operating before you with separate detachments, while skillfully maneuvering equipment and raids by tanks and aircraft.
You need to destroy the enemy’s strong points with strong groupings of infantry in cooperation with tanks and artillery. Your tanks are operating in isolation, and the majority of your artillery is operating at a great distance. The infantry is operating without adequate supporting artillery and tanks.
[Therefore] I order [you to]:
1. Decisively continue the offensive with the immediate mission to capture the Pochinok region. Assign the cavalry the mission of reaching the enemy’s rear from behind your flank.
2. Employ the tank division in close cooperation with the infantry with obligatory strong artillery support.
3. Use the artillery as antitank guns and infantry support groups in the division’s systems of combat formations.
4. Destroy the enemy with destroyer detachments of infantry in skillful and decisive night operations.39
Geyr’s two panzer divisions began their assault early on 1 August, followed the next day by IX Army Corps’ infantry divisions. In both instances, Guderian personally led his forces because he thought it necessary to encourage the infantry since neither of his corps was experienced in conducting joint armor-infantry operations with air support. The initial assault by Kühn’s 3rd and Langermann’s 4th Panzer Divisions immediately tore a gaping hole through the defenses of 13th Army’s 8th and 148th Rifle Divisions on Kachalov’s left flank, through which the armor and infantry then poured in a veritable flood. Once through Kachalov’s defenses, the two panzer divisions wheeled eastward along the Roslavl’ road, 3rd Panzer Division occupying blocking positions along the Krichev-Roslavl’ road and 4th Panzer Division heading straight for Roslavl’, while VII Army Corps’ 197th, 23rd, and 78th Infantry Divisions marched eastward along the same road. The assault overran 21st and 52nd Cavalry Divisions’ defenses, splitting them apart and forcing them to withdraw in disorder in separate directions, and turned 222nd Rifle Division’s left flank. As VII Army Corps’ infantry advanced on Roslavl’ from the west, driving the riflemen before them in disorder, IX Army Corps’ 137th, 292nd, and 263rd Infantry Divisions began their thrust to the south, turning both flanks of Group Kachalov.
See Map 46. Armeegruppe Guderian’s assault, 1 August 1941.